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PANEL ON THE RESPONSES TO THE RECENT
TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE U.S.
Anne F. Bayefsky
The war on terrorism has a fundamental flaw, which puts its success
directly at risk. It is the unwillingness to espouse publicly, a definition of
terrorism, and hence to separate morally, politically and legally, terrorists
from non-terrorists. It is not possible to win this war unless we recognize
the enemy, are prepared to define a terrorist, and follow that lead wherever
it goes, without discrimination.
Over the past two months the path has been impeded by smokescreens
and subterfuge. Two months-because the current rhetorical battle took off
from Durban, South Africa at the United Nations World Conference
Against Racism, which ended just three days before the bombing of the
World Trade Center. Durban was a conference in which Syrian and
Pakistani diplomats took a leading role, with the vocal support in particular
of the Palestinian delegation, Iran, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.
They hijacked the agenda, isolated Israel, and forced the United States
delegation to walk out. But in so doing, they also clarified their intentions.
In Durban, delegates remaining after the US and Israeli departure,
discussed in public sessions whether the Holocaust had a capital "H" or an
"s" on the end. Iran objected to the imbalance and favoritism which would
result from adding a reference to Holocaust. The United Arab Emirates
thought references to the Holocaust detracted from the accurate
representation of historical events. In the end the global declaration
against racism deleted all references to the Holocaust but one, which
reminded us of its occurrence.
Durban delegates discussed the meaning of antiSemitism and whether
it was appropriate to include it in a final anti-racism agenda. Syria called
it a "curious and bizarre concept." Pakistan called it "a difficult area."
All references to antiSemitism in paragraphs relating to political parties,
legal and judicial cooperation, education and training, were eventually
removed. Only two references were ultimately permitted, as equivalent to
"Anti-Arabism" or "Islamophobia."
Visiting Professor, Columbia University School of Law. These remarks were
presented at the International Law Association ILA Weekend, October 2001, New York, New
York, United States.
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The political assault on Israel in Durban began with "Zionism is
racism," and metastasized into Israel as an apartheid state. Both were
specifically approved by the NGO Forum, in which the words of
Palestinian Hanan Ashrawi drew parallels between Israelis and Nazis. In
the government conference, Egypt complained that occupation "implants
people who are of a different religion and that breeds racism,"
"Judaization" in United Nations Human Rights Commission lingo. Since
separation from Palestinians was "apartheid," intermingling of Moslem
and Jew was evidently acceptable as long as it was not on Arab soil. In the
end, the Durban Declaration declared a new "right to return to their
homes" designed to terminate the Jewishness of Israel, and placed the
"plight of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation" into a global
commitment to fight racism.
On September the 8th, therefore, the political strategy was clear. One
and the same states sought to minimise or exclude references to the
Holocaust, and redefine or ignore antiSemitism, as sought to isolate the
state of Israel from the global community as a racist practitioner of
apartheid and crimes against humanity. The vestiges of Jewish victimhood
were to be systematically removed by deleting the references to
antiSemitism and the Holocaust. They were to be displaced by the
Palestinian victim living under racist, Nazi-like, oppression. Success on
the political battlefield was to be accomplished by utilizing the language of
human rights to demonize, and then dismember, the opponent. In sum,
every "antiSemitism" was matched with "anti-Arabism." Every objection
to singling out Israel was met with cries of "Islamophobia." Every Jewish
tragedy was met with Palestinian grievance.
Post September 1lth, the strategy of Arab states and many Moslems
in and outside the United States, is exactly the same. From Jordan's King,
Egypt's President, Iran's Ayattolah Khamenei, and Saudi Arabia's Prince
Bandar, comes: combating terrorism means looking for root causes.
American support for Israel is at fault. Dozens of Islamic leaders in the
Arab world tell us that a war against terrorism is a racist response against
Islam. From the purveyors of hate on the Internet, the Jews in the World
Trade Center all escaped, and Palestinian celebrations were media
concoctions. According to demonstrators in many Arab states, the true
victim is the Palestinian, not the dead beneath the rubble. From France's
Ambassador to Israel and Palestinians themselves, Jewish children in pizza
parlours or teenagers in Tel Aviv discotheques are different. In sum, the
goal is to eclipse the dead in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington by
the victims of anti-Arabism in the United States and elsewhere. A war
against terrorism is Islamophobia. The root causes of terrorism reveal the
true victim to be the Palestinian.
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The United Nations continues to serve as a staging ground for this
inversion of terrorist and victim. In the recent General Assembly debate
on terrorism, Libya, on behalf of the Arab Group, said: "[R]esistance to
occupation is one of the most important obligations, not only legitimate
rights, for people whose lands are occupied by the foreigners.
... Occupation must be on the top of the terrorists acts that the world should
decide to confront and eliminate." Many Arab delegations, including the
Iranian and Saudis, denounced an alleged new wave of Islamophobia and
bigotry against Muslims and Arabs, called for the international community
to "address terrorism at its roots," and objected to criticism of "resistance
to foreign occupation and state terrorism."
The insistence by Arab states on differentiating between violence
directed at Israelis and all other forms of terrorism, and exempting
violence in the name of self-determination or against foreign occupation, is
also scheduled to come to a head shortly in the General Assembly's Sixth
Committee. The definition of terrorism will be a determinative factor in
the adoption of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. At
the same time, the election of Syria to the Security Council means a state
sponsor of terrorism will now be a major player in the operation of the
Committee of the Whole charged with implementing Security Council
directives to combat terrorism.
In this environment, refusing to define a terrorist is no longer an
option for the Administration. The failure to clearly state that Israelis are
the victims of terrorism, and vocally support their entitlement to self-
defence, will blow apart the existing coalition just as surely as the
deafening silence.
Some thought the President could have it both ways. Moslem
participation in the fight against terrorism on the one hand, and rewards
for Arafat in the form of promises of statehood and pressure on Israel to
negotiate in the face of violence, on the other. To many, the two tracks
seemed eminently complimentary. Keep Moslem states inside by keeping
Israel on the outside.
The plan, as could have been anticipated, is disintegrating as we
speak. Moslem states will not be satisfied with what has been offered so
far, since what they seek is the total isolation of Israel. Israel cannot
afford to be marginalized in a war against the very terrorism that threatens
to destroy it. The rest of us risk losing our way in the absence of a
coherent purpose. State sponsors of terrorism or foreign terrorist
organizations are not reliable allies in a fight against terrorism, whatever
their religion. The victims of terrorism will not be silenced, just as they
are also not defined by race, religion or nationality.
2002]
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At bottom, Americans continue to underestimate the sense of
vulnerability in Israel and the gravity of the threat. It is a threat felt by
five million Jews in a region of over 100 million people in surrounding
hostile states, living in 28,000 square kilometers or 0.2% of the land
occupied by the Arab world. At the same time, the assassination of a
cabinet Minister in any democracy is impossible to ignore. Such facts
make an Israeli Prime Minister, regardless of political party, unable to
stand by.
The essential rules which govern a war on terrorism are those of
proportionality. Those who would instead define ally or foe alike by
religion-be they Moslem or Jew-will doom the current campaign to
failure and ultimately irrelevance, as the passions of racism triumphant in
Durban will take over.
TRANSNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE
POLITICS OF SHAME
James N. Rosenau"
Since my work on world affairs is sensitive to the legal dimensions of
the course of events, it is an especial pleasure to participate for the first
time in a meeting of the International Law Association. But I must note at
the outset that I am somewhat illiterate in the both the practice and study of
international law. My sensitivity to the relevance of the legal context that
infuses any international situation has never superseded my preoccupation
with other dimensions of such situations. Hence my illiteracy stems from
always locating questions of law in more encompassing political, social,
and economic contexts. Such is the case with this panel. The questions
we shall address are essentially political questions, or at least my
comments on them will perforce focus on other than their legal aspects.
Indeed, my main message largely involves epistemology and
methodology, the need to be clear what we mean by certain terms and to
approach their implications in a cautious and nuanced way. With the
world undergoing powerful challenges marked by huge uncertainties,
pervasive contradictions, and endless ambiguities, it is not easy to trace
nuance. It is easier to yield to the temptation to come up with clear-cut
and simple solutions rather than to extend ourselves to avoid falling into a
wide rage of definitional and epistemological traps.
Perhaps the most dangerous trap involves what I call the "domestic
analogy": The tendency to think about the problem of accountability at the
international level as if we had domestic processes in mind. Even if one
accepts that a sharp distinction can be drawn between the domestic and
international worlds-as I do not-the procedures that allow for
accountability in domestic systems cannot be developed in an international
context. Or at least the practice of holding elected officials and
administrations responsible for what happens on their watch cannot be
duplicated in international settings. The reasons are numerous.
International organizations are run by states that are not accountable to
Professor of Law, George Washington University. This paper was prepared for the
Opening Panel of the Annual Meeting of the American Branch of the International Law
Association, New York, New York, October 25, 2001.
1. See JAMES N. ROSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIC-FOREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORING
GOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT WORLD (1997).
354 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:353
their domestic publics for how they vote because such votes are not
politically salient. NGOs and transnational advocacy groups are not
accountable to their memberships in any meaningful way. In some their
leaders may be elected by their memberships, but this form of
accountability is rare and it is ineffective in those rare cases when it is
operative. Corporations are accountable to their stockholders, but they
usually manage to prevent dissident stockholders from having any
consequence. In short, elections in which individual citizens or members
have any say in what transnational collectivities do or plan are either
nonexistent or superficial. Accordingly, it is far-fetched to ponder how
accountability can be achieved through the domestic methods that allow for
the ouster of old leaderships and the election of new ones. The traditional
definition of democratic practice simply does not apply in the case of
transnational and international collectivities.
Does this mean that transnational accountability cannot be achieved?
No, it does not if one can break free of the stranglehold that the domestic
analogy has on our thinking. There are mechanisms for maximizing rather
than minimizing accountability beyond domestic boundaries. They may
not be adequate from a domestic perspective, but they can be more rather
than less effective if different criteria of effectiveness are employed.
A second mistake to avoid is that of focusing on radical rather than
practical changes. There is no reason to believe that proposals to replace
the IMF and World Bank, or to enlarge the membership of the UN
Security Council, or to create a .third house of the United Nations that
represents civil society-to mention just some of the radical proposals that
have been bandied about-can ever be realized. To borrow a social
science concept, the course of global affairs, like that of any large
organization or society, is too path dependent, too habituated to set ways of
getting from one day to the next, to undertake radical changes of course.
As noted below, however, there is a host of less encompassing and more
practical steps that can be taken to enhance the transparency and
responsiveness of the prevailing international architecture.
A third trap to avoid is that of aspiring to one instrument of
accountability suitable to all situations. The world is too diverse, its
dependent pathways too numerous and too pervaded with contradictions,
for any single mechanism to be sufficient.
But, despite the diversity, and notwithstanding the deeply entrenched
pathways in which the course of events are ensconced, there are
mechanisms for enhancing the accountability of the present international
architecture. Some of these are linked to the continuing disaggregation of
world affairs. My view of the current scene is one in which traditional
centers of authority are breaking down and new ones proliferating, with
Rosenau
the result that the global stage is ever more dense with both governmental
and nongovernmental collectivities that enjoy sufficient legitimacy with
their followers to act on their behalf.2 More than that, the advent of the
Internet and other micro-electronic technologies have facilitated extensive
networking among NGOs. There is strength and accountability in the
complexity of this surfeit of ever-proliferating transnational actors and
their networks. Their growing numbers make it increasingly difficult for
any one actor, or any coalition of actors, to act imperiously and without
being held to account. To be sure, the density of the global stage renders
the chances of wide consensus's in response to the challenges of our time
highly problematic. But muddling through in the absence of broad
consensus's is not a bad price to pay for greater accountability.
Put differently, the pathways on which the world is dependent have
undergone a major bifurcation. There are now two worlds of world
politics: the state-centric world that has presided over global structures for
centuries and what I call the multi-centric world, which encompasses the
wide range of new actors that have clambered onto the global stage and
that have the authority to challenge, cooperate, or otherwise interact with
the state-centric world and its institutions. Some analysts refer to the state-
centric world's new rival as civil society, but I prefer to view it as a multi-
centric world in order to allow for a diversity that includes corporations,
professional societies, and other entities as well as the advocacy groups
that are usually viewed as the core of civil society. Indeed, using the letter
"n" to represent any number, one can say that the emergent structure of
bifurcation is best labeled as an "nfurcation" of world politics.
But this is not to downplay the relevance of advocacy groups. The
boisterous politics of shame they practice through their recurrent protests
against international financial institutions (IFs) is not without
consequence. They have succeeded in elevating the rich-poor gap and the
pervasiveness of poverty to a perch high on the global agenda. There is
more than a little evidence that their messages are being heard in corporate
boardrooms- and the halls of governments. It is not far-fetched to
anticipate that the accountability and transparency of IFIs will be
considerably expanded in the coming years through the publication of their
board minutes, country-assistance strategies, letters of intent, internal
evaluations, and other documentary evidence of their decisions and actions.
Conceivably, too, the politics of shame will contribute to bargaining that
results in more seats for developing countries on the IFI boards and the
2. The notion of proliferating authority centers is elaborated in JAMES N. ROSENAU,
DISTANT PRoxiMmEs: DYNAMICS BEYOND GLOBALIZATION (forthcoming Princeton Univ.
Press).
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establishment of think tanks to provide independent analyses and advice to
the boards.
Needless to say, the politics of shame is not dependent on recourse to
violent protests. On the contrary, the shaming messages get overridden
and lost when protests turn violent.
Of course, there are other mechanisms besides that of publicity
through shaming protests. Shame can take the form of publishing statistics
such as the annual corruption index released by Transparency International
(TI). Quiet pressures can also be effective. Rather than sponsor mass
protests, for example, TI devotes most of its resources and energies to
negotiating with the elites that preside over IFIs and other international
institutions rather than mobilizing mass publics.,
If time permitted, one could list a number of other mechanisms for
furthering accountability without reliance on the domestic analogy. Most
of these involve working with international organizations and national
governments to promote further disaggregation, thus bringing transnational
decisions closer to the people and publics affected by them. And it is with
respect to these mechanisms that the legal profession has a huge role to
play inasmuch as treaties and public policies will have to be rewritten to
achieve desirable levels of decentralization. But elaborating these
mechanisms will take me beyond my allotted time. And having already
indicated that my legal competencies are limited, that is just as well. For
now it is enough to stress that while the storehoise of potentially effective
accountability mechanisms may not be overflowing, it is full.4 And there is
no dearth of able individuals and organizations, including my colleagues on
the panel and in the audience, committed to enumerating, analyzing, and
implementing them.
3. Cf. Hongying Wang and James N. Rosenau, Transparency International and
Corruption as an Issue of Global Governance, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 25 (Jan. 2001).
4. See, e.g., Report on the 2020 Global Architecture Conference, Centre for Global
Studies at the University of Victoria (Aug. 29-31, 2001).
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I. INTERPOL MISUSE-A CASE STUDY: KAZAKHSTAN
A. De jure
The limits imposed on member states are explicitly set forth in Article
III of the ICPO-Interpol Constitution and General Regulations. Thus, it is
strictly forbidden for the organization to undertake any intervention or
activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character. According
to the interpretation given to Article III, a political offense is one that is
considered to be of a predominantly political nature because of the
surrounding circumstances and underlying motives, even if the offense
itself is covered by ordinary criminal law in the country in which it is
committed. This interpretation, based on the predominant aspects of the
offense, was first mentioned in a resolution adopted by the Interpol
General Assembly in 1951. A resolution adopted in 1984 states that, in
Charles R. Both is a founding senior partner in the law firm Yablonski, Both &
Edelman, located in Washington, D.C. Since early 1998 he has been representing Hon. Azekhan
M. Kazhegeldin the former Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, the Chairman of the Republican Party
of Kazakhstan and the leading opposition leader in Kazakhstan. These remarks were presented at
the International Law Association ILA Weekend, October 2001, New York, New York, United
States.
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general, offenses are not considered to be political when they are
committed outside a "conflict area," and when the victims are not
connected with the aims or objectives pursued by the offenders.
B. De facto
The principles seem sound, but how do they work in reality? What if
a member state abuses Article III and seeks to use the organization in
pursuit of its own authoritarian objectives? What if that member state
repeatedly invokes Interpol's apparatus but fails to carry forward its
obligation to obtain extradition of the detainee? That is precisely the case
that we describe here in relation to the actions of the repressive
Nazarbayev regime in Kazakhstan during 1999 and 2000, as it sought to
interfere and disrupt the political opposition and criminalize the activities
of the leading opposition figure, former Prime Minister Akezhan
Kazhegeldin.
II. BACKGROUND
In early October 1998, Kazhegeldin participated in an organizational
meeting of the "Movement for Free Elections" in anticipation of
presidential elections to be scheduled in Kazakhstan. Kazhegeldin had
emerged as the most viable opposition candidate to challenge incumbent
president Nazarbayev, the holdover president from the Soviet era.
Kazhegeldin was charged with an administrative violation for
participation in the activities of an "unregistered organization." He was
convicted while away from the country, i.e., in absentia, and subsequently
"disqualified" as a result of that conviction from becoming a candidate for
the office of president. Prior to his "disqualification," but in an effort to
discredit and intimidate him, Kazhegeldin was accused of income tax
evasion, abuse of office (bribe taking), illegal ownership of property
outside of the country (specifically real estate in Belgium), and other
economic crimes. Each accusation was rebutted and disproved by
Kazhegeldin with specific evidence, and at considerable expense. The
international community, including OSCE, the United States Department
of State, and numerous human rights organizations, uniformly criticized
the eventual "reelection" of President Nazarbayev.
Following the elections, Kazhegeldin continued his efforts to
reform the political and economic conditions in Kazakhstan by supporting
efforts to create an independent media, establishing an opposition political
party (Republican Peoples Party of Kazakhstan "RPPK"), and criticizing
the Nazarbayev regime outside of the country before various governmental
forums.
2002]
III. DETENTION IN MOSCOW-SEPTEMBER 1999
In May 1999, Kazhegeldin testified before the United States Congress
concerning conditions in Kazakhstan and was particularly critical of the
Nazarbayev regime. Shortly after his hearing before Congress, the Kazakh
authorities "reopened" the "tax investigation" that had been previously
closed upon a determination that all taxes had been paid and no criminal
activity had occurred in connection with the payments.
In early summer 1999, the Kazakhstan Security Police ("KNB"), the
successor to the KGB, requested Interpol to issue a Red Alert for the arrest
and extradition of Kazhegeldin. The purported reasons for his detainment
were the 1997 tax charge against Kazhegeldin and the allegations of
misconduct with respect to property he allegedly owned in Belgium.'
While traveling to Russia to meet with political activists and members
of the RPPK who were organizing for Parliamentary Elections in
Kazakhstan, Kazhegeldin was temporarily detained by Russian police
authorities on the basis of the Interpol Red Alert. When the General
Prosecutor of Kazakhstan was unable to provide sufficient evidence to
support an arrest or extradition, Kazhegeldin was released. According to
the contemporaneous press accounts, the Russian General Prosecutors
Office studied the charges brought against Kazhegeldin and came to the
conclusion that the detention was not substantiated. By this action,
however, he was prevented from meeting with his political supporters and
from exercising rights guaranteed to him under the United Nations
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
IV. DETENTION IN ROME-JULY 2000
Again, in July 2000, while he traveling to Rome to pursue political
activities directed at advancing democracy and a free press in Kazakhstan,
Kazhegeldin was detained by Italian authorities on the basis of an Interpol
1. These are the same allegations that first arose during Kazhegeldin's effort to run for
president in 1998. In May 1999, Professor A. I. Khudyakov, a leading authority on Kazakh Tax
Law, who was directly involved in drafting the law, rendered an unqualified legal opinion that
"the criminal proceedings [against Kazhegeldin] were initiated without sufficient grounds." All
of the relevant facts concerning the handling of Kazhegeldin's receipt of income and payment of
his taxes, albeit late, of his taxes made clear that the requisite intent to avoid payment was
absent. Indeed, on October 16, 1998, the Almaty Tax Committee confirmed that Kazhegeldin
had not engaged in any criminal activity with respect to the payment of his taxes. Likewise, the
persistent allegations concerning the ownership of property in Belgium were repeatedly
disproved, first by submission of certified land records showing the absence of any ownership of
property by Kazhegeldin and, ultimately, by securing a Court decision in the Dutch Court
establishing that Kazhegeldin never owned the property or corporation that the Kazakh authorities
alleged he did. Ironically, Nazarbayev's close political advisor and business partner owned the
property in Belgium.
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alert issued at the request of Kazakhstan KNB. The request was based on
the same previously rejected allegations and a "new," equally frivolous,
allegation that Kazhegeldin was engaged in "terrorism." Again, the
Kazakhstan General Prosecutor was not able to justify the arrest and
extradition of Kazhegeldin. The Justice Ministry announced that the Rome
Appeals Court had ordered Kazhegeldin's release from preventative
detention after concluding that there were no grounds to detain him.
V. AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONALLY REPUGNANT
TRIAL INABSENIA
In March 2001, Nazarbayev signed a most pernicious law permitting
the trial and conviction of Kazakh citizens "in absentia." This new law is
regionally known as the "Kazhegeldin Amendments" and has been
employed to obtain a conviction "in absentia" of former Prime Minister
Kazhegeldin of the very same charges that have been leveled against him
since 1998 when he challenged Nazarbayev for the presidency.2 The
conviction was assailed as particularly unfair by the OSCE whose
representatives in Kazakhstan personally observed the "trial." The
conviction was also the subject of a formal demarch issued by the United
States Department of State. The Nazarbayev regime, yet again, has used
this false "conviction" as the basis for requesting that Interpol use its
apparatus to detain Kazhegeldin as an enemy of the state. The obvious
objective of the request is to stifle dissent and to interfere with the political
rights of the Kazakhstan opposition.
VI. A SOLUTION
The adage that "every dog is entitled to one bite" seems apt. Here,
the authoritarian Nazarbayev regime has now demonstrably had "two"
bites. No matter how vicious or rabid its attempts have proven to be, on
both occasions it has been unprepared to present justification or credible
basis for the obvious interference with protected political activities of the
opposition within the country. Having twice acted in direct contravention
of Article III's prohibitions against use of the organization to interfere with
"predominantly political" activities, Kazakhstan police authorities should
2. Recognizing that it had on at least two prior occasions failed to convince a legitimate
and objective "trier of fact" (e.g., Russian and Italian authorities, among others) that the charges
were justified or credible, the Nazarbayev regime now tried Kazhegeldin not for taking bribes,
but rather for soliciting them. Of course, those who testified against him and claimed to have
made the bribes were close supporters of the regime, in fear of the own status in the country, or
persons with motives to fabricate the charges. The court sitting in judgment of Kazhegeldin was
comprised of a single Supreme Court judge who had been personally appointed by Nazarbayev
and was related to him. His judgment is not appealable.
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not be permitted to use the organization's apparatus. Kazakhstan should
first establish, in a competent and credible forum, that the request is not a
further violation of Interpol's constitution and regulations. In these
circumstances Interpol, or some judicial authority outside of the member
state, should make an initial determination that the request is legitimate.
The burden should then shift to the member state seeking use of the
organizations apparatus to explain, justify, and establish credible basis for
a detention.
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND
THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Elizabeth Defeis"
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was enacted in 1976
and provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in
the federal courts.'
Until 1952 the United States, as a matter of grace and comity, granted
foreign sovereigns "virtually absolute immunity" from the suit in the
courts of this country. 2 The judicial branch consistently deferred to the
decisions of the political branches-in particular, those of the Executive
Branch-on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign
sovereigns and their instrumentalities.
In the first half of the twentieth century, as the commercial and
trading activities increased, the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity
gained international acceptance. Under this approach, immunity is
confined to the sovereign or public acts of the foreign state and does not
extend to its commercial or private acts. The Department of State, through
its famous Tate Letter3, embraced the restrictive theory of immunity in
1952. Thereafter, the State Department continued to advise courts on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether to extend immunity. If in a
particular case no advice was forthcoming, then the courts would
independently determine whether immunity was appropriate. By enacting
the FSIA in 1976, Congress substantially codified the restrictive theory of
Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. The professor would like to
thank her research assistant, Cemile Angun, Class of 2003. These remarks were presented at the
International Law Association ILA Weekend, October 2001, New York, New York, United
States.
1. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentina Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d. Cir. 1987) cert. granted, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988) rev'd 488 U.S.
428 (1989).
2. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). Later, the notion of
Comity was defined as "recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
3. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Dep't. of State, to Acting Attorney
General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEPT. ST. BULL., Jan. 7, 1952, at 984-85.
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sovereign immunity.' FSIA effectively transferred the determination of the
immunity question from the Executive Branch to the Judicial Branch.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides that foreign
sovereigns are immune from the jurisdiction of the United States courts
except under limited stated circumstances.' In order to bring a suit against
a foreign sovereign, the case has to be brought within one of the exceptions
enumerated in the Act. The relevant exceptions for the human rights
analysis are:
1. Waiver of immunity by the foreign state either explicitly
or by implication;'
2. Commercial activity exception in which the foreign state
carries on commercial activity in the United States or the
activity carried on outside of the United States territory
that has direct effect on the United States;8
These comments will first discuss the efforts that have been made to
address the human rights violations using the argument that a foreign
government waives its immunity by engaging in actions that amount to a
violation of jus cogens principles. It will then discuss the various
amendments and proposed amendments to the FSIA that would allow suites
to be brought for human rights abuses..
In discussing the waiver of immunity argument for human rights
abuses, one must start with the case of Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1989.
In that case, two Liberian corporations sued Argentine in the United States
District Court to recover damages for a tort, allegedly committed by its
armed forces on the high seas in violation of international law. The
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's attack on the neutral ship violated
international law and thus triggered the District Court's jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute (ATCA).9 The ATCA, enacted in 1982, provides
4. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976)).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 reads: "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this
chapter."
6. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 439.
7. 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(1).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
9. ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT OF 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982), was originally passed as
a provision of JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). The Act was not
used widely by the courts until its revival by the Second Circuit in 1980 decision of Filartiga v.
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that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United states."' 0 They also argued jurisdiction under the
general admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the principle of universal
jurisdiction." The District Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, ruling that the Plaintiffs' suit was barred by the FSIA. 1
The Second Circuit reversed and held that a cause of action did exist under
the Alien Tort Claim Statute. The Court reasoned since the bombing of an
unarmed vessel on the high seas was a tort, and it was done in violation of
an international law, the ATCA conferred jurisdiction on the United States
Courts."
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding explicitly that the
FSIA was the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
government in the courts of the United States. Even if the case involves a
violation of an international law, the cause of action must fit within one of
the exceptions of the FSIA in order for the Federal Courts to have
jurisdiction.
The Plaintiffs in the Amerada Hess case argued that the international
agreements entered into by United States and the Defendants were
sufficient to create an exception to immunity under the FSIA. '4 Their
argument was based on the language of the Act which provided that the
FSIA was adopted "subject to international agreements to which the United
States was a party at the time of its enactment." ,1 They then referred to the
Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the Pan American Neutrality
Convention as constituting an implied waiver of exception under §
1605(a)(1). However, the Court ruled that the international agreements
would constitute a waiver only when they expressly conflict with the
immunity provisions. It rejected the idea that a foreign nation could waive
its immunity simply by "signing an agreement that makes no mention of
waiver of immunity to suits in the United States or even the availability of
a cause of action in the United States." 6
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980), when it conferred jurisdiction against former
Paraguayan police inspector general for the torture and death of Plaintiffs' relatives.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
11. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 428.
12. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. at 77.
13. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d at 426.
14. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 442.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
16. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 442.
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In order to circumvent the unambiguous language of the Amerada
Hess case to allow suits against the foreign governments for alleged human
rights abuses, several creative arguments have been developed over the
years. Some have been based upon a jus cogens exceptions to immunity.
This argument was discussed in a creative 1989 law review article entitled
Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for
Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law. 7
In Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, Is the jus cogens argument
was urged. In that case, an American citizen who survived the Holocaust
sued the Federal Republic of Germany to recover money damages for
injuries he suffered, and slave labor he performed, while a prisoner in
Nazi concentration camps. The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia allowed subject matter jurisdiction over the survivor's
claim. However, in an opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg,
the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court decision, rejecting Princz's claim
that Germany waived its immunity by violating jus cogens norms. ,9 The
Court focused on the intent requirement that is implicit in the FSIA and
held that Germany did not display any intention of waiving its immunity by
violating these principals.2
This comment will discuss only that aspect of the case that pertains to
the claim of implied waiver of immunity.
In Princz, the Plaintiff had argued that the Third Reich impliedly
waived Germany's sovereign immunity under the FSIA by violating jus
cogens norms of the law of nations. It was argued that "A foreign state
that violates these fundamental requirements of a civilized world thereby
waives its right to be treated as a sovereign." 2'
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a jus
cogens norm is a principle of international law that is "accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character. "2 They prevail over and invalidate international agreements and
17. Adam C. Belsky, Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSL4: A Proposed Exception
to Inmrunity for Violations of Preemptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365
(1989).
18. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d. 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
19. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d at 1176.
20. Id. at 1174.
21. Id. at 1173.
22. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 699 (1969).
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other rules of international law in conflict with them. According to the
Restatement, a state violates jus cogens, if it "practices, encourages, or
condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or
causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights."" In Princz, Justice Ginsberg
noted that the Nuremberg trials
for the first time made explicit and unambiguous what was
theretofore, . . . implicit in International Law, namely,..
and that to persecute, oppress, or do violence to
individuals or minorities on political, racial, or religious
grounds in connection with such a war, or to exterminate,
enslave, or deport civilian populations, is an international
crime.24
She noted further that "the universal and fundamental right of human
being identified by Nuremberg-rights against genocide, enslavement, and
other inhuman acts . . . are the direct ancestors of the universal and
fundamental norms recognized as jus cogens."2 Justice Ginsburg
acknowledged that it was doubtful that any state had ever violated jus
cogens norms on a scale rivaling that of the Third Reich. Thus it was
argued that interpreting the FSIA to imply a waiver where a violation of
jus cogens norms has occurred "would reconcile the FSIA with accepted
principles of international law."26
The court held, however, that the jus cogens theory of implied waiver
is incompatible with the intent requirement that is implicit in the FSIA. It
referred to the examples of implied waiver set forth in the legislative
history of the Act." These examples all arose either from the foreign
state's agreement to arbitrate, or to a choice of law, or from its filing a
responsive pleading without raising the defense of sovereign immunity.
The court also observed, "[s]ince the FSIA became law, courts have been
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702,
comment n.
24. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d at 1174.
25. Id. at 1174 (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715
(9th Cir. 1992)).
26. Id. at 1174 (citing Adam Besky, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed
Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 365 (1989)).
27. H.R. REP No. 1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., 18 (1976); S. REP. NO. 1310, 94th Cong.
2d Sess., 18 (1976).
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reluctant to stray beyond these examples when considering claims that a
nation has implicitly waived its defense of sovereign immunity. "2
In sum, an implied waiver depends upon the foreign government's
having at some point indicated its amenability to suit. In the Princz case,
however, the court found, that neither the present government of Germany
nor the predecessor government of The Third Reich actually indicated,
even implicitly, a willingness to waive immunity for actions arising out of
the Nazi atrocities. Thus, the court concluded that the violation of jus
cogens norms by the Third Reich did not constitute an implied waiver of
sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Rather, a clear intention by a foreign
sovereign to waive its immunity is required before the federal court could
assume jurisdiction over human rights abuses. The court noted further that
the expansive reading of the FSIA urged by the Plaintiff would place not
only a strain on the federal courts but also, and perhaps more importantly,
upon the United States' diplomatic relations with the foreign
governments."2
However, there was a strongly worded dissent by Judge Patricia
Wald. She argued that Germany implicitly -waived its immunity by
engaging in atrocities in this case. Reminding the court that American law
incorporates international law, Judge Wald concluded that as a matter of
proper statutory construction, "the only way to reconcile the FSIA's
presumption of foreign sovereign immunity with international law is to
interpret the act as encompassing the principle that a foreign state
implicitly waives its right to sovereign immunity in United States court by
violating jus cogens norms."3°
Earlier, the Ninth Circuit has also rejected the jus cogens argument.
The 1992 case of Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina," involved
allegations of official torture against the government of Argentina. The
plaintiffs argued that when a foreign state's acts violate jus cogens, the
state is not entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to those acts. This
argument was based on the notion that jus cogens norms "enjoy the
highest status within international law,"32 and thus "prevail over and
invalidate . . . other rules of international law in conflict with them."
28. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d at 1174 (citing Frolova v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1985)).
29. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d at 1174.
30. Id. at 1184.
31. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
32. Id. at 715 (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859
F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
33. Id. at 716 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102, cmt. k).
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Since sovereign immunity itself is a principle of international law, it is
trumped by jus cogens. In short, they argued that when a state violates jus
cogens, the cloak of immunity provided by international law falls away,
leaving the state amenable to suit. The Ninth Circuit agreed that official
torture is a violation of the jus cogens principle of international law.
However, it found no implied waiver of the FSIA. The court noted that
the FSIA contains no exception to immunity based on jus cogens. It then
felt constrained to follow Amerada Hess, holding that "if violations ofjus
cogens committed outside the United States are to be exceptions to the
immunity, Congress must make them so."14
Several other lower court cases have been based on the jus cogens
exception to the immunity. Although the courts found the arguments
"appealing" and cited the law review articles with approval, they felt
themselves bound by the explicit words of the statute and the restrictive
reading given to it by the Supreme Court. They dismissed suites for lack
of jurisdiction. 11
Congress has amended the FSIA in the past to address specific
concerns. Addressing the problem of terrorism, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. This Act amended
section 1605 of the FSIA by adding a new subsection, which created a new
exception to foreign sovereign immunity. Under this section United States
nationals may bring suit against foreign sovereigns for personal injury
resulting from "torture, extra judicial killing, air sabotage, hostage taking
or provision of material support or services . . . for such an act" if the
foreign state is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. 6
This amendment to the FSIA followed the original drafting pattern
used in the FSIA, and simply added an additional exception to the original
five exceptions. Although very broad, this exception has several
limitations on its applicability. The amendment will apply only if the
foreign state is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the State
Department. Even if a state is so designated, courts will deny jurisdiction
if the victim was not a national of the United States, or if a plaintiff cannot
34. Id. at 719.
35. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306 (N.Y. 1996),
aff'd 101 F.3d 239, (even though Libya's connection to bombing of Pan America flight 103 was
in violation of JUS COGENS, there is no implied waiver under FSIA); Hirsh v. State of Israel, 962
F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), (denied implied waiver under the FSIA, relying on Smith).;
Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001), (implied waiver
exception under FSIA should be construed narrowly and does not include violations of jus
cogens).
36. ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT, 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(7)
(1996). States so designated include Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Cuba and North Korea.
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show that the offending state was afforded "a reasonable opportunity to
arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted international rules of
arbitration. 3
However, as reported in the New York Times of October 25, 2001, in
the last five years, judgments under the Act have brought verdicts of
hundreds of millions of dollars and more than $200 million have been paid
from frozen assets and from the United States which has a right to recover
from those assets.38 A suit has been filed against Osama Bin Laden, al
Queda, Afghanistan and the Taliban based upon the September llth
attacks.
In addition, it should be noted that the Torture Victims Protection Act
(TVPA) created a civil cause of action for all individuals-aliens and
United States citizens alike-who are victims of torture or extra judicial
killing. The language of the act limits the jurisdiction of the courts to suits
against individuals acting "under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation." 9 By limiting the act to individuals, the
drafters avoided the issue of sovereign immunity and the new law's
relationship to the FSIA. They did so, however, at great cost to the
effectiveness of the legislation. The tension created is evident in the
language of the TVPA itself, which expressly targets official torture, yet
does not reach the state sponsoring the activity.
An amendment to the FSIA could be made to allow for suits based
upon violations of human rights norms that violate jus cogens principles.
The reasons for providing such an exception are indeed compelling and
would create a remedy to victims of human rights violations and deter
future breaches of international human rights laws. The state violators
would no longer have protection in United States courts for their
transgressions.
It is clear from the cases that the courts are sympathetic to the loss of
the plaintiffs in cases of human rights abuses committed by state actors.
However, they have been reluctant to challenge the restrictive reading of
the FSIA because of the floodgates of litigation argument and also the
judgment that such decision is best left to the political branches of the
government. Therefore, at this juncture, any change in this act has to
come from Congress. The amendment that extends jurisdiction to
terrorism-related actions is a positive first step.
37. 28 U.S.C 1605(a)(7).
38. William Glaberson, Attack Victims Are Expected to Turn Law Against Terrorists, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001 at A9.
39. TORTURE VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2)(a) (1994).
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An amendment to the Act similar to the Anti-terrorism Act to address
the concerns regarding the scope of the jus cogens violations is warranted.
Such an exception would be a narrow one and would apply only to the
most grave human rights abusers. On a practical level, an exception
designed to cover jus cogens abuses with a narrow focus is more likely to
gain Congressional approval than a proposal that covers all human rights
abuses. In fact, several legislative proposals have been introduced to
amend the FSIA to add an exception for immunity in cases of human rights
violations but without success.10
In view of the unwillingness of the courts to accept jurisdiction
without a clear expression from Congress, it seems appropriate to urge
Congress to express such intent. Despite the fact that suits against foreign
governments could have broad political consequences, Congress has not
been hesitant to step into the area where terrorism is concerned. It could
also do so where grave human rights abuses are concerned and indeed
Amerada Hess, and its reliance on congressional intent supports this
approach.
In drafting this amendment, several questions remain. Should such
suits be limited to those states branded as terrorist states by the State
Department? Certainly, in this time of heightened political sensitivities and
awareness, there is a question as to whether it would be prudent to allow
such suits against states not on the list but are known abusers of human
rights, such as China. Should such legislation permit suits to non-nationals
as well as nationals? These questions should be answered before one can
draft an effective immunity exception to the Act.
We do not accept state-sponsored terrorism and we ought not accept
other serious violations of human rights. The 1966 Anti-Terrorism
Amendment has opened the door to restricting immunity for illegal acts. A
human rights exception to the FSIA would be consistent with that
approach.
40. H.R. 2357, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced by Representative Lawrence J.
Smith), H.R. 934, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Representative Mazzoli), 14. R.
2363, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Representatives Schumer and Pallone).
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RESOLVING HOLOCAUST CLAIMS AT THE END OF
THE 2 0TH CENTURY: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT'S ROLE
Eric Rosand"
I will focus on the role the U.S. Government has played in the past
few years in the resolution of a number of Holocaust-related disputes.
These recent efforts should be seen as a continuation of a more than
half-century initiative by the United States to secure a measure of justice to
victims of the Holocaust and their heirs. As early as 1945, Washington
instructed General Eisenhower, the Commander in Chief of United States
Occupation Forces, to ensure that stolen property was impounded and
prompt measures for restitution instituted. In 1947, the United States
military government issued restitution decrees on which German
authorities modeled German restitution laws after West Germany was
established in 1949. The 1952 Transition Agreement required Germany to
maintain the restitution system established under Allied legislation and led
to the establishment of the German system for compensating victims of
Nazi persecution.
The United States played a similar role in post-war Austria as it
played in Germany. The Allied Occupation forces insisted that the newly-
formed Austrian Government enact legislation providing for the restitution
of property illegally transferred during the Nazi era in Austria. Thus,
between 1946-49, Austria passed seven-albeit not comprehensive-
restitution laws. In the 1955 State Treaty, the United States subsequently
demanded that Austria commit to the restitution of any remaining Jewish
property that had not been restituted. A 1959 exchange of notes between
the United States and Austria led to the establishment of a compensation
Eric Rosand is an Attorney-Adviser in the United States Department of State's Office
of the Legal Adviser. From March 1999-January 2001, he served as legal adviser to Stuart E.
Eizenstat, the President and Secretary of State's Special Representative on Holocaust Issues,
during negotiations that led to agreements with Austria, France, and Germany to address
outstanding Nazi-era issues. These remarks were presented at the International Law Association
ILA Weekend, October 2001, New York, New York, United States. Parts of this paper are
drawn from the remarks of Ronald J. Bettauer, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, at
the 2001 American Society of International Law Annual Meeting Panel on Holocaust Issues,
which will appear in 2001 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law Annual
Meeting.
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fund in Vienna to provide payments to Holocaust victims for banking and
certain other property claims.
Largely because of the enormity of the crimes committed and amount
of property plundered during the Nazi era, however, the above measures,
although significant, left gaps. Moreover, neither the measures nor the
United States' diplomatic interventions resulted in the waiver of the
victims' rights to pursue their claims in United States courts. Although a
few such people did choose to file lawsuits in the United States in the years
following the war, such suits were few and far between. By the 1990s,
however, this started to change, and these suits became an irritant in the
United States' relations with a number of European governments.
To some degree, the United States' recent initiatives have been
triggered by the filing of such suits against European governments and
companies. As a result, these efforts involved the twin goals of securing
compensation or restitution for Holocaust victims and helping achieve the
dismissal of the lawsuits. During this period the United States has used a
variety of different methods to achieve both of these goals.
The September 1995, Princz Agreement was the first of these
endeavors. After years of unsuccessful attempts to secure compensation
from Germany for his suffering in a concentration camp, Hugo Princz sued
the German Government in United States court. After the suit was
dismissed in view of Germany's sovereign immunity, Mr. Princz then sued
German companies. Simultaneously, Mr. Princz lobbied Congress to pass
legislation to remove sovereign immunity from the German Government
for Holocaust suits. The House of Representatives' passage of such a bill
got the German Government's attention, and shortly thereafter the German
Chancellor and President Clinton agreed to negotiate a traditional claims
settlement agreement covering Princz and comparable claimants. The
German Government, not wanting to deal with further litigation in United
States court on these issues, insisted that such an agreement finally resolve
all such claims. Thus, under its terms, the Germans made a lump -sum
(some $20 million) payment that provided compensation essentially to
concentration camp survivors who were United States citizens at the time
of their internment and the United States waived all claims against
Germany in that category. The Department of Justice's Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission bore responsibility for distributing this money.
The United States used entirely different approaches to address
subsequent major Holocaust-era related disputes. I will very briefly
address the Swiss bank settlement and then turn to the agreements the
United States negotiated with Germany, Austria, and France.
In the fall of 1997, the question arose of what role, if any, the State
Department should play in resolving the class action lawsuits that had
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recently been brought against three major Swiss banks alleging wrongdoing
during the Holocaust. Our initial reaction was that this was litigation
between private parties and that litigation should proceed without United
States involvement. However, we soon changed our mind after the
counsel for both sides requested the Department's help in resolving the
dispute. We decided that our interest in getting payments to Holocaust
victims and in getting rid of the lawsuits (thereby removing an irritant in
our relationship with Switzerland) justified our involvement.
During these negotiations the United States Government acted as a
facilitator and mediator and was intimately involved in all aspects of the
process. The product was a $1.25 billion class action settlement that was
finally approved by the court in November 2000. Unlike the Princz
Agreement, where the United States not only provided the Germans with
the claims waiver to address their concerns about future lawsuits but bore
sole responsibility for distributing the compensation as well, under the
Swiss bank settlement-a traditional class action settlement-the United
States had no role to play in its implementation.
Our role in the series of negotiations between late 1998 and January
2001 that culminated in agreements-one with Germany, two with Austria,
and one with France-which have led to the establishment of four
foundations that will distribute some $6 billion to Holocaust victims and
their heirs was significantly different from previous ones. As the structure
of the French and both Austrian negotiations and agreements were largely
modeled on the one with Germany, in the interest of time, I will focus on
the German one.
The talks arose in the context of both a series of class action lawsuits
brought by Holocaust victims-both United States and foreign nationals-
against German companies for asserting primarily Nazi-era forced and
slave labor, banking and insurance claims, and an announcement by the
German companies of their intention to establish a foundation to address
their moral responsibility for the wrongs committed by German companies
during the Nazi era.
To dispose of the lawsuits, the companies wanted the United States to
conclude an executive agreement with Germany extinguishing all Nazi-era
claims against German companies in United States courts. For a number
of reasons, however, we declined. First, under customary international
law we could have only have extinguished claims of those who were
nationals at the time the claims arose. Second, customary international law
does not address a government's ability to settle the claims against private
entities, such as companies. Third, no United States law precedent existed
for the settlement of claims of nationals against foreign private entities by
executive agreement (as opposed to by treaty).
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In early 1999, around the same time that the Germans announced their
intention to create a foundation to pay former forced and slave labors, they
asked Stuart Eizenstat, then an Undersecretary of State, to help them find a
way to dispose of the lawsuits in favor of this foundation. Soon thereafter
the plaintiffs' attorneys asked for his help in facilitating an out-of-court
resolution to the lawsuits. The Governments of Belarus, the Czech
Republic, Israel, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, which represented the vast
majority of surviving forced and slave laborers, were eager to participate
in any such negotiations. In addition, the Conference on Jewish Material
Claims Against Germany, an umbrella Jewish organization that was
established after the war to negotiate with Germany for compensation and
restitution for Holocaust victims, rightly felt that it had to be included as
well. This mix of negotiating partners was novel-government
representatives, private attorneys, and a non-governmental organization-
and was replicated in the Austrian and French negotiations.
The negotiations addressed four key issues: how much money the
Germans would contribute to the foundation; how the money would be
divided among the victims; the structure of the foundation; and a suitable
mechanism to achieve the dismissal of all pending and future Nazi era
lawsuits against German companies. I will briefly address the last two.
With respect to the last one, with the United States unwilling to enter
into a claims settlement agreement and the German companies not prepared
to enter into a traditional class action settlement (believing it would give
lawsuits, which they viewed as lacking merit, both status and legitimacy),
there was no available mechanism to guarantee that the companies would
never again be sued in United States courts for Nazi-era wrongs. The
German companies' lawyers, however, came up with an alternative
concept, which was accepted. If all of the participants in the negotiations
agreed on the parameters of the foundation, the participating plaintiffs'
attorneys would seek to dismiss the pending lawsuits and the United States
would file statements of interest in those and all future Nazi era lawsuits
against German companies in United States courts. The United States
would say that it would be in the United States' foreign policy interest for
the foundation to be the exclusive remedy and forum for resolving such
claims. Because the companies wanted the United States' commitment to
file such statements of interest memorialized in an executive agreement,
the United States assumed a different role than it had in prior Holocaust
claims issues: negotiating an executive agreement. This turned out to be a
quite unusual agreement.
Although the United States refused to discuss the actual text of the
Statement, as the companies requested, it did agree to negotiate the
"elements" of such a filing and attach this "elements paper" as an annex to
Rosand
the agreement. The Justice Department, including the Solicitor General
himself, was deeply involved, since the agreement would commit the
United States to positions in all levels of United States courts. Eventually,
after almost a year of heated discussions over the content of this annex
with Eizenstat and Justice and State Department lawyers, it took letters
from the President, his National Security Adviser, and White House
Counsel to the Germans to resolve this issue. The involvement of so many
different parts of the United States Government in addressing the
consequences of the Holocaust, as well as negotiating the text of an
executive agreement with private parties, i.e., the companies, was
unprecedented.
As the foundation negotiations progressed, there was a fundamental
shift in approach. Rather than create a private foundation, for a number of
reasons the German Government and companies decided to create a public
one established under German law. This change in course led to the
United States' engaging in another unprecedented role: negotiating with
the Germans an annex to the executive agreement setting forth the elements
of the Foundation that would be incorporated in the German law. We
essentially began discussing drafts of this German law, and Eizenstat even
testified before the Bundestag concerning what the United States felt
needed to be included in the law. These discussions were further
complicated by the need to include the victims' representatives in them.
After all, the United States was only going to lend its support to a
foundation that received the broad support of the victims' representatives.
Thus, in the German Foundation talks, the United States Government
assumed a variety of roles, including those of a facilitator among disparate
parties, a treaty negotiator, and the role of pressing a foreign government
on internal law matters-roles it later assumed in negotiations with the
Austrians and the French.
Let me conclude with some observations. Will the complex German
Foundation arrangement and the multifaceted role played by the United
States serve as precedents beyond the Austrian and French cases? The
confluence of a number of circumstances in these cases enabled us to
achieve the results we did achieve. First, all parties to the disputes asked
the United States to help find a resolution. Second, a senior United States
Government official, Stuart Eizenstat, was willing to expend the time and
energy to convince initially reluctant State and Justice Departments to
become involved. Third, largely because of his clout in the Clinton
Administration, Eizenstat was able to get the White House to weigh in at
crucial moments to break impasses that threatened to derail the
negotiations. Fourth, the substance of the disputes, elderly Holocaust
survivors seeking a measure of justice in the last few years of the lives,
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coincided with the United States' policy objectives. Finally, there were no
pre-existing treaty documents to impose legal constraints on the type of
role the United States could assume.
There may be future disputes involving foreign companies or
governments were some of these circumstances are replicated. However, I
am skeptical that there will be any such disputes where all will be
replicated.
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE:
ESTABLISHING A NEW APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
John Cerone*
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 379
II. THE CONTEXT: THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA
L EO NE .................................................................... 380
III. THE GENESIS OF THE SPECIAL COURT ............................. 380
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SPECIAL COURT
AND THE ICTY / ICTR ................................................ 381
A . Legal Basis ....................................................... 381
B . Personnel ......................................................... 382
C. Relationship with National Courts ........................... 382
D. Temporal Jurisdiction .......................................... 382
E. Territorial Jurisdiction ......................................... 383
F. Personal Jurisdiction ........................................... 383
G . P enalties .......................................................... 384
H. Subject Matter Jurisdiction .................................... 384
1. Crimes Against Humanity ............................. 385
2. War Crimes .............................................. 385
3. Crimes Under Sierra Leonean Law .................. 386
V. THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY: OCTOBER 2001 ........... 386
I. INTRODUCTION
The proposed Special Court for Sierra Leone is sometimes referred to
as a national/international hybrid entity. There are several factors that may
lead to this conclusion. Unlike the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), which were established by
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Government of Sierra Leone in its negotiations with the United Nations on the establishment of
the Special Court. All of the information presented herein has been drawn from the public
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the United Nations Security Council as United Nations subsidiary bodies,
the legal basis for the Special Court for Sierra Leone is a treaty between
the United Nations and Sierra Leone. The substantive criminal law to be
applied by the Court, while codified in the treaty, was derived from both
international law and domestic law. Finally, the personnel of the Court
will also be mixed, employing both international and national staff.
II. THE CONTEXT: THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
Over the course of the past decade a very brutal civil war raged in
Sierra Leone. The conflict was marked by the use of child soldiers and the
severance of limbs of civilians as part of a strategy of terror. An estimated
two-thirds of the population was displaced. Six hundred thousand Sierra
Leoneans fled to neighboring countries.'
In the Summer of 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and the
rebels, represented by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), concluded
the Lom6 Agreement, one of a series of failed peace agreements. Under
that agreement, the RUF was brought into the government, receiving
cabinet and ambassadorial posts as well as the leadership of certain public
sector agencies. The agreement also provided for the establishment of a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to be established under the
laws of Sierra Leone. Finally, the Government agreed to a blanket
amnesty for crimes committed during the war. In adding his signature to
the agreement, the United Nations envoy indicated that the amnesty would
not bar prosecution for crimes under international law.2  The Lom6
Agreement rapidly collapsed and fighting resumed.
III. THE GENESIS OF THE SPECIAL COURT
Deeply concerned "at the very serious crimes committed within the
territory of Sierra Leone against the people of Sierra Leone and United
Nations and associated personnel and at the prevailing situation of
impunity," the Security Council took up the issue of an international
criminal justice mechanism for Sierra Leone in August 2000. In its
Resolution 1315, the Council called upon the United Nations Secretary
General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to
create "an independent special court" consistent with that resolution.
Resolution 1315 contained several significant features. First, the
resolution stated that the Council deemed the situation in Sierra Leone to
1. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, AFR. REPORT NO. 28, SIERRE LEONE: TIME FOR A NEW
MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRATEGY (2001).
2. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, para. 23, S/2000/915, Oct. 4, 2000.
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constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region. Thus,
while it did not proceed to invoke its Chapter VII power, the Council
indicated that the situation would warrant the use of Chapter VII power if
necessary. Second, the Council recalled that the amnesty provision of the
Lom6 Agreement was inapplicable to crimes under international law.3
Third, the Council recommended that the "subject matter jurisdiction of
the special court should include notably crimes against humanity, war
crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as
well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law committed within the
territory of Sierra Leone." Fourth, it recommended that the special court
should have "personal jurisdiction over persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for the commission of" these crimes. Finally, the Council
indicated that the court would be funded through voluntary (as opposed to
assessed) contributions from states.
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SPECIAL COURT AND THE ICTY /
ICTR
A. Legal Basis
The ICTY and ICTR were established by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.4 Having a Chapter VII
resolution as their legal basis, all United Nations member states are obliged
to cooperate with those tribunals. As with all obligations arising under the
Charter, the obligation to cooperate with the tribunals is superior to other
international obligations.,
The legal basis for the Special Court will be a treaty between the
United Nations and Sierra Leone. Thus, obligations arising under that
treaty will bind only the United Nations, as a legal entity, and Sierra
Leone.6 This issue may become significant should alleged perpetrators of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Court flee from the territory of
Sierra Leone.
3. This is reflected in the Draft Statute of the Court. Article 10 of the Draft Statute
provides that "[a]n amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special
Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a
bar to prosecution."
4. See U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N.. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). U.N. SCOR, 3453rd
mtg., U.N.. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
5. U.N. CHARTER, art. 103.
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 3, 1969, art. 34, 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969). See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, art. 34 & 74(3), March 21, 1986, 25
I.L.M. 543.
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B. Personnel
Prosecutors and judges at the ICTY and ICTR are all international
staff. The personnel of the Special Court will be mixed. The Special
Court will be composed of one Appeals Chamber and one or more Trial
Chambers. Of the five judges in the Appeals Chamber, three will be
appointed by the United Nations Secretary General and two will be
appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone. Of the three judges in each
Trial Chamber, two will be appointed by the United Nations Secretary
General and one will be appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone.7
Note that there is no requirement that the judges appointed by Sierra Leone
be citizens of that country.,
The Prosecutor of the Special Court will be appointed by the
Secretary General. He or she will have a "Sierra Leonean" Deputy
Prosecutor. 9
C. Relationship with National Courts
Similar to the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court will have
concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, but will also have primacy.
Thus the Special Court will be able to take cases away from the domestic
courts of Sierra Leone. 10
D. Temporal Jurisdiction
As with the ICTY and ICTR, 1 the starting date of the Special Court's
jurisdiction will be specified in the Statute of the Court. In addition, as
with the ICTY but unlike the ICTR, 12 no termination date is specified. The
starting date of the Special Court's temporal jurisdiction will likely be
November 30, 1996.13 The Agreement establishing the Court will
7. Draft Statute, art. 12.
8. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 2.
9. Draft Statute, art. 15.
10. Note, however, that the authority to assert primacy extends only vis-t-vis domestic
courts of Sierra Leone, and cannot apply with respect to the courts of other countries, which are
not parties to the treaty establishing the Court. Vienna Convention, supra note 6; see also supra
text accompanying note 6.
11. The temporal jurisdiction of the ICTY extends to Jan. 1, 1991. The temporal
jurisdiction of the ICTR is limited to the calendar year 1994.
12. See id.
13. The Government of Sierra Leone has recently requested that this date be changed to
correspond with the date upon which the armed conflict is deemed to have been initiated. See
infra note 17; see also text accompanying note 17.
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terminate by agreement of the parties once its judicial activities have been
completed.
E. Territorial Jurisdiction
Unlike the statutes for the ICTR and ICTY, the Draft Statute of the
Special Court does not contain a separate article stipulating the Court's
territorial jurisdiction. The Court will have the power, as expressed in
Article 1 of the Draft Statute, "to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and
Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone . .. .
Thus, while it is clear that the territorial jurisdiction of the Court will
include Sierra Leone, it is conceivable that those who bear the greatest
responsibility for crimes committed in Sierra Leone never set foot in the
country. It may therefore be possible that acts of instigation, the ordering
of atrocities- or other serious forms of complicity could be prosecuted even
if they occurred outside of the territory of Sierra Leone.
The ICTY Statute limits its jurisdiction to the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. The territorial jurisdiction of the ICTR covers the territory of
Rwanda, as well as the territories of neighboring countries to the extent
that crimes otherwise falling within the jurisdiction of the Court were
committed there by Rwandan nationals."
Note also that while the seats of the ICTY and ICTR are located
outside of the territories over which those courts have jurisdiction, the seat
of the Special Court will be in Sierra Leone.
F. Personal Jurisdiction
As with the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court will have jurisdiction
over natural persons only. Thus it will not have the power to prosecute
organizations, as did the Nuremberg Tribunal. Further, as noted above,
and as mandated by the Security Council in Resolution 1315, the personal
jurisdiction of the Special Court will be limited to those "who bear the
greatest responsibility for" the crimes committed.
The Draft Statute also contains a provision on jurisdiction over
peacekeepers. While not excluded from the Special Court's jurisdiction,
the Draft Statute provides that peacekeepers are within the primary
jurisdiction of the sending state. If a state is unwilling or unable to
14. Contrast the International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC), which is envisioned as a
court of general criminal jurisdiction. The ICC Statute contains no express limitation on the
Court's territorial competence. If a criminal act did not occur on the territory of a state party,
the act will still fall within the competence on the court if the perpetrator is the national of a state
party.
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prosecute its peacekeepers, the Special Court may do so, if it receives
authorization from the United Nations Security Council. Thus, there are
two hurdles to the Special Court's exercise of jurisdiction over a
peacekeeper. The sending state must be unwilling or unable to prosecute
and the Security Council must authorize the Special Court's exercise of
jurisdiction in the particular case.
The Special Court will not have jurisdiction to prosecute those under
fifteen years of age at the time of the offense. While it will have
jurisdictions over those between fifteen and eighteen years of age at the
time of the offense, such persons will be treated as juvenile offenders. The
Draft Statute provides that in
The disposition of a case against a juvenile offender, the
Special Court shall order any of the following: care
guidance and supervision orders, community service
orders, counselling, foster care, correctional, educational
and vocational training programmes, approved schools
and, as appropriate, any programmes of disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration or programmes of child
protection agencies...
In this regard, it is also important to recall the mandate of the Court
to prosecute "persons who bear the greatest responsibility." As a juvenile
offender's youth would presumably mitigate his or her degree of
responsibility, those under eighteen are not likely to be prosecuted.
G. Penalties
As with the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court will not be
empowered to sentence convicted persons to death. Only imprisonment
will be allowed, with the exception of juvenile offenders who will be
subject to the alternative measures outlined above.
H. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Special Court can be divided
into three categories: Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, and Crimes
under Sierra Leonean Law. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the crime of
genocide is not within the jurisdiction of the Special Court.
As with the ICTY and ICTR, all of the crimes contained within the
Draft Statute have either acquired the status of customary law or been
drawn from treaties to which Sierra Leone is a party. Thus, the principle
nullem crimen sine lege is respected.
Cerone
1. Crimes Against Humanity
Article 2 of the Draft Statute contains the definition of Crimes Against
Humanity. As with all definitions of crimes against humanity, Article 2
sets forth contextual elements as well as a list of enumerated acts that will
constitute Crimes Against Humanity if the contextual elements are
established.
The definitions in the statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals are almost
identical. However, there are two critical distinctions in the contextual
elements of each. That is, the definition in each of the two statutes
requires a contextual element that the other does not. Under the ICTY
Statute, the existence of a state of armed conflict is a required element.
Under the ICTR Statute, the attack within which the crimes occur must be
launched on discriminatory grounds. As defined in the Draft Statute,
Crimes Against Humanity requires neither of these contextual elements. It
requires only that there be a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population. This definition is therefore broadly in
accord with the definition established in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), and with what is generally considered to be the
definition under customary law.
The lists of enumerated acts contained in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes
are identical. While the acts listed in Article 2 of the Draft Statute are
similar, there are some important differences. First, in addition to politics,
race, and religion, ethnicity is included as a grounds for persecution.
Second, borrowing language from the ICC Statute, Article 2 includes
"sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and any other
form of sexual violence" as additional acts constituting Crimes Against
Humanity if the contextual elements are met, i.e.., if committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.
2. War Crimes
War Crimes are divided between two articles in the Draft Statute.
Article 3 concerns Violations of Common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol II. Article 4 is entitled Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law.
Article 3 of the Draft Statute essentially contains the law of non-
international armed conflict. It is virtually identical to Article 4 of the
ICTR Statute. While not expressly set forth in the ICTY Statute, the law
of non-international armed conflict has been read into Article 3 of the
ICTY Statute, which covers "[v]iolations of the laws or customs of war."'
15. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Oct. 2, 1995, IT-94-1-AR72 (RP D6413-D6491).
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Article 4 lists certain serious war crimes that have occurred during the
conflict in Sierra Leone, and is thus specific to the Draft Statute. These
acts include attacks against civilians, attacks against peacekeepers and
those providing humanitarian assistance, and the use of child combatants.
Thus, Article 4 permits prosecution for:
a) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such
or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
b) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations,
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or
civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict; and
c) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
3. Crimes Under Sierra Leonean Law
Certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law are set forth in Article 5 of
the Draft Statute. Again, the acts listed correspond to acts that have
occurred in the course of the conflict in Sierra Leone. This article is also
unique for obvious reasons.
The crimes are drawn from the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act
of 1926 and the Malicious Damage Act of 1861. The first crime listed is
abusing a girl or abducting a girl for immoral purposes. The second
relates to the wanton destruction of property, and is specifically concerned
with arson.
V. THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY: OCTOBER 2001
At present, the United Nations Secretariat is preparing to dispatch a
planning mission to Freetown. The purpose of the mission will be two-
fold. First, the mission will be responsible for making the practical
arrangements for the establishment of the Court. Second, the mission is
also charged with drafting guidelines, in consultation with the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), regarding the relationship
between the Special Court and the TRC .
Finances for the Special Court remain a concern. Recall that the
Special Court is to be funded through voluntary contributions of states.
Even though the budget has been drastically reduced from initial
16. OHCHR has taken a lead role in facilitating the establishment of the TRC.
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projections, sufficient funds have yet to be deposited for the first year of
operations.
Finally, the issue of the temporal jurisdiction of the Court has recently
been re-opened. While the Government of Sierra Leone continues to
express full support for the Court, it has requested a modification to its
proposed temporal jurisdiction. On August 20, 2001, the Government sent
a letter to the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs requesting that the
temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court extend back to March 1991,
coinciding with the inception of the armed conflict. 7 At present, this issue
remains unresolved.
17. Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone, Sept. 7, 2001, para. 48, U.N. Doc S/2001/857.
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I. INTRODUCTION: SCAPEGOAT OR WAR CRIMINAL?
There were disquieting echoes of Nuremberg at the arraignment of
Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague on July 3, 2001. Standing before the
three-judge panel, Milosevic challenged the Security Council-created War
Crimes Tribunal's validity. "You are not a judicial institution; you are a
political tool," Milosevic told the panel. Drawing on the commonly-
accepted notion that the post-World War II Nuremberg Trials were tainted
by "victor's justice," Milosevic's initial trial strategy was to attempt to
discredit the Yugoslavia Tribunal's legitimacy and impartiality.
Will history remember Milosevic as a victim of victor's justice, a
scapegoat tried in a show trial before a one-sided court? Or will the
Milosevic trial be seen as fair and free of political influence? More than
* Professor of Law and Director of the War Crimes Research Office, Case Western
Reserve University Law School; formerly Attorney-Adviser for Law Enforcement and
Intelligence (1989-1991) and Attorney-Adviser for U.N. Affairs (1991-1993), U.S. Department
of State. This text is an expanded version of the author's presentation at International Law
Weekend 2001, a conference sponsored by the International Law Association in New York City
on October 27, 2001.
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anything else, the answer to these questions may dictate the ultimate
success or failure of the proceedings.
If viewed as legitimate, the trial of Milosevic could potentially serve
several important functions in the Balkan peace process. By pinning prime
responsibility on Milosevic and disclosing the way the Yugoslav people
were manipulated by their leaders into committing acts of savagery on a
mass scale, the trial would help break the cycle of violence that has long
plagued the Balkans. While this would not completely absolve the
underlings for their acts, it would make it easier for victims to eventually
forgive, or at least, reconcile with former neighbors who had been caught
up in the institutionalized violence. This would also promote a political
catharsis in Serbia, enabling the new leadership to distance themselves
from the discredited nationalistic policies of the past. The historic record
generated from the trial would educate the Serb people, long subject to
Milosevic's propaganda, about what really happened in Kosovo and
Bosnia, and help ensure that such horrific acts are not repeated in the
future.
On the other hand, a trial that is seen as "victor's justice" would
undermine the goal of fostering reconciliation between the ethnic groups
living in the former Yugoslavia. The historic record developed by the trial
would forever be questioned. The trial would add to the Serb martyrdom
complex, amounting to another grievance requiring vengeance. In
addition, the judicial precedent would be tainted. For any real advance to
be made in the long march toward the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court, Milosevic's trial must be seen to be more
about real justice than realpolitik.
II. THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST
History's first international criminal court was the Nuremberg
Tribunal, created by the victorious Allies after World War II to prosecute
the major German war criminals. Although Adolf Hitler escaped
prosecution by committing suicide, many of the most notorious German
leaders were tried before the Nuremberg Tribunal. After a trial that lasted
284 days, nineteen of the twenty-two German officials tried at Nuremberg
were found guilty, and twelve were sentenced to death by hanging. As the
former Serb president, himself, is keenly aware, Nuremberg provides a
compelling benchmark for assessing the legitimacy of the trial of Slobodan
Milosevic.
The United States Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Supreme Court
Justice Robert Jackson, noted in his opening statement at the Nuremberg
trial that "we must never forget that the record on which we judge these
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defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow.
To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well."
Given Jackson's admonition, it is ironic that history has not been altogether
kind to the Nuremberg Tribunal.
In the years following its judgment, there have been three main
criticisms levied on the Nuremberg Tribunal: first, that it was a victor's
tribunal before which only the vanquished were called to account for
violations of international humanitarian law committed during the war;
second, that the defendants were prosecuted and punished for crimes
expressly defined for the first time in an instrument adopted by the victors
at the conclusion of the war; and third, that the Nuremberg Tribunal
functioned on the basis of limited procedural rules that inadequately
protected the rights of the accused.
While the Nuremberg Tribunal deserves praise as a novel endeavor
that paved the way for future war crimes tribunals and the development of
international criminal law, these criticisms are not without foundation. It
was true, for example, that only the leading victorious nations-the United
States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union-were represented
on the Nuremberg Tribunal's bench. There were no judges from neutral
states, and the defendants were confined to German political and military
leaders. None of the Allied commanders had to answer for similar crimes.
Moreover, the Nuremberg judges oversaw the collection of evidence
and judged the defendants in a necessarily political arena, thereby raising
questions about their ability to objectively preside over the trials. Most
astonishing of all, however, was the fact that two of the Judges of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, General Nikitchenko (Soviet Union) and Robert
Falko (Alternate, France), served earlier as members of the committee that
had drafted the Nuremberg Charter and the indictments. Having written
the law to be applied and selected the defendants to be tried, it is hard to
believe they could be sufficiently impartial and unbiased. And yet, they
were insulated from challenge since the Nuremberg Charter stipulated that
neither the Court, nor its members, could be challenged by the prosecution
or the defendants.
In addition, the States which tried the Nuremberg defendants were
arguably guilty of many of the same sorts of crimes for which they sat in
judgment over their former adversaries. Had Germany and Japan won the
war, American leaders could just as easily have been prosecuted for crimes
against humanity in relation to the dropping of the atomic bombs,
firebombing civilian centers, and conducting unrestricted submarine
warfare. Soviet leaders could have been prosecuted for waging aggressive
war and mistreatment of prisoners with respect to the forcible Soviet
annexation of the Baltic States and appalling record of the Soviets
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regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. Most reprehensible of all,
however, was the Soviet Union's insistence that the German defendants be
charged with responsibility for the Katyn Forest Massacre, in which
14,700 Polish prisoners of war were murdered in 1941-when the true
perpetrators of this atrocity, we now know, were the Soviets and not the
Germans.
Perhaps the most often-heard criticism of Nuremberg was its
application of ex post facto laws, by holding individuals responsible for the
first time in history for waging a war of aggression and by applying the
concept of conspiracy which had never before been recognized in
continental Europe. One of the first to voice this criticism was Senator
Robert Taft of Ohio in 1946, but it was not until John F. Kennedy
reproduced Taft's speech in Kennedy's Pulitzer Prize-winning 1956 book,
Profiles of Courage, that this criticism became part of the public legacy of
Nuremberg. To this day, articles appear in the popular press deriding
Nuremberg as "a retroactive jurisprudence that would surely be
unconstitutional in an American court."
The other major criticism was that the Nuremberg Charter failed to
provide sufficient due process guarantees to the defense, and that those it
did provide were circumscribed by several pro-prosecution judicial rulings.
The most notable of such rulings was the Tribunal's decision to allow the
prosecutors to introduce ex parte affidavits (depositions taken out of the
presence of the accused or his lawyer) of persons who were in fact
available to testify at trial. In addition, the Nuremberg Tribunal prevented
the defendants from having access to the Tribunal's evidentiary archives
assembled by the Allies, and it allowed only the Prosecution the right to
object to witnesses before questioning. Such rulings were particularly
troubling because the Nuremberg Tribunal did not provide for a right of
appeal.
Even Justice Jackson acknowledged at the conclusion of the
Nuremberg Trials that "many mistakes have been made and many
inadequacies must be confessed." But he went on to say that he was
"consoled by the fact that in proceedings of this novelty, errors and
missteps may also be instructive to the future."
Ill. IMPROVEMENTS OVER NUREMBERG
In keeping with Justice Jackson's aspiration, the drafters of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal's Statute were determined to prevent this modem-day
Nuremberg Tribunal from being subjected to the kinds of criticisms that
have tarnished the legacy of its predecessor. And the judges of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal have recognized that they must do better than their
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brethren did fifty-years earlier at Nuremberg; they must ensure that the
Yugoslavia Tribunal is perceived as scrupulously fair.
In some respects, the Yugoslavia Tribunal is a vast improvement over
its predecessor. Its detailed Rules of Procedure and Evidence, for
example, represent a tremendous advancement over the scant set of rules
fashioned for the Nuremberg Tribunal. Further, in contrast to the
Nuremberg Tribunal, the Yugoslavia Tribunal prohibits trials in absentia,
which are inherently unfair and are likely to be seen as an empty gesture.
And where the defense attorneys at Nuremberg were prevented from full
access to the Nuremberg Tribunal's evidentiary archives, defendants before
the Yugoslavia Tribunal are entitled to any exculpatory evidence in the
possession of the Prosecutor, and both the prosecution and the defense are
reciprocally bound to disclose all documents and witnesses prior to trial.
With respect to Nuremberg's application of ex post facto laws, the
creators of the Yugoslavia Tribunal went to great lengths to ensure that the
Yugoslavia Tribunal could not be subject to similar condemnation.
Beginning in 1992, the Security Council adopted a series of resolutions that
put the leaders of the former Yugoslavia on notice that they were bound by
existing international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva
Conventions and Genocide Convention. The resolutions enumerated the
various types of reported acts that would amount to breaches of this law,
and warned that persons who commit or order the commission of such
breaches would be held individually responsible. Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal is defined on the basis of the
highest standard of applicable law, namely rules of law which are beyond
any doubt part of customary law, to avoid any question of full respect for
the ex post facto principle-known internationally by the Latin phrase
nullem crimen sine lege. It is particularly noteworthy that the crime of
waging a war of aggression, which engendered so much criticism after
Nuremberg, is not within the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Jurisdiction.
Ironically, it is the one crime that might have been easiest to prove against
Milosevic.
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE YUGOSLAVIA TRIBUNAL
While the Nuremberg Charter precluded challenges to the legitimacy
of the Nuremberg Tribunal itself, the Yugoslavia Tribunal considered the
question in its first case in 1996. The Tribunal ruled that, although its
creation by the Security Council was without precedent, it was a valid
product of the Security Council under the Council's broad powers to take
action to maintain international peace and security. But, as Milosevic may
be quick to point out, the judges that made that decision could not be
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seriously expected to decide the issue impartially, given that their
incredibly prestigious, $200,000-per-year jobs would have been instantly
extinguished if they had decided otherwise.
Having rendered that decision, the Yugoslavia Tribunal is unlikely to
revisit the question in the Milosevic trial. In response to Milosevic's
challenges to the Tribunal's legitimacy at a pre-trial hearing in August
2001, Presiding Judge Richard May responded, "Mr. Milosevic, we are
not going to listen to these political arguments." While this might seem
unduly harsh, it is a bit late in the day for Milosevic to be challenging the
Tribunal on this ground, given that he recognized the legitimacy of the
Tribunal when he signed the Dayton Accords in 1995, which require the
parties to cooperate with the Tribunal. Any doubt should have been erased
when Milosevic authorized the transfer of Drazen Erdemovic for
prosecution before the Tribunal for the part the young Serb soldier played
in the massacres at Srebrenica.
Having failed to convince the Yugoslavia Tribunal to reconsider this
issue, Milosevic attempted to attack the legitimacy of the Tribunal in the
Hague District Court. But the Dutch Court declared itself incompetent to
consider the question.
V. VICTOR'S JUSTICE
If Milosevic's goal is not to obtain a dismissal but to publicly discredit
the Tribunal, he may have a greater chance of success with his argument
that the Yugoslavia Tribunal, like Nuremberg, represents "victor's
justice."
In contrast to Nuremberg, however, the Yugoslavia Tribunal was
created neither by the victors nor by the parties involved in the conflict,
but rather by the United Nations, representing the international community
of States. The judges of the Yugoslavia Tribunal come from all parts of
the world, and are elected by the General Assembly, in which each of the
world's 188 countries gets an equal vote. Moreover, the message of the
International Tribunal's indictments, prosecutions, and convictions to date
of Muslims and Croats, as well as Serbs, has been that a war crime is a
war crime, whoever it is committed by. The Tribunal has taken no sides.
On the other hand, the decision to establish the Yugoslavia Tribunal
was made by the United Nations Security Council, which cannot truly be
characterized as a neutral third party; rather, it has itself become deeply
involved and taken sides in the Balkan conflict. The Security Council has,
for example, imposed sanctions on Milosevic's Serbia, which it felt was
most responsible for the conflict and atrocities. Throughout the conflict,
the Security Council had been quite vocal in its condemnation of Serb
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atrocities, but its criticisms of those committed by Muslims and Croats
were comparatively muted. And, most problematic of all, three of the
Permanent Members of the Council-the United States, France, and the
United Kingdom-led the 78-day bombing campaign against Milosevic and
Serbia in 1999.
While both the Prosecutor and the Judicial Chambers of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal were conceived to be independent from the Security
Council, one cannot ignore the fact that the Statute provides that the
Tribunal's Prosecutor is selected by the Security Council. The Judges are
selected by the General Assembly from a short list proposed by the
Security Council, and they have to stand for re-election after a four-year
term. Moreover, the operation of the Tribunal has been dependent on
hundreds of millions of dollars in contributions from the United States and
its Western allies. And most of the staff of the office of the International
Prosecutor are on loan from NATO countries.
Although a creature of the United Nations, the Tribunal has,
according to its former president, Antonio Cassese, tended to "take into
account the exigencies and tempo of the international community." There
are those who would argue that this means that the Tribunal has yielded to
the objectives of the United States and other NATO powers, without whose
financial and military support the Tribunal could not function.
VI. THE TIMING OF THE INDICTMENT
For evidence of the political influence of the United States on the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, Milosevic can turn to the suspicious timing of his
indictment. It was issued on May 22, 1999, sixty days into the 78-day
NATO bombing campaign against Serbia. The indictment came down at a
crucial time when popular support for the intervention was waning in
several NATO countries in the face of intense press criticism of NATO's
use of cluster bombs and depleted uranium munitions, attacks on civilian
trains, truck convoys, and media centers, and the accidental bombings of
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the territory of neighboring
Bulgaria. If this forced a premature end to the bombing campaign,
American officials feared that it might irrevocably damage the credibility
of NATO, potentially leading to its demise.
After years of pressuring the International Prosecutor not to indict the
Serb leader whose cooperation was seen as essential for the Balkan peace
process, suddenly the United States was pressing for the immediate
issuance of charges against Milosevic, knowing that such action would
bolster the political will of the NATO countries to continue the bombing
campaign, and ultimately force Milosevic to accept NATO's terms for
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Kosovo. And after years of refusing to turn over sensitive intelligence data
to the Tribunal in order to protect "sources and methods," the United
States and Britain were hurriedly handing over reams of satellite imagery,
telephone intercepts, and other top-secret information to help the
Prosecutor make the case against Milosevic.
To make matters even more questionable, a few weeks after issuing
the Milosevic indictment, the International Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, was
given her dream job: the only seat on the Supreme Court of Canada open
to an Ontario resident that was likely to be available during her
professional lifetime. One doesn't need to use much imagination to guess
what would have happened to Arbour's judicial prospects if, instead of
indicting Milosevic, she had issued an indictment charging NATO leaders
with war crimes in the midst of the intervention.
VII. THE MANNER OF MILOSEVIC'S SURRENDER
The newly elected President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Vojislav Kostunica, backed up by a federal court ruling, refused to permit
the extradition of Milosevic to The Hague. But in a late-night move that
caught everyone off guard, Kostunica's political rival, Prime Minister
Zoran Djindjic, instructed the Serb police under his command to secretly
take Milosevic to an American air base in Tuzla, Bosnia, from which
Milosevic was transferred by military jet to The Hague on July 28, 2001.
In announcing the action, Djindjic said that he had been forced to take a
"difficult but morally correct" decision to protect the interests of Serbia
(that is, the United States and its European allies were promising $1.28
billion in aid in return for the surrender of Milosevic). Immediately
thereafter, a furious Kostunica protested that the extradition of Milosevic
was "illegal and unconstitutional."
Meanwhile, on board the flight to The Hague, Milosevic reportedly
told the tribunal officials who read him his rights, "You are kidnapping
me, and you will answer for your crimes." In analogous cases (Stocke v.
Germany (1991) and Bozano v. France (1986)), the European Court of
Human Rights has held that luring or abduction in violation of established
extradition procedures is a human rights violation for which dismissal is
the appropriate remedy. But the Yugoslavia Tribunal rejected the
argument in the Dokmanovic Case (1997) on the ground that there does not
exist a formal extradition treaty between the Tribunal and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
Whatever the technical legal merits of his argument, politically, the
timing of Milosevic's surrender could not be worse for the Tribunal. He
arrived at the Yugoslavia Tribunal on St. Vitus's day, the solemn holiday
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commemorating the historic Serb defeat to the Ottoman Turks at the battle
of Kosovo Poije in 1389, which figures so prominently into the Serb
mythology of victimization.
VIII. UNCLEAN HANDS
To further illustrate the Tribunal's politicization, Milosevic will
attempt to force the Tribunal to face the tu quoque argument (literally
meaning "you too"). First, Milosevic may point out that Franjo Tudjman,
the former leader of Croatia, was never indicted by the Tribunal for the
mass atrocities that Croatian troops committed against the Serbs in re-
taking Serb-controlled areas of eastern Croatia. In fact, Tudjman was
welcomed to the United States for cancer treatment at Walter Reed
Hospital in Washington, D.C., a few months before his death in 1999.
Next, Milosevic will raise the issue of NATO war crimes. When
several respected human rights organizations urged the Tribunal to
investigate the possibility that NATO had committed war crimes during the
1999 intervention, the then Prosecutor, Louise Arbour (from Canada, a
NATO country), assigned the task to her Legal Adviser, William Fenrick.
Fenrick is an ex-NATO lawyer, who went to the tribunal directly from his
post as director of law for operations and training in the Canadian
Department of Defense. Not surprisingly, Fenrick's report, which was
released in June 2000, concluded that NATO had committed no indictable
offenses. But critics have been quick to seize upon the clause of the report
that notes that the review of NATO's actions relied primarily on public
documents produced by NATO, and that the authors of the report "tended
to assume that the NATO and NATO countries' press statements are
generally reliable and that explanations have been honestly given."
.Finally, Milosevic may argue that the United States opposition to a
permanent international criminal court has undermined its moral right to
participate in any way in the trial of Milosevic. According to United
States officials, such international tribunals are prone to politicization-the
very argument that Milosevic has made about the Yugoslavia Tribunal.
There are several answers to Milosevic's tu quoque arguments. First,
whatever Franjo Tudjman and NATO have done, their actions do not
excuse what Milosevic did. Second, the Tribunal's Prosecutor at the time
of the Milosevic indictment, Louise Arbour, has stated that she was about
to issue an indictment for Franjo Tudjman just before the Croatian
President passed away, demonstrating that the Tribunal was striving to be
evenhanded. Third, whether or not one believes NATO violated the laws
of war during the 1999 bombing campaign, NATO did not systematically
set out to kill and torture civilians on a mass scale-the crimes of which
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Milosevic has been accused. The alleged NATO offenses are just not in a
league with those of which Milosevic is charged. Fourth, established
democracies have mechanisms (a free press, political opposition, and an
independent judiciary) to examine publicly their own past: for example,
America's actions in Vietnam or France's use of torture in Algeria. While
Serbia was willing to try Milosevic for corruption, the Yugoslavia Tribunal
is the only venue in which his war crimes and crimes against humanity
could be exposed.
Finally, these arguments might suggest that the Tribunal's Prosecutors
might have been out to get Milosevic. But selective prosecution is never a
valid defense, even in domestic trials. Milosevic's ultimate fate is in the
hands of the Tribunal's judges, not its prosecutor. As long as the bench is
impartial, and the procedures are equitable, the trial of Milosevic will be
considered credible.
IX. COMPOSITION OF THE BENCH
Given that the pool of the Tribunal's judges that were available for the
Milosevic trial included citizens from several countries that had no stake in
the Balkan conflict, the three judges assigned by Chief Judge Jorda to
preside over the case represented a most unfortunate selection. The judge
selected to head the panel, Richard May, hails from one of the NATO
countries (the United Kingdom) that led the 1999 intervention against
Serbia. May is said to have close continuing contacts with the British
Foreign Ministry. The second judge, Patrick Robinson, is from Jamaica, a
Caribbean country with very close political and economic ties to the United
States and United Kingdom. Having served with Judge May on other
trials, Robinson is said to be somewhat too deferential to his British
associate on the bench. Only the third judge, O-Gon Kwan of South
Korea, who replaced the judge originally assigned to the trial, Mohamed
El Habib Fassi Fihri of Morocco, hails from an unquestionably netural
country.
These distinguished jurists could not be expected to recuse themselves
from participating on the Milosevic bench because, that would be an
admission of their bias and would subvert the credibility of the Tribunal as
a whole. And yet, however fair and impartial these judges actually turn
out to be, one can certainly understand why some might perceive that the
"fix is in." In this regard, Osgoode Hall Law Professor Michael Mandel
maintains that "Milosevic has about as much chance of getting a fair trial
from this court as he had of defeating NATO in an air war."
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X. FAIRNESS OF THE PROCEDURES
In addition to an impartial bench, the validity of the trial depends on
the court allowing Milosevic the equality of arms and fair procedures
which the Nuremberg defendants did not receive.
Another criticism of Nuremberg that Milosevic will attempt to
resurrect was that the Nuremberg Tribunal did not comport with due
process because it permitted the prosecution to base much of its case on
hearsay evidence and ex parte affidavits. In its previous cases, the
Yugoslavia Tribunal has similarly permitted unfettered use of hearsay by
prosecution witnesses, as well as anonymous witnesses, whose identities
are not provided to the defendant or defense counsel. These rulings have
undermined the right to examine or cross-examine witnesses supposedly
guaranteed by the Yugoslavia Tribunal Statute. Simply put, the right of
confrontation cannot be effective without the right to know the identity of
adverse witnesses. With the stakes as high as they are in the Milosevic
trial, it is unlikely that the Tribunal will permit anonymous witnesses, and
it will probably be far more circumspect with regard to the use of hearsay
evidence.
Another criticism of the Nuremberg procedures was that those
acquitted by the Tribunal were retried and convicted in subsequent
proceedings before national courts. The Statute of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, in contrast, expressly protects defendants against double jeopardy
by prohibiting national courts from retrying persons who have been tried
by the International Tribunal. However, by permitting the Tribunal's
Prosecutor to appeal an acquittal, Milosevic may argue that the Tribunal
itself infringes the accused's interest in finality which underlies the double
jeopardy principle.
As the United States Supreme Court has said, "Perhaps the most
fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been
that a verdict of acquittal ... could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise,
without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the
Constitution." The proscription of the Double Jeopardy Clause applies no
matter how erroneous or ill-advised the trial court's decision appears to the
appeals court. The rationale for the American rule is that permitting a
second trial after an acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have
been, would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with
its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that even
though innocent, he may be found guilty. This rationale is just as
applicable to prosecution before an international criminal court as to
domestic prosecutions. The Yugoslavia Tribunal's Office of Prosecutor,
together with State authorities assisting that office, will have the full
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resources of the Tribunal and several interested States behind it, while
1,Milosevic and his counsel have minimal resources at their disposal.
Yet, this expansive notion of double jeopardy is a uniquely American
judicial concept. Other common law countries such as Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom permit their prosecutors to appeal acquittals. And
while it may offend American sensibilities, a prosecutorial appeal is
perfectly consistent with international standards of due process, as well as
with the practice of the courts in Serbia. In light of the unique function of
the Yugoslavia Tribunal, prosecutorial appeals may be important to
ensuring uniform precedent
XI. CONCLUSIONS
As described above, Slobodan Milosevic adopted a trial strategy of
attacking the legitimacy of the International Tribunal at every opportunity
rather than trying to prove his innocence of the charges against him. But
his refusal to "play by the rules" was blunted somewhat by the Tribunal's
clever decision on the eve of trial to appoint three distinguished defense
counsel to act as "friends of the court" and thereby to ably build
Milosevic's defense in court, regardless of his wishes.
In the end, Milosevic may still be able to convince many throughout
the world that the Yugoslavia Tribunal is not quite the impartial
international justice system, immune from big power influence, that its
founders had promised. But only starry-eyed idealists could ever have
imagined that power politics would play no part in the timing and targeting
of the Tribunal's indictments. By way of comparison, despite its
shortcomings, few today question the validity of the judgment of the
Nuremberg Tribunal because the defendants were convicted on the strength
of their own meticulously-kept documents. Similarly, if the International
Prosecutor is able to prove the case against Milosevic with compelling
evidence, Milosevic will have a much harder time convincing anyone that
his trial represents a denial of justice.
But, one of the modem myths of Nuremberg is that the German
people immediately accepted the legitimacy of the Tribunal. Opinion polls
conducted by the United States Department of State from 1946 through
1958 indicated that a large majority of West Germans considered the
Nuremberg proceedings to be nothing but a show trial, representing
victor's justice rather than real justice. Yet two generations later, the
German people largely speak of the Nuremberg Tribunal with respect, and
Germany is the foremost advocate of the permanent international criminal
court. Perhaps this suggests that regardless of the strength of the evidence,
the Serb people will not immediately embrace the findings of the
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Yugoslavia Tribunal in the Milosevic case, and that the question of its
success will await the judgment of future generations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When this panel was originally conceived, we could not have
anticipated the extent to which the limits of international law would have to
be stretched by events in the city where our conference would be held.
Our thinking about the pace and nature of changes shifting the boundaries
of international law have had to be radically revised and the aftermath of
September l1th has necessarily prompted a significant change in the
thinking about the limits of international law. In the place of the sense of
confidence in the consistent deepening of globalization, and the attendant
web of international legal frameworks for the regulation of transnational
activity, we are confronted with a sudden pessimism of the impotence of
law in the face of violence. Rather than taking up the question of evolving
practices of inclusion in and exclusion from international participation, as I
had originally intended, I will focus my discussion on the available
paradigms through which we might understand the spectrum of
international options in responding to the attacks of September 11th.' This
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1999; M.P.A., Princeton University, 1999; M.Phil.,
University of Cambridge, 1995; B.A. Williams College, 1993. These remarks were presented at
the International Law Association ILA Weekend, October 2001, New York, New York, United
States.
1. There is a subtle relationship between this question and the original subject of my
remarks, but the constraints of the presentation on which these remarks are based did not allow
more than an allusion to this link. Practices of inclusion in and exclusion from international
participation-by which I mean formal mechanisms of recognition and accession to international
legal regimes, as well as informal mechanisms for the entry into or exclusion from regular
channels of inter-state transactions-can also be described as strategies of engagement or
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subject requires a somewhat more prescriptive approach than legal
academics are in the habit of adopting. However, the urgency of the
current international crisis, and the convergence of policy and legal
approaches on the question of designing new mechanisms to counter
terrorism, warrants stepping out of character.
The first question to which we must turn our attention in asking how
to wage the battle against terrorism is whether we are best served by
conceptualizing the attacks as criminal acts or acts of war.2 While there
containment. The classic mechanism of inclusion is the entry into diplomatic relations. The
classic mechanism of exclusion is the withholding of recognition or the imposition of sanctions.
Between these examples, there is a wide array of practices of inclusion and exclusion that may be
considered. Recent trends in American foreign policy, including the use of unilateral and
multilateral sanctions, has given rise to the question whether the formal mechanisms of
membership in the international community (recognition as a declaratory statement that an entity
meets the objective test of statehood through effective control of its territory) are being displaced
by the development of normative or quasi-normative criteria governing inclusion in and exclusion
of states from participation in a variety of international fora. For an example of the definition of
this "objective test," see the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art.
1, 49 Stat. 3097, 3099, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 21 (providing that "[t]he State as a person of
international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a
defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.").
The question, when we turn our attention to developing responses under international law
to the threat of terrorism, is whether there is any effective 'means of "containing" terrorism
through exclusionary practices whereby states are subjected to coercive intervention. As I will
suggest below, treating terrorism as an international crime, and attacks of the kind witnessed on
September 1 1th as massive crimes against humanity, would permit the invocation of principles of
universal jurisdiction in the pursuit of those responsible for such acts, wherever they may be
located. Under such a conception, states may be engaged through a series of international legal
obligations in a transnational effort to pursue, prosecute and punish terrorists found within their
territory, with appropriate sanctions associated with the failure to do so. For a discussion of
proposed principles for the implementation of universal jurisdiction through national courts, see
STEPHEN MACEDO, THE PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURSIDICTION, THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001). In contrast, to treat acts of international
terrorism as acts of war authorizing the use of force against territories from which terrorists may
operate suggests a military paradigm for countering the threat of terrorist violence. Where the
use of force encompasses not only those responsible for terrorist acts, but states where they may
be present (with no necessary requirement of state-sponsorship) such a strategy would contribute
to the development of exclusionary mechanisms under international law by broadening the
grounds on which states may become subject to coercive intervention. However, the
effectiveness of conventional uses of force in combating what may be a transnational
phenomenon not bound to a particular territorial base is questionable, especially when the high
costs to the international system of destabilizing military interventions and their aftermaths are
taken into consideration. I will provide principled and pragmatic arguments for the privileging of
a legalist paradigm over a military one. For the purposes of the remainder of this discussion,
however, the inclusionary or exclusionary implications of different strategies in combating
terrorism are of secondary concern, and will have to be left to be taken up elsewhere.
2. Although this has been conceived as an either/or question in most discussions of the
status of the attacks under international law, it is more accurate to say that the attacks blurred the
lines between criminal acts and acts of war. The question remains, however, whether the
appropriate response to the attacks should draw more on the resources in international law to
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are strong arguments for both paradigms, when viewed from the
perspective of fashioning an effective, long-term strategy for countering
international terrorism, I will argue that drawing on international criminal
law is the more promising avenue of response. In particular, I will make
the case that adopting a politico-military approach rather than a legalist
paradigm undermines the effectiveness of international law, in ways
dangerous to international order, and potentially detrimental to efforts to
prevent and punish acts of terrorism. In the third section of this essay, I
will turn to the question of the resources already available in international
law, and the ways that the boundaries of international law may be shifted,
to address terrorism.
II. Two PARADIGMS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO
TERRORISM: POLITICO-MILITARY AND INTERNATIONAL-LEGALIST
While the September l1th attacks were an unprecedented form of
international terrorism, international law is not without resources for
developing an appropriate and effective response. International law, like
all bodies of law, develops through the application of precedents to like
cases, or the adaptation of precedents to suit new circumstances by way of
extrapolation and analogy. There are two relevant precedents for
considering how an international response to massive terrorist attacks may
be fashioned in the wake of the September 1lth attacks. The first is the
Nuremberg war crimes tribunal,, and the international legalist paradigm
address transnational crime or whether there should be a reliance on the use of force. This is the
question that I mean to evoke here, and not the diversionary debate over the fit between the
attacks and pre-existing conceptions of terrorism and war. See also infra note 7.
3. One challenge to the applicability of the Nuremberg precedent and the developing
practice of international criminal tribunals in this context is that in each case these tribunals have
been convened in the aftermath of a war or crime against humanity. According to this reasoning,
the use of international tribunals cannot be relevant until the conclusion of the military campaign
against the particular terrorist organization or network implicated in the September 11 th attacks.
But this argument presumes the necessity of undertaking military action in response to the attacks
and subordinates the use of an international tribunal to a secondary and subsequent phase of
response. If, however, the convening of an international criminal tribunal were considered as an
alternative to a military approach, this objection ceases to be relevant. That is, if the attacks of
September llth were conceptualized as a crime against humanity, then the convening of the
tribunal would clearly be subsequent to the crime, and thus the timing objection would have been
met.
Aside from this timing objection, however, there are at least three other disadvantages that
may be cited to convening international tribunals to prosecute terrorists for crimes against
humanity: 1) the difficulty of apprehending the perpetrators; 2) the inadequacy of international
criminal law to the task of deterring transnational crime; and 3) the risk of acquittal.
The first two objections are pragmatic, and as a matter of practical urgency, will be
resolved. In the first case, transnational efforts to develop an international policing capacity,
through the United Nations or through a specific, separate multilateral framework, are long
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that developed out of that precedent, leading to the creation of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the "ICTY"),'4
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the "ICTR"),' and
ultimately the drafting of the statute for the International Criminal Court
(the "ICC").6 The other is the Kosovo War of 1999, with the political and
military paradigm of a coalition that represents a subset of the international
community and that operates outside of a United Nations framework to
undertake an enforcement action in response to aggression or crimes
overdue. In response to the second objection, one can readily point to the tremendous
acceleration in the formulation of international criminal law over the last decade. The particular
objection in this instance could be overcome by the convening of an ad hoc tribunal, the statute
of which would provide all of the relevant legal grounds necessary for prosecution. I discuss this
option below. Beyond this, the deterrence debate is one intrinsic to all instances of criminal
prosecution, whether domestic or international. While no application of law can fully deter
extremism, raising the costs of sponsoring or facilitating terrorist acts will serve as an important
deterrent to state sponsorship. A full discussion of the deterrent value of a legalist paradigm,
with all of its complexity, is beyond the scope of this essay. For one thorough analysis of the
question of deterrence in applications of international criminal law, see JUDITH SHKLAR,
LEGALISM (1964).
As for the third objection, it seems misplaced. In the past, international criminal tribunals,
including the Nuremberg tribunal, have issued a (quite limited) number of acquittals. In light of
the magnitude of the crimes against humanity in question at Nuremberg, and in the ICTY and the
ICTR, if the risk of acquittal was deemed acceptable in these cases (and in the cases of the latter
two tribunals, they were convened in the absence of the "total" military defeat of the parties
accused of the crimes), then it is difficult to imagine the distinct principled or pragmatic
argument against permitting the possibility of acquittal in the case of trials of alleged terrorists.
After all, the possibility of the innocence of at least some persons brought before such a tribunal
cannot be excluded.
4. This is the official abbreviated title for the Tribunal. See U.N. Press Release, No.
IT/13, Nov. 30, 1993, and No. IT/30, Feb. 11, 1994. The full title of the ICTY is the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991. For the Security Council resolution establishing the ICTY, see U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993).
5. The full title of the ICTR is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and
31 December 1994. For the Security Council resolution establishing the ICTR, see S. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
6. The Statute for the International Criminal Court was drafted at the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court [hereinafter, "U.N. Diplomatic Conf. of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
ICC"] held in Rome, Italy (1998). See Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N.
Diplomatic Conf. of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an ICC, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998).
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against humanity.7 I will consider the former to represent the international
legalist tradition, and the latter a politico-military approach.
7. By "Kosovo war" I am referring to the eleven-week bombing campaign conducted by
NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, beginning on March 24, 1999. This
campaign was designated "Operation Allied Force" and had many unique features worth bearing
in mind. Most importantly, the Kosovo war may represent a precedent for expanding the
international legal basis for the use of force. As at least one international legal scholar has noted,
Operation Allied Force represented "the first time a major use of destructive armed force had
been undertaken with the stated purpose of implementing UN Security Council resolutions but
without Security Council authorization." Adam Roberts, NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over
Kosovo, 41(3) SURVIVAL 102, 102 (1999).
In this sense, this is a more pertinent example than the common references to the Pearl
Harbor attack as the relevant precedent for a military response. Where the Pearl Harbor attack
had all of the features of a conventional form of state aggression (on the part of Japan) giving rise
to a straightforward right of self-defense on the part of the victim of that aggression (the U.S.).
The bombing campaign against Afghanistan by Anglo-American forces-initially dubbed
'Operation Infinite Justice,' but later renamed 'Operation Enduring Freedom'-which began on
October 7, 2001, resembles the Kosovo campaign in that it does not enjoy direct Security
Council authorization, though two resolutions in September express the United Nations's support
for efforts to combat terrorism.
In the case of the air campaign against Afghanistan, the American representative to the
United Nations, Ambassador John Negroponte, presented a letter to the Security Council on
October 8, 2001 stating that the attacks against Afghanistan were acts of self-defense under
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. See Christopher Wren, U.S. Advises U.N.
Council More Strikes Could Come, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at B5. Absent evidence
establishing state sponsorship on the part of Afghanistan of the attacks of September 11th, this
invocation of the right of self-defense reflects an expansive interpretation of the Article 51. In
particular, while Article 51 recognizes an "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
[sic] if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations" it has not previously
been interpreted to permit uses of force against a state not held directly responsible for the attack
in question. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
Thus the question arises whether the right of self-defense extends to attacks on states on
whose territory non-state actors believed to be responsible for an armed attack may be present.
Some international jurists have argued that the unprecedented nature of the September lth
attacks combined with the apparent absence of a direct state-sponsor require a broadening of the
United Nation Charter's authorization of the use of force to cover actions like Operation
Enduring Freedom, and future uses of military force to attack terrorists wherever they may be
located. See, e.g., Richard Falk, Falk Replies, THE NATION, Nov. 26, 2001, at 2. Such a
broadened definition of the justified use of force would only be necessary if it could be
established that the nature of the threat is of a continuous, military onslaught by an organization
or network with access to military technologies.
What the attacks of September 1 1th have so far proved is the ability of non-state actors to
hijack civilian technologies and use them in acts of political violence. Hijacking itself is not, of
course, a new phenomenon, and it is a phenomenon that has been defined in the past as an
instance of transnational crime, which has largely been deterred or prevented through national
security precautions and international coordination. Whether hijacking coupled with the use of
the hijacked planes to attack civilian or military targets transforms the criminal act into an act of
war depends on a definitional question requiring the adaptation of existing definitions to these
circumstances, as there is no clear precedent. The September l1th attacks constitute a blurring
of the line between criminal acts and acts of war in a way that challenges pre-existing
international legal categorizations, and accordingly challenges international lawyers to fashion
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The international legal community has been somewhat disabled in
formulating an adequate account of what a response in the first tradition
might be. On September 1lth, it would seem, from this perspective, that
we reached the limits of international law. Events overtook theory and as
the military attacks on Afghanistan began, consideration of international
legal mechanisms became moot. Despite the apparent current pessimism
regarding the adequacy of legal mechanisms, considerable resources are
available in the international legal arsenal to formulate an adequate non-
military response. Further, military action may have unfortunate
international legal consequences, establishing new norms with problematic
implications and undermining the perceived legitimacy behind subsequent
efforts at a legalist response in the wake of a military campaign.
The attacks of September 1 1th were widely seen by media
commentators and international legal scholars alike as demonstrating a
series of deficiencies in international law. These include, but are not
limited to:
* the absence of a comprehensive international legal framework to
address terrorism;
* the absence of adequate international criminal law infrastructure
to address massive crimes against humanity and/or acts of war,
particularly by non-state actors;
* the absence of sufficient international legal mechanisms for
regulating, monitoring, prosecuting, and punishing non-state actors;
and
* the absence of international policing capacities and adequate
cooperative arrangements to undertake intelligence gathering and
crime prevention at the international or multilateral level.
The response of the international legal community to these
deficiencies in the immediate aftermath of September 11 th has been a
woeful retreat from the earlier trend of increasing the range of issues
brought within the purview of international law. 8
new categories, drawing by analogy on our existing taxonomy. The debate, then, should not be
whether the attacks were criminal or military in nature, but rather whether the international
response should draw more heavily on existing resources for international crime prevention or
for authorizing uses of force. I will come to this question below.
8. This retreat reflects the view, supported by the deficiencies listed above, that the
severity of the threat posed by international terrorism dooms the legalist paradigm to irrelevance.
See, e.g., Falk, supra note 7. However, many facets of the present multilateral efforts, beyond
the military campaign against Afghanistan, reflect a tacit reliance on the legalist paradigm, in the
form of international cooperation in intelligence-gathering, policing, law enforcement, and the
prosecution of suspected terrorists. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Spain to Study U.S. Requests
to Extradite Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B4. The question remains whether
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Yet avenues of response to the challenge of terrorist crimes against
humanity had already been proposed and developed during the 1990s by
the Sixth (or Legal) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
("Legal Committee") to suggest an international legal framework within
which to conceptualize international responses to the present challenge.
These proposals developed in conjunction with the push to establish a
statute for an international criminal court. Even as the ICC statute was
being formulated in Rome in 1998, 9 in New York the General Assembly
("UNGA") commissioned an ad hoc committee on international terrorism
to begin drafting a new comprehensive convention on international
terrorism. The declared goal of the UNGA and its Legal Committee was
to convene a high-level conference in the year 2000 under United Nations
auspices to "formulate a joint, organized response of the international
community to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations." 1 It is perhaps
useful to note that this language would not sound out of place in describing
the goals of the United States in its efforts to form a multilateral coalition
to wage the "war on terrorism."',
The UNGA approach of 1996 onward was well suited to the nature of
the threat posed by international terrorist activities; transnational threats
require the development of a framework for coordinated international
effort. But there are two further questions to consider. First, in light of
these efforts, what international legal mechanisms are available to cope
with an attack on the scale of what was witnessed on September llth?
Second, why are such mechanisms preferable to the ad hoc military
these approaches, rather than short-term military strategy, are not the more likely to characterize
the battle against international terrorism in the long run, and if so, whether an acceleration in the
development of international law in these areas, coupled with the use of existing international
organizations (like the United Nations) to coordinate present efforts does not represent a viable
and highly relevant legalist paradigm in addressing the terrorist threat.
9. See supra note 6.
10. U.N. Doc. GA/L/3103.
11. Several commentators have noted the parallel between the metaphor of war in the
struggle against terrorism and the deployment of the same metaphor in American policies to
counter international narcotics trafficking. See, e.g., Tim Golden, A War on Terror Meets a War
on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4. The limitations of the
metaphor in invoking the most effective mechanisms for preventing international narcotics
trafficking may be instructive in considering the prospects for success of a military effort to curb
terrorism. In particular, if the organization or network in question does not operate primarily
from a single territorial base, then the benefits of destroying particular physical infrastructure
(which in the case of a state is often devastating to its capacity to continue to pose a threat) may
have little consequence in the long-term. The problem, in dealing with transnational threats is
precisely fashioning responses that are not territorially specific, and that address the sources that
sustain the threat, which in the case of terrorism, as with narcotics trafficking, may have little to
do with physical location.
B6li 409
410 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:403
approach now being undertaken? Let us come at this in reverse order, and
ask first what the politico-military approach has been.
The strategies in this approach have ranged from measured to
hysterical, but have largely revolved around dividing states between those
that join in an international coalition against terrorism and those that
sponsor terrorism. 2 The former are admitted into a loose military and
diplomatic alliance, while the latter are targeted for military and diplomatic
attack. The specific strategy of the military attack, at least in the early
stages against Afghanistan, was an attempt to target areas where physical
infrastructure associated with terrorist organizations or networks may have
been located. The absence of substantial terrorist infrastructure, coupled
with a frustration with the regime in power in Afghanistan, quickly led to
an expansion of the military strategy to the toppling of that regime and
support to a rival faction on the ground. In the process, collateral damage
with respect to civilian targets occurred and there may have been
substantial violations of the laws of war.'3 The expansion of the aims of
the military campaign, the strategy of dividing nations between those that
support the coalition and those that support terrorism, and the absence of
12. This strategy has been developed primarily by the Bush administration in the United
States and the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair in the United Kingdom. See, e.g.,
Elisabeth Bumiller, Prepare for Casualties, Bush Says, While Asking Support of Nation, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at Al (noting that President Bush "posed a stark choice to other nations.
'Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make,' he said. 'Either you are with us, or
you are with the terrorists.'"); Nicholas Blatt and Suzanne Goldenberg, Blair Delivers the Final
Warning: Tough New Rhetoric May Signal Strike at Regime Within Week, THE GUARDIAN
(LONDON), Sept. 26, 2001, at 1. The Bush-Blair military campaign is not, of course, the only
means by which a politico-military strategy for dealing with the threat of terrorism might be
formulated. However, it is instructive that the approach they adopted required identifying state
entities that might be the legitimate target of a use of force, although no allegations of state-
sponsorship of the actual attacks of September l1th were ever issued. Accordingly, the impulse
to divide the international system between those that will join a coalition against terrorism and
those that will be targeted by it is a politically expedient policy for distinguishing appropriate
targets of attack. The absence of a connection between the states that are potential targets of the
military campaign and direct responsibility for the attacks is an indication of the poor fit between
the military strategy and the atrocity it is intended to address.
13. See, e.g., Nicholas Watt, Richard Gordon-Taylor, and Luke Harding, Allies Justify
Mass Killing, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Nov. 29, 2001, at 1 (noting that "Britain and the
United States were facing growing international pressure ... to explain their role in the deaths of
up to 400 Taliban prisoners who were killed by United States warplanes and Northern Alliance
fighters at a fortress outside the northern Afghan town of Mazar-i-Sharif'). Whether the
circumstances surrounding this massacre rise to the level of a violation of the Third Geneva
Convention is unclear, but other aspects of military policy have also raised concerns. See, e.g.,
Dexter Filkins and Carlotta Gall, Foreign Militants Seek Safe Passage From Afghan City, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al (noting that United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
"was firmly opposed to any agreement to evacuating the foreigners" from the besieged city of
Kunduz).
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any clear allegation that the state(s) targeted by the military campaign bear
direct responsibility for the September llth attacks are all sources of
serious concern.
More generally, the politico-military response glosses over a number
of obvious difficulties, such as defining terrorism, determining how to
address different forms of terrorism (ranging from state-terrorism to
terrorism by transnational non-state actors that may or may not have state
sponsorship to terrorism by domestic groups with no international
ambitions), and developing an internationally coordinated strategy that
includes policing capabilities, intelligence gathering and sharing
arrangements, and enforcement mechanisms. Arrangements involving
sufficient international cooperation to develop effective intelligence sharing
and policing capacities have proven historically to involve enormous
obstacles, which is part of the reason that a legal framework on terrorism
has been slow in developing, as have frameworks on international narcotics
trafficking. I would argue that the only means of assuring long-term
multilateral cooperation in these areas is through an agreed, legally binding
framework.
One short-cut around developing complex mechanisms to cope with
the surveillance, policing, and enforcement capacities required to combat
non-state terrorism currently being tested is to develop criteria whereby
individual states may be penalized through existing international
mechanisms, thereby generating state-level incentives to do the dirty-work
of prevention, prosecution, and/or punishment. By attributing
responsibility to putative state sponsors, international pressure might be
brought to bear on individual states to undertake the massive intelligence
gathering, policing, and enforcement measures necessary to combat
terrorism. Thus, states that are known to have terrorist bases within their
borders, or states that appear to be involved in the financing of terrorist
networks, would bear the costs of international prevention efforts. While
this alternative seems attractive at first, and certainly underlies current
efforts to identify states that "harbor" terrorists, absent a coherent and
comprehensive legal framework this approach encounters difficulties.
First, if physical location (i.e., provision of a "harbor") is a basis for guilt-
by-association then presumably one should attribute culpability as much to
Hamburg, London, and parts of Florida, Maryland, and New Jersey, not
to mention Riyadh and Dubai, as to Kandahar. Second, if facilitating the
financing of terrorist networks is a basis for guilt then, again, it would
appear that several major Western banking groups would have to face as
much international scrutiny and pressure as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.
What this shows is not that we should bomb Germany or dismantle major
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banking groups, but that the definitions being used are overly broad or
unsound and require precision and systematization.
Bypassing these difficulties by invocation of an us-and-them strategy
that divides the world between the coalition against terrorism and those that
allegedly sponsor terrorism is unhelpful. So long as sponsorship of the IRA
in Northern Ireland or ETA in the Basque region of Spain or the FARC in
Colombia is not at issue, the question is not a division between those that
do and do not sponsor terrorism, but rather a division between different
forms of terrorism, with different goals and different tactics. Efforts to
draw a sharp line between those that oppose and those that support
terrorism also run certain risks, not least because the civilizational
overtones of these efforts confirm the worldview of the very terrorist
groups that the coalition is seeking to combat. In light of the potential
disadvantages of the military approach, let us now to turn to an account of
the alternative legal mechanisms available for managing the threat of
international terrorism.4
III. EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Well in advance of September 11th, international jurists had begun to
undertake the monumental task of extending the boundaries of international
law to develop mechanisms to deal with transnational criminal actors,
whether terrorists, mafia, or international traffickers of illegal materials.
Viewed widely as the underside of globalization, the transnationalization of
crime and the trade in commodities previously regulated exclusively by
states (including precious minerals, drugs, and weapons of mass
destruction) requires a coordinated international legal response, involving
international policing capacities, intelligence-gathering, and prevention
work, as well as development of international criminal law to prosecute
14. I should note at the outset, however, that there are a series of legal mechanisms that
are relevant to the current crisis-especially now that it has entered the phase of actual military
action against a state-that are beyond the scope of this essay, though they are highly relevant.
These are the laws of war, both jus ad bello and more importantly jus in bello. Clearly, to the
extent that a politico-military approach is adopted, any use of force must be governed by the laws
of war-including the requirements of the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations-
beginning with the principles of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination between
combatants and non-combatants. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
with annex of regulations, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (Hague Convention); Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (First Geneva Convention); Convention for the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (Second Geneva Convention); Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Third Geneva
Convention); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Fourth Geneva Convention).
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those accused of undertaking such crime. In the face of these realities, the
UNGA began efforts in earnest to draft a comprehensive convention
against international terrorism by the mid-1990s, parallel to the efforts to
draft a statute for a permanent international criminal court.
The first draft that emerged from these efforts was the draft
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, which was opened for signature in January 2000, in the hopes
of having enough state signatories to have it take effect by December 31,
2001.15 The convention would make it an international crime for any
person to intentionally and unlawfully finance the commission of an act
that constitutes a terrorist offense. Terrorist offenses, in turn, were
defined not only within the convention, but also in relation to definitions in
nine other terrorism related treaties already in effect, ranging from the
criminalization of attacks on civil aviation to prohibitions on bombings.
These treaties already provide a basis for prosecution of the terrorists
behind the September 11 th attacks.16
Although the UNGA goal of convening an international conference on
terrorism has not yet been accomplished, the impetus to convene such a
conference is clearly present today. The creation of an ad hoc criminal
tribunal for September 1 lth with a statute providing a definition of
terrorism would also be an important step toward developing a
comprehensive international legal framework on terrorism.
While the favored metaphor for conceiving the September 1 lth attacks
has been that of "war" or a "military" act, the attacks challenge our
categories for conceptualizing the distinction between criminal acts and
acts of war. Nonetheless, understanding the attacks by analogy to crimes
against humanity is more constructive than the current efforts to cast the
attacks, and the response to them, militarily. Understood in terms of
15. This Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on December 9, 1999, G.A.
Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 54th Sess., U.N. Docs. A/54/607-16 (1999).
16. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564; Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975; International Convention against the Taking
of Hostages Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, with annex, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080;
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, supplementary to the Convention of Sept. 23, 1971, Feb. 24, 1988, Senate Treaty
Document No. 100-19; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, with protocol, Mar. 10, 1988, Senate Treaty Document No. 101-1;
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 37 I.L.M
249.
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crimes against humanity, the attacks immediately invoke a series of
innovative international legal remedies that we have grown accustomed to
contemplating in the last decade, including: the application of principles of
universal jurisdiction; the convening of ad hoc criminal tribunals; the
invocation of United Nations Security Council collective security powers;
and other comparable measures. These remedies have had a mixed record
of success over the course of the last decade, but they have been refined
and could be adapted to fashion an effective response in the aftermath of
the September 11 th attacks. 7
In concluding my remarks, let me identify three constructive
approaches for making use of the spectrum of relevant international law
and suggesting productive directions for legal developments that could
contribute to restoring international security in the wake of September
1 1th.
First, I would advocate the immediate adoption of the United Nations
General Assembly proposal to convene an international conference to draft
a comprehensive international convention on terrorism, based on the
UNGA Legal Committee's preliminary works." • Such a conference would
produce a working framework to coordinate international policing and
intelligence-gathering efforts that would greatly accelerate the process
already underway to identify perpetrators, their methods and their
organizational structure so as to prevent future attacks.
Second, I would propose the convening of an ad hoc criminal tribunal
(similar to the ICTY and the ICTR)' 9 for the terrorist attacks on New York
and Washington, DC. The statute of such a tribunal could establish
important precedents, including:
0 upholding a principle already being developed by the ICTR,
namely the extension of the definition of a crime against humanity in
customary international law to include crimes perpetrated by non-state
actors;
17. At least one scholar has observed that it has always been in the wake of terrorist acts
that gaps in the existing international legal frameworks have been identified and have stimulated
negotiations. See, e.g., David Freestone, The 1988 International Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 3 INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL
L. 305, 305-06 (1988). The same can, of course, be said for military strategy, which is also
currently being adapted to suit the purposes of a war against actors that have neither effective
control over a territory nor a regular army at their disposal.
18. See supra notes 6, 10, and 14, and accompanying text.
19. See supra notes 4, 5, and 6. It should be noted that such a tribunal need not remain in
existence once the permanent International Criminal Court is established.
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0 providing a definition of international terrorism, with a proper
carve-out for national resistance movements,2 and including a
criminal theory of conspiracy analogous to the one developed at
Nuremberg; and
* reinforcing the criminalization of the trade in controlled
substances or illegal materials, especially where used to finance
terrorist activities (a provision might be developed that would include
all black-market activities for such financing, encompassing the trade
in precious commodities like diamonds as well).
Of the mechanisms I would mention here, the final one is the
extension of the United Nations Security Council's peace and security
mandate to include threats to international peace and security emanating
from international terrorism and other actions by non-state actors or
transnational actors. The precedents set by Security Council resolutions
1368 (200 1)21 and 1373 (200 1)22 move precisely in this direction and,
particularly in the case of Resolution 1373, go a considerable distance in
defining an international legal agenda for preventing and punishing
terrorism. Specifically, 1373 envisions action under Chapter VI 3 of the
United Nations Charter to:
* prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
* criminalize all forms of state support to terrorist entities and
persons and assign serious criminal penalties proportionate to the
crimes;
20. An abiding difficulty in international efforts to establish a comprehensive framework
on terrorism have been definitional debates, largely centered on drawing a distinction between a
"legitimate struggle for self-determination" and terrorism. See, e.g., Press Release: Co.sensus
Eludes Legal Committee in Final Act of Session As It Recommends Blanket Condemnation of
Terrorism-Abstaining States Decry Failure to Distinguish Legitimate Struggle for Self-
determination from Terrorism, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. GA/L/3140
(1999). The current international effort to combat terrorism has drawn a clear division between
non-state actors using political violence to advance self-determination claims (ETA in Spain or
the IRA in Ireland) and the terrorist organizations with a global dimension targeted by the
coalition against terrorism. In this light, it would appear that there is a defacto agreement to the
distinction between terrorist groups and groups exercising either a national right of self-
determination or of self-defense (depending on the perspective adopted). The proposed tribunal
might build on this pragmatic consensus to develop a working definition of terrorism that would
command broad international support.
21. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368
(2001).
22. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1371
(2001).
23. U.N. CHARTER ch. 7, arts. 39-51 (entitled "Action With Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression").
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* facilitate cooperation in intelligence-gathering, investigation, and
prevention, and the exchange of operational information between
states to track the movement of terrorist networks;
* address the links between international terrorism and transnational
crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking and
illegal movements of weapons of mass destruction; and
* encourage all states to become parties to the relevant international
conventions for the prevention of terrorism in order to develop
coordinated mechanisms of prevention and punishment.
The claim that the attacks of September 1 1th transcend the capacities of
the United Nations, and international law more generally, suggests that neither
the organization nor the law is equipped to deal with crime by transnational or
non-state entities. However, it remains an undeniable fact of international life
that the system is organized around states as basic units and that even terrorist
networks have to operate in a system of state boundaries. In such a system,
any response to terrorism will also be organized around states, whether it be
legal or not. International law and international organizations enjoy the
distinct comparative advantage of being designed to facilitate inter-state
interaction and coordination, an advantage with which military strategy can
scarcely compete when faced with an enemy that is not organized militarily but
through transnational coordination.
The insight shared by those who adopt a legalist paradigm in response to
terrorism is that there can be no ad hoc or unilateral solution to terrorism. Nor
in the long run can there by a military solution. Terrorism as it emerged on
September 1 1th is a transnational phenomenon that requires a concerted,
consistent and coordinated international cooperative framework if there is to be
any chance of eliminating the threat. The only viable mechanisms available for
accomplishing integration and coordination of strategy are those of
international law and organization. Efforts to short-cut the development of an
international legal framework to cope with terrorism, in favor of military
coalitions and a binary division of states between good and evil, though
possibly more satisfying to some in the short-term, run the risk of aggravating
the very international divisions that can most easily be exploited to coordinate
further underground criminal and terrorist enterprise. Entrenching an us-and-
them paradigm is in tension with the need for coordination-it is both unlikely
to yield vital information in the short-run and less likely to yield international
security in the long run. A preferable alternative is to employ the resources
already in place within the boundaries of existing international law, and to
pursue constructive proposals on how to shift those boundaries outward.
These efforts, more than any military campaign, hold the long-term promise of
a more secure international system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous forms of non-state actor conduct in violation of treaty-
based and customary international law have been subject to criminal and
civil sanctions in various international and domestic fora for centuries.
Within United States domestic legal processes, early types of non-state
actor violations included, among others, piracy, war crimes, the
counterfeiting of foreign currency, violation of passports, the slave trade,
breaches of neutrality, violations of territorial rights, other acts of hostility,
violence against foreign officials, general trespasses against the law of
nations, conduct of poisoners and assassins, and violations of human
rights.2 Thus, statements that private actor liability did not begin until the
twentieth century or that private actor liability with respect to human rights
did not begin until after World War II would be in serious error. More
recently, the landmark case of Kadic v. Karadzic' provides continued
recognition of private actor liability for, among others, piracy, slave trade,
passport violations, breaches of neutrality, hijacking of aircraft, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and war crimes.4 The United States Executive
1. Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston. Director of the International Law
Institute, Houston Law Center. These remarks were presented at the International Law
Association ILA Weekend, October 2001, New York, New York, United States.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227, 231 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No.
15,329) (Campbell, J., on circuit) (private human rights duties); JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 8, 15-17, 23-24, 120-32 passim (2000);
JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATEs 7-8, 34 n.38, 48-49
ns.60-80, 50 n.88, 182, 201-03, 205, 264-70, 274-76, 289-91 passim (1996).
3. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
4. See id. at 236, 239-43(2d Cir. 1995).
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branch has also recognized on numerous occasions that private actors,
including private companies, can violate international law, including
human rights law, especially when non-state actors have been prosecuted
by the government for violations of international law.,
I. PROSECUTION OF AND LAWSUITS AGAINST BIN LADEN ETAL.
In view of such trends and recognitions, it should not be surprising
that Mr. bin Laden and his entourage, if reasonably accused, as well as the
companies or corporations they control or that are complicit in their illegal
schemes, as private actors, are subject to criminal and civil sanctions in the
United States for violations of international law. For example, if
captured, 6 prosecution of Mr. bin Laden and others acting outside the
United States in connection with the September 1 lth terroristic attack on
the United States and on United States nationals is possible under the
United States Antiterrorism Act. 7  Section 2332(a) of the Act is not
applicable to homicide as such arising from the attacks because although
the section applies to "Whoever kills a national of the United States" it
adds the limiting phrase "while such national is outside the United States."
Yet, such language would cover prosecution of homicide against United
States nationals abroad in the case of the bombings of United States
5. See, e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N. C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) ("both
the Executive and Legislative Branches have expressly endorsed the concept of suing terrorist
organizations in federal court"-there, liability for unlawful killing); Haun, 26 F. Cas. at 231
(President Jefferson's recognition in an address to Congress of "violations of human rights" by
private "citizens of the United States"); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907) (U.S. dredging
company is liable for harm caused by dredging activity); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 61, 62 (1796); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795); Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights:
The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in
Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 617-18 (also quoting Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus Curiae in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 at 621 (human rights under
international law "'directly create rights and duties of private individuals . .. ' do create such
rights and duties," (quoting the "highly respected" Constitutional Court of Germany)), 623-24
n.502 (quoting President Washington and E. MCDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE, Supra, at 171), 630-31 (1989), revised in PAUST, supra note 1, at 199-201, 204-05,
269 n.504.
6. I assume that capture of Mr. bin Laden or others in Afghanistan would be permissible
under international law either as lawful acts undertaken during a process of self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter or as lawful acts undertaken during a U.N. Security Council
authorized use of armed force under S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001), which reaffirmed "the need to combat by all means... threats to international
peace and security caused by terrorist acts," id. at pmbl., and called upon all states "to prevent
terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts," id. at 3(c)). Concurring in
the general propriety of arrests in foreign states in such circumstances, see, e.g., PAUST, ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 479.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq.
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Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
Section 2332 (b) does not contain the limiting phrase noted above
regarding the location of United States victims and can cover attempts and
conspiracy in connection with the killing of a national of the United States
(apparently anywhere) although the accused must be "outside the United
States" at the time of the attempt or the engagement in a conspiracy to kill.
Section 2332(c) should also be applicable, since it reaches an accused
"outside the United States" who "engages in physical violence-(1) with
intent to cause serious bodily injury to a national of the United States; or
(2) with the result that serious bodily injury is caused to a national of the
United States." Section 2332(d) requires written certification by the
United States Attorney General "or the highest ranking subordinate" that
offenses under Section 2332 were "intended to coerce, intimidate, or
retaliate against a government or a civilian population"-a certification that
would be relatively easy to make.
Section 2332(b) applies to "acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries" and can form the basis for prosecution, for example, of any
person who kills, maims, or assaults (if the latter results in serious bodily
injury) any person within the United States or "creates a substantial risk of
serious bodily injury to any other person by destroying or damaging any
structure . . . or other real or personal property within the United States..
" if such involves "conduct transcending national boundaries" and one of
the circumstances listed in subsection (b) is present. Relevant
circumstances in subsection (b) could include:
(A) the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce is used
in furtherance of the offense;
(B) the offense obstructs, delays, or affects interstate or foreign
commerce, or would have so obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate or
foreign commerce if the offense had been consummated;
(C) the victim, or intended victim, is the United States Government, a
member of the uniformed services, or any official, officer, employee, or
agent of the legislative, executive, or judicial branches, or of any
department or agency, of the United States;
(D) the structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property is, in
whole or in part, owned, possessed, or leased to the United States, or any
department or agency of the United States.
The listed circumstances would be met if Mr. bin Laden used any
facility of foreign commerce to plan, finance, order, or carry out the
September 11 th attack; if the targeting of the World Trade Center affected
interstate or foreign commerce; if the United States Government and
Pentagon personnel were victims; and/or if the Pentagon was targeted.
Prosecution of non-state and state actors is also possible under United
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States legislation implementing the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (which
in Article 7 thereof also requires all signatories to bring into custody those
reasonably accused of international crimes covered by the treaty and either
to initiate prosecution of or to extradite such persons, without any
exception or limitation of such duty whatsoever). 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)
should be applicable to "[wihoever willfully-(1) . . . destroys, disables,
or wrecks, any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
States" and to whoever "(5) performs an act of violence against or
incapacitates any individual on any such aircraft . . . " and such persons
should include any co-conspirators who were involved in the willful
destruction of United States commercial aircraft flying within United States
airspace.
Since international terrorism9 and crimes against humanity' are
international crimes over which there is universal jurisdiction and a
universal responsibility either to initiate prosecution of or to extradite those
reasonably accused," the United States should also be able to enact new
legislation that operates retroactively for prosecution of what were already
recognizable international crimes under customary international law, and
such legislation should not be challengeable under prohibitions of ex post
facto laws. The permissibility of such retroactive legislation was affirmed,
for example, in the Eichmann case in Israel'2 (also addressing similar
rulings in the Netherlands and Germany); in the United States extradition
decision in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky;'3 and by the Executive officials
applying the 1863 Lieber Code to acts that were already war crimes under
customary international law. 4  Certain persons accused of international
crimes before the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and for
the Far East made claims that Charters of the Tribunals incorporating such
crimes were violative of ex post facto or nullum crimen sine lege precepts,
8. Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 21, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
9. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001);
S.C. Res. 579, U.N. SCOR, 2637th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985); G.A. Res. 40/61,
U.N. GAOR, 108th mtg., Supp. No. 53 at 301, U.N. Doc. AIRES/40/61 (1986); JORDAN J.
PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 995, 1005, 1007 (2d ed. 2000).
10. See, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 9, at 855-916.
11. See, e.g., id. at9, 16-17, 132-35, 140-41.
12. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, reprinted in PAUST ET. AL., supra note 2, at
455.
13. 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
14. See, e.g., DIGEST OF OPS. OF JAG, ARMY 244 (1866); PAUST ET. AL., supra note 9,
at 244-48.
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but the Tribunals correctly ruled that the crimes existed under international
law at the time of their commission and that no such precepts were
violated. 15 Similarly, a new International Criminal Tribunal could be
created by Executive Agreement to prosecute international crimes arising
out of the September 11 th attack.
Civil lawsuits are also possible against non-state persons or
corporations under the Antiterrorism Act, assuming that Mr. bin Laden or
other persons outside the United States are captured and brought to the
United States and process has been served. Section 2333 allows civil
remedies in a lawsuit brought by "[a]ny national of the United States
injured in his or her person, property, or business, by reason of an act of
international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs . . . and
[such plaintiff] shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and
the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees." The main problem after
winning such a lawsuit will involve execution of a judgment on any
properties of the defendants located within the United States (no real
problem) or execution abroad (at the discretion of some foreign court).
Perhaps bank accounts of Mr. bin Laden, his entourage, and companies
involved in terrorism could be frozen not merely for purposes of
preventing the financing of terrorism, but also for recompense and other
types of damages for victims.
Foreign plaintiffs can also sue non-state persons or corporations under
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)' 6 for any wrong in violation of
customary international law and/or treaties of the United States, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'7 or the Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation. 8 Punitive damages are recoverable in such lawsuits.
Under the ATCA, plaintiffs could sue any companies or corporations
complicit in relevant violations of international law, e.g., companies or
corporations used to finance terroristic attacks in violation of human rights.
Whether lawsuits by United States or foreign plaintiffs are possible under
the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)19 depends on interpretation of
phrases such as "extrajudicial killing" and on whether Mr. bin Laden and
15. See, e.g., PAUSTETAL., supra note 9, at 625, 628-29.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 9, 1966, art. 6, 7, 9, 974
U.N.T.S. 171 (in particular, plaintiffs should stress violations of the right to life (art. 6), cruel
and inhumane treatment (art. 7), and liberty and security of person (art. 9). Concerning human
rights duties of non-state actors, see, e.g. supra note 1 and infra notes 26-31, 33-40.).
18. Montreal Convention, supra note 8.
19. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 1992.
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his entourage were acting "under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation" (such as Iraq or Afghanistan). Of course, Mr.
bin Laden is not a leader of any foreign nation, state, belligerency, or
insurgency within the meaning of international law and is merely a private
actor. However, under certain circumstances, private actors can be acting
under actual or "apparent authority" or "color" within the meaning of the
TVPA.2 Appropriate tests recognized in Kadic include inquiry whether
the non-state actor acts "together with" a state, "in concert with" a state,
or with "significant state aid"; 21 and tests recognized in Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Company2 include whether the non-state actor acts "in close
cooperation with" or has "worked closely with" a state.2
If relevant acts were committed by Mr. bin Laden and his entourage
without direct participation in any armed conflict, the acts would not be
war crimes. However, if they were committed in direct connection with
an armed conflict-e.g., as an extension of the armed conflict between Iraq
and the United States and other countries in the ongoing Gulf War or as an
extension out of the insurgency that was occurring prior to September 1 1th
in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance-
prosecution is possible under 10 U.S.C. §§ 818 and 821, as supplemented
for purposes of jurisdiction in the federal courts by 18 U.S.C. § 3231,21
whether or not other war crimes legislation is available alternatively.
When "grave breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (including
"willful killing, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health . . . " to persons protected by the Conventions) have been
committed by any person "inside or outside the United States" against a
United States national, the War Crimes Act of 1996 is operative.,,
Mr. bin Laden and others are also under indictment for various other
crimes in connection with the first bombing of the World Trade Center,
including conspiracy to murder United States nationals, to use weapons of
mass destruction against United States nationals, to destroy United States
buildings and property, and to destroy United States defense utilities. 26
20. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 244-45.
21. Id. at 245.
22. 67 F. Supp.2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
23. Id. at 445-46 and n.27.
24. See, e.g., PAUST ET. AL., supra note 9, at 243-44, 253-59; Jordan J. Paust, The Case
for War Crime Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REV. 6 (1971).
25. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2401 (1996).
26. See United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al., 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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III. PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMPANIES AND CORPORATIONS
MORE GENERALLY
With respect to corporate liability for violations of international law,
it should be noted that a private company or corporation as such is simply
a juridic person and has no immunity under domestic United States or
international law. In each nation-state, private corporations, like private
individuals, are bound by domestic laws .21 Similarly, private corporations
and entities are bound by international laws applicable to individuals. For
example, in the United States and elsewhere, companies and other non-
state associations and organizations have been found to have civil and
criminal responsibility for various violations of international law, including
human rights and related international proscriptions.2 Further, the
27. This widespread pattern of legal responsibility and nonimmunity of private
corporations under domestic law is itself a general principle of law relevant to international legal
decisionmaking. Concerning the relevance of general principles of law, see, e.g., Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38 (1) (c).
28. See, e.g., cases infra notes 28-41; Weisshaus v. Swiss Bankers Ass'n (in re Holocaust
Victim Assets Litigation), 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000) (participation of Swiss banks in war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 336-37
(1 lth Cir. 1992) (the Contras can be civilly liable for torture and unlawful killing); Klinghoffer v.
S.N. C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (the PLO and various organizations can be
civilly liable for murder); 739 F. Supp. 854, 858, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Nazi Era Cases
Against German Defendants Litigation, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis No. 18148 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2000);
In re Holocaust Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp.2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Austrian and
German Bank Holocaust Litigation, 80 F. Supp.2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Doe I v. Islamic
Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1998); PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 16, 106-107
(Japanese court found Japanese store liable for discrimination against foreigners in violation of
the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195); PAUST ET. AL., supra note 9, at 43-44, 617; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 213, RN 7 (1987) ("Multinational
enterprises have been under increasing scrutiny by international bodies"); 3 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 21, 104, 230 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1987); Jordan J. Paust, The
Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. H.R. J. 51 (1992); Beth
Stephens, Human Rights Accountability: Congress, Federalism and International Law, 6 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 277, 284-85 (2000) ("corporations can be held liable for human rights abuses
when they are responsible for violations of international human rights norms that apply to private
actors, or when they act in complicity with government officials to commit other human rights
violations."). See also In re World War H Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F. Supp.
2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (U.S. nationals' claims against Japanese corporations concerning slave
labor of former prisoners of war in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. No. 539, and thus claims concerning war crimes, had been settled by a 1951 U.S.-
Japan Treaty of Peace); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 139 (2001); MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET. AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 103-04 (1980) ("deprivations and nonfulfillment" of human rights values by
corporations); 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 n.3 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952)
("observance of fundamental human rights is not dependent upon the recognition of a specific
status"); Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, arts. 9-10, Annex to the
London Agreement (8 Aug. 1945), 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (discussing criminal groups and
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propriety of lawsuits against companies and corporations under the ATCA
for violations of international law has been recognized in several United
States cases,29 and liability can attach directly as a private actor, as an actor
colored by a connection with a state or other public actor, or as a
participant in a joint venture or complicitous relation with another violator.
For example, in 1997 in Doe v. UNOCAL Corp.,30 it was recognized that
several human rights and other international law claims made by farmers
from Burma against a private corporation and others were viable under the
organizations); Control Council Law No. 10, art. II (1) (d) (20 Dec. 1945), reprinted in PAUST
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 151, 152 (2000) (discussing
criminal groups and organizations).
29. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 2001 U.S. Lexis 2488 (Mar. 26, 2001) (human rights claims re: imprisonment, torture,
killing); Bodner et al. v. Banque Paribas et al., 114 F. Supp.2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-95 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Doe v. UNOCAL Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997); National Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v.
UNOCAL, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (private company utilizing slave labor
may be subject to liability under the ATCA); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 251-53 (1907). See also
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Nguyen da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194,
1201-02, n. 13 (9th Cir. 1975) (private adoption agencies seemed to be joint tortfeasors under the
ATCA, but there was no briefing on such and they were not joined in the complaint); Iwanowa v.
Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999); Burger-Fisher v. Degussa AG, 65 F.
Supp.2d 248, 272-73 (D.N.J. 1999); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10834, at 6-7
(D.C. 1999); Doe v. The Gap, Inc., No. CV99-717 (D. Haw.) (settled-see CALIFORNIA
LAWYER 17 (Jan. 2000)); Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts:
Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1139 (1999); Richard L.
Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545
(2000); Kevin M. McDonald, Corporate Civil Liability Under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act for
Violations of Customary International Law During the Third Reich, 1997 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW
TRANS'L L.J. 167 (1997); Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights Under the Alien Tort
Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 335, 347, n.37, 391-95 (1997); Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries Into the Alien
Tort Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 473, 501-03 (1986); Beth
Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and Punish . . .
Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 W&M L. REV. 447, 521-22 (2000); Stephens, supra
note 28, at 284-85.
Other ATCA cases and opinions addressing private actor duties under international law
include the following: Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1, 607); Jama v.
I.N.S., 22 F. Supp.2d 353, 362-63 (D.N.J. 1998); Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F.
Supp. at 8; Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Adra v. Clift, 195
F. Supp. 857, 864 (D. Md. 1961); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57,
58 (1795). See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438
(1989) (Rehnquist, J.) ("The Alien Tort Statute by its terms does not distinguish among classes
of defendants, and it of course has the same effect after passage of the FSIA as before with
respect to defendants other than foreign states."); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202,
206 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., op.) ("Alien Tort Statute . . . may conceivably have been
meant to cover only private, nongovernmental acts. ); M'Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas.
128 (C.D. S.C. 1794) (No. 8,810) (dictum).
30. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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ATCA, including claims of slave or "forced" labor, torture, violence
against women, and other human rights violations and crimes against
humanity that also occurred in complicity with Burmese military,
intelligence groups, and police.' Addressing universal jurisdiction through
the ATCA and nonimmunity of corporate actors for cruel, inhumane
treatment and slave or forced labor, the district court in Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co.12 added: "No logical reason exists for allowing private
31. Id. at 891-92. Later, the district court dismissed such claims, "finding no evidence
that UNOCAL 'participated in or influenced' the military's unlawful conduct,'" and no evidence
that UNOCAL conspired with the military, or that UNOCAL's conduct amounted to
"participation or cooperation in the forced labor practices" beyond mere knowledge of and
benefits from the unlawful military practices. 110 F. Supp.2d 1294, 1306-07, 1310. Compare
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 245 ("color of law" responsibility exists when a private actor acts
"together with" or "in concert with" a state or "with significant state aid"); Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d at 445-46, n.27 (when defendant was "in close cooperation with" or
had "worked closely with" a state).
Apparently the district court did not realize that various human rights prohibitions other
than those relating to slavery or forced labor, genocide, other crimes against humanity, or war
crimes can form the basis for private actor liability in the absence of conspiratorial state
involvement, complicity with a state actor, or "color of law," and that United States lests for
"color of law" or "state action" responsibility are not part of international law and are
inappropriate and too limiting with respect to non-state actor liability for various other human
rights violations. Compare 110 F. Supp.2d at 1304-05, 1307-08 (apparently unaware of judicial
recognitions and opinions of Attorneys General not cited therein, the Executive's Amicus brief in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (quoted supra note 5), and other recognitions of private actor liability
noted herein).
The district court also seemed to be unaware of the full range of complicity standards under
international law. Concerning standards regarding criminal complicity that can include both
action and inaction amounting to participation, assistance, aiding, encouragement, reinforcement,
or inducement (each with some minimally demonstrated criminal intent). See, e.g., PAUST ET
AL., supra note 9, at 39-43. However, civil liability should pertain under a lower threshold than
criminal intent, e.g., negligence or fault. See, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 510-12
(addressing the Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), 80-92 (1989) (conduct by one
actor when such involves a foreseeable "real risk" of a human rights violation by another actor
leads to an independent violation, an "associated" violation, or a form of complicitous violation
of human rights)), 517 (addressing a similar decision in Chahal v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (15 Nov. 1996)), 557, 561 (Jefferson's recognition), 565-66 (also addressing a 1994
Human Rights Committee decision), 626 (addressing Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F.
Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998) and complicity of Iran in hostage-taking). Civil liability for fault is
normal in international law. See, e.g., id. at 406-07, 410, 869, 871; RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 28, at § 601.
Clearly, if the military had acted as a defacto agent of UNOCAL, liability also could have
been based on negligence under the customary "knew or should have known" standard. See,
e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 17, 21, 288-90, 293, 302, 305-07, 310-11, 329, 332-34,
342 (also addressing application of the standard where persons who commit violations are under
one's effective authority or control). Concerning such a standard under international criminal
law, see, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 9, at 29-30, 46-76, 99, passim.
32. 67 F. Supp.2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999). With respect to nonimmunity, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1602 et seq., recognizes immunity
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individuals and corporations to escape liability for universally condemned
violations of international law merely because they were not acting under
color of law.""3 In 1907, an Opinion of the United States Attorney General
recognized that a private United States dredging company violated a treaty
by dredging activities diverting the Rio Grande, noted that an International
Water Boundary Commission "found . .. that the . . .Company . . .
violated the stipulations of that treaty," and recognized that injuries
included "damage to property," including injury to "riparian rights," and
"[a]s to indemnity for injuries which may have been caused to citizens of
Mexico, I am of the opinion that existing statutes provide a right of action
and a forum . . . the statutes [including the ATCA] provide a forum and a
right of action."31
merely for foreign states and foreign state entities. Id. § 1603(b). It clearly does not apply to
individuals (official or private) or to private juridic entities. See also Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at
438, quoted supra in note 28. Moreover, even when the FSIA reaches foreign state entities, the
violation of treaties exception to immunity contained in §§ 1330(a) and 1604 assures that
violations of human rights treaties are not entitled to immunity, especially since human rights law
requires access to courts and application of the right to an effective remedy.
33. Id. at 445.
34. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 251-53 (1907). It had been recognized near the time of
formation of the ATCA that the ATCA provides both a right of action or "remedy by a civil
suit" and a forum. See I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795). Access to courts by aliens and rights to
a remedy for violations of international law were of great importance in order to not "deny
justice" to aliens, which would constitute a violation of international law by the United States and
exacerbate relations with foreign states. An original purpose of the ATCA was to avoid a
"denial of justice" to aliens in violation of customary international law by providing them access
to our courts with respect to injuries received here or abroad at the hands of United States
nationals or others found within the U.S. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.), (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton)
and adding: "Under the law of nations, states are obliged to make civil courts of justice
accessible for claims of foreign subjects against individuals within the state's territory.") See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28 § 711, cmts. a, c, e, RN 2 (denial of access to
courts, judicial denial of human rights, and denial of remedies for injury inflicted by state actors
or private persons); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795) (Bradford, Att'y Gen.); PAUST, supra note
2, at 199, 258-61 ns.479, 481; 385 n.87; Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 64-65 (1988); Stephens, supra note 28, at
522.
Today, it is also well-recognized that the ATCA provides a cause of action or right to a
remedy and that the only relevant inquiry is whether suit is brought by an alien, for a tort only,
alleging a violation of international law. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847-48
(11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d
421, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds., 488 U.S. 428 (1989); Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 777, 779-80 (Edwards, J.); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 880-
82, 884-85, 887; Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424, 441-43 (D.N.J. 1999); Jama
v. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp.2d at 362-63; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass.
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In addition to cases involving claims under the ATCA, lawsuits
brought against companies under other United States statutes or domestic
legal provisions have led to recognition of the applicability of relevant
human rights precepts in varied contexts."
1995); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 279-80 (S.D. Cal.
1986); Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371, 1379 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (court can fashion remedies);
26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795); PAUST, supra note 2, at
203, 206-08, 212, 281 ns.560-61, 282 ns.570-71. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp.
860, 862-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (international law provides "substantive principles" and "tort"
means wrong under or in violation of international law). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Repub., 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J. concurring). Judge Bork's views were in
error, were opposed by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, and have not been followed. See, e.g.,
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d at 442 n.20 (Bork's "highly criticized opinion,"
"reasoning is flawed"); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 238; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
at 1539.
Even if the ATCA did not provide a right to a remedy, human rights treaties incorporated
through the ATCA provide rights enforceable by private parties, and human rights law requires
access to domestic courts and enforcement of the right to an effective remedy. See, e.g., PAUST,
supra note 2, at 75 n.97, 198-203, 256-72 ns.468-527, 280 n.556, 292, 362, 375-76, passim;
PAUST ET. AL., supra note 2, at 72-73, 266-68, 273, 344, 459, 726; Dubai Petroleum Co. et al.
v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 82 (Tex. 2000) ("The Covenant [ICCPR] not only guarantees foreign
citizens equal treatment in the signatorie's courts, but also guarantees them equal access to these
courts. ").
It should also be noted that the ATCA is congressional legislation that executes, implements
or incorporates by reference treaties of the United States. See, e.g., PAUST ET. AL., supra note
2, at 194; PAUST, supra note 2, at 207, 282 n.571, 371-72; Paust, Customary International Law
and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301, 327 &
n.126 (1999); Paust, Suing Karadzic, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 91, 92 (1997). The ATCA
performs the very role that implementing legislation plays with respect to non-self-executing
treaties and it also provides a cause of action and a remedy. Thus, treaties that are not self-
executing for the purpose of creating a private cause of action are executed or implemented by
the ATCA. Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp.2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000) ("because the
ICCPR is not self-executing, Ralk can advance no private right of action under the" treaty, but
"could bring a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act for violations of the ICCPR"). But see
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d at 439 n. 16 (missing this point when suggesting in
false dictum that two law of war treaties (1) do not "confer rights enforceable by private
parties," but see Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43; Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War
Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351, 360-69 (1991), and (2) are entirely non-
self-executing-and then falsely concluding, in terse, unreasoned and unsupported dictum beyond
what plaintiff had argued or briefed, see id. at 439, that "[slince neither ...provide a private
action, they cannot provide a basis for suit under the ATCA." (even under Iwanowa's false
dictum, human rights treaties are clearly distinguishable because they provide a private action).
More generally, the ATCA expressly incorporates all treaties of the United States by reference
and it is the ATCA that provides the direct basis for a lawsuit or private action, not the treaties as
such. Further, it is not the prerogative of courts to rewrite a long-standing statute to apply
merely to some treaties but not to others.
35. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989)
("fundamental human right to privacy"); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483,
487 (1974); Novotny v. Great American Federal Savings, 584 F.2d 1235, 1248, 1254, 1261 (3d
Cir. 1978) ("human right" of equal opportunity for female employees and the 1964 Civil Rights
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Recognition of human rights responsibilities of private persons,
companies, and corporations also exists in judicial decisions outside the
United States. For example, Japanese6 and German 7 cases have
recognized such forms of private responsibility, and the European Court of
Human Rights has recognized that private "terrorist activities . . . of
individuals or groups ... are in clear disregard of human rights."3" More
recently, the British House of Lords recognized that a private corporation's
responsibilities under domestic employment law are also "[s]ubject to
observance of fundamental human rights . . . . " In 1998, the Supreme
Court of Canada also recognized that it is possible "for a non-state actor to
perpetuate human rights violations on a scale amounting to persecution"
within the reach of the Refugee Convention and, thus more generally, that
private actors can engage in human rights violations.- Previously, the
Supreme Court of Canada had also recognized that sexual harassment in
the workplace can involve a corporate violation of human rights precepts
concerning sex-based discrimination that were actionable under Canadian
human rights legislation.4  An Israeli Supreme Court Justice has also
recognized that "basic human rights are not directed only against the
Act); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 32 F.2d 490, 494 (1st Cir. 1929); In re Nazi Era Cases, 2000
U.S. Dist. Lexis No. 18148 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2000) (voluntary dismissal of human right and other
claims occurred because of agreement re: redress through an available fund); Continental Data
Systems, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 1986 U.S. Dist. Lexis No. 23490 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (quoting
Kewanee Oil Co.); Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 758 (D.
Conn. 1935); Behrens v. Illinois Central Railway Co., 192 F. 581, 582 (E.D. La. 1911) (act of
Congress reaching a private company provides "betterment of human rights"). See also Trotter
v. Jack Anderson Enterps., Inc., 818 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1987) (indirect attention to alleged
Coca-Cola plant involvement in human rights violations in Guatemala); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets
Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 1977) ("basic civil rights of man" in the employment
arena); United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1011
(S.D.N.Y. 1915) (not "right of mankind" to contract out of all courts); Jones v. Great Southern
Fireproof Hotel Co., 86 F. 370, 375-76 (6th Cir. 1898) (liberty of contract is one of the
"inalienable rights of man"); Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 942 (D.N.J.
1978) (discussing sex-based discrimination claims in the employment arena).
36. See supra note 28.
37. See supra note 5.
38. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 149 (1977).
39. Johnson v. Unisys, Ltd., UKHL/13, at 37 (Mar. 22 2001) (Lord Hoffmann).
40. Pushpanathan v. Canada, 1 S.C.R. 982 (1997) also noting a related practice of
Australia. The Court recognized that private violations of human rights fell within the scope of
Article 1 F (c) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, which
deals with denial of refugee protections to persons "guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations." U.N. Charter purposes and principles include the need to
respect and observe human rights.
41. Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., .1 S.C.R. 1252 (1989). Sex-based discrimination is a
violation of human rights law. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, arts. 1 (3), 55 (c); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 17, arts. 2 (1), 26.
Paust
authority of the state, they spread also to the mutual relations between
individuals themselves." 2
IV. CONCLUSION
From the above, it is clear that non-state actors involved in terrorism
and other violations of human rights law are vulnerable to prosecution and
civil suits in domestic fora. In particular, various international crimes and
infractions allegedly engaged in by bin Laden and his followers, including
companies and corporations under his control, can be addressed in United
States courts. Civil liability can reach private actors directly and as private
actors participating in a joint venture or complicitous conduct with other
actors or as actors colored by a connection with a state, state entity, or
other public actor.
42. Hevra Kadisha, Jerusalem Burial Company v. Kestenbaum, C.A. 294/93, 46(2) P.D.
464, 530 (S. Ct. Israel 1992) (Barak, J.).
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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS FROM DR. ROY S. LEE
Lee: Welcome to this panel, dealing with one of the most important
activities of the United Nations, peacekeeping operations. The Panel will
focus on legal, policy and doctrinal issues and we have an excellent panel.
On my right is Mr. Hans Corell, who is the Legal Counsel of the
United Nations, who came to the United Nations with rich experience in
the administration of justice, law-making, and institutional management.
He has been involved in all the legislative activities of the United Nations.
He will discuss political and legal issues relating to peacekeeping issues.
Mr. Verheul on my left will discuss the policy issues. Mr. Verheul is
a specialist in peacekeeping operations. He works at the United Nations
Department on Peacekeeping Operations and he has been in charge of a
number of large peacekeeping operations, particularly in Africa.
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Professor Johnstone will look at this subject from the doctrinal
standpoint, and he will give us the benefit of his assessment of the subject
matter from both the practical and theoretical standpoint. Before he joined
the United Nations, he worked at the International Peace Academy. He
was then recruited to the Office of Legal Affairs, then moved to the
Peacekeeping Operations Department, then the Office of the Secretary-
General. Now he is an academic. After the panelists have made their
presentations, the floor will be open for questions and comments.
Before I turn the floor to the panelists, I would like to give you some
background information on peacekeeping. First, a story. A few years
ago, I had the opportunity to congratulate a French gentleman upon his
assumption of the responsibilities for a large peacekeeping operation. He
was a full general in the French army and had conducted many military
missions around the world.
To my surprise, he said, "Don't congratulate me, it's really an
impossible job. Let me tell you why."
"First, I have a difficult mandate that will be hard to implement. It is
not very realistic to expect me to maintain peace, law, and order, when
both parties involved are not ready to implement a cease-fire agreement,
and there is no peace to keep on the ground."
"Second, I have two thousand soldiers coming from eight different
countries. They are poorly equipped, and in many cases I have to match
equipment from countries A and B with the soldiers from countries of X
and Y."
"Third, we are not supposed to use force except in case of self-
defense."
"Fourth, they all speak different languages and have their own
national commanders. Although they are supposed to be under my
command, I have a suspicion that whenever there is a special situation, the
first thing they do is to call their capitals."
"Finally, the territory we are in has no infrastructure. Without
sufficient electricity or water, the first thing we have to do is to buy
generators to produce electricity. I have no headquarters either. We will
be camping in the field for at least the next six to eight months."
"Do you really want to congratulate me? Yes. I am the United
Nations military commander with two thousand men, but this is worse than
a general without an army."
I mention this to serve as a point of departure for our panelists. Let
me now give you a few figures relating to the current peacekeeping
situation. Since 1948, the United Nations has established fifty-four
operations, thirty-nine have been completed, and there are fifteen existing
peacekeeping operations: four in Africa, two in Asia, five in Europe, and
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four in the Middle East. Five have been completed in the Americas, but
none are there at present. At its peak, 78,000 soldiers and civilians were
dispatched, at a cost of US$ 3.6 billion per year, with the highest fatalities
experienced at its peak (between 150 and 250 soldiers a year killed). The
operating costs of the existing fifteen missions are at about US$ 2.5 billion.
Allow me to note that this is less than the annual budget of New York
City's sanitation department. There is a deficit of US$ 3.4 billion that
member States owe to the United Nations for their contributions to
peacekeeping operations. With this background we now turn to Dr. Hans
Corell.
II. REMARKS OF DR. HANS CORELL
Corell: Thanks. It is a pleasure to be with you this morning and to
discuss peacekeeping. I am glad to have my fellow panelists with me, as
they know much more than I do about the details, being part of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. I also recognize in the audience
true experts in the field, including Oscar Schachter.
Let me start with a brief introduction, for those who know less about
peacekeeping operations. Such operations are not even mentioned in the
United Nations Charter. The Organization has invented them over the
years. The classical situation was an international conflict with a peace
agreement, and the parties to that agreement wanted the United Nations to
be present. Gradually there has been a shift, and now conflicts tend to be
internal. Such conflicts are always much more vicious, and more difficult
to deal with. The United Nations is sent in to keep a peace that is not
always present, and must deal with factions who often see the United
Nations operations as partial and accuse them of taking sides.
From having been a relatively straightforward operation,
peacekeeping has become quite complex. There is often also reference to
Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Chapter VI missions however,
are voluntary and are based on acceptance by the receiving State. Now,
however, Chapter VII, which allows the Security Council to act without
this acceptance, has been applied. The real change came when the two
missions were set up for Kosovo and East Timor, because these are not
ordinary peacekeeping operations, but are rather intended to govern, with
all the attaching complications.
Let me focus on a few political elements. When is a peacekeeping
operation born? How does it appear in reality? There is the feeling among
States that something must be done and no one else is there or wants to do
it. The United Nations feels this pressure to do something, when no one
else is prepared to act. The problem is one of political will. Is that will
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also demonstrated in commensurate resources? I am sure my co-panelists
will address this matter.
Also, we should remember there are two actors here: the Security
Council, which sets up the operation, and the General Assembly, which
funds it through a separate mechanism. There could be tension between
the two, as the General Assembly does not always feel properly consulted
by the Security Council. This can affect the prospects for success of the
operation.
Who will go there? The United Nations does not have any troops, but
rather is dependent upon contributions from member States. It is fair to
say that over the years there has been closer cooperation between the
Security Council and troop-contributing countries, because the latter want
information about what will happen to their troops. They do not want to
put their young men and women in harm's way. It is very important also
for the government to consult at the national level with the opposition
because the government does not want to be criticized by them if
something goes wrong.
The scope of the mandate is also very important. A peacekeeping
operation must have a clear mandate. The mandate should be seen as
distinct from the rules of engagement. What are the rights and obligations
of the troops,- once they are sent into the field? Other elements have
presented themselves, in the political context, in particular human rights.
We cannot just stand by when human rights are being violated, we must
speak out. Gradually, human rights have been included in the mandate of
peacekeeping operations. It infuses a new culture into the area where an
operation is conducted; the purpose is to create a better atmosphere.
Another element is the question of transition. We must look at the
post-mission situation. Other actors must start planning for activities to be
phased in, as peacekeeping operations end.
In regard to the United Nations not having any forces of their own,
the drafters of the United Nations Charter took a different view from what
has actually transpired. See article 43, which calls upon all members of
the United Nations to make available to the Security Council upon its call
and in accordance with special agreements armed forces, assistance and
facilities, including rights of passage to uphold international peace and
security. I do not think that this will ever come true; member States have
taken a different course, setting up stand-by forces. They prefer to look at
a situation when it occurs and decide on a case-by-case basis when to send
them in. This is an interesting development; you can see that some
provisions of the Charter never took on life.
Now, what about the United Nations's preparedness? Are we
prepared for peacekeeping operations? This is where we have a big
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problem. I mentioned the Brahimi report, and there are others. There are
numerous studies of peacekeeping. The Brahimi report sets out some of
the weaknesses of the system. Out of this report came the conclusion that
we must look at the infrastructure of the Organization, to ensure that it is
equipped to deal with these difficult situations. The idea is to strengthen
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, so it can deploy peacekeepers
within thirty to ninety days; there should be pre-arranged letters of assist
between the United Nations and troop-contributing countries; there could
be stand-by arrangements with certain member States; and most
importantly, the military is not enough. Several thousand civilian police,
for example, are now involved in peacekeeping operations. So, to sum up
on the political side, the situation is more and more complex and the
preparedness of the Organization is perhaps not what it ought to be. At the
same time, the expectations of what the Organization can do are too high.
I could mention a very good example. How many of you have seen
calls from the media to undertake an operation in Afghanistan? Presently,
there is no way the United Nations can go in and do something useful in
Afghanistan by way of peacekeeping; we would require a totally difficult
situation internally in that country.
As for legal issues, I mentioned that the United Nations Charter does
not touch upon peacekeeping, and also mentioned Chapters VI and VII.
What I would focus on is Chapter VII. If you study the relevant
resolutions, you would see that Chapter VII is only referred to occasionally
in resolutions, -to allow missions to protect themselves with the use of
force. Sometimes though it is invoked as an umbrella over the whole
resolution, allowing the whole resolution to be enforced. In some cases, as
with East Timor and Kosovo, it allows the mission to govern.
The relationship between the Security Council and the General
Assembly is important because the General Assembly must decide about
the funds.
Another important legal issue is the Status-of-Forces Agreement,
which is concluded with the country where forces are deployed. It creates
a relationship with the host country. It is very important to remember that
troops contributed are still under the jurisdiction of the State that
contributed them. Unfortunately not all troops behave as they should, and
some have to be repatriated and may have to be brought to justice before
national courts. There are also the agreements with the troop-contributing
countries, to regulate the relationship between those countries and the
United Nations. There you have the problem that Roy Lee pointed to, that
troops may consult with their capitals before they will go along with their
head of mission. This is a very delicate matter, and maybe Mr. Verheul
knows more about that.
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Then we have procurement; from the start, it was normally handled
through the troop-contributing countries. But then in the early 1990s, the
United Nations decided to head to the open market with requests for bids.
Now, millions of dollars are spent on contracts supporting the missions.
This can lead to disputes, which must be settled through arbitration. This
has become quite an industry in the Office of Legal Affairs. My
colleagues and I had to defend one case, involving a claim of $50 million
against the Organization. This is a big issue for us now.
There are also many legal issues that arise during a peacekeeping
mission. For example, deaths that occur during missions raise legal issues,
as do accidents (car accidents injuring civilians, for example). We have
crimes committed against the mission or by people in the mission. There
are contracts to be negotiated at the local level, or issues if a peacekeeper
is to appear before a court. Often there is a legal officer present in the
field to deal with these issues on a daily basis, and sometimes issues are
referred back to Headquarters. I follow the cable traffic between
Headquarters and the field not only for information, but also to track legal
issues, which gives me advance notice of possible formal requests from the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The tempo of the legal work has
increased dramatically.
Now, the two missions I mentioned, East Timor and Kosovo. Here
we have a distinct legal difference because we govern these provinces and
legislate for them. The laws (regulations) are issued by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General after being vetted in the Office of
Legal Affairs. This vetting is necessary. At the national level, legislation
is the product of a democratic process, but here this cannot happen since
there is not yet a parliament competent to do this. We check whether the
regulations are in accordance with the United Nations Charter, with the
mission's mandate, i.e. the relevant Security Council resolutions, and with
international human rights standards.
Lee: Thanks, now from the legal and political aspects, we turn to
Professor Ian Johnstone for his assessment from the doctrinal standpoint.
III. REMARKS OF PROFESSOR IAN JOHNSTONE
Johnstone: I will look at the development of peacekeeping doctrine
over the years, in particular in the 1990s. As a preliminary point, there is
no universally accepted doctrine of peacekeeping. Instead, there are fifty
years of accumulated experience and some effort over the years to provide
some clarity as to what peacekeepers should do, what the Security Council
expects them to do. Those efforts first resulted in the formulation of three
fundamental principles: consent, impartiality and non-use of force, except
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in self-defense. My presentation will focus on what those three principles
mean in practice and how they have evolved over the years. I would also
ask the question at the end as to whether these doctrinal innovations have
succeeded in providing clarity.
First, consent. Peacekeeping operations were originally based on
Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, deployed on the basis of consent
and depended for their success on the continuing cooperation of the parties.
Peacekeepers were there to provide the parties some reassurance that the
other party or parties would not cheat on their commitments and
obligations.
Second, impartiality. Impartiality, as originally conceived was
understood to mean that peacekeepers shouldn't take sides in a conflict or
seek to alter the military balance in any way. The term impartiality was
often used interchangeably with neutrality.
Third, non-use of force except in self-defense. Traditionally,
peacekeepers were unarmed or lightly armed troops and not expected to
use force except to the minimum extent necessary and only in self-defense.
This concept was expanded in 1973 to include defense of the mandate,
meaning force could be used by peacekeepers to resist forceful attempts to
obstruct them in the discharge their duties. This potentially broad concept
was invoked rarely by commanders on the ground because they were
concerned about becoming a party to the conflict.
Now, these traditional principles worked fairly well during the cold
war years. They also worked fairly well in some post-cold war operations,
in Namibia and Mozambique, for example. Even though these missions
were much more complex than the simpler operations of the earlier years,
the parties involved were genuinely ready for peace and amenable to
making the operations work.
But most of the post-cold war conflicts were much messier and the
traditional principles could not be so easily applied. This changed
environment for peacekeeping was recognized early on by the Security
Council, and in 1992 the Council asked the Secretary-General for
recommendations, leading to the Agenda for Peace, published also in
1992. The tone, if not the content of Agenda for Peace, marked a
significant departure from the traditional principles of peacekeeping. The
most significant concept was the idea of peace-enforcement units. The
idea was to deal with situations that fell between the environment where
traditional peacekeeping can take place, and outright aggression or war. In
other words, they would occupy the middle ground between peacekeeping
and enforcement action. In these situations, consent was not reliable, force
had to be used beyond self-defense but not for the purpose of wining a
war, and impartiality was harder to maintain. In this gray area, there was
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no doctrine. Troops were being deployed and asked to do things without
really knowing how they should go about doing them. So, there were
efforts to develop doctrine to cover this area, but events on the ground,
especially in Somalia and Bosnia, were always ahead of doctrinal
developments.
There were significant United Nations failures or at least setbacks, in
Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. These failures led to serious questioning
and rethinking of involvement in this gray area. This rethinking led to a
supplement in 1995 to the Agenda for Peace, which was not meant to
revise the earlier document, but does represent some significant
backtracking. The main lesson drawn in the Supplement is that
peacekeeping and peace enforcement should not be mixed, as they were in
Somalia and Bosnia. As noted by Shashi Tharoor, head of the Yugoslavia
desk in DPKO at the time, it is no easy task to make war and peace with
the same people on the same territory at the same time. The Security
Council was adding mandate after mandate, some of which required the
cooperation of the parties, and some of which required coercion. How
could peacekeepers do both at the same time? The incoherence of this
approach was most dramatically illustrated by the fall of the safe areas in
Bosnia. Civilians in the safe areas expected to be protected by thinly
deployed peacekeepers, with only the threat of air strikes, made less
credible by the vulnerability of peacekeepers to being taken hostage.
The Supplement reflected the mood in the Secretariat and among
Member States at the time, but it was not the final word. In 1999-2000,
three very important reports were produced: one on Srebrenica, and two
on Rwanda (the Srebrenica and first Rwanda report are United Nations
documents; the second Rwanda report is an OAU report). These reports
drew some of the same conclusions as the Supplement, but said something
else as well. The failures were not just a matter of inadequate means or
mandate, but a question of how peacekeeping itself is carried out - the
whole ideology of peacekeeping. These three documents prompted the
Secretary-General to establish the Brahimi panel, which convened in early
2000 and drafted a report, against the backdrop of the ongoing crisis in
Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, peacekeepers were being taken hostage -
just like in Bosnia - and there were concerns that the situation was getting
out of control.
The Brahimi report reaffirms the traditional principles of
peacekeeping, but qualifies each in significant ways. On consent, the
report says that consent can be manipulated, and goes on to list a range of
circumstances where you can't count on it. On impartiality, it redefines
the concept to mean not neutrality but impartiality in the execution of the
mandate. On the use of force, the report says that the operations must be
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prepared to take on spoilers, parties or other actors who try to undermine a
peace process. Spoilers must be met with a credible threat of force. The
implication of the report is that the United Nations or its operations must
be prepared to conduct robust peacekeeping. Many of the institutional
recommendations are intended to prepare the United Nations to do this.
Does the report provide clarity on the traditional principles? Is it a
step forward in terms of doctrine? Does it make distinctions that are useful
in trying to devise concepts of operations and carry out missions in the
field? My answer is that yes, it does provide some clarity; it doesn't
provide full answers to the doctrinal debates of the last ten years, but
points to some possible directions forward.
On consent, implicit in the report is the idea that the only clear
distinction is between situations where consent is initially granted and those
where it is not. Intervention in the latter situation is not peacekeeping or
peace-anything, it is war and those engaged in it should be prepared to
conduct war. In the first situation, where consent is granted, sometimes it
is reliable, more often it is not. The message of the Brahimi report is that
peacekeepers should not assume that consent is always reliable. This
implies a need to build on the initial consent and work to sustain it over
time.
Another implication is that if consent is not reliable all the time, you
may need to use force against spoilers. While it is not explicit, the
Brahimi report seems to distinguish three situations in which force may be
used: in self-defense (that is traditional peacekeeping); to take on spoilers
and compel them to comply with an agreement; and to defeat an enemy
(that is enforcement action).
That brings me to my third and final point, on impartiality. If force is
used against spoilers, is it possible to maintain impartiality? I think it is
possible if impartiality is defined as it is in the Brahimi report, i.e. not
neutrality, but impartiality in execution of the mandate. An important
corollary of that is at the heart of challenges faced by peacekeepers. If the
guiding principle is impartiality in execution of a mandate, the mandate
must be clear to all concerned - the parties, the peacekeepers and external
actors. You can look back at all the resolutions adopted in the 1990s on
peacekeeping mandates and clarity is rare. So the challenge is not really a
legal or doctrinal one, but a political challenge for intergovernmental
bodies. The application of the principles of peacekeeping will follow
naturally from mandates set by the Security Council. The challenge for the
Secretariat, as the Brahimi report points out, is to insist on this clarity.
Lee: From the doctrinal perspectives, we now turn to Mr. Verheul
for his operational experience.
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V. REMARKS OF MR. ADRIAAN VERHEUL
Verheul: Thanks, with an eye on the time, I will keep this brief. I
will do two things: characterize peacekeeping as the intensive care unit of
the international community, and describe the prerequisites of the surgeons
who must deal with the patient. The objective of peacekeeping is not to
create a perfect situation, but the conditions that will allow the patient to
walk out on his own two feet and continue treatment elsewhere. This
means establishing a security regime, building institutions in the field of
governance and human rights that are lacking, participating in
psychological wound healing, promoting processes that put countries back
on their feet, like elections, and creating conditions that would enable
reconstruction, like disarmament.
This is what peacekeeping can potentially offer. As Ian has pointed
out, sometimes the patient is less than willing to undergo treatment, which
is why you need a couple of well-built nurses to keep the patient down
from time to time. Robust peacekeeping is needed, as it was in Sierra
Leone. Regarding the doctor, it is not correct to say that peacekeeping is
in the hands of the United Nations Secretariat alone. Its success depends
on five players working together. If one is missing, the risk of failure is
real. First, the willingness of the parties to undertake a peace process is
essential. Consent is important at the strategic and technical level.
Second, the Security Council must demonstrate a measure of unity and
common understanding of the tasks ahead. If the Security Council is
divided, this division can be exploited. Third, the support of troop-
contributing countries is essential, to ensure that troops who can actually
do the job are deployed. This has been a crisis; the experiences of the
1990s have deterred western countries from participating. The risks,
political and otherwise, are real. So it is increasingly harder to put
together a force that reflects all the members of the United Nations. We
more often get troops from countries that cannot come up with the
equipment necessary to sustain themselves on the ground. This is a huge
logistical problem. We must go to the market to meet this need, a task in
and of itself. This is a bigger problem though because it does not reflect
the needed unity of the member States. The Security Council sets the
mandate, then expects poorer countries to send their troops to run the risks
in trying to fulfill the mandate. Fourth, the international community must
support the peace process through injections of funds and programs, to
help the rehabilitation, reconciliation, and redevelopment processes.
Another aspect to this is that peacekeepers alone cannot provide
everything. The World Bank, the World Food Program, and others must
bring their unique skills and programs into play. There must be a
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complementarity of efforts. We have only now really begun in the last half
year or so to make this a more operational concept. This is difficult
because it means changing the culture of the organizations in question. We
are slowly but surely making progress in this area. Fifth and finally, the
United Nations Secretariat plays a central role. The Department of
Peacekeeping Operations will soon grow to around 600, but this is not
nearly enough to support the operations currently in the field. No
government or corporation would allow this logistics ratio to stand. We
are getting a few more tools, in part due to the Brahimi report, but it
remains a relatively tight operation. These are the links of the chain, and
the overall context is as strong as the weakest link.
VI. QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS FROM THE FLOOR
A. Does the United Nations engage in strategic planning or
"wargaming " to better plan for peacekeeping operations ?
Corell and Verheul both addressed this question. Corell noted that
the Secretary-General had established an Executive Committee on Peace
and Security, to advise him on matters in this field. He had also attempted
to establish a new unit in the Department for Political Affairs in order to
be able to gather information more effectively, in particular to be able to
make better analyses before the creation and implementation of
peacekeeping operations. This effort had met with some resistance in the
General Assembly, some members are reluctant to share too much
sensitive information with the Secretariat. Verheul noted that wargaming
is difficult in situations where there are so many actors, their motives are
often hidden or unclear, and much necessary information is lacking. The
United Nations must rely on member States to provide much of the
requisite information, aside from what the United Nations can learn from
its staff who operate in the field. Taking into consideration these
limitations, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
does undertake this kind of strategic thinking on a daily basis and works to
develop templates that will render peacekeeping operations more effective
and successful.
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B. Have the member States of the United Nations and in particular
of the Security Council abdicated their responsibility to fulfill
article 43 of the United Nations Charter, to make available to the
United Nations the "armed forces, assistance, and facilities"
necessary to maintain international peace and security ?
Verheul and Johnstone responded to this question. Verheul noted that
abdication of responsibility is not simply an issue regarding provision of
troops, but also in prompt payment of assessments. Where States pay their
assessments in a timely manner, their troop contributions are less essential.
Also, provision of logistical support is critical. Johnstone referred to the
mission in Eastern Slavonia as worth mentioning because the Belgians had
learned lessons in Rwanda, which they were able to successfully apply in
Eastern Slavonia. Specifically, they agreed to be involved only if
necessary resources would be made available to the mission and if they
could exercise a certain degree of control over the operations. Verheul
added that a major difference between Rwanda and Eastern Slavonia was
that, in the latter case, NATO was close at hand, and prepared to intervene
on behalf of the United Nations at the first sign of trouble. NATO was not
and is not engaged in Africa.
C. What might be the future role of the United Nations in
Afghanistan, if the Taliban regime loses power? Do activities
undertaken by member States to eliminate offensive capacity of a
government or to eliminate the government qualify as self-defense
under article 51 of the United Nations Charter?
All three speakers responded to this question. Corell noted that he
could not speak extensively on the subject; he referred instead to the
ongoing work of the Secretary-General's Special Representative on
Afghanistan, Mr. Brahimi. Specifically on the subject of article 51, he
noted that the Security Council is actively seized of this matter, and has
invoked article 51 in its resolution of September 12. The two States taking
action under article 51, the US and the UK, are responsible for reporting
on their actions under this article to the full Council and thus far have met
with no criticism. Verheul noted that peacekeeping in Afghanistan
wouldn't necessarily be the United Nations's first step, but rather it should
focus on the provision of humanitarian aid. A new coalition of States
might also have to be encouraged to form, to address security-related and
political issues. It is essential to create the environment that will support a
successful peacekeeping operation. Johnstone agreed, noting that the
United Nations would have considerable difficulties in executing any
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operations in Afghanistan, given the lack of security that country will
experience, should the Taliban be ousted from power.
D. What are the prospects for the creation of world government,
given the successes and failures of the United Nations?
Verheul and Corell responded to this question. Verheul remarked that
the idea of world government is an old dream that many have expressed.
The way the United Nations is built would contradict that dream. It is an
organization of member States, each of which are sovereign and unwilling
to give up that sovereignty. So, to ask whether the United Nations could
put in place a world government is a contradiction in terms. This question
should not be directed at the United Nations, but at the member States,
whether they would be willing to work towards world government. He
personally could not see it happening for the next century or so, but was
reminded that the United Nations is seen by many people in different ways.
Some see it as a Machiavellian body of member States that scheme and
conspire; while for others it remains a symbol of hope. The United
Nations has a strong role to play in pursuing the hopes and dreams of
mankind. Corell noted that he personally could see no alternative to the
sovereign State, as the basic building block of the international system.
The State is most capable of providing order and guaranteeing peace;
boundaries help to create order. The United Nations's role is in helping to
ensure that member States are represented by governments that truly hold
the mandate of their people. The more democracies in the United Nations,
the better will the Organization be able to deal with States that occasionally
"flip out". The question that remains unanswerable regarding the
prospects of a world government is the Roman query: who supervises the
supervisors?
E. How can the relations between the United Nations Secretariat,
including the Secretary-General, and the Security Council be
improved, given the difficulty the Secretariat has experienced in
executing the Security Council resolutions pertaining to Bosnia
and Rwanda?
Johnstone responded to this question, also touching upon a quote from
the Brahimi report that was raised several times: that the United Nations
Secretariat must be prepared to tell the Security Council what it needs to
know, not what it wants to hear. Johnstone argued that the Secretariat
cannot outright refuse to implement a Security Council resolution, but can
advise against action that is ill-advised. The Secretariat also plays a key
role in encouraging troop-contributing countries to participate in
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operations, and so the Secretariat must be onboard with whatever the
Security Council decides. In the end though, Johnstone saw the Brahimi
quote as a message to the Security Council rather than to the Secretariat.
It is to be hoped that the Security Council has learned lessons from the
peacekeeping operations of the 1990s and that the Council would be much
more reluctant to draft unimplementable resolutions, as it has done in the
past.
F. What are the prospects of a peacekeeping operation in Palestine,
either authorized by the Security Council or by the General
Assembly, the latter following the precedent of the Uniting for
Peace resolution which sent troops to Korea?
Corell responded to this point, noting that the question was highly
political and so he was limited in how he could respond. He added that
many actors are engaged in trying to resolve problems relating to
Palestine, and that he hoped that the situation would be resolved soon.
G. What is the future of peacekeeping, if so many States have
become disillusioned by its failures?
Johnstone responded to this question, noting that the perception of
peacekeeping has shifted many times between the idea that it is a panacea
to the idea that it is impossible. He expressed the hope that the Security
Council had learned lessons from the operations of the 1990s, which failed
in part because of the incoherent behavior of the Council. He indicated
that it would be instructive to see what happens with Afghanistan, given
that many see the United Nations as the only reasonable post-conflict actor
capable of addressing the needs of that country and region.
H. What are the objections that inhibit serious discussion of the
creation of a standing United Nations peacekeeping force?
Verheul responded, noting that such a force could solve a practical
problem, that is the need for rapid deployment. As it currently stands, the
United Nations must enter into lengthy negotiations with troop-contributing
States in order to obtain and deploy troops. However, member States have
expressed a preference to improve upon stand-by arrangements, which
represent promises to provide assistance but are not a guarantee to the
United Nations in every case to be forthcoming with that assistance.
Verheul noted that States were reluctant to consider a standing force
because they were reluctant to give up that much control over the process.
He added that where member States do send troops, this can be a powerful
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symbol of their solidarity in the face of a threat to international peace and
security and that this clout must be visible, if a peacekeeping operation is
to succeed. Lee noted that the US government has gone on the record to
oppose the idea of a standing force, and Johnstone concurred that the
concern with this idea is that it is a technical fix for a political problem.
Deployment of a standing force cannot replace the lack of political will on
the part of member States of the United Nations and of the Security
Council.
L How do peacekeeping forces exercise impartiality in situations
where there is no clear "good guy?"
Verheul responded, noting that the United Nations no longer employs
the term "neutral." The United Nations has a mandate to protect civilians
and their human rights, but of course implementation is harder. The
United Nations can deal with an individual bad guy from time to time, but
often needs the group they represent to be part of a political process. The
use of force may be helpful in specific situations, but may also lead to the
end of that group's cooperation with the peace process. The overall goal is
to bring the process to a successful conclusion, not to deal with the bad
guy. Deals often have to be made, and peacekeeping operations often have
to deal with bad guys. If the process can be done without firing a shot, so
much the better. Use of force may deliver a message to the bad guys, but
the message itself is political. Delivery of that message really depends on
whether the means on the ground exist, and whether member States are
providing those means. Brahimi said in his report that the Security
Council should be told what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.
Verheul recounted in this context his understanding that the Security
Council is a partner in the process, not an adversary. The Secretariat
writes reports and undertakes its work not in isolation, but maintains close
contact with the Security Council. This coordination is essential, because
member States have the necessary intelligence. The Secretariat must keep
in mind the overall objective, and focus on that, even in the face of specific
interests and goals of individual member States. There is not much to gain
though in confronting the Security Council, if they then withdraw their
support. The Brahimi statement is not a message to the Secretariat, but to
the Security Council, to give the Secretariat the space to plan and to
implement the operations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Our current policy is nuclear deterrence, whereby we threaten the use
of nuclear weapons against any adversary who uses nuclear, chemical,
biological, or even massive conventional weapons against us. I'm going to
address the lawfulness of our potential use of nuclear weapons pursuant to
that policy.
Both the defenders, including the United States, and the opponents of
the nuclear weapons regime agree that the international law rules of
discrimination, proportionality, and necessity apply to nuclear weapons.
The rule of discrimination makes it unlawful to use weapons whose likely
or foreseeable effects cannot discriminate between military and civilian
targets. The rule of proportionality makes it unlawful to use weapons
whose probable effects upon combatant or non-combatant persons or
objects would likely be disproportionate to the value of the military
objective. The rule of necessity makes it unlawful to use weapons
involving a level of force not necessary in the circumstances to achieve the
military objective.
Both the United States and the opponents of the nuclear weapons
regime further agree that it is unlawful under these rules to use weapons
whose effects will be uncontrollable. Weapons whose effects are not
controllable cannot lawfully be used under international law, and this is
recognized in the military manuals of the United States armed services,
recognized in manuals used for training and disciplining of United States
personnel, and often cited by the United States as a reliable statement of
international law.
II. UNCONTROLLABILITY UNDER RULE OF DISCRIMINATION
The Air Force Commander's Handbook states that weapons that are
"incapable of being controlled enough to direct them against a military
objective" are unlawful.' The Air Force Manual on International Law
defines indiscriminate weapons as those "incapable of being controlled,
through design or function," such that they "cannot, with any degree of
certainty, be directed at military objectives." 2
In its military manuals, the United States has acknowledged that the
scope of this prohibition extends to the effects of the use of a weapon. The
1. THE U.S. DEPT. OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-34, COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 6-2 (1980) [hereinafter THE AIR FORCE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK].
2. THE U.S. DEPT. OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31, INT'L LAW-
THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 6-3 (1976) [hereinafter THE AIR
FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW].
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Air Force Manual on International Law states that indiscriminate weapons
include those which, while subject to being directed at military objectives,
"may have otherwise uncontrollable effects so as to cause disproportionate
civilian injuries or damage." 3 The manual states that "uncontrollable"
refers to effects "which escape in time or space from the control of the
user as to necessarily create risks to civilian persons or objects excessive in
relation to the military advantage anticipated."4 It is noteworthy that this
prohibition encompasses the causing of risks, not just injury.
As a "universally agreed illustration of an indiscriminate weapon,"
The Air Force Manual on International Law cites biological weapons,
noting that the uncontrollable effects from such weapons "may include
injury to the civilian population of other States as well as injury to an
enemy's civilian population." 5 The Naval/Marine Commander's Handbook
states that such weapons are "inherently indiscriminate and
uncontrollable." 6
The Air Force Manual on International Law further cites Germany's
World War II V-1 rockets, with their "extremely primitive guidance
systems", and Japanese incendiary balloons, without any guidance
systems. 7 The manual states that the term "indiscriminate" refers to the
"inherent characteristics of the weapon, when used, which renders [sic] it
incapable of being directed at specific military objectives or of a nature to
necessarily cause disproportionate injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects. "8
As an example of an indiscriminate weapon, The Air Force
Commander's Handbook similarly cites the use of unpowered and
uncontrolled balloons to carry bombs, since such weapons are "incapable
of being directed against a military objective.-"
III. UNCONTROLLABILITY UNDER RULE OF NECESSITY
The requirement that the level of force implicit in the use of a weapon




6. U.S. DEPT. OF THE NAVY ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 10-21, Naval Warfare Publication 9 (Rev. A,
Oct. 5, 1989) (this handbook was adopted by the U.S. Marine Corps as FLEET MANUAL FMFM
1-10) [hereinafter THE NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK].
7. See THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 6-3.
8. Id. at 6-9, n.7.
9. THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 6-1.
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necessity requirement. If a State cannot control the level of destructiveness
of a weapon then it cannot assure that the use of the weapon will involve
only such a level of destructiveness as is necessary in the circumstances.
The Air Force Manual on International Law recognizes as a basic
requirement of necessity "that the force used is capable of being and is in
fact regulated by the user."10
IV. UNCONTROLLABILITY UNDER RULE OF PROPORTIONALITY
So also, if the State using a weapon is unable to control the effects of
the weapon, it is unable to evaluate whether the effects would satisfy the
requirement of being proportionate to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated from the attack or to assure such limitation of
effects. The Air Force Manual on International Law notes that the
requirement of proportionality prohibits "uncontrollable effects against
one's own combatants, civilians or property.""
V. UNITED STATES POSITION
It is the formal United States position that under these rules of
discrimination, proportionality, and necessity some uses of nuclear
weapons would be lawful and that others would be unlawful-and that the
lawfulness of any potential use is something that has to be evaluated in the
context of that use. The United States' position is that the effects of
nuclear weapons, or at least of the smaller, ostensibly tactical nuclear
weapons, are controllable.In its written and oral presentations to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in the recent Nuclear Weapons Advisory Case,'" defending
nuclear weapons, the United States argued that, even if nuclear attacks
directed at significant numbers of large urban area targets or at a
substantial number of military targets would be unlawful, a small number
of accurate attacks by low-yield weapons against an equally small number
10. THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 1-6.
11. Id. at6-2. See also id. at 5-10.
12. International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 827 (July 1996) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion]. All but five of the fifteen ICJ opinions, including the holding of the Court, are
available at 35 I.L.M. 809 (1996). The remaining five, the declarations of Judges Bedjaoui,
Herczegh and Bravo, and the individual opinions of Judges Guillaume and Ranjeva, appear at 35
I.L.M 1343 (1996). The opinions and various submissions to the Court are also available at the
Court's own website at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Mar. 16, 2002) or at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/world (last visited Mar. 16, 2002). Some of the same materials are
also available in THE CASE AGAINST THE BOMB (Roger S. Clark & Madeleine Sanns eds.,
1996).
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of military targets in non-urban areas would not be. The United States
further argued that nuclear weapons can reliably be targeted at specific
military objectives.
VI. DEFENSE OF SMALL-SCALE USE:
Let's take first the United States' defense of small scale use. If you
look at the United States nuclear arsenal, you will see that it is
predominately made up of large strategic nuclear weapons, not the small-
scale ostensibly tactical nuclear weapons the United States defended.
VII. PRECISION TARGETING
The United States position on its ability to control the effects of
nuclear weapons through precision targeting does not withstand analysis.
First of all, our ability to hit specific targets with precision is only
statistical. We can deliver a warhead to a particular target with startlingly
high probability, but where any particular warhead will end up is far from
certain.
Even more importantly, even if we deliver the nuclear warhead with
precision to the intended target, we cannot control the radiation effects.
They are subject to natural forces of the environment, wind and weather.
This applies to even the use of a so-called small-scale nuclear weapon.
The most cogent argument the proponents of nuclear weapons make is
that under certain circumstances the effects of nuclear weapons might be
controllable because of the remote area of use and the limited nature of the
weapons used.
Michael Matheson, sitting to my left, one of the chief lawyers
representing the United States before the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Case, has pointed in his writings to an example given by the
United States judge on the court, Judge Schwebel, now the President of the
court, in his opinion in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Case-the use of a
nuclear depth charge to destroy a submarine that is about to fire nuclear-
armed missiles.
It seems to me that that kind of argument fundamentally misses the
point as to the risks of nuclear weapons use and as to nature of the
challenge to the rule of law that nuclear weapons present.
Mr. Matheson and Judge Schwebel are correct that if one
hypothesizes a laboratory-type circumstance in which there are no other
factors, just the submarine about to launch nuclear weapons and our ability
to take the submarine out before the use, and assumes a remote
environment where civilians will not be at risk, such a use sounds as if it
must be lawful.
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But is it not clear that such a scenario is unrealistic to the point of not
being a legitimate basis upon which to ground the legal analysis? For if
the adversary State has one submarine with nuclear weapons, it most likely
has other submarines carrying nuclear weapons; if the adversary State has
nuclear weapons in submarines, it most likely has other nuclear weapons
which it is capable of delivering by land and sea-based missile, by aircraft,
and otherwise; if the adversary State has such nuclear weapons and the
means to delivery them, it may well have chemical and biological weapons
and the means to deliver them; and if the adversary State has nuclear
weapons, it will likely have allies or potential allies who have nuclear,
chemical, and/or biological weapons. In addition, in the real world, any
use of nuclear weapons, in the types of circumstances in which we might
resort to such weapons, would likely carry with it a high risk of escalation;
our adversaries would likely respond with nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons.
So, in the real world, this hypothesized strike on the submarine will
likely not be as limited as it at first appeared. In real terms, this scenario
will potentially put us right in the middle of widescale use by us and our
adversaries of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The kind of
situation that threatens effects of a apocalyptic nature.
Outside the courtroom, the United States. recognizes the potential
uncontrollability of the effects of nuclear weapons. This can be seen from
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Joint Pub 3-12, Doctrine for Joint
Nuclear Operations, setting forth the current operational planning for the
integrated use by United States forces of nuclear weapons in conjunction
with conventional weapons:' 3 "[Tihere can be no assurances that a conflict
involving weapons of mass destruction could be controllable or would be
of short duration."
Outside the courtroom, the United States has also recognized the
disproportionate nature of the damage United States nuclear policy
threatens. The Joint Chief of Staff's Nuclear Weapons Joint Operations
manual states:
US [sic] nuclear forces serve to deter the use of WMD
["weapons of mass destruction," including chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons] across the spectrum of
military operations. From a massive exchange of nuclear
13. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, PUB 3-12, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
(Dec. 15, 1995), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_12.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2002). See also CHARLES J. MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR WEAPON AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD Ch. 2, n.75, ch. 17, nn.38-53, ch. 18, n.56, chs. 26, 27
and accompanying text (2000).
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weapons to limited use on a regional battlefield, US [sic]
nuclear capabilities must confront an enemy with risks of
unacceptable damage and disproportionate loss should the
enemy choose to introduce WMD into a conflict.14
I submit that virtually any use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful
under these rules, such that the use of nuclear weapons is per se unlawful.
I submit that it is clear that the effects of nuclear weapons are
uncontrollable and hence that the use of such weapons would be unlawful.
I further submit that, by our defense of the potential lawfulness of our
limited use of small-scale tactical nuclear weapons against remote targets,
we are not only justifying a huge arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons not
addressed by our legal theory but also raising the level of risk of possible
widescale use of nuclear weapons.
Rather than recognizing that the scale of the effects of these weapons
exceeds what could be unlawful under any view of the law, we are
legitimizing the possession, threat of use, and the potential actual use of
these weapons.
To the argument, again made by Mr. Matheson, that the threat of use
of these weapons can itself protect us against some other State's use of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, I submit that, while the point
may be valid in limited circumstances, the potential gain from such
deterrence is substantially outweighed by the risks created by our
legitimization of these weapons.
Mr. Matheson's support of threats is also inconsistent with the legal
rule that it is unlawful to threaten that which it is unlawful to do. As the
ICJ stated, "If an envisaged use of weapons would not meet the
requirements of humanitarian law, a threat to engage in such use would
also be contrary to that law."'5 The Court noted that "no State-whether
or not it defended the policy of deterrence-suggested to the Court that it
would be lawful to threaten to use force if the use of force contemplated
would be illegal."16 The United States, as well as not disputing the
unlawfulness of a threat to commit an unlawful act, stated to the Court:
[E]ach of the Permanent Members of the Security Council
has made an immense commitment of human and material
resources to acquire and maintain stocks of nuclear
weapons and their delivery systems, and many other States
14. DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 1-2 (emphasis
omitted).
15. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 827. See also id. at 823.
16. Id. at 823.
20021 453
454 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:447
have decided to rely for their security on these nuclear
capabilities. If these weapons could not lawfully be used in
individual or collective self-defense under any
circumstances, there would be no credible threat of such
use in response to aggression and deterrent policies would
be futile and meaningless. In this sense, it is impossible to
separate the policy of deterrence from the legality of the
use of the means of deterrence.'7
Our legitimization of these weapons has innumerable effects of the
most dire sort: we develop, purchase, and maintain such weapons for use,
often on a fast trigger; we threaten that we will use the weapons, causing
other States to develop, purchase, and maintain their own nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, often on even more of a hair trigger; we
foster proliferation; by training our personnel and setting contingency plans
in place for use of these weapons, we raise the likelihood of intentional,
unintentional, and mistaken use, and, by emphasizing nuclear weapons, we
may even hold back from developing conventional capabilities, or
stockpiles, that would both better serve our military needs, and provide the
means for the lawful conducting of armed conflict.
With the dread events of September 1 lth, we have now seen the
effects of weapons of mass destruction or something approximating them,
at first hand, have looked them in the face, breathed the air. And what we
have seen are effects, sickeningly horrific as they are, that are far less than
the destruction to civilians and civilian society that could result from uses
of nuclear weapons we are threatening every day and have for over fifty
years by our polices of nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction.
Indeed, to the extent our policy is or at times has been mutual assured
destruction, we threaten or have threatened just this kind of thing. The
very reason given by the Bush Administration pre-September llth, for
national missile defense-that our policy of mutual assured destruction,
which the Administration seemed to be assuming is our current policy, is
immoral and unacceptable-makes the point. Mutual assured destruction is
a policy of terror.
I don't mean to suggest that we would ever intentionally conduct a
nuclear strike against large civilian buildings in the middle of an urban
area, but the effects of these weapons are so vast and so uncontrollable,
and so many military targets are located in the vicinity of urban areas, that
under our current policies, military personnel training, and contingency
17. Op. I.C.J. (1995), Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, available at http://www.ici-
cii.org/iciwww/icases/iunan/iunan cr/iUNAN iCR9534 19951115.PDF.
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plans, we could end up causing such effects in the course of strikes aimed
at military targets.
By our legitimization of the potential use of nuclear weapons, we are
fostering proliferation and the other types of effects I alluded to earlier-
and increasing the likelihood that at some time, under some set of
circumstances, intentional or not, these weapons will be used on a
broadscale and escalatory basis by combatants in war, causing catastrophic
damage that could make the survivors nostalgic for the limited strikes of
September 1lth and the limited nature of the current anthrax attacks. Our
current policies contribute to the risk that eventually some States will use
nuclear weapons against major urban centers. Here is the United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff statement setting forth our potential uses of nuclear
weapons:
The Joint Chief of Staffs Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear
Operations, issued as recently as February 1996, states:
Nuclear operations can be successful in achieving US
military objectives if they are used in the appropriate
situation and administered properly . . .Nuclear weapons
have many purposes, but should only be used after
deterrence has failed . . .The purpose of using nuclear
weapons can range from producing a political decision to
influencing an operation. 11
The manual identifies types of situations where the use of nuclear
weapons may be "favored over a conventional attack" or otherwise
preferred:
* Level of effort required for conventional targeting. If the target is
heavily defended such that heavy losses are expected, a nuclear
weapon may be favored over a conventional attack.
* Length of time that a target must be kept out of action. A nuclear
weapon attack will likely put a target out of action for a longer period
of time than a conventional weapon attack.
* Logistic support and anticipation of delays caused by the "fog and
friction" of war. Such delays are unpredictable and may range from
several hours to a number of days. 9
As to the purpose for using nuclear weapons, the manual states:
18. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, PUB 3-12.1, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS (Feb. 9, 1996), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new pubs/jp3 12_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) (emphasis
omitted).
19. Id. at 111-4 (emphasis omitted).
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The purpose of using nuclear weapons can range from
producing a political decision at the strategic level of war
to being used to influence an operation in some segment of
the theater. Operations employing nuclear weapons will
have a greater impact on a conflict than operations
involving only conventional weapons.20
The manual identifies "enemy combat forces and facilities that may be
likely targets for nuclear strikes":
0 WMD ["weapons of mass destruction," including chemical
biological, and nuclear weapons] and their delivery systems, as well
as associated command and control, production, and logistical support
units;
0 Ground combat units and their associated command and control
and support units
* Air defense facilities and support installations;
* Naval installations, combat vessels, and associated support
facilities and command and control capabilities;




There are some other legal issues implicated in this overall question
which I do not have time to go into in detail but which I believe deserve
much more attention than they have gotten, and which I would like to
address briefly.
In its written and oral presentations to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in the recent Nuclear Weapons Advisory Case, defending
nuclear weapons, the United States expressed or assumed the following
positions:
* The United States contended that the anticipated effects from the
use of nuclear weapons would have to necessarily and inevitably be
unlawful before the use would be unlawful. 22
20. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis omitted).
21. Id. at 111-6-7.
22. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 2, nn.58-62, 74, 88, and accompanying text.
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* The United States ignored the mens rea issues as the lawfulness of
the use of nuclear weapons, ignoring the potential for unlawfulness
based upon less than strict intentionality .23
* The United States argued that unlawfulness could only arise from
conventional or customary international law and not from general
principles of international law.2
* The United States assumed that one hundred percent applicability
is necessary before per se unlawfulness may incept.Y3
* The United States assumed that the principles of risk analysis are
irrelevant to the lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons.2
* The United States argued that the use of nuclear weapons could be
lawful as reprisals.27
IX. UNLAWFUL EFFECTS AS NOT INEVITABLE
The United States argument that unlawful effects would not be
inevitable begs the question. While the quantum of likelihood that must be
present for unlawfulness to incept is not an issue that appears to have been
broadly addressed or precisely defined in international law, there seems no
basis for imposing a standard of inevitability.2 The rules of
discrimination, necessity, and proportionality are rules of reason designed
to limit the use of weapons, before their use, based on their likely effects
in light of applicable military factors. The rules of international law as to
the mens rea or mental state necessary for war crimes culpability are
inconsistent with the assumption that inevitability must be present before
culpability incepts.
X. MENS REA
The lawfulness of our use of nuclear weapons involves issues as to
such lawfulness vis--vis the United States as actor and vis-a-vis the United
States civilian, military, industrial, and other leadership as actors.
Ultimately, it is individuals, not States, who are imprisoned or executed.
The law is clear that strict intentionality is not required for criminal
culpability for violation of the law of armed conflict. Willfulness,
23. See id. at ch. 2, nn. 104-06 and accompanying text.
24. See id. at ch. 2, nn.40, 42-46, 50-53, and accompanying text.
25. See id. at ch. 2, nn.48, 49, 57, 59, 67-69, 74, 88, and accompanying text.
26. See id. at ch. 2, nn.71-74, 89 and accompanying text.
27. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 2, nn.57, 129, and accompanying text.
28. See id. at ch. 1, nn.161, 172, 282, 286, ch. 8, nn.6-53 and accompanying text.
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recklessness, gross negligence, and even mere negligence are potential
bases for culpability.29 The actor need not have intended the unlawful
effects from the use of nuclear weapons; it will potentially be a sufficient
ground for war crimes culpability if he used such weapons notwithstanding
the known risks-and the risks of nuclear use or certainly known today.
Thus, The Air Force Manual on International Law recognizes the
sufficiency of gross negligence or deliberate blindness.30  The manual
quotes Spaight's statement of the rule:
In international law, as in municipal law intention to break
the law-mens rea or negligence so gross as to be the
equivalent of criminal intent is the essence of the offense.
A bombing pilot cannot be arraigned for an error of
judgment, it must be one which he or his superiors either
knew to be wrong, or which was, in se, so palpably and
unmistakenly a wrongful act that only gross negligence or
deliberate blindness could explain their being unaware of
its wrongness.3'
It is also clear that the law of armed conflict generally recognizes
recklessness and other mental states less than strict intentionality as a basis
for war crimes liability.32 The Geneva conventions extensively provide for
criminal culpability for violations committed willfully," a state of mind
broadly recognized as encompassing recklessness.?' The law of armed
29. See id. at ch. 1, nn.286, 289-95, and accompanying text, ch. 8 passim.
30. THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 15-3, 15-8 n.3 (citing
SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 57, 58 (1947)).
31. Id. at 15-8, n.13.
32. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 8, nn.6-15 and accompanying text. See generally
id. ch 8.
33. See id. ch. 8, nn.8-14 and accompanying text; THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L
LAW, supra note 2, at 15-1 to 15-2, 15-8 n.12 (quoting the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, adopted
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 85, and other Geneva Conventions).
34. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 8, nn.6-18 and accompanying text. See generally
id. ch. 8. See also GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART § 22, 59-62
(1953); Amnesty International-Report-IOR 40/10/98 May 1998 U.N., The International
Criminal Court Making the Right Choices-Part V Recommendations to the Diplomatic
Conference, available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/IOR400101998 (last visited
Feb. 8, 2002) (quoting ICRC Commentary to article 85 of Protocol I (1. 3474)); Commentary on
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Part V: Execution of the
Conventions and of this Protocol #Section II-Repression of Breaches of the Conventions and of
Moxley
conflict similarly recognizes criminal culpability for acts of wantonness
and of wanton destruction, acts also not reaching the level of strict
intentionality."
Similarly, in imposing war crimes culpability for "an attack which
may be expected to cause" certain impermissible effects, as prescribed, for
example, in Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 51(5), or for
acts that are "intended, or may be expected, to cause" certain
impermissible effects, as prescribed, in Protocol I, Article 35(3), the law
again recognizes potential culpability for war crimes committed with a
mental element of less than strict intentionality .36
So also, the law of armed conflict recognizes an extremely scope of
potential commander culpability for war crimes based on what the
commander "knew or should have known.""
While the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinions did not
focus on the question of the general mens rea requirements under the law
of armed conflict, a number of the judges made the point that information
as to the potential effects of nuclear weapons is so widely known and
available as to provide a basis for war crimes based on the use of such
weapons. Judge Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion, stated:
["By-products" or "collateral damage"] are known to be
the necessary consequences of the use of the weapon. The
author of the act causing these consequences cannot in any
coherent legal system avoid legal responsibility for causing
them, any less than a man careening in a motor vehicle at a
hundred and fifty kilometers per hour through a crowded
market street can avoid responsibility for the resulting
this Protocol, art. 85-Repression of breaches of this Protocol, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
35. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Statute of the
International Tribunal (Adopted May 25, 1993) (as amended May 13, 1998), art. 3(b), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm; Jordan J. Paust, The Preparatory Committee's
"Definition of Crimes"-War Crimes, 8 CRIM. L.F. 431, 438-41 (1997) (emphasis omitted)
(citing, inter alia, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 95/15 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523); Report of
the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N.
Doc. S/25704 & Add. 1 (1993), Annex, arts. 2(d), 3(b); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, pp.27, 41, 44
(1995) (Indictment, Int'l Trib. for Former Yugo.), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglish/kar-ii950724e.htm; CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT'L PEACE, REPORTS OF MAJORITY AND DISSENTING REPORTS OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION OF RESPONSIBILITIES CONFERENCE OF PARIS, LISTS OF WAR
CRIMES (1919).
36. Paust, supra note 35, at 438-41 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
37. Id. (citing, inter alia, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 757 (1948)).
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deaths on the ground that he did not intend to kill the
particular person who died.38
Judge Weeramantry added, "The plethora of literature on the
consequences of the nuclear weapon is so much part of common universal
knowledge today that no disclaimer of such knowledge would be
credible. "19
To the argument that the rule of moderation-the prohibition of the
use of arms "calculated to cause unnecessary suffering"-requires specific
intent, Judge Weeramantry cited the "well-known legal principle that the
doer of an act must be taken to have intended its natural and foreseeable
consequences."40 He also stated that reading into the law a requirement of
specific intent would not "take into account the spirit and underlying
rationale of the provision-a method of interpretation particularly
inappropriate to the construction of a humanitarian instrument.-14
Making a point that, as we saw above, is confirmed by the United
States' military manuals, 42 Judge Weeramantry added that nuclear weapons
"are indeed deployed 'in part with a view of utilizing the destructive
effects of radiation and fall-out.'" 3
As noted above, Judge Weeramantry reached a similar conclusion
with respect to the rights of neutrals: "The launching of a nuclear weapon
is a deliberate act. Damage to neutrals is a natural, foreseeable and,
indeed, inevitable consequence.""
Judge Weeramantry also emphasized the element of intent contained
in the policy of deterrence: "Deterrence needs to carry the conviction to
other parties that there is a real intention to use those weapons, it leaves
the world of make-believe and enters the field of seriously-intended
military threats. ",,1
38. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 901 (J Weeramantry,
dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 904.
41. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 3, note 313 and accompanying text.
42. See id. at ch. 29, notes 38-40, ch. 30 notes 14-22, and accompanying text.
43. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra notel2, at 904 (J Weeramantry, dissenting)
(citing Ian Brownlie, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 445 (1965)); DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at i, 1-6-7
(emphasis omitted).
44. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 905 (J. Weeramantry,
dissenting).
45. Id. at 919 (internal citations omitted).
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Judge Weeramantry concluded that the policy of deterrence provides
the element of intent:
[D]eterrence becomes stockpiling with intent to use. If one
intends to use them, all the consequences arise which
attach to intention in law, whether domestic or
international. One intends to cause the damage or
devastation that will result. The intention to cause damage
or devastation which results in total destruction of one's
enemy, or which might indeed wipe it out completely,
clearly goes beyond the purposes of war.46
The challenging aspect of the evaluation of the lawfulness of the use
of nuclear weapons is the fact that-unlike the legal determinations made at
Nuremberg or in war crime trials generally-with nuclear weapons it is
obviously not a prudently available strategy to wait until after the weapons
are used to make the evaluation. While war crimes charges seem to have
rarely been brought based on risk taking that did not result in illicit effects,
nuclear weapons pose a threat that requires full and effective advance
evaluation and compliance if the applicable law is to be given effect.
47
That is perhaps the best way to conceptualize the nuclear threat: that
the rules of the law of war applicable to nuclear weapons will be
frustrated-in effect nullified-if they are not applied in advance.
XI. WAR CRIMES CULPABILITY UNDER GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
LAW
The law is clear that the rules of discrimination, proportionality and
necessity are binding as established principles of international law. The
United States is bound by these rules; if, under these rules, the use of
nuclear weapons would be unlawful, the United States is bound by such
unlawfulness. It is not necessary that it independently agree by
convention, custom, or otherwise to such unlawfulness or even that it agree
with the conclusion that the rules of discrimination, proportionality, or
necessity render use unlawful.
The Air Force Manual on International Law thus states that the use of
a weapon may be unlawful based not only on "expressed prohibitions
46. Id.
47. The need for prudence in planning in this area goes also to the need for adequate
procurement of conventional weapons, so the United States will not find itself in a position of
needing to use nuclear weapons. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, nn.91-101, ch. 17,
nn.29-36, 45-50, ch. 18 n.5 and accompanying text.
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contained in specific rules of custom and convention," but also on "those
prohibitions laid down in the general principles of the law of war. "4
Similarly, in discussing how the lawfulness of new weapons and
methods of warfare is determined, the manual states that such
determination is made based on international treaty or custom, upon
"analogy to weapons or methods previously determined to be lawful or
unlawful," and upon the evaluation of the compliance of such new
weapons or methods with established principles of law, such as the rules of
necessity, discrimination and proportionality .
The manual notes that the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg in the case of the Major War Criminals found that international
law is contained not only in treaties and custom but also in the "general
principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts."1
The Army's Law of Land Warfare states "[t]he conduct of armed
hostilities on land is regulated by the law of land warfare which is both
written and unwritten."'
Based on the foregoing, it seems clear that the use of nuclear weapons
can be unlawful per se regardless of whether there is a treaty or custom
establishing such unlawfulness.
XII. PREREQUISITES FOR A PER SE RULE
The question also arises as to what level or extent of unlawfulness
must be present for a per se rule to arise. The United States contended, 2
in a position that the ICJ ostensibly accepted sub silentio,"3 that one
hundred percent illegality-the unlawfulness of all uses of nuclear
weapons-would be necessary before a rule of per se illegality could arise.
48. THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 6-1, 6-9 n.3. See also
MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, nn.14-18, 24, ch. 2, nn.42-49 and accompanying text.
49. See THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 6-7; MOXLEY, supra
note 13, at ch. 1, nn.25 and accompanying text.
50. THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 1-6. See also MOXLEY,
supra note 13, at ch. 1 n.26 and accompanying text.
51. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 3 (FM27-10
July 18, 1956) with Change No. 1 (July 15, 1976) [hereinafter THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE].
See also MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1 n.3 and accompanying text.
52. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, nn.314-20, ch. 2 n.26 and accompanying text;
THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 6-3; THE NAVAL/MARINE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 10-2; Op. I.C.J. (1995), Legality of the Use by a
State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 17, at 90.
53. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 3, nn.237-45 and accompanying text; Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 822, 823, 829; 937 (J. Higgins, dissenting), 915
(J. Weeramantry, dissenting).
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To the extent one concludes, as I have, that all or "virtually all" uses of
nuclear weapons would be unlawful, either because the resultant effects,
particularly radiation and escalation, would be uncontrollable, or because
any such use would be likely to precipitate impermissible effects, or would
involve the risk of precipitating extreme impermissible effects, the issue of
whether unlawfulness in one hundred percent or virtually one hundred
percent of cases is required is not reached.
If one concludes, however, that the United States position-that some
uses could potentially be lawful-has merit, one reaches the question of the
prerequisites for a per se rule.
The ICJ ostensibly assumed that the use of nuclear weapons could be
held per se unlawful only if all uses would be unlawful in all
circumstances. This appears, for example, from the Court's conclusions
that it does not have sufficient facts to determine that nuclear weapons
would be unlawful "in any circumstance,"" that the proportionality
principle may not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self-
defense "in all circumstances,"" and that, for the threat to use nuclear
weapons implicit in the policy of deterrence to be unlawful, it would have
to be the case that such use would "necessarily violate the principles of
necessity and proportionality."5 6
However, the Court's approach may have been affected by the
wording of the question referred to it by the General Assembly: "Is the
threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under
international law?"57
This issue deserves more attention. There are numerous bases for
inferring that, under widely accepted principles of law, a per se rule can
arise under circumstances of less than one hundred percent applicability,M
and that this is particularly appropriate where unlawfulness would exist in
the vast majority of cases and the potential benefits of avoiding the
repercussions of unlawful uses exceed the benefits of using such weapons
in instances of putative lawfulness. 9 A number of the judges of the ICJ, in
54. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 829. See MOXLEY, supra note
13, at ch. 3, nn.9, 30, 43, 237, 245, 249, and accompanying text.
55. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 822. See MOXLEY, supra note
13, at ch. 3, nn.30, 62, 237-42, 303 and accompanying text.
56. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 823.
57. Id. at 811 (question presented to the Court by U.N. General Assembly resolution
49/75 K, adopted Dec. 15, 1994).
58. See, e.g., MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 4, nn.3-13 and accompanying text.
59. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 4, nn.3-5, 10, 25-31, 37-39, and accompanying
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their individual opinions, addressed the issue. Judge Shahabuddeen stated,
"[I]n judging of the admissibility of a particular means of warfare, it is
necessary, in my opinion, to consider what the means can do in the
ordinary course of warfare, even if it may not do it in all circumstances."60
Judge Weeramantry, addressing the issue from the perspective of
nuclear decision-making, concluded that nuclear weapons should be
declared illegal in all circumstances, with the proviso that if such use
would be lawful "in some circumstances, however improbable, those
circumstances need to be specified."61 Judge Weeramantry stated:
A factor to be taken into account in determining the
legality of the use of nuclear weapons, having regard to
their enormous potential for global devastation, is the
process of decision-making in regard to the use of nuclear
weapons.
A decision to use nuclear weapons would tend to be taken,
if taken at all, in circumstances which do not admit of fine
legal evaluations. It will, in all probability, be taken at a
time when passions run high, time is short and the facts are
unclear. It will not be a carefully measured -decision taken
after a detailed and detached evaluation of all relevant
circumstances of fact. It would be taken under extreme
pressure and stress. Legal matters requiring considered
evaluation may have to be determined within minutes,
perhaps even by military rather than legally trained
personnel, when they are in fact so complex as to have
engaged this Court's attention for months. The fate of
humanity cannot fairly be made to depend on such a
decision.
Studies have indeed been made of the process of nuclear
decision-making and they identify four characteristics of a
nuclear crisis. These characteristics are:
1. The shortage of time for making crucial decisions.
This is the fundamental aspect of all crises.
60. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 869 (J. Shahabuddeen,
dissenting).
61. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 915 (J. Weeramantry,
dissenting).
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2. The high stakes involved and, in particular, the
expectation of severe loss to the national interest.
3. The high uncertainty resulting from the inadequacy of
clear information, e.g., what is going on?, What is the
intent of the enemy?; and
4. The leaders are often constrained by political
considerations, restricting their options.62
Judge Weeramantry further concluded that, even if there were a
nuclear weapon that totally eliminated the dissemination of radiation and
was not a weapon of mass destruction the Court, because of the technical
difficulties involved, would not be able "to define those nuclear weapons
which are lawful and those which are unlawful," and accordingly that the
Court must "speak of legality in general terms."63
Even using the United States formulation of requiring one hundred
percent unanimity, there is room for "sub-classes" of per se unlawfulness.
Based on the Court's decision, there is a basis for concluding that the use
of strategic nuclear weapons and the wide scale use of tactical nuclear
weapons or their use in urban areas, would be per se unlawful." As far as
equipment is concerned, this would ostensibly render unlawful the use of
something on the order of eighty percent of the nuclear weapons in the
United States' active arsenal. As far as circumstances are concerned, this
would ostensibly render unlawful a very large portion of the instances in
which the United States might use such weapons.
To the objection that such piecemeal illegalization would be
incomplete or unworkable, the answer is that we already have something
analogous in practice and that, in any event, social and political evolution,
like chance in catastrophe theory,5 work in sequential steps as well as
jumps. Incrementalism in the right direction is not necessarily bad, and
can be infinitely better than nothing, particularly if it is the most that is
available at a particular point in time.
62. Id. (citing Conn Nugent, How a Nuclear War Might Begin, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF
NUCLEAR WAR 117).
63. Id. at 922. It is unclear whether Judge Koroma in his dissenting opinion, in
concluding that the use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful "in any circumstance," was
assuming that per se illegality required every possible use be unlawful. See id at 925.
64. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 3, nn.10-11 and accompanying text. See, e.g.,
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 829, 835.
65. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 22, nn.46-59 and accompanying text.
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As to the workability of partial limitations, the United States has
already undertaken numerous such limitations. In addition to the pledge
not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries, 6 the United
States has agreed not to use nuclear weapons, subject to certain conditions:
in Latin America, pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco of February 14,
1967;61 in the South Pacific, pursuant to the Treaty of Rarotonga of August
6, 1985;6 in Southeast Asia, pursuant to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone Convention of December 15, 1995;69 in Africa,
pursuant to the nuclear weapons free zone convention signed on April 1,
1996;10 and in the Antarctic, pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.11
So also, the United States, in its appearance before the ICJ in the
Nuclear Weapons Advisory case, strongly reassured the Court that the
United States doctrine of nuclear deterrence is purely of a defensive
nature, such that the United States would never use such other weapons
other than in a defensive mode.72
It could be said that this issue as to the prerequisites for a per se rule
is semantic, because many per se rules are themselves generally subject to
exceptions and qualifications. 73  Nonetheless, on the assumption that law
matters, it seems clear that, were the United States to recognize the per se
unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons, in whole or in part, even if
there were qualifications and footnotes to the recognition, a powerful step
would have been taken.
XILI. RISK ANALYSIS
To what extent may any one State put protected persons and indeed
the whole human venture at risk in an attempt to further the State's own
military objectives, even its survival?
66. See id. ch. 30 n.75 and accompanying text.
67. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 824. Other nuclear States
imposed further limitations on their ratification of the Protocol. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at
ch. 3, nn. 127-33 and accompanying text.
68. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 824-25.
69. See id. at 826.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 825.
72. See Op. I.C.J. (1995), Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17, at 86. See also
MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 2, nn.130-35 and accompanying text.
73. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 4, nn.3-5, 10-13, 16-30, 41-42, and accompanying
text. See also id. ch. 30 n.151 and accompanying text.
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In any such circumstance in which these weapons might be used,
whether intentionally or by mistake, is it not ineluctably the case that there
would be some risk of the occurrence of extreme effects, given the
potential destructiveness of the weapons, the inherent uncontrollability of
radiation,4 and the overall potential for escalation, misperception, and loss
of command and control?75
This is clear, I submit, even from Judge Schwebel's example of the
use of "tactical nuclear weapons against discrete military or naval targets
so situated that substantial civilian casualties would not ensue."7
6
The ICJ in its decision referenced similar arguments the United States
and Great Britain had made:
91. . . .The reality . . . is that nuclear weapons might be
used in a wide variety of circumstances with very different
results in terms of likely civilian casualties. In some cases,
such as the use of a low yield nuclear weapon against
warships on the High Seas or troops in sparsely populated
areas, it is possible to envisage a nuclear attack which
caused comparatively few civilian casualties. It is by no
means the case that every use of nuclear weapons against a
military objective would inevitably cause very great
collateral civilian casualties . 7
These examples, and the ones used by the United States and Great
Britain before the ICJ, appear to assume one of two things: that the
submarine in the ocean and the army in the desert or other such remote
targets would exist independently of the rest of the world, rather than being
affiliated with a State that either itself or with its allies has nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons that it is likely to use in response to
nuclear attack, and that the State using the nuclear weapons has no other
74. See id. ch. 29, nn. 41-124, and accompanying text.
75. See id. chs. 15, 25, 26, ch. 2, nn.63-87, ch. 15, nn.1-14, 33-43, 58-89, 99, 102-108,
ch. 16, nn.32-38, and accompanying text; NATO HANDBOOK ON THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF
NBC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, AMEDP-6(B), Part I, ch. 1, § 102(a) (1996) (adopted as Army
Field Manual 8-9, Navy Medical Publication 5059, Air Force Joint Manual 44-151); Carl Sagan,
Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 257, 273
(Winter 1983/1984). See also MOXLEY, supra note 13, at chs. 7-9, on weighing risks and the
legal relevance of risks. The escalation is particularly extreme, as has been recognized by the
civilian and military leadership of the United States and by defense experts throughout the
nuclear era. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at chs. 24, 25.
76. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 839 (J. Schwebel, dissenting).
77. Id. at 829 (citing United Kingdom, Written Statement 1 3.70 at 53 and United States of
America Oral Statement, CR 95/34 at 89-90). See also MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, n.29
and accompanying text.
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enemies that might find the attack provocative and retaliate; or that the
potential escalation by the attacked State or other party is not relevant to
the analysis.
Neither assumption seems reasonable. As the United States has
recognized, the legality evaluation is to be made in light of all available
facts as to potential risk factors."8 Although it may be possible that there
could be a scenario where the submarine or the army in the desert and the
related conflict existed independently of the rest of the world, such a
prospect seems so remote as to preclude its constituting the basis, on any
rational level, for the overall lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons.
Interestingly, Judge Schwebel recognized the legal point that if a use
of nuclear weapons could cause severe effects, it would be unlawful:
At one extreme is the use of strategic nuclear weapons in
quantities against enemy cities and industries. This so-
called "countervalue" use (as contrasted with
"counterforce" uses directly only against enemy nuclear
forces and installations) could cause an enormous number
of deaths and injuries, running in some cases into the
millions; and, in addition to those immediately affected by
the heat and blast of those weapons, vast numbers could be
affected, many fatally, by spreading radiation. Large-scale
"exchanges" of such nuclear weaponry could destroy not
only cities but countries and render continents, perhaps the
whole of the earth, uninhabitable, if not at once then
through longer-range effects of nuclear fallout. It cannot
be accepted that the use of nuclear weapons on a scale
which would-or could-result in the deaths of many
millions in indiscriminate inferno and by far-reaching
fallout, have profoundly pernicious effects in space and
time, and render uninhabitable much or all of the earth,
could be lawful. 9
The ICJ, as we have seen, concluded that it had not been given
sufficient facts to resolve the issue:
78. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, nn.84-93, 109-120, 161, ch. 5, nn.3-4, ch. 6,
nn.26-27, ch. 29, nn.125-127 and accompanying text; THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW,
supra note 2, at 1-8, 1-9 (citing SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 57, 58 (1947)); 11
INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMP. LAW, Torts § 2-114 (1983).
79. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 839 (J. Schwebel, dissenting)
(emphasis added). See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, n.38 and accompanying text.
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95 .... [N]one of the States advocating the legality of the
use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances,
including the "clean" use of smaller, low yield tactical
nuclear weapons, has indicated what, supposing such
limited use were feasible, would be the precise
circumstances justifying such use; nor whether such
limited use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use
of high yield nuclear weapons. This being so, the Court
does not consider that it has a sufficient basis for a
determination of the validity of this view.0
The Court declined to engage in risk analysis:
43. Certain States contend that the very nature of nuclear
weapons, and the high probability of an escalation of
nuclear exchanges, mean that there is an extremely strong
risk of devastation. The risk factor is said to negate the
possibility of the condition of proportionality being
complied with. The Court does not find it necessary to
embark upon the quantification of such risks; nor does it
need to inquire into the question whether tactical nuclear
weapons exist which are sufficiently precise to limit those
risks: it suffices for the Court to note that the very nature
of all nuclear weapons and the profound risks associated
therewith are further considerations to be borne in mind by
States believing they can exercise a nuclear response in
self-defense in accordance with the requirements of
proportionality."
This issue of risk analysis would appear to be the heart of the matter.
In a milieu in which the dominant policy of nuclear deterrence is inherently
provocative, the question of the extent to which any State may subject the
rest of the world, or any appreciable portion of it, to the risk of severe,
even apocalyptic, effects would appear to be one that must be addressed if
the law in this area is to be meaningful.
The applicability of risk analysis would seem to be recognized by the
United States statement of the proportionality test to the ICJ:
80. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 829, 894. See also MOXLEY,
supra note 13, at ch. 3, n.31 and accompanying text.
81. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 822. See also MOXLEY, supra
note 13, at ch. 6, n.8 and accompanying text; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note
12, at 819, 821, 822, 829, 830.
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Whether an attack with nuclear weapons would be
disproportionate depends entirely on the circumstances,
including the nature of the enemy threat, the importance of
destroying the objective, the character, size and likely
effects of the device, and the magnitude of the risk to
civilians . 2
XIV. DEFERRED LEGAL EVALUATION AS RISKING ABNEGATING THE
RULE OF LAW
Our current approach that each potential use of nuclear weapons must
be evaluated in the context of the particular use has the effect of largely
vitiating the rule of law. In the circumstances of a war where nuclear
weapons might be resorted to, the situation will likely be extremely
volatile; the fog of war will be thick (maybe even thicker than in wars of
the past, given the extent to which we are dependent on computer
controls); information will be incomplete and possibly inaccurate; passions
will be high; time will be short. The likelihood of reasoned application of
the law of armed conflict will be slight.
Our failure to come to grips with these the legal issues of nuclear
weapons now puts not just the rule of law but the continuation of human
civilization at risk. The United States is the indispensable leader; it alone
can start the process of change in this area.
Not by expecting quick success. Not by expecting a situation in
which we can quickly rid ourselves of these weapons or expect other
nuclear States to do so-but committing ourselves to a process that, in
perhaps our children's or grandchildren's time, will see the de-
legitimization of these weapons and progress on the road to ridding the
world of them.
XV. UNLAWFULNESS OF SECOND USE/REPRISALS
The concept of reprisal is one of justifying actions that would
otherwise be unlawful. But the United States recognizes as a requirement
for lawful reprisal that the strike be limited to that necessary to force the
adversary to cease its unlawful actions and that it satisfy proportionality. 3
If my factual conclusion is correct that the effects of nuclear weapons are
uncontrollable, it would seem that lawful reprisal would not be possible.
82. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, nn.75-108, ch. 2, nn.88-91 and accompanying
text.
83. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 29, nn.227-42 and accompanying text (discussion
of the application of the law of reprisal to nuclear weapons).
Moxley
The probabilities are overwhelming that the second use would be
designed to punish the enemy and, not incidentally, in the case of a
substantial nuclear adversary, to use one's own nuclear assets before they
could be preemptively struck by the adversary, and to attempt to
preemptively strike the adversary's nuclear assets (many of which would
likely be "co-located" with civilian targets) before they could be used.
Even assuming adequate command and control, crucial decisions would
have to be made within a very short time and would likely be dictated
largely by existing war plans contemplating nuclear weapons use. The
notion of a second strike as limited to the legitimate objectives of reprisal
seems oxymoronic.
In addition, the United States, while it disputes the applicability to
nuclear weapons of the limitations upon reprisals imposed by Protocol I, 1
recognizes that the law of armed conflict, including that as to reprisals, is
subject to the limitations inherent in the purposes of the law of armed
conflict, such as preserving civilization and the possibility of the
restoration of the peace, purposes that would likely be exceeded by the use
of nuclear weapons.
Even if it were assumed that certain second uses of nuclear weapons,
although otherwise unlawful, might be legitimized as reprisals, such
legitimization-like the lawfulness of the limited use of a small number
low-yield nuclear weapons in remote areas asserted by the United States
before the ICJ-would only affect a small portion of the potential uses for
nuclear weapons contemplated by United States policy and planning. It
would leave unaffected the unlawfulness of the vast bulk of potential uses
and virtually the totality of likely possible uses, including first uses against
conventional, chemical and biological weapons targets, second uses
intended to defeat and destroy the enemy, disproportionate second uses,
and other high-megatonnage nuclear strikes with likely extreme effects.
XVI. OUR NATIONAL INTEREST
Paradoxically, all of this is in even our short term interest. We no
longer need these weapons. Not only do they pose more of a risk than a
solution to any military threat. We can in fact, with our greatly expanded
conventional weapons and particularly with the precision with which we
can deliver payloads, now achieve with conventional weapons potentially
all of the military missions for which we might previously have considered
resorting to nuclear weapons.
84. See id. ch. 1, nn.274-77 and accompanying text; ch. 2, nn. 127-129 and accompanying
text. See also ch. 3, nn.246-249 and accompanying text.
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I submit that virtually any use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful,
and that the lessons of September lth should unify us in a broad
determination to the delegitimization of all uses of weapons threatening
terroristic effects.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Scientific research whaling is one of the most hotly debated points of
contention between anti-whaling forces and those few remaining states that
seek to resume commercial whaling. While the justification for scientific
whaling in international law needs to be carefully considered, so, too, must
one understand the political and economic motivations underlying the
practice. This paper is a brief overview of the legal, political and
economic context of scientific research of whaling in the world today.
Research whaling programs do not exist in a vacuum. On the
contrary, scientific whaling is intimately bound up with the status of
commercial whaling. The legacy of commercial whaling is one of the
saddest examples of resource overexploitation in human history. Whales
(cetaceans) were hunted for centuries without regard for the maintenance
of healthy stocks.' With many important commercially valuable species
LL.M., J.D. Adjunct Assistant Professor, New York University School of Continuing
and Professional Studies. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2001 annual
International Law Weekend of the American Branch of the International Law Association,
October 2001, New York, New York, United States.
1. For a review of the history of commercial whaling, see Howard Scott Schiffman, The
Protection of Whales in International Law: A Perspective for the Next Century, 22 BROOK. J.
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depleted, the whaling states sought to create an international legal
framework for whale harvesting. The product was the 1946 International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). 2  The primary
achievement of the ICRW was the establishment of the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) as an organization responsible for the
stewardship of whale stocks and the whaling industry., The IWC is
comprised of representatives of each member state of the ICRW and it
remains the most significant international organization devoted to whale
conservation and management.
The most salient responsibility of the 1WC is that it may amend the
provisions of the ICRW's Schedule (of catch-limits) by adopting
regulations with respect to the conservation and utilization of whale
resources.' The amendments of the Schedule "shall be such as are
necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Convention and
to provide for the conservation, development and optimum utilization of
whale resources." 6 The amendments of the Schedule also "shall be based
on scientific findings.'7
II. THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION AND SCIENTIFIC
WHALING
In addition to the powers of the IWC to regulate commercial whaling,
the ICRW conferred upon member states the power to grant their nationals
special permits to harvest whales for scientific purposes. Article VIII of
the ICRW provides as follows:
1. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention
any Contracting Government may grant to any of its
nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill,
take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research
subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to
such other conditions as the Contracting Government
INT'L L. 303 (1996); Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to
Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21 (1991); DAVID DAY, THE WHALE WAR (1987).
2. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S.
72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) [hereinafter ICRW].
3. See id. at art. III. The International Whaling Commission (hereinafter IWC) remains
the most significant intergovernmental organization devoted to cetacean conservation and
management.
4. Id. at art. III(1).
5. Id. at art. V(1).
6. id. at art. V(2)(a).
7. Id.
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thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in
accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be
exempt from the operation of this Convention. Each
Contracting Government shall report at once to the
Commission all such authorizations which it has granted.
Each Contracting Government may at any time revoke any
such special permit which it has granted.,
2. Any whales taken under these special permits shall so
far as practicable be processed and the proceeds shall be
dealt with in accordance to directions issued by the
Government by which the permit was granted. 9
In 1982, faced with the catastrophic results of its inability to provide
for the recovery of whale stocks the IWC voted to phase in a moratorium,
or zero catch-limit, on commercial whaling subject to annual review.'0 The
moratorium was largely predicated on the scientific uncertainty and
inability to accurately assess stock populations."
Despite the moratorium on commercial whaling, scientific research
whaling, along with aboriginal subsistence whaling,2 continued to be
permitted. Without question, the state at the forefront of the practice of
scientific whaling is Japan. Not surprisingly, Japan is also a stalwart
whaling state; one of the few seeking to overturn the moratorium and
resume commercial whaling. Japan's vigorous research whaling program
has raised questions about whether these activities are merely a way to
circumnavigate the present commercial moratorium.'3 Japan has countered
this with the argument that these specially designated scientific catches are
8. Id. at art. VIII(l).
9. Id. at art. VIII(2).
10. See INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, THIRTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION 20-21 (1983) [hereinafter THIRTY-THIRD REPORT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION].
11. Id. One of the factors that weighed in favor of the moratorium was a letter by then-
President Ronald Reagan expressing concern over the insufficient data on whale stocks. See
President's Message to the International Whaling Commission, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 634 (JULY
1981).
12. ICRW, supra note 2, Schedule at para. 13. Aboriginal subsistence whaling, along with
scientific research whaling are two of most contentious issues in international marine mammal
policy.
13. See International Whaling Commission, The IWC, Scientific Permits and Japan, at
http://www. Iwcoffice.org/sciperms.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2001) [hereinafter The IWC,
Scientific Permits and Japan].
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essential to obtain information necessary for rational management and
other important research needs.14
III. OBJECTIONS TO JAPANESE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH WHALING
The controversy over Japan's research catches largely stems from
three key points: 1) the lethal nature of the research program; 2) the size
and unilateral nature of its research catch; and, 3) the ultimate commercial
sale of whale products derived from the scientific hunts.
The ultimate decision on whether or not a scientific permit shall be
issued is up to the individual member state and not the IWC.'5 This
unilateral decision includes the manner in which the research is conducted,
however, the Scientific Committee of the IWC reviews proposals for
permits in each case." The Scientific Committee's review focuses upon:
(1) whether the permit adequately specifies its aims,
methodology and the samples to be taken;
(2) whether the research is essential for rational
management; the work of the Scientific Committee or
other critically important research needs;
(3) whether the methodology and sample size are
likely to provide reliable answers to the questions being
asked;
(4) whether the questions can be answered using non-
lethal research methods;
(5) whether the catches will have an adverse effect on
the stock;
(6) whether there is the potential for scientists from
other nations to join the research programme.'"
Applying these criteria to Japan's programs, some of the key
objections are apparent. Japan currently maintains three (3) main research
14. Id.
15. ICRW, supra note 2, at art. VIII(l). For the full text of Article VIII(l), see supra text
in Section II at note 8.
16. See The IWC, Scientific Permits and Japan, supra note 13.
17. Id. The Scientific Committee is comprised of over 120 scientists, some nominated by
member governments and others invited especially by the Committee itself. The Committee
inevitably includes the scientists proposing the scientific permit. Id.
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whaling programs, one in Antarctica and two (2) in the North Pacific (one
North Pacific program focuses specifically on the western North Pacific)."
Their scientific catch in each of these programs involves the death of a
significant number of whales.
A. The Research is Lethal
In the year 2000, Japan's scientific catch included approximately 400
minke whales in the Antarctic region, approximately 100 minke whales, 50
Bryde's whales and 10 sperm whales in the western North Pacific. 9
Whenever the whales die for the purpose of the scientific research it is
referred to as lethal, or consumptive research. Japan's fisheries industry
maintains the objectives of these lethal catches are to study the population,
structure, feeding ecology and pollutant levels in these chosen whale
species.2
Despite Japan's assertions about the necessity of the research and their
vehement arguments for the ability of the minke stocks to sustain the
research catch, the IWC has expressed strong reservations on these very
grounds. At the 2001 meeting of the IWC, two salient resolutions were
adopted strenuously urging Japan to refrain form the lethal taking of
whales in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary (Antarctica) and the Northern
Pacific. In Resolution 2001-7 the IWC strongly urged Japan to halt the
lethal take of minke whales conducted under the Antarctic program until
the Scientific Committee reports on the impact of the research on the
minke stocks."
In Resolution 2001-8 the IWC strongly urged Japan to reconsider its
lethal scientific catch in the North Pacific as it was unconvinced that
Japan's objectives could not be achieved by non-lethal means and the
18. Id. The research whaling program in the Antarctic waters is particularly troublesome
to anti-whaling advocates because the IWC has designated the Antarctic as a Southern Ocean
Sanctuary which theoretically offers whales protection distinct from, and above and beyond, the
present moratorium. Although Japan maintains an objection to the Southern Ocean Sanctuary, if
a Sanctuary is in place, are further data needed on stock populations in those protected waters?
Id.
19. The IWC, Scientific Permits and Japan, supra note 13.
20. See Press Release, Japan Whaling Association Website, Media Release by Japan's
Fisheries Agency: Japan Responds to Criticism of its Whale Research Program, (Aug. 3, 2000),
available at http://www.jp-whaling-assn.com/bannerl.htm. [hereinafter Japan Responds to
Criticism].
21. See International Whaling Commission, Resolution 2001-7 of the IWC, Resolution on
Southern Hemisphere Minke Whales and Scientific Permit Whaling, available at
http://www.iwcoffice.org/Resolutions200l.htm (last visited November 11, 2001).
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objectives themselves did not rise to the level of justifying lethal research.2
These resolutions from the IWC's 2001 meeting follow-up on key
resolutions adopted in 1999 and 2000 requesting the Scientific Committee
to advise the IWC on proposed research programs as to whether the
information sought in the research program under each special permit is:
required for the purposes of management of the species or stock being
researched; and, whether the information sought could be obtained by non-
lethal means. 23
Understanding the feeding patterns and diet of whales is often raised
as a research objective that can be realized through non-lethal research.
Even if this was not the case, however, the use of such information by pro-
whaling states is suspect. With greater frequency, Japan and other pro-
whaling states have argued that the recovery of some species, coupled with
their voracious appetites for commercially valuable fish stocks is positive
proof of the need to resume whaling operations. In other words, some
species of whale are now so plentiful and rapacious that they threaten other
valuable ocean resources, such as some commercial fish stocks, and it is
therefore necessary to cull the herd.24 This argument is understandably
22. See id. Resolution 2001-8 of the IWC, Resolution on JARPN II Whaling in the North
Pacific. The JARPN II is Japan's research whaling program in the western North Pacific.
Resolution 2001-8 is similar to others from previous years expressing the identical concern for
the necessity of lethal research. Most particularly, in Resolution 1995-9 the IWC recommended
that scientific research involving the killing of cetaceans should only be permitted in exceptional
circumstances where the questions address critically important issues which cannot be answered
by the analysis of existing data and/or use of non-lethal research techniques. For a reference to
Resolution 1995-5 see The IWC, Scientific Permits and Japan, supra note 13. For a discussion
of the overall ethics of lethal research whaling, see Alexander Gillespie, Whaling under a
Scientific Auspice: The Ethics of Scientific Research Whaling Operations, 3 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L.
& POL'Y 1 (2000).
23. Resolution 1999-2 of the IWC, Resolution on Special Permits for Scientific Research
(IWC/51/48 Rev.). The full text of Resolution 1999-2 is reproduced on the Journal of
International Wildlife Law & Policy Website at http://www.eelink.net/-asilwildlife/cet2.html. In
fact, the IWC has repeatedly passed resolutions expressing concern and recommending caution in
the practice of scientific whaling. In particular, at the 47th meeting, the IWC adopted Resolution
1995-9, which "recommended that scientific research involving the killing of cetaceans should
only be permitted in exceptional circumstances where the questions address critically important
issues which cannot be answered by the analysis of existing data and or/use of non-lethal
techniques ... " IWC Resolution 1995-9. In 2000, Resolution 2000-4 and 2000-5 condemned
Japan's Antarctic and Pacific programs on that basis. See generally the IWC's website at
http://www.iwcoffice.org/.
24. See The Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society Website [hereinafter WDCS
Website], Why We Do Not Need to Cull Whales to Protect Fish (visited November 13, 2001),
http://www.wdcs.org/dan/publishing.nsf/allweb/B1B776DDB9DB8D2680256A370033A60B.
The Japan Whaling Association suggests that the amount of fish consumed by whales is
problematic. See Japan Responds to Criticism, supra note 20. "It is becoming clear that whales
are eating 3 to 5 times of marine living resources than fisheries catch by humans [sic]."
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controversial and will continue to be the subject of scientific and policy
debate .25
Environmentalists have argued that at least part of Japan's research
objectives could be achieved . through non-lethal means such as biopsy
techniques to assess stock identity.26 They maintain that Japan has not
seriously investigated non-lethal substitutes because the costs of non-lethal
research cannot be recouped by the sale of whale products. As a result of
these objections, the United States, has seriously criticized Japan's ongoing
lethal scientific program. Former-President Bill Clinton, for example, sent
a letter to Congress in January 2001, where he expressed concern that
Japan was expanding its research program to include sperm and Bryde's
whales.2 8  Clinton also noted that Japan's "research whaling activities
diminish the effectiveness of the (IWC) conservation program. ' 29
President George W. Bush continued the U.S. objection. In May 2001, the
State Department openly criticized Japan's continuing lethal research
operations in the North Pacific °
While observers of research whaling may honestly debate the
scientific value of the data generated by Japan's programs, any scientific
utility must be balanced with both the environmental and legal impact of
Research with the objective of discovering the diet and feeding patterns of certain species is often
referred to as prey consumption or prey preference research.
25. See Jock W. Young, Do Large Whales Have an Impact on Commercial Fishing in the
South Pacific Ocean, 3 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 253 (2000) (concluding that despite high
consumption, dietary overlap with commercial fish species appears to be relatively low, although
direct data on the matter is limited).
26. See, WDCS Website, Japan's Scientific Whaling (visited November 12, 2001)
http://www.wdcs.org/dan/publishing.nsf/allweb/84A8B79F42BEB580802569070055CB80
[hereinafter Japan's Scientific Whaling]. On the other hand, it is clear that some data such as the
age of an animal and the reproductive status of females can only be obtained through lethal
means. See The IWC, Scientific Permits and Japan, supra note 13.
27. WDCS Website, Japan's Scientific Whaling, supra note 26. For a discussion of the
sale of whale products derived from Japan's scientific programs see infra text accompanying
notes 44-51.
28. See Washington File, U.S. Dept. of State, January 2, 2001, Text: Clinton Letter to
Congress on Japan's Whaling Practices, 3 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 311 (2000).
29. Id. The particular wording invoked by President Clinton is significant in that it tracks
the language of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments which provide for sanctions
against states that "diminish the effectiveness of" international fishery and whale conservation
programs. See Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 1978
(1994); Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994).
30. See Press Statement of Richard Boucher, United States Department of State, U.S.
Opposes Renewed Japanese Whaling 'in the North Pacific (May 14, 2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/prsrl/2001/index.cfm?docid=2870.
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the lethal research. The next section considers the legal consequences that
flow from the substantial size of the Japanese scientific catch.
B. A Large Unilateral Research Catch is not Justifiable
Assuming the species targeted by the Japanese programs-minkes,
sperm and Bryde's-are robust enough to sustain a lethal research catch (a
matter of some debate among IWC members), we are still left with other
genuine questions as to whether the scale of the Japanese research
programs runs afoul of other meaningful legal limitations. The large
scale" and unilateral nature of the research raises one such objection.
While both the size of the research catch and its unilateral character could
easily be considered independently, combined they form a compelling
synergy. Therefore, it is instructive to consider them together.
Where a single state removes hundreds of whales from ocean space in
furtherance of research objectives promulgated only by that state, such
action might constitute a violation of the law of the sea governing marine
scientific research. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) 2 is not only the framework agreement governing
virtually all aspects of ocean usage, it is also one of the most significant
achievements in international law in the twentieth century. One of the
many innovations of UNCLOS is Part XIII governing marine scientific
research." In particular, Article 241 of UNCLOS provides that: "[m]arine
scientific research shall not constitute the legal basis for any claim to any
part of the marine environment or its resources. '34  Since the Japanese
scientific whaling programs are not only lethal, but also unilateral and
consumptive of a significant number of cetaceans, one can easily see the
basis for a violation of Article 241. Simply put, Japan is laying claim to
hundreds of whales every year in the name of scientific research while it is
doing so to the exclusion of other states' enjoyment of those same cetacean
resources.
31. Id. For information on the size of the year 2000 Japanese research catch and the
species affected see supra text accompanying note 19.
32. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
33. Id. at Part XIII. Part XIII is entitled, "Marine Scientific Research" and is comprised of
28 articles addressing numerous aspects of marine scientific research including international
cooperation, conduct and promotion, installations and equipment and responsibility and liability.
Id.
34. Id. at art. 241.
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Although it is true that Japan has called upon other states to conduct
similar studies," the Japanese programs are nevertheless unilateral
undertakings. Most significantly, the ultimate sale of whale meat from the
scientific catch in the Japanese markets36 highlights the particular Japanese
interest in the large number of whales killed for research purposes. While
the key question of whether Japan's research objectives could be achieved
through a smaller catch is ultimately one for scientists and statisticians,
Japan can partially respond to objections to the size of its research
programs with the counter-argument that a larger sample of whale
specimens will likely yield more accurate data and more reliable scientific
conclusions. This counter-argument, of course, assumes in the first
instance the ability of minke, Bryde's and sperm stocks to absorb the
number of whales taken for research purposes.
More compellingly, as previously noted, the essence of Article VIII of
the ICRW is to allow individual states to unilaterally issue special permits
to their nationals for the purpose of conducting scientific research.3 In
addition, the ICRW also clearly contemplates the use of whale resources
that are not directly related to scientific purposes under the direction of the
state issuing the permit.3 8  As with all treaty rights, however, the rights
conferred by Article VIII must be exercised in good faith and in a manner
not prejudicial to the interests of other IWC members.3 9 Furthermore, the
provisions of UNCLOS, a later treaty, specifically addressing marine
scientific research would suggest that the interests of other states should
temper research upon a common marine resource.
In addition, any discussion of cetaceans in the context of UNCLOS
must include the special status which the drafters of UNCLOS saw fit to
confer upon them. The treatment of marine mammals, cetaceans in
particular, under UNCLOS unquestionably set them apart as a resource
deserving special attention and consideration. Article 65 states:
35. See Japan Whaling Association Website, Japan Responds to Criticism, supra note 20.
36. Id. For a more detailed analysis of this particular objection see infra section III(C).
37. See supra text in section II at note 8.
38. See supra text accompanying note 9. For a more complete discussion of the right to
dispose of whale meat generated by research catches see infra text accompanying notes 46-48.
39. For a thought-provoking article on whether the Japanese practices under the scientific
whaling exception rises to the level of an "abuse of right" see Gillian Triggs, Japanese Scientific
Whaling: An Abuse of Right or Optimum Utili[z]ation? 5 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL L. 33 (2000).
Triggs concludes that the question of whether Japan's activities constitute "an abuse of right to
conduct scientific whaling will depend upon the evidence regarding the primary purposes of the
right, the significance of the research and the scale of any commercial activities." Id.
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[n]othing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal state or
the competence of an international organization, as
appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation
of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this
Part. States shall co-operate with a view to the
conservation of marine mammals and in the case of
cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate
international organizations for their conservation,
management and study. 4°
Article 65 appears in Part V of UNCLOS entitled, "Exclusive
Economic Zone."41 Article 120 extends the provisions of Article 65 to the
High Seas (international waters).' 2  An interpretation of these key
UNCLOS provisions would strongly suggest that conservation, not
consumption or utilization, is the weightier objective in the case of
cetaceans. This contrasts with clearer provisions for utilization of other
marine resources. Most significantly, Article 65 highlights the necessity of
cooperation with international organizations to further the goals of
conservation, management and study. Such a requirement would certainly
seem to limit a large-scale scientific operation where the appropriate
organization has condemned the scientific programs in the first instance
and established guidelines disfavoring lethal research.
As previously noted, the UNCLOS provisions specifically pertaining
to marine scientific research directly inform any marine research
activities.43 The UNCLOS marine scientific research regime, coupled with
Articles 65 and 120 would seem to set a high bar for any ongoing, large-
scale, lethal scientific whaling activities conducted by a single state.
C. The Whale Meat from Scientific Research Catches is Sold for
Profit
Of all the criticisms of the Japanese scientific program, the ultimate
commercial sale of whale products derived from the scientific catches has
perhaps generated the loudest objection by anti-whaling advocates. In their
view, this fact exposes the scientific program as a subterfuge; that is,
commercial whaling is simply being repackaged and sold in the name of
40. UNCLOS, supra note 32, at art. 65.
41. Id. at Part V. The Exclusive Economic Zone (hereinafter EEZ) is an area beyond and
adjacent to a state's territorial waters where it may exercise its rights and jurisdiction for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing, the natural resources found there.
42. Id. at art. 120.
43. See supra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text.
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science. Cynicism aside, the practice of scientific whaling raises some
genuine questions about motivations and whether an unstated goal of the
research is to hold the place of the commercial whaling industry until such
time as the present moratorium can be overturned.
It is no secret that whaling states maintain that the IWC has failed in
its mandate to provide for the proper stewardship of the whaling industry
as provided for in the ICRW." Similarly, it should be no surprise that an
objective of scientific whaling is the establishment of parameters for an
ultimate resumption of commercial whaling. Such resumption, in the view
of whaling states, would be perfectly consistent with a consumptive
application of sustainable utilization of cetacean resources.4 5
On the other hand, anti-whaling advocates point to the fact that whale
products derived from scientific catches, whale meat in particular, is
regularly sold in commercial markets." For example, the Whale and
Dolphin Conservation Society protested the commencement of Japan's
2001 scientific whaling season in the Antarctic by highlighting the ultimate
sale of the whale meat from the catch.4 7
Japan's response to this criticism can be found in the text of the
ICRW itself. Article VIII(2) indeed indicates that whale products taken
under special permits shall be processed and the proceeds shall be dealt
with in accordance with directions issued by the government who granted
the permit. A plain reading of this provision demonstrates the wide
discretion accorded the issuing government in the disposition of whale
44. See WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS
1982 AND BEYOND 288-289 (1994). The preamble to the ICRW clearly designates the interests of
the whaling industry as an objective of the treaty. "Having decided to conclude a convention to
provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly
development of the whaling industry[.]" ICRW, supra note 2, at Preamble.
45. For arguments on how the Japanese whaling industry hopes to proceed in the future
from a model of sustainable utilization see INSTITUTE OF CETACEAN RESEARCH, WHALING FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1996). The Institute of Cetacean Research is a nonprofit research
organization whose legal status is authorized by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries. For a particular criticism of the role of the Institute of Cetacean Research see infra
text accompanying note 48.
46. See WDCS Website, Action Alert-Protest at Japan's New Whaling Season, at
http://www.wdcs.org/dan/publishing.nsf/allwell/3B8BO75EDFODCB6E80256AFE0037B558
(visited November 29, 2001) [hereinafter Action Alert]. The WDCS is a global non-
governmental organization dedicated to the conservation of whales and dolphins and their
habitats.
47. Id. The WDCS criticism is supported by scholarly skepticism of Japan's motivations.
Professor Gillian Triggs raises the question of whether "[t]he JARPA programme appears to
camouflage the harvesting of whales for the Japanese commercial market so that the issue of
special permits is a sham and in bad faith." Triggs, supra note 39, at 37 (citing Sara L. Ellis,
Japanese Whaling in the Antarctic: Science or Subterfuge? 31 OCEANUS 68-69 (1988)).
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products not used directly for research. The Japanese government has
indicated that the commercial distribution of the whale meat from the
scientific catch, required by the ICRW, ensures that whale resources are
not wasted.
Anti-whaling advocates, on the other hand, expand their case against
scientific whaling beyond the textual language of the ICRW. In an effort
to demonstrate an unbroken link between scientific whaling and
commercial whaling, conservation forces point to the source of funding for
the research program. In particular, they cite the central role of the
Institute of Cetacean Research: a private institute established with a grant
from the whaling industry and subsidized by the Japanese government.48
Questions of motivations and funding aside, robust and active
scientific whaling by a single government certainly seems to hold the
economic and political space of the commercial whaler during the time of
the moratorium, even if it is not a direct circumnavigation of the
moratorium.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Until anti-whaling advocates are successful in securing a permanent
ban on commercial whaling or whaling states are successful in repealing
the present moratorium, the matter of scientific research whaling will
continue to be contentious in law and policy. Although Japan is currently
the only state actively pursuing scientific whaling, its exercise of the
scientific whaling exception provided for in the ICRW is a bellwether for
the status of the whalers during a time of strong anti-whaling sentiment
within the IWC. Japan lawfully asserts its treaty right to conduct scientific
whaling operations. Such operations, however, must be viewed in the
context of a number of obligations in international law that may limit an
extensive exercise of that right.
Japan's heavy emphasis on lethal research is strongly criticized by the
IWC and does not comply with guidelines set forth by that body. While
these guidelines may not themselves establish binding obligations, the
resolutions of the IWC, as a competent international organization, deserve
consideration. Importantly, the lethal nature of the research, the large size
of the experimental catch and the fact that the research is conducted
unilaterally may rise to the level of a claim that Japan is not fully
cooperating with the work of the IWC. In addition, these facts support
arguments that Japan has unlawfully and unfairly laid claim to these
cetacean resources to the exclusion of other states. Such contentions arise
48. See WDCS Website, Action Alert, supra note 46.
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from specific obligations in UNCLOS relating to cetaceans and marine
scientific research.
Finally, the commercial sale of whale meat derived from scientific
catches, although provided for in the ICRW, raise questions of motive. Is
the purpose behind large-scale lethal scientific research the generation of
useful data to be shared openly and in good faith in international discourse?
Or, on the other hand, is it simply a way to circumnavigate the current
moratorium on commercial whaling and preserve the status of the Japanese
whaling industry? The answer may lie somewhere in between. Even if
convinced of the legal justification of its actions, at a minimum, Japan
should respond to these objections with an understanding that the legal and
political landscape now favors conservation over utilization of cetacean
resources.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is an honor to speak before you at this panel. The issue of whaling
has been extensively debated in various international occasions for at least
one quarter of the century. No quick solution has yet to be found. This is
partly because arguments against or for whaling tend to based on political
feelings, although these political feelings vary from country to country. In
this situation, the legal and scientific facts are deserved to be the basis of
the debate in order to achieve a proper settlement of the issue
Today, I will provide the view of the Government of Japan on Japan's
research program that includes the limited, lethal taking of whales. I will
first summarize the reasons why the research program complies with
Japan's obligations under international agreements, and then explain in
greater detail the scientific nature and purpose of the research program.
Finally, I will discuss how Japan's programs and policies are consistent
with those of other countries, and with the conservation of all species of
whales.
II. THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF JAPAN'S RESEARCH PROGRAM
The Japanese research program does not violate the letter or spirit of
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling ("ICRW"),'
nor does it violate the letter or spirit of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS").2
A. ICRW
The ICRW stipulates in Article VIII that "[n]ot withstanding anything
contained in this Convention, any Contracting Government may grant to
any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take,
and treat whales for purposes of scientific research." 3
The conduct of the Japanese government is in complete conformity
with this provision. The text of the ICRW does not endorse a total
protection of whales that would preclude the taking of any whales. Rather,
a key objective of the ICRW is "to provide for the proper conservation of
whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the
whaling industry."4 It is clear that the ICRW represents an agreement to
1. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW].
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter Law of Sea].
3. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII, 1.
4. Id. at pmbl.
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manage whale stocks to permit the wise commercial use of the stocks and
to avoid irresponsible exploitation.
Because the Japanese research program collects data necessary for
whale conservation and the proper use of whale resources, the research
program helps achieve the objectives of the ICRW.
B. UNCLOS
Article 65 of UNCLOS provides that "[s]tates shall cooperate with a
view to the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans
shall in particular work through the appropriate international organizations
for their conservation, management and study. "
With respect to the conservation of whales, Japan is working in good
faith through international bodies, including the International Whaling
Commission ("IWC"). We provide research data and other information to
other countries and international organizations, and therefore it can
reasonably be stated that our research practices do not conflict with this
provision of UNCLOS.
C. IWC Resolutions
The IWC every year passes resolutions that recommend that Japan
refrain from conducting its whale research program. However, such
recommendations are non-binding. The resolution is proposed as a non-
binding instrument, and adopted by a simple majority vote. At the 2001
IWC meeting, members of the IWC adopted two such resolutions, one by a
vote of twenty-one for, fourteen against, and one abstention, and the other
by a vote of twenty for, fourteen against, and two abstentions.
To adopt binding "regulations with respect to the conservation and
utilization of whale resources" pursuant to Article V, the ICRW requires a
three-fourths majority of those members voting.6  Also, the Rules of
Procedure of the IWC require that any proposal involving an amendment
to any Schedule adopted pursuant to Article V be "dispatched by airmail to
the Commissioners at least sixty days in advance of the meeting."' The
resolutions the IWC adopts on Japan's research program are usually
introduced at the time of the meeting, without sixty days' prior notice of
the text to members, thereby further indicating that the members do not
consider the resolutions to be formally binding on Japan.
5. Law of Sea, supra note 2, art. 65.
6. ICRW, supra note 1, art. III, 1 2.
7. ICRW, supra note 1, Rules of Procedure, R. J., Order of Business.
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These resolutions, because they are not binding under the terms of the
ICRW, are asking a member state voluntarily to give up its treaty rights to
conduct research. Failure to comply with such a request does not
constitute a violation of the ICRW.
D. Conformity with Other IWC Regulations
Some may question Japan's catching of Minke whales in the Southern
Ocean Sanctuary. Again, this activity does not violate the ICRW. The
sanctuary provision prohibits only commercial whaling.8 Therefore, it
does not apply to Japan's research program. Furthermore, Japan does not
think this sanctuary is necessary to achieve the goal of the ICRW. Japan
therefore lodged an objection to the Southern Ocean Sanctuary pursuant to
Article V.3. 9 As a result, under the terms of the ICRW Japan is not bound
by the IWC's action on this sanctuary.
E. Proper Role of Science in IWC Deliberations
We believe that IWC members have made decisions in recent
meetings that are inconsistent with the requirements in the ICRW that all
such actions be based on science. These decisions include the approval of
the sanctuary I have just discussed, which the members adopted without
benefit of a supporting recommendation from the Scientific Committee.
They also include the IWC's decision not to adopt a Revised Management
Procedure ("RMP") as part of a Revised Management Scheme ("RMS") to
regulate any commercial whaling that IWC members may approve, despite
the approval by the Scientific Committee of a proposed RMP.
In 1993, the then-Chairman of the Scientific Committee, Philip
Hammond, resigned from his position over the failure of the majority of
IWC members to base their action on a proposed RMP on science. In his
letter of resignation, Hammond noted that in 1992 the Science Committee
unanimously recommended the adoption of an RMP to guide any possible
resumption of commercial whaling that the IWC may approve. The
members of the IWC declined to follow the recommendations of the
Scientific Committee for reasons that Hammond wrote had "nothing to do
8. ICRW, supra note 1, Schedule, 7(b).
9. ICRW, supra note 1, sched., fn. relevant to 7(b) ("The Government of Japan lodged
an objection within the prescribed period to paragraph 7(b) to the extent that it applies to the
Antarctic Minke whale stocks ... For all Contracting Governments except Japan paragraph 7(b)
came into force on 6 December 1994"). Schedule, fn. relevant to 7(b).
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with science."' 0 He told the IWC's Secretary that "I can no longer justify
to myself being the organizer of and spokesman for a Committee whose
work is held in such disregarded by the body to which it is responsible.""
The 1994 decision to adopt the Southern Ocean Sanctuary was based
on political opinion rather than scientific fact. The Scientific Committee of
the IWC did not issue a recommendation supporting adoption of the
Southern Ocean Sanctuary in 1994, and in fact had not even seen the
amended sanctuary proposals the IWC adopted that year.' 2 The chairman
of the Scientific Committee, to the contrary, suggested "there was little to
gain" from the proposal.'3 Prior to the IWC Annual Meeting in 1994,
Japan proposed a scientifically appropriate compromise version that would
have excluded abundant Minke whales from the prohibition against the
taking of whales in the sanctuary. At the same time it warned that "the
IWC would enter into an identity crisis if such a [Southern Ocean]
sanctuary with no scientific backing were to be adopted at the upcoming
46th Annual Meeting of the IWC. Abandoning science would constitute a
dangerous precedent for all resource management in the future.""
However, a majority of the members of the IWC voted against this
compromise, and approved a sanctuary proposal covering all IWC species,
regardless of the status of the stock of each species. In a subsequent letter
to the IWC, the Commissioner of Norway to the IWC reiterated Norway's
opposition to the Southern Ocean Sanctuary and indicated that the
establishment of this sanctuary was not in accordance with the ICRW
because "there is no scientific basis for the Southern Ocean Whale
Sanctuary. "'3
The actions of the IWC members on adopting the Southern Ocean
Sanctuary and disapproving RMP ignore Article V.2 of the ICRW, which
states that any amendments to the Schedule governing the taking of whales
"shall be based on scientific findings, "16 among other requirements.
10. Letter from Philip Hammond, Chairman, IWC Scientific Committee, to Dr. R.
Gambell, IWC Secretary 2 (May 26, 1993), at www.highnorth.no/Library/mgnagreement-
resignation/IWC/le-frotn.htmi.
11. Id.
12. 45 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N 45, 27-28 (1995).
13. Id. at 27.
14. Letter from Kazuo Shima, IWC Commissioner for Japan, to IWC Commissioners
(Apr. 28, 1994).
15. Letter from Karsten Klepsvik, IWC Commissioner for Norway, to Dr. R. Gambell,
IWC Secretary 1 (Sept. 5, 1994).
16. ICRW, supra note 1, art. V, I 2(b).
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III. SCIENTIFIC NATURE OF JAPAN'S RESEARCH PROGRAM
People sometimes complain that Japan's program violates the ICRW
because it constitutes commercial whaling rather than scientific research.
From our viewpoint, this is a serious misunderstanding of the nature of
Japan's activities. As I will now discuss, Japan's scientific research
program falls clearly within the provisions of the ICRW giving a member
state the unconditional right to engage in scientific research activities.
A. View of Scientific Committee of the IWC
Japan's research plan and its results are annually reviewed and
commented on by the IWC's Scientific Committee. The Committee
consists of over one hundred scientists from around the world. Each year
the members of this Committee give Japan's research program a positive
evaluation.
For example, the 1997 Report of the Scientific Committee reported
favorably on Japan's Antarctic research program, known as JARPA. The
report noted that "[t]here was general agreement that the data presented on
stock structure . . . were important contributions to the objectives of
JARPA and stock management."' 7  The report added "the information
produced by JARPA has set the stage for answering many questions about
long term population changes regarding Minke whales . . . [and] has
already made a major contribution to understanding of certain biological
parameters.""S
Japan also conducts another research program in the North Pacific
that involves an annual sampling of 100 Minke whales, fifty Bryde's
whales, and ten Sperm whales. This program, known as JARPN, has
similar scientific objectives. The 2000 Report of the Scientific Committee
noted that "information obtained during JARPN had been and will continue
to be used in the refinement of Implementation Simulation Trials for North
Pacific Minke whales, and consequently was relevant to their
management. "'9
Some people claim that the Scientific Committee has suggested that
Japan's research is not needed for whale management. This is another
serious misunderstanding. It appears that the claim is based on citing out
of context a portion of one sentence from the same 1997 report noted
above that refers to the "major contribution" that JARPA was making.
The sentence states: "The results of the JARPA program, while not
17. IWC, REP. OF THE SC. COMMITTEE, IWC Doc. IWC/49/4, at 61 (1997).
18. Id. at 65.
19. IWC, REP. OF THE SC. COMMITrEE, IWC Doc. IWC/52/4, at 74 (2000).
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required for management under the RMP, have the potential to improve
the management of Minke whales in the Southern Hemisphere. "0
I was at the IWC meeting that particular year. Members of the
Scientific Committee shared an implicit assumption that the RMP's
algorithms and computer program for calculating catch limits required only
a few data inputs at the beginning stage of operations. At the same time,
members of the Scientific Committee knew that if the input of additional
data occurred, the accuracy of the RMP would increase. This is the
context of the original wording in the Scientific Committee's report. It
does not oppose the collection of additional data by Japan, and it in fact
recognizes the positive role such additional data plays in improving the
management of Minke whales.
The IWC's Scientific Committee has not endorsed Japan's research
catch. However, this is because the Scientific Committee is not authorized
to do so. Paragraph thirty of the applicable ICRW schedule only directs
the Scientific Committee to review and comment when possible on the
research of member states.2 ' It is not the function of the Scientific
Committee or the IWC to endorse or approve the research program
generally, or its level of catch in particular. Only the government of the
member state conducting the research has that right, under Article VIII of
the ICRW.22
B. Importance of Japan 's Research in Assessing the Moratorium
Japan undertook its research activity because the IWC needs scientific
data to review the effects of its moratorium on commercial whaling. The
moratorium by its own term does not preclude the resumption of
commercial whaling. Paragraph 10(e) of the Schedule of the Convention
adopted at the IWC Annual Meeting in 1982 specifies that "[tihis provision
will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by
1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive
assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider
modification of this provision and the establishment of other catch limits. "2 3
The research program will also contribute to the required review of
the whale stocks in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. According to
Paragraph 7(b) of the Schedule of the Convention, "this prohibition [the
Southern Ocean Sanctuary] shall be reviewed ten years after its initial
20. IWC, REP. OF THE SCI. COMMITFEE, IWC Doc. IWC/49/4, at 66 (1997).
21. ICRW, supra note 1, sched., 30.
22. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII, 1.
23. ICRW, supra note 1, sched., 10(e).
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adoption." 4 The Government of Japan expects that Japan's research will
provide valuable research data to assist in this review.
Before the IWC first adopted a moratorium on commercial whaling,
most scientific data had been obtained from samples gathered in connection
with such whaling. Scientists complained that the samples had serious data
biases, because commercial whaling targeted only large individual whales
in small areas where there is a high density of whales. This caused an
argument over the "uncertainty of the scientific data," and contributed to
the decision to adopt the moratorium.
Japan's research program is designed to obtain unbiased data, and to
obtain a fair representative of samples from the whales in vast ocean areas.
As part of this effort, the program requires the research vessels to follow a
special course that was designed to ensure a valid random sample, even
though this increases the cost of the research effort.
The sampling size is 440 Antarctic Minke whales per year, which is
significantly smaller than the number of Minke whales caught
commercially each year in the early 1980s. The larger the sample size, the
higher the statistical reliability of the data. Japan decided to limit the catch
to 440, however, since it is the lowest number of takings possible that
would still yield statistically meaningful research results. It is a very small
portion of the total population of Southern Hemisphere Minke whales.
Scientists believe that the population of Antarctic Minke whales has rapidly
increased in the last half century from its original population of 85,000. It
has done so by filling the ecological vacuum created when excessive
whaling several decades ago eliminated many larger whales such as blue
whales. In 1990 the Scientific Committee estimated the population of
Minke whales to be approximately 760,000. In 1992 the Scientific
Committee estimated that commercial whaling conducted under IWC-
approved procedures could take annually at least 2000 Minke whales with
no risk of depletion of the whales in the Antarctic. Even if the current
population should turn out to be in fact somewhat lower, an annual catch
of 440 is unlikely to pose any danger to the stock.
The key data the research program obtains is the age of individual
whales, which can only be obtained from the whale's internal earplugs.
No other source can provide reasonably reliable data on the age of the
whale. By using this age data, the research program can estimate whether
the population trend is up or down.
The final results of Japan's research program are expected to reduce
the risk of mismanagement of the Minke and other whale resources. In
other words, Japan's research program is a good faith contribution to the
24. ICRW, supra note 1, sched., 7(b).
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scientific review of the effect of the moratorium on whale stocks. The
language establishing the moratorium in the first place mandates this
scientific review.
C. Effective Research Cannot Be Conducted Through Non-Lethal
Methods
The IWC has never concluded that non-lethal methods can adequately
replace research that includes the lethal taking of whales, although there
have been intensive discussions of this issue at the IWC. In the case of
large terrestrial animals, scientists can closely study their age through
individual identification of animals. This is relatively easy for terrestrial
mammals in particular.
However, individual identification is almost impossible for Minke,
Bryde's, and Sperm whales. As a result, scientists do not know of a non-
lethal way to obtain age data for these whale species. The 1997 Report of
the Scientific Committee agreed with this assessment, noting that the
"logistics and abundance of Minke [whales] . . . probably precluded [the]
application [of non-lethal methods]. 25
I would also like to underline the fact that Japanese scientists conduct
non-lethal research whenever possible. Many of our research projects only
use sighting observations and acoustic surveys. Japan also studies stranded
animals. The taking of whales is only permitted when it is absolutely
necessary.
D. Sale of By-Products of the Research Activity
Paragraph 2 of Article VIII of the ICRW requires that by-products
from research be fully utilized so far as is practicable. The provision
states: "Any whales taken under these special permits shall so far as
practicable be processed and the proceeds shall be dealt with in accordance
with directions issued by the Government by which the permit was
granted."' 6  Accordingly, the whale meat resulting from the research
program is sold in the market by the Institute for Cetacean Research, the
non-profit institute responsible for carrying out the research. These sales
help defer a portion of the cost of the research program. The rest of the
cost has to be covered by a government subsidy. Thus, the research
program does not result in any net profit or similar commercial advantage
to those responsible for the project.
25. IWC, REP. OF THE SC. COMMITTEE, IWC Doc. IWC/49/4, at 63 (1997).
26. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII, 2.
Yagi 495
496 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:487
IV. OVERALL REASONABLENESS OF JAPAN'S POLICIES
Japan's policies are consistent with those of some other countries and
with good conservation policies.
A. Majority of Countries Have Not Opposed Japan's Research
Some people argue that the vast majority of the world opposes the
catching of whales for research. The majority of the countries of the
world, however, have not taken a clear position on this issue.
There are around 190 countries in the world now. Only forty-three
nations are members of the IWC. Only twenty-one of the forty-three
nations have opposed Japan's research program. At least fourteen nations
are sympathetic to this research, judging from the vote at the most recent
IWC meeting.
With only twenty-one of the world's 190 countries clearly on record
against Japan's research program, it is not accurate to say that the "world"
is against this research.
B. Other Countries Also Catch Whales
When it comes to the taking of whales, various nations including
Canada, Denmark, Indonesia, the Philippines, Norway, Russia, the United
States, and a Caribbean nation catch large whale species such as Bowhead,
Bryde's, Fin, Grey, Humpback, Minke, or Sperm whales.
The Bowhead whaling by the United States represents the highest
ratio of harvest to total population of any program. Its annual harvest
amounts to 0.9% of the Bowhead whale population. Japan's annual level
of take in its research program is less than half this percentage.
A number of other countries in addition to Japan have also engaged in
the taking of whales for scientific purposes, pursuant to Article VIII of the
ICRW. Prior to 1982, over one hunred permits were issued by
governments like the United States and Canada for this purpose. After
adoption of the moratorium, Norway and Iceland also issued permits for
research programs. Thus, Japan's research program is not unique.
C. Healthy Status of Certain Whale Stocks
Since the 1970s, whales have been protected, and most whale
populations are abundant. There still are five depleted species among the
large whales, and Japan strongly supports the international protection of
these endangered whale species. Japan every year donates more funds than
any other IWC member to support the IWC's research activities
concerning these endangered species.
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With respect to certain abundant species, however, it is no longer
necessary to prohibit the taking of whales in order to protect them from
becoming endangered. It is reasonable to allow the carefully regulated
reopening of commercial whaling for these species to help achieve a key
objective of the ICRW. Some people have expressed concern that once
whaling is resumed; it will expand rapidly and become uncontrollable.
This is highly unlikely.
The IWC Scientific Committee has adopted a new program for
calculating appropriate catch limits based on the work of a well-known
scientific expert, Dr. Justin Cooke. Japan and Norway have already
agreed to these limits, although they are based on methodology so
conservative that if it were applied to fish, it would preclude the harvesting
of fish in most major fisheries on the high seas. In reality, the world's
whaling industry shrank in the 1970s when cheap substitutes for whale oil
were introduced. Even without strict IWC catch limits, overhunting would
be unlikely to occur with the resumption of commercial whaling because
demand for whale products today is much lower than in the past.
V. CONCLUSION
A program of limited taking of whales for the purpose of science
would be consistent with the proper conservation of whaling stocks, as
provided in the ICRW.
As a country that has an interest in responsible utilization of marine
resources, Japan is conducting its current research program to assess the
stock of certain whales within the limits of the current legal and scientific
constraints. Japan only authorizes catches of the lowest number of non-
endangered whale species necessary to carry out the scientific research
anticipated by the existing schedules to the ICRW. No scientifically
adequate alternatives to the research exist.
Some countries oppose the continuation of scientific research, while at
the same time they argue Japan has not provided the necessary evidence
that commercial whaling can be safely resumed. In no other fishery
organizations do these countries argue against both commercial fishing and
the conduct of scientific research necessary to determine the sustainability
of the fishery. If they did make these arguments, almost all utilization of
such fishery resources would be barred.
The differences of opinion between IWC members have proven
exceptionally difficult to resolve. However, Japan will to continue to
engage in dialogue with any other member in a good faith effort to resolve
these differences.
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Thank you. I look forward to hearing the comments of others, and to
take questions from the audience.
TRADE POLICY UNDER THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION
Richard N. Gardner'
Let me begin by saying that I believe the Bush Administration is
doing an excellent job in trade policy. Peter Davidson has given some
convincing reasons why we need Trade Promotion Authority and a
successful start of a new World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Round
at Doha. I would add two other reasons.
First, we need further trade liberalization in two key areas of trade
where foreign trade barriers prevent us from fully capitalizing on our
competitive advantage: agriculture and services. The agricultural export
subsidies of the European Union are over seventy times greater than those
of the United States. The European Union provides more than six times as
much trade-distorting domestic support as we do. The average maximum
agricultural tariff of WTO members is over sixty percent, compared to
twelve percent in the United States. In services, we continue to face
obstacles in important foreign markets for our banks, insurance companies,
securities firms, and other service providers. We must remedy this by
supplementing the GATTs framework agreement of the Uruguay Round
with meaningful market access commitments.
Second, we need to do much more to open markets for the products of
the developing countries. This is an additional reason for seeking reforms
in the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy. The United States
should be willing to reduce its own agricultural trade barriers-in sugar,
for example-that damage developing country economic prospects. The
industrialized countries should also be willing to make substantial
reductions in their restrictions in labor-intensive industries such as textiles
and footwear. The WTO now consists of 142 members, of whom three-
quarters are developing countries. The best way to assure the success of
the next trade round is to make it a "Development Round" so that the
benefits of trade liberalization are fully and fairly shared.
Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia University. Special
Counsel to Morgan Lewis LLP. Member of President's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy
and Negotiations and member of the State Department's Advisory Committee on International
Economic Policy. These remarks were presented at the International Law Association ILA
Weekend, October 2001, New York, New York, United States.
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Peter Davidson has explained why Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
is needed if our trade negotiators are to have credibility with other
countries. The Thomas bill, H.R. 3005, provides TPA in a pragmatic,
sensible way. It recognizes the need to include worker rights and the
environment in the trade agenda, but it avoids insisting that all the
International Labor Organization's core worker rights be accepted
immediately as a condition for receiving trade benefits.
As a final observation, I would urge that the Bush Administration
develop a policy on international assistance as realistic and far-sighted as
its trade policy. Except for a little extra money for international programs
on AIDS, the Administration's budget requests for the current fiscal year
provide for no increase after inflation in spending for sustainable
development (health, education, food security), on aid to refugees and
humanitarian assistance, on economic support on behalf of peace efforts in
the Balkans and Middle East, or on democracy building and safeguarding
nuclear materials in the republics of the former Soviet Union.
The budget does not even provide funds to pay our $490 million in
arrears to the multilateral development banks. Worse still, the
Congressional budget resolution provides for no growth after inflation in
the foreign0 affairs budget from 2002 to 2011. This spending target is at
odds with the ambitious international development goals the United States
is committed to achieve by 2015 with its partners in the Group of Eight
and in United Nations bodies.
Our defense budget has been increased to $343 billion for this fiscal
year, but our foreign affairs budget is still only $23 billion, of which only
about $10 billion is for international aid. This is 0.1% of our gross
national product (GNP), compared to the average aid contribution of
0.35% of GNP by other developed countries. An improvement in the
quantity and quality of our aid efforts would help build developing country
support for our trade objectives as well as other priorities of our foreign
policy.
The tragic events of September 11th and the struggle against terrorism
on which we are now embarked make it even more urgent to re-examine
our development aid policies. It is already clear that we will need to join
with other developed countries in providing substantial financing for the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. But we will also need to take a broader
approach, addressing with other nations the desperate poverty and
hopelessness that have been such a fertile breeding ground for terrorism.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION MODEL AND PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW DISPUTES
Richard W. Hulberr
As someone who has been close to the ICC for more than fifteen
years, my position on this afternoon's topic must seem preordained, except
to those cynical enough to believe that familiarity breeds contempt rather
than. more familiarity. Although, or perhaps because, I am a strong
proponent of international commercial arbitration as it now is, I have some
concerns about the adequacy and appropriateness of it as a model for the
resolution of the kinds of public law questions that have come up and
surely will arise with ever increasing frequency under the now thousands
of treaties providing for arbitration of investment disputes.
I do not question what Judge Holtzmann has said about the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal and its use of the same UNCITRAL Rules,
that are frequently an option under the investment treaties. The Tribunal
has been a grand success and in no small part because of the quality of the
judges who have served it. Arbitration before the Tribunal, however, is
quite a different animal from ordinary international commercial arbitration
or from the structure provided for treaty arbitration of investments. We
notice that the Tribunal has "judges", indeed, it has a stable cadre of these
judges, it sits in one place, the Hague, it publishes its decisions, as any
proper court should do, and no doubt over the years it has developed a set
The author is of counsel to the law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, an
adjunct professor at New York University Law School, and a member of the Commission on
International Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. From 1994 to 1999, he
was a vice chairman of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC. The views expressed
are his own and not necessarily those of his firm, NYU, or the ICC. These remarks were
presented at the International Law Association ILA Weekend, October 2001, New York, New
York, United States.
1. The Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law
(adopted by UNCITRAL on April 28, 1976, and approved by United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 31/95 on December 15, 1976) [hereinafter the UNCITRAL Rules.] The UNCITRAL
Rules are reprinted in II YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 147 (1977).
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of procedures, modes of proof and terms of substantive jurisprudence well
known to the bar that practices before it.2
This recital will bring to mind the many points of difference between
the Iran-United States Tribunal and what I will call ordinary international
arbitration. I will briefly touch on three of them: confidentiality, fluidity
of process, and the uncertain or varying degree of judicial review.
First as to confidentiality. In ICC practice this is carried to the point
that the ICC will not even confirm that X and Y are parties to an
arbitration pending before it. Confidentiality is required under the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules3, frequently availed of in investment treaty
arbitrations, as it is under the UNCITRAL Rules., Confidentiality appears
to be one of the most significant attractions of international commercial
arbitration for the parties that resort to it.' In the usual case the hearings
are closed6 and the award remains undisclosed, unless there are subsequent
judicial proceedings. Consideration surely must be given to whether it is
2. See, e.g., Charles N. Brower, Evidence Before International Tribunals: The Need for
Some Standard Rules, 28 INT'L LAW. 47, 49-54 (1994) (reporting on the principles "routinely
applie[d]" by the Hague Tribunal in evaluating evidence).
3. Article 14(2) requires each arbitrator to sign a declaration that includes the statement
that "I shall keep confidential all information coming to my knowledge as a result of my
participation in this proceeding as well as the contents of any award made by the Tribunal." If
he fails to do so by the conclusion of the first session of the tribunal, he "shall be deemed to have
resigned." Id. Under article 24(1) "The deliberations of the Tribunal shall take place in private
and remain secret." Article 39(2) states that "The Tribunal shall decide, with the consent of the
parties, which other persons besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses
and experts during their testimony, and officers of the Tribunal may attend the hearings." Under
article 44(2) the minutes of hearings "shall not be published without the consent of the parties."
4. Article 25(4) provides that "Hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties
otherwise agree." Article 35(2) provides that "The award may be made public only with the
consent of the parties."
5. According to the results of a recent survey of practitioners and users of international
commercial arbitration, the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings ranked behind only the
neutrality of the forum and the assurance of worldwide enforcement of the award as an attraction
of arbitration. CHRISTIAN BUHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 395-96 (1996).
6. This is explicitly provided for in the major international arbitration rules. Arbitration
Rules of the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (the
ICC Rules)(1998), art. 21(3) ("Save with the approval of the Arbitral Tribunal and the parties,
persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be admitted [to the hearings]"); Arbitration
Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA Rules) (1998), art. 19.4 ("All
meetings and hearings shall be private unless the parties agree otherwise in writing or the
Arbitral Tribunal directs otherwise"); International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA International Arbitration Rules) (1997), art. 20(4) ("Hearings are private
unless the parties agree otherwise or the law provides to the contrary"); UNCITRAL Rules,
article 25(4), supra note 4.
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an appropriate element of litigations (before arbitrators, to be sure) that
challenge important national regulation.
A second attraction of ordinary international commercial arbitration is
the very fluidity of the available procedures. All the major international
arbitration rules, again including the UNCITRAL Rules, leave the shaping
of a particular case to the expectations, desires and traditions of the parties
and the arbitrators.7 It is, in fact, the very intention of these rules to
accommodate different legal traditions and legal cultures. Whether there is
any discovery at all, how witnesses are questioned, whether partisan expert
testimony may be presented-these and many other such questions are left
for case by case arrangement. Some might well conclude that such
uncertainty is an obstacle to adjudication of public law questions.
These two issues may be thought to take on particular importance in
the context of treaty arbitration of public law regulations when one
considers that, although the details of the individual cases will vary, these
arbitrations are primarily focused on giving content to or interpretation and
implementation of the treaty constraints on government action that affects
investment. How does a consistent jurisprudence develop if a decision
must be reached in substantial ignorance of others on the same issue? In
private commercial arbitration, by contrast, the issues in controversy are
all over the lot and usually of narrow compass or effect, and the applicable
law is whatever the parties have chosen.,
A third circumstance that almost surely matters less in respect of
private international arbitration than in public law arbitration is the varying
degree of post-award judicial scrutiny. Under ICSID procedures
(applicable in many investment treaty arbitrations), there is no national
court review of any kind: the national court's obligation under Article 54
of the Washington Convention is simply to enforce. 9 On the other hand, an
7. ICC Rules, art. 15(1); LCIA Rules, art. 14.1; AAA International Arbitration Rules,
art. 16(1); UNCITRAL Rules, art. 15(1). These provisions reflect the principle enunciated in
Article 19(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985):
"Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be
followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the. proceedings." This provision has been
described by the UNCITRAL Secretariat as "the Magna Carta of Arbitral Procedure." See
HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY
364-68 (1989).
8. This generalization is subject to the possible application of what is usually termed the
"mandatory law" of a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction whose law has been stipulated as
applicable by the agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Yves Derains, Public Policy and the Law
Applicable to the Dispute in International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE PRACTICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN ARBITRATION 242-254 (Pieter Sanders ed. 1986).
9. Paragraph 1 of article 54 provides in part as follows: "Each Contracting State shall
recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
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award rendered under the ICSID Additional Facility procedures, which are
not subject to the Washington Convention, or under the UNCITRAL
Rules, is subject to whatever judicial review is available under local law at
the place of arbitration and under Article V of the New York Convention
almost everywhere.10  If coherent investment treaty interpretation is
desirable, or even judged indispensable, is this diversity in the review
process constructive?
If there are issues as to process, there are also implications that arise
from the possible results of these treaty arbitrations. In the usual case the
investor challenges host country regulation. What is the standard by which
such a challenge is to be weighed? Is it something akin to the traditional
American view of what constitutes a taking? Under the Fifth Amendment
it has recently been held by the Supreme Court that "mere diminution in
the value of something, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a
taking."" Or is it the proposition announced by the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal in the SEDCO case some years ago, that "a state is not
liable for economic injury which is a consequence of bona fide regulation
within the accepted 'police power' of states?"" Or is it something else, or
several somethings else, applied variously by successive arbitral panels
operating confidentially and substantially or totally immune from judicial
review? Is this a recipe for success?
If arbitral procedures are applied where they do not necessarily fit
well, injurious consequences may follow for the arbitral process where it
does serve well. In some countries, though not the United States, pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in consumer or employment contracts are not
enforceable.' 3 Where, as in this country, they are enforceable14-at least so
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were the final judgment of a court
in that State."
10. Article V of the New York Convention establishes the minimum standards for
recognition of a foreign award in every state that is a party to it. By contrast, it is generally
accepted that an award may be set aside only in the state where (or under the law of which) the
award was rendered, and that in setting aside an award the state where it was rendered is not
constrained by the New York Convention in the scope of its review. See International Standard
Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (New
York District Court had no authority to set aside an arbitral award rendered in Mexico); Yusuf
Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "W" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997) (an award in
international arbitration rendered in the United States may be set aside for "manifest disregard of
the law" although that is not a permitted ground under the New York Convention on which an
international award rendered abroad may be refused recognition).
11. Concrete Pipe & Prod. Co. of California v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 645 (1993).
12. SEDCO Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-US C.T.R. 248, 275 (1985).
13. For example, under Article 2061 of the French Civil Code, predispute arbitration
clauses, as distinct from the submission to arbitration of existing disputes, is generally authorized
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far-there is ample evidence of intense pressure on the court system to
intrude into the arbitration process in the interest of perceived "fairness"l":
is the expense prohibitive, is the panel fairly composed, is there adequate
access to necessary evidence, did the arbitrator, to cite a recent decision in
the Second Circuit, "manifestly disregard the law or the evidence or
both?"16  A concern one might reasonably have is that prophylactic
doctrines justifying increased court intervention into arbitration, contrived
to deal with such perceived problems, will be unthinkingly extended to
international arbitrations between sophisticated business enterprises, where
they are not needed and where they would run counter to the most
significant attraction of international commercial arbitration, its freedom
from interference by national courts.'7
I am concerned that judicial action along similar lines may follow if
arbitral decisions of public law questions are seriously unacceptable in the
politics of the host country, with a negative spill-over effect on current
practice in private international commercial arbitration. Courts will not
necessarily restrain themselves, as the Indonesian courts did not in the
recent CalEnergy geothermal project cases.,, Constraints on judicial
review can be evaded or ignored. Indeed, treaties can be denounced or
simply not adhered to. Dubious doctrines may well be born of difficult
cases.
In light of the foregoing, it would be well to consider improvements
that could be introduced into arbitration of public law questions which
would represent departures from the international commercial arbitration
model, such as substantive standards applied with reasonable uniformity,
transparent procedures, available jurisprudence, and perhaps, following the
example of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the establishment of
panels of arbitrators. In that way the undoubted value of honest and
only for contracts concluded "by reason of professional activity," as distinct from submission of
existing disputes to arbitration, permitted by article 2059. Article 631 of the Commercial Code
confines the permitted scope of pre-dispute arbitration clauses to matters over which the
commercial courts have jurisdiction.
14. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
15. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
16. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1034 (1999).
17. The Bdhring-Uhle study, supra note 5, lists neutrality-primarily freedom from the
intrusion of the national courts of either contracting party-as the "most highly relevant"
attraction of international commercial arbitration.
18. See Mark Kantor, International Project Finance and Arbitration with Public Sector
Entities: When is Arbitrability a Fiction?, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1122 (2001).
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neutral decisions that international arbitration can provide may be brought
effectively to bear on these important questions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Efforts at health care cost containment are common to all
industrialized nations. In most countries, governments set the framework
for such measures, and exert a certain degree of control over both the
delivery and the standard of health care. Macro-level decisions define
coverage and allocate health care funds, micro-level allocation is mostly
left to the clinical judgment of the attending providers. Since at least some
restraints on the provision of care to individual patients are exercised in all
our nations, either through specific state rationing decisions (such as
limiting the access to dialysis in Great Britain) or through budgets for
health care (as in Germany), clinical and financial considerations have
become inextricably intertwined. Physicians are increasingly moving from
"advocacy to allocation. '"' The United States Supreme Court, in its recent
ruling in Pegram v. Herdrich,2 created the term "mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions," and declared rationing to be an integral element of
the managed care approach to health care cost containment. A high-level
official of the German Ministry of Health chided physicians for chafing
against cost-based considerations imposed on them through budgets by
claiming that rationing has always been a component of clinical decision
making as resources have never been unlimited.3
1. John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The American Health Care System, 327(10)
NEW ENG. J. MED. 742 (1992) (quoting DAVID MECHANIC, FROM ADVOCACY TO
ALLOCATION: THE EVOLVING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (1986)).
2. Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S.Ct. 2143 (2000).
3. Dr. Schulte-Sasse, Was soll das "Geschrei der Arzte"? [Why are Physicians
"Whining"?], 26 MED. TRIBUNE 18, June 30, 2000.
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Macro-level allocation of health care funds is based on coverage and
medical necessity definitions, micro-level allocation involves the;
performance or denial of treatment and diagnostic procedures. Coverage is
set by contract (managed care) or by statute (Germany), specifying either
specific benefits (managed care) or general categories of services
(Germany) members4 are entitled to receive. Macro-level medical
necessity definitions in managed care plan documents can be quite
generous and reflective of the prevailing standard of care, but on the
micro-level are operationalized through the application of restrictive
criteria for access to care. Benefits may be included in the macro-level
coverage contract and certainly covered by the promise to "provide all
medically necessary care according to good medical practice" but may still
be denied at the bedside for lack of "medical necessity." The SGB V
(Title Five of the Social Code), the foundation of the German statutory
health care system, defines both coverage and medical necessity as
concepts but does not use those terms. Only lately, influenced by
information on managed care techniques in the United States, has "medical
necessity" found its way into the most recent German code revisions. But
in spite of apparent similarities, the cost containment approaches pursued
in these two countries is diametrically opposed. In Germany, the law
provides a general framework for the guaranteed delivery of health care
and relies on the therapeutic autonomy of the clinical decision maker. In
the United States, managed care organizations (MCOs) have implemented
an elaborate utilization management bureaucracy to control care at the
bedside.
II. UNITED STATES: MANAGED CARE TREATMENT DECISIONS
A. The Managed Care Approach to Health Care Delivery
Almost fifty percent of all health care expenditures in the United
States are financed by the government through programs such as Medicaid
and Medicare, while sixty percent of the population are covered by private
insurers, accounting for only thirty percent of total spending.' Seventy
five percent of working Americans obtain private health insurance through
employer-sponsored plans which rely on contracts with large managed care
4. The common German term is "patient," not "subscriber" or "member," since 90% of
all Germans are covered under the statutory health care system, the remainder by private
insurance. All therefore are patients as of the first day of their lives.
5. Sheila Smith et al., The Next Decade of Health Spending: A New Outlook, 18 HEALTH
AFFAIRS, No. 4, July/August 1999 at 86.
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corporations, providing health care on a prepaid basis for a total of over
170 million individuals.6
Managed care was initially conceived as a cost-effective alternative to
the traditional fee-for-service indemnity plans. It consisted of vertically
integrated, brick-and-mortar health care delivery systems (called HMOs)
and employed salaried providers. Today, having metamorphosed into giant
corporations, MCOs offer employers a multitude of contractual
arrangements- "products"-for the provision or arrangement of medical
care which may include an insurance and claims processing function.7
6. Currently, 16% of Medicare beneficiaries-6.2 million among 39 million individuals
covered by the program-also receive their medical care through MCOs because the Health Care
Financing Administration temporarily assumed that managed care would help to lower costs. But
since Medicare, a system of social insurance similar to the German statutory health care system,
has attempted to curb spending, MCOs are increasingly terminating services to Medicare
beneficiaries. By January 2001, almost 1.7 million elderly patients will have their medical care
disrupted. Even though government studies have shown that Medicare is already paying MCOs
more for individual patients than it would pay for them in its fee-for-service program (all those
dropped by a MCO will revert back to the traditional Medicare coverage), Republican members
of Congress have agreed on adopting a Medicare spending package which "would pump large
sums of money into HMOs." As a representative of a managed care trade association noted,
"Medicare managed care is a program in crisis ... it needs to be rescued"; while the president
of the Greater New York Hospital Association observed, "Congress is channeling money from
hospitals on Main Street to investor-owned HMOs on Wall Street, enhancing the profits of
managed care companies without improving the delivery of services." Robert Pear, Congress
Near Deal to Raise Fee Payments to H.M.O.s, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at 16. So far,
Congress has been unable to pass a "Patients' Rights Bill," regulating managed care abuses on a
national level.
7. Most employers today, however, are "self-insured," bearing all actuarial risks while
minimizing them through reinsurance. "Self-insurance" creates a legal vacuum because §502(a),
the civil enforcement section of ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.) preempts state law causes of action for malpractice and denials of
benefits against providers and MCOs, and limits actions to benefit recovery and the clarification
of current and future rights under the plan. §514(a) preempts all state tort law claims against
employee benefit plans "relating to" ERISA plans; §514(b) "saves" from preemption any state
law regulating insurance, but §514(c) "deems" all self-insured employee benefit plans not to be
insurers, thus exempting them from state insurance regulation. The Supreme Court, however,
has reined in the preemptive reach of §514(a) by limiting the expansive interpretation of the term
"relate to" in three cases: New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995); DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. And Clinic Services Fund, 117
S.Ct. 1747 (1997); California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement Division v. Dillingham
Construction, 117 S.Ct. 832 (1997).
In Unun Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 119 S.Ct. 1380 (1999), the Supreme Court
weakened the scope of §514(b) by ruling that California's "notice prejudice rule" regulates
insurance and thus falls outside of this section. The Court specified that all three factors
enumerated in the McCarran-Ferguson Act defining when a business is to be considered an
insurance company are merely "checking points or guideposts."
Furthermore, after the Third Circuit ruling in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d
Cir. 1995), distinguishing between the "quality" and "quantity" of medical care, many
malpractice cases which formerly would have been preempted by §502 as actions for
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Common to all these plans is patient access to a limited network of
providers such as physicians and hospitals which receive discounted, often
capitated, fees in exchange for a higher volume of cases. Increasingly,
plans include a POS option (point of service) which permits members to
receive treatment by non-network providers but requires a higher
copayment to be paid out-of-pocket.
MCOs rely on a number of cost-containment mechanisms: primary-
care gate keeping to restrict referrals to more expensive specialists;
telephone hotlines staffed by nurses to be called in emergencies to reduce
emergency room utilization; financial incentives for providers8  and
administrative staff; capitated payments shifting the morbidity risk to
providers, and utilization management, a corporation-wide complex system
designed to reduce the use of health care resources. Based on corporate
averages and/or treatment guidelines both corporate and commercial,
health care funds are micro-allocated through case-by-case preauthorization
for medical procedures and hospital admissions. Treatment plans
submitted by providers are reviewed prospectively, followed by the
concurrent review of the course of treatment. Administrative case
managers may deny procedures and shorten hospital stays, often contrary
to the attending physicians' recommendations. Regional and national
norms are computed and compared with the utilization data collected for
individual providers. Such "provider profiling" allows the MCO to detect
patterns of "overutilization" and the frequency with which a provider has
appealed case managers' decisions. Providers falling outside of the norms
are "deselected." Furthermore, accounting firms are called in to audit
utilization management procedures, analyze treatment and hospitalization
denial rates, and suggest areas for additional cost-savings. Increasingly,
medical decisions and guidelines are thus determined by cost-based
criteria, ignoring the clinical circumstances of individual patients, and
lowering the quality of care across the board.
administrative benefit denial, were remanded to state court. In Pegram, supra note 2, the
Supreme Court created the term "mixed eligibility and treatment decisions," defined as all
benefit decisions involving medical judgment. Health care, however, has traditionally been
reserved to state regulation. The door is now open for courts to limit ERISA preemption to the
few purely administrative coverage decisions, making available the full range of state law
remedies for patients or their survivors victimized by managed care abuse.
8. Financial incentives include year-end bonuses or withholds from compensation to limit
the referral to specialists, and the utilization of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, as
compared with corporate benchmarks. Financial incentives for achieving such performance
targets are often laid out in the provider contracts. In regions served by no more than one or two
MCOs where most of the insureds are members, providers have no or very limited choice but to
sign such contracts.
2002]
512 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:507
While utilization management serves the micro-allocation of health
care funds on a case-by-case basis, macro-allocation occurs when
employers contract with MCOs for the provision or management of
medical services. These contracts determine eligible individuals such as
employees, spouses and children up to a certain age, and covere benefits
such as ambulatory care, hospitalization and prescription drugs.
Frequently excluded from coverage under such "plans" are preexisting
conditions, cosmetic and other "elective" surgery, mental health benefits,
"experimental" treatments such as high dosage chemotherapy and
autologous bone marrow transplants, alternative therapies, "convenience
items" such as some types of durable medical equipment, childhood
immunization, obesity treatment, in vitro fertilization, and surgery to
correct nearsightedness. These could be termed "categorical exclusions"
while "selective coverage" limits certain services under certain conditions.
Rehabilitative therapy may be covered only "when the personal physician
determines that significant improvement of a member's condition can be
expected within a period of two months." Physical, occupational, and
speech therapy may not be authorized "when there is no reasonable
expectation that the member's condition will improve over a predictable
period of time as determined by the plan."' Plan subscribers often receive
only summary plan descriptions promising "all medically necessary
care. "
10
9. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY (1998). See also
Bedrick v. Travelers, 93 F.3d 149, 153-155 (4th Cir. 1996). Travelers had argued that physical
therapy for a small child with cerebral palsy was no longer a covered benefit "based upon a
finding that the specified treatments did not reach a level of potential for significant progress
which would allow the therapies to be provided on a medically necessary level." The boy's
pediatrician had given the child a fifty/fifty chance of walking by age five. The court ruled, first,
that the "significant progress" requirement was not laid down in the plan nor in any internal
corporate guidelines, and second, that "the implication that walking by age five would not be
'significant progress' for this unfortunate child is simply revolting." Furthermore, the
application of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch Standard, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) led to
a finding of abuse of discretion by the MCO as the policy had promised as medically necessary
and covered durable medical equipment "which replaces a lost body organ or part or helps an
impaired one to work." (An upright stander is important for bone and hip joint development in a
child with cerebral palsy, and facilitates sustained neck and trunk extension.) But the court
upheld the lower court's denial of speech therapy since the policy specified that "these services
must be given to restore speech." As the child had never been able to speak, "medically
necessary or not, there is just no coverage here."
10. Micro-allocation issues have been litigated more frequently than coverage issues on a
macro level. Managed care companies micro-manage treatment on a case-by-case basis. Macro
coverage issues concern, for example, the ERISA preemption of state laws mandating standards
of care and prohibiting discrimination, and the fiduciary duties of ERISA fiduciaries such as
disclosure and avoidance of dual loyalties. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT, SYLVIA A. LAW, SARA




Even though plan documents may promise all medically necessary
care, medical necessity determinations by the managed care company,
functioning either as the payor or the arranger of medical services, often
result in the denial of procedures recommended by the attending
physician." This raises two questions: is there a valid definition of
medical necessity, and how do managed care companies operationalize
medical necessity?
So far, no federal agency has received the mandate and resources to
propose a valid definition. For many years, however, state courts have
struggled with the issue since managed care policies are private insurance
contracts, and federal courts have ruled in employee benefit cases under
ERISA. At least one state court found that "medical necessity" was
ambiguous as a matter of law and hence, under the rules of construction
for insurance contracts, a question of fact for the jury. ' 2 But no consensus
has emerged among the .courts. State legislatures, however, have
responded to the need to prevent MCOs from denying needed care.
Today, almost half of all states have adopted statutory definitions of
"medical necessity," most of them for managed care plans, some for
Medicaid.' 3 A typical example is the definition adopted by the state of
Virginia:
"Medical necessity" or "medically necessary" means
appropriate and necessary health care services that are
rendered for any condition that, according to generally
accepted principles of good medical practice, requires the
diagnosis or direct care and treatment of an illness, injury,
or pregnancy-related condition, and that are not provided
only as a convenience. 14
Some states define the standard of care more or less restrictively:
"Treatment or care in accordance with nationally accepted current medical
criteria" (Louisiana); "Within generally accepted standards of medical care
11. The German term for medical necessity is "medizinische Notwendigkeit.
Notwendigkeit is a composite noun of Not (distress, misery, imminent danger) and the verb
wenden (to change, to turn around). As a German physician commented, "The question is how
to define distress, who should turn it around, and who should decide on both." Klaus Schnetzer,
personal communication, on file with the author.
12. ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 10, at 211, 212. Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 574
F.Supp. 547, aff'd 768 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1985).
13. PANEL PUBLISHERS, 2001 STATE GUIDE To MANAGED CARE LAW §5.1 (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 STATE GUIDE To MANAGED CARE LAW].
14. 1998 Va. Acts ch. 891.
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in the community" (North Carolina); "In accordance with the prevailing
practices and standards of the medical profession and community" (Texas).
Several states mandate that medical necessity must be determined by a
physician (Louisiana, Texas, Wisconsin).' 5
C. Managed Care and The Operationalization of Medical Necessity
1. The Use of Corporate Criteria
Even though many plans contain a seemingly appropriate contractual
definition of medical necessity (often in accordance with state law), the
procedures by which coverage is operationalized through a panoply of
(unregulated) corporate criteria determine the actual provision of medical
care. Such restrictive criteria, sometimes spelled out in policies provided
to members but often supplemented by additional internal undisclosed
guidelines, often fly in the face of the prevailing standard of care,
sometimes even in the face of logic. They have spawned a. spate of novel
lawsuits, most of them still pending, which incorporate, for example,
causes of action for breach of contract and fiduciary duty based on internal
undisclosed cost-based criteria and procedures. These result in coverage
determinations according to factors other than medical necessity, and
designed to reduce the level of medically necessary services.
The complaint in Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society v. Green Spring,
Magellan,6  stated that the Provider Agreement concluded with
psychiatrists required Green Spring to "provide medically necessary health
services to patient-subscribers in a prompt and efficient manner consistent
with the standard of practice of the community in which the Provider
renders Health Services." According to the Agreement, "Green Spring's
utilization management procedures shall not diminish Provider's obligation
to render Health Services consistent with the applicable standard of care. "7
Plan documents assured patient-subscribers that, whenever medically
necessary, they would receive up to twenty outpatient treatment sessions
per calendar year, thirty inpatient days per consecutive twelve-month
period, seven days of detoxification, and thirty days of rehabilitation for
substance abuse care. The complaint alleged, however, that Green Spring
applied more restrictive internal guidelines, not disclosed to patient
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:657(D)(3)(e) (West. 2001), 40:2232(B)(5) (West. 2001);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3-200(b), 58-3-200 (2001); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, ch. 88, §
88:001 (no longer in effect); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.54(3)(d) (2001).
16. Amended Complaint (Aug. 1999), in Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc'y v. Green Spring
Health Services, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7953 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (Civil Action No. 99-937),
vacated and remanded, 280 F.3d.378, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1816 (3d Cir. 2002).
17. Id. at 10.
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subscribers, to reduce benefits. These internal guidelines and standards,
"developed to increase profits by denying care," allegedly violated Green
Spring's obligations under the Provider Agreements, contradicted
representations made to both employer-purchasers and patient-
subscribers'8, and routinely and systematically undermined the quality of
behavioral health care and substance abuse treatment. 9 Green Spring care
managers, for example, were said to have refused to authorize treatment
plans for another round of therapy sessions when the proposed treatment
plan was identical to the one for the sessions which had already taken
place. This rendered the provision of medically necessary and appropriate
treatment impossible for those patients who had not responded "to therapy
within the arbitrary time frame allotted to patient-subscribers by Green
Spring. "2 The management of mental illness, including substance abuse,
however, often requires longer-term treatment planning because of
therapy-resistent syndromes, comorbidity and repeat episodes-no different
from many somatic illnesses.
In spite of a number of poignant cases presented in the complaint as
examples, the magistrate judge found for lack of association. He
recommended dismissal of the action for breach of contract, good faith and
fair dealing, interference with present and prospective economic
advantage, tortious interference with the physician-patient relationship, and
fraudulent misrepresentation. Even though acknowledging that "this case
is pregnant with issues constituent to the ongoing public debate concerning
managed health care," the magistrate judge stated that individual patients
could instead sue in their own behalf, alleging specific injuries.2 '
The Green Spring medical necessity and utilization review criteria for
residential treatment for substance abuse have recently been the subject of
18. Id. at 25.
19. From 1988 to 1998, the employer-provided value of health benefits generally declined
by 11.5% while both in- and outpatient substance abuse benefits were reduced by 74.5%. 80%
of the participants of an American Society of Addiction Medicine annual meeting felt that
managed care had a negative impact on "the quality of care of my addicted patients." 81%
indicated that managed care also had a negative impact on their "ethical practice of addiction
medicine." Marc Gallanter, The Impact of Managed Care on Addiction Treatment: Evaluating
Physician's Views and the Value of Health Plan Benefits, 18(4) J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 1
(1999).
20. Amended Complaint (Aug. 1999) at 24, in Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc'y v. Green
Spring Health Services, (Civil Action No. 99-937) 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7953 (W.D. Pa.
2000, vacated and remanded, 280 F.3d 378, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1816 (3d Cir. 2002).
21. Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc'y v. Green Spring Health Services, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8017 (2000). Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc'y
v. Green Spring Health Services, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7953 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (Civil Action
No. 99-937), vacated and remanded, 280 F.3d 378, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1816 (3d Cir.
2002).
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two lawsuits .22 Both complaints alleged that the Green Spring medical
necessity definition and medical necessity interpretive criteria were more
restrictive than the medical necessity definition in the plaintiffs' policy with
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Maryland (BCBSM), contracting with Green
Spring for mental health utilization management (prior authorization,
concurrent review and retrospective review). The following BCBSM
medical necessity definition was applicable at the time when plaintiffs'
causes of action arose:
Services and supplies by a provider to identify or treat an
illness that has been diagnosed or is suspected. They are:
a. consistent with:
(1) the diagnosis and treatment of a condition, and
(2) the standards of good medical practice;
b. required for other than convenience; and
c. the most appropriate supply or level of service.
When applied to inpatient care, the term means: the
needed care cannot be safely given on other than an
inpatient basis.23
Green Spring supplemented this medical necessity definition with
criteria for mental health treatment, including admission and continued stay
criteria for substance abuse residential treatment. The most controversial
elements were, first, a "fail first" admission requirement: "Structured
professional outpatient treatment is the treatment of first choice.
Residential treatment . .. should follow recent outpatient treatment in a
structured professional program of significant duration and intensity during
the course of which the patient has not been able to maintain abstinence for
22. Amended Class Action Complaint, Jane Doe et al. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Maryland, Inc. (Civil Action No. 183811) (Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Md., March
2000). This lawsuit for breach of contract was settled. Second Amended Complaint, John Doe
et al. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc., (Civil No. L-98-121) 173 F. Supp. 2d 398
(D. Md. Sept. 2001). The complaint alleged several causes of action under ERISA such as
failure to disclose, breach of fiduciary duty, and denial of benefits.
23. Second Amended Complaint at 5, John Doe et al. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Maryland, Inc., (Civil No. L-98-121) 173 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. Sept. 2001).
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a significant period of time."A In other words, unless potentially
irreparable harm to the patient's personal and professional life had already
occurred, the possibly most appropriate treatment according to "good
medical practice "would not be approved and the patient would be placed
at risk for further harm."'
Second, if this requirement for residential treatment was not met, the
following conditions applied: "1) patient must be residing in a severely
dysfunctional living environment (emphasis added); or 2) there must be
actual evidence for, or clear and reasonable inference of serious, imminent
physical harm to self or others directly attributable to the continued abuse
of substances which would prohibit treatment in an outpatient setting." 2'
Since all family environments of alcoholics are marked by a certain degree
of impairment, the Green Spring criteria imposed further deterioration and
potential irreparable harm before treatment according to good medical
practice might be approved. Serious, imminent harm to self or others is an
indication for involuntary commitment and as such, an excessively
stringent and inappropriate standard for residential substance abuse
treatment.
Third, the Green Spring Medical Necessity Criteria required the
"documentation of restorative potential for the proposed admission" in
cases of repeated relapses.2' In other words, unless patients with a history
of failed treatment compliance could prove their current ability to benefit
from residential treatment, they would be assigned to a lower level of care.
But "a more appropriate clinical approach would be careful assessment and
identification of the barriers to recovery . . . Failure to address specific
recovery barriers and match the client to appropriate services and settings
only increase the human and financial cost to the client and society. "28
And lastly, the criteria for continued stay required that "all of the
24. GREEN SPRING HEALTH SERVICES, INC., GSHS MEDICAL NECESSITY CRITERIA:
SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT 16 (1992, 1995) [hereinafter GSHS MEDICAL
NECESSITY CRITERIA].
25. Denial of "having a problem" is common among alcoholics but whenever a patient
accepts responsibility for the condition, appropriate treatment is essential for a successful
outcome. Complete "remission" from alcoholism often occurs only after several failed attempts
at recovery. Denying residential care may expose patients to failure at a time when they are most
amenable to treatment.
26. GSHS MEDICAL NECESSITY CRITERIA, supra note 24, at 17.
27. Id.
28. LEE GARTNER & DAVID MEE-LEE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
THE ROLE AND CURRENT STATUS OF PATIENT PLACEMENT CRITERIA IN THE TREATMENT OF
SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDERS. 13 TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL (TIP) SERIES 15, at
17 (1995).
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admission criteria must be met "on a daily, continuing basis."29  This
requirement defies all logic of treatment-patients may not improve in
order to qualify for continued residential therapy. If they responded to
such a structured treatment approach which, by definition, spans a certain
period of time, they were no longer eligible for continued approval of the
appropriate level of care.
In 1995, the Green Spring alcohol and drug detoxification and
rehabilitation criteria for utilization review were compared by Green
Spring authors with the Patient Placement Criteria (PPC) of the American
Society of Addiction Medicine?0 While both sets of criteria dealt with
level-of-care determinations for substance-abusing patients and included
admission, continued stay and discharge criteria, the authors emphasized
that the Green Spring medical necessity criteria were intended for
utilization management while the ASAM criteria served "a broader
treatment rationale and purpose.' 3' The article concluded that the ASAM
criteria "are helpful in treatment planning" but in their current form "are
not adequate in medical-necessity review for utilization management
purposes."32 The Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, however, striving to lay
the groundwork for the development of national uniform patient placement
criteria, found that the ASAM criteria represented the "best effort to date"
and provided "a solid base upon which to build."33 The CSAT team had
reviewed all available sets of public and private placement criteria for its
Treatment Improvement Protocol (TIP) as both public and private
treatment systems were seen as increasingly relying on PPCs. A more
standardized approach was also considered advisable since most managed
care organizations employed their own criteria attempting "to place
patients in the least restrictive and least expensive treatment setting that is
most likely to produce positive treatment outcomes. " ' The TIP
emphasized that managed care criteria were "substantially more restrictive
in regarding intensive levels of care" than the ASAM criteria. Noted
advantages of the ASAM criteria were their development by consensus
29. GSHS MEDICAL NECESSITY CRITERIA, supra note 24, at 17.
30. Jonathan Book et al., The ASAM and Green Spring Alcohol and Drug Detoxification
and Rehabilitation Criteria for Utilization Review, 4(3) AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 187 (1995).
Dr. Book is the current Magellan (formerly Green Spring) Medical Director in the Magellan
corporate office in Columbia, Maryland.
31. Id. at 189.
32. Id.
33. GARTNER & MEE-LEE, supra note 28.
34. Id. at 11.
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among a range of clinicians (even though not as broad as might ideally be
desirable), their publication after extensive field review, and their high
visibility in the clinical arena in general.
2. The Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines
According to the Institute of Medicine, chartered by the National
Academy of Science, clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) are
"systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances."3I Currently, more than 2,200 scientifically derived
guidelines have been developed by recognized scientific institutions
(including the former Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
AHCPR, now called Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
AHRQ36) and medical specialty organizations. Their use, however, is not
required by law, and MCOs are free to develop and apply their own
customized guidelines.17 As a MCO representative observed in response to
an informal survey of the use of official practice guidelines: the AHCPR
guidelines "did not seem to fit his circumstances."38  Furthermore,
managed care organizations, "with their commitment to the bottom line,
may make modifications to guidelines to achieve their best interests and not
those of the patients."39  "Among these managed care guidelines, a
staggering diversity reigns. Indeed, the full extent of the variety can not
be known since many of them are proprietary, kept confidential partly to
35. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMM. ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, CLINICAL
PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM (M.J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr,
eds., 1990). The IOM definition has also been adopted by German institutions and medical
specialty societies developing clinical practice guidelines.
36. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, USING CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES TO EVALUATE QUALITY OF CARE
(1995). Volume 1 contains a "List of attributes of good practice guidelines" and a twelve-point
checklist for guideline development, similar to the approach developed by the German
workgroup AZQ.
37. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRACTICE GUIDELINES: MANAGED CARE
PLANS CUSTOMIZE GUIDELINES TO MEET LOCAL INTERESTS 3 (1996). More than 75% of all
MCOs use at least some formally implemented guidelines. Frances H. Miller, Medical
Malpractice: External Influences and Controls-Medical Discipline in the Twenty-First Century:
Are Purchasers the Answer?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 31, 46 (1997).
38. Jane Sisk, How are Health Care Organizations Using Clinical Guidelines?, 17
HEALTH AFFAIRS, No. 5, Sept./Oct. 1999, at 91.
39. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 37, at 12 (quoting an
anonymous expert source on guidelines).
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ensure commercial salability and partly to limit physicians' ability to
'game' the system for extra benefits. "4
3. Commercial Guidelines
Managed care organizations increasingly resort to guidelines
developed by actuarial firms (Milliman & Robertson, InterQual"', Value
Health Services) for commercial purposes.4 2  The Milliman & Robertson
(M&R) guidelines, for example, are sold to a large number of MCOs
including companies such as Cigna, Prudential, United Healthcare Corp.,
and U.S. Healthcare.4 3  By 1995, the firm's "Optimal Recovery
Guidelines" (ORGs) were applied to the treatment of more than 50 million
patients-but not without serious resistance by practitioners and the
American Medical Association, dubbing the guidelines "cookbook
medicine," sacrificing autonomous clinical judgment and the consideration
of each patient's unique circumstances. 4 In order to avoid costly referrals
to specialists or hospital stays, the extensive list of conditions to be treated
by general practitioners in Volume 5, "Ambulatory, Primary and
Pharmaceutical Care" (developed in focus groups of managed care primary
care physicians) includes heart failure, pneumonia, and epileptic seizures.
Still, the "purpose of the Guidelines is not to ration or reduce care, but
rather to help minimize waste and inefficiency in the healthcare system. "4
As the company itself consistently emphasizes in its literature, its
Healthcare Management Guidelines are "a set of optimal clinical practice
benchmarks for treating common conditions for patients who have no
complications. If you have an uncomplicated patient with a particular
40. E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal
Standard of Care, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 12 (Fall 1997) (quoting Lucian L. Leape, Translating
Medical Science Into Medical Practice: Do We Need a National Medical Standards Board? 273
JAMA 1534, 1536 (1995)).
41. Miller, supra note 37, at3l, n.104.
42. An extensive search of the National Library of Medicine database revealed only a slim
1992 edition of the Milliman & Robertson Guidelines, an entry of InterQual as a publisher, and
no entry of Value Health Services. (The NLM is the largest repository of scientific medical
publications in the world.) All three corporations sell clinical practice guidelines for "medical
review services" (the precertification and concurrent review of individual patients' medical care)
to large managed care corporations.
43. Morreim, supra note 40, at 11, n.28. Since then, some of these corporations have
merged with other MCOs.
44. Allen R. Myerson, Helping Health Insurers Say No, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1995, at
Dl. Most M&R documents emphasize, however, that the guidelines should be adapted to local
standards and are not intended to supplant clinical expertise.
45. MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, INC., HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 3 (Apr. 1998).
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illness, here is the most-efficient, demonstrated-quality course of
treatment."- "Eighty percent of under-age 65 cases and 40% to 50% of
over-age 65 cases are generally considered uncomplicated. '"4 7  This
approach completely ignores the considerable incidence of comorbidity,
especially among the elderly.4 8  As one physician commented, "The
standards take an absurdly optimistic approach. If all the stars are aligned
in the heavens and everything turns out just right, what is the least we can
do?"49
In some cases, it appears that health plan guidelines are
based not even on average needs but on the needs of
patients in the best of circumstances. For example, in
developing benchmarks to which managed care plans
should strive, the consulting company Milliman &
Robertson based its benchmarks on the experiences of the
10% of patients in each type of treatment who needed the
least amount of care. Thus, if experience showed that
10% of patients could be discharged within one day of an
appendectomy, the benchmarks set a goal for discharging
appendectomy patients within one day of their surgery.3
Empirical studies have supported the contention that only 10% of all
hospital treatments provided meet the M&R guideline goals.5'
With hospitalization the most expensive component of health care,
guidelines focus on the projected length-of-stay for "the entire spectrum of
medical and surgical patients-regardless of the severity of the condition so
46. Id. at 1.
47. Id. at 2.
48. No guidelines adjusted for comorbidity are provided. Indeed, when developing
scientifically valid guidelines for treatments of specific conditions, comorbidity should be
excluded to prevent the results from being confounded by the effects of coexistent illnesses and
the interaction of multiple treatments. But the Milliman & Robertson estimates of
"uncomplicated" cases, especially among those over age 65, are excessive, making the guidelines
next to useless and potentially damaging for patients. See generally MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON,
INC., supra note 45.
49. Myerson, supra note 44, at Cl (quoting Gary S. Dorfman, medical society officer and
in charge of quality and cost control at Rhode Island Hospital).
50. David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit
Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155, n.71 (1996). (quoting Greg Borzo, R.I. Doctors Face
"Absurd" Inpatient Limits, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 21, 1994, at 1, 9).
51. Hirshfeld et al., Structuring Provider-Sponsored Organizations: The Legal and
Regulatory Hurdles, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 11 (1999).
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long as the patient does not develop complications." '52 In 1997, the
company, supporting its conclusion with six pages of tables, reported that
new mothers should be able to be released from the hospital twenty-four
hours after an uncomplicated vaginal delivery, and forty-eight hours after a
Cesarean.53 The report added that no health status information on mother
and newborn nor on post-discharge medical care provided had been
considered, but that "such post-discharge care is likely included as
medically appropriate for short-stay patients."i' In 1999, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, in In re U.S. Healthcare,55 upheld the lower court's
ruling that the twenty-four hour contractual coverage limitation of
hospitalization after delivery was a quality of care issue, and thus outside
of the scope of the ERISA preemption. Furthermore, the refusal of a
requested home visit by a nurse, a covered benefit, was also considered-a
novum for any court!-a violation of the standard of care. Since the MCO
had acted as a "medical provider", it was not immune to state law medical
malpractice claims. Today, forty-two states prohibit "drive-through"
deliveries,5' and President Clinton's Newborns' and Mothers' Health
Protection Act of 1996 has been in effect since January 1, 1998.11
4. Guideline Development
How are the Milliman & Robertson guidelines developed? Precise
information on the data entering into the guidelines have been difficult to
obtain since M&R has limited itself to general statements only. In spite of
its claims that "guidelines are developed in accordance with the principles
52. HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 45,
at 6.
53. Frederick W. Spong and Dennis J. Hulet, MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, INC., RESEARCH
REPORT: HEALTH STATUS IMPROVEMENT AND MANAGEMENT HSIM EXTRACT #1 - INPATIENT
CARE FOR MOTHERS AND NEWBORNS (1997). The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists recommends two days for uncomplicated births and four days for Cesarean
sections. German women currently spend an average of four days in the hospital for
uncomplicated deliveries.
54. Id. at 4.
55. In re United States Healthcare, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22464. U.S. Healthcare Inc.
v. Steven Bauman, 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. June
19, 2000) (Civil Action No. 99-1383). The newborn Michelina had died of an undiagnosed
meningitis the day after she and her mother had been discharged from the hospital 24 hours after
delivery.
56. See 2001 STATE GUIDE To MANAGED CARE LAW, supra note 13, at §3.2.
57. Id. The Act mandates a minimum stay of 48 hours after a normal vaginal delivery,
and a minimum of 96 hours after a Cesarean. Furthermore, no health plan approval is required.
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of evidence-based medicine, employing the current best evidence,"18 none
of the details customarily provided for scientifically derived clinical
practice guidelines are made available. Medical literature, especially
randomized controlled trials and observational studies in peer-reviewed
literature are cited as sources. 9 But how such data are then aggregated to
arrive at the guidelines remains a mystery.60 Another source of data for
guideline development are utilization review organizations, MCOs and
chart reviews of managed care providers.6' This method relies on insurers'
own decisions instead of scientifically obtained material.62 Since all MCOs
strive to prevent health care costs from rising by applying increasingly
stringent standardized criteria, and their data are returned into the feedback
loop for guidelines updates, the standard of care follows the downward
spiral.
As M&R admits, the guidelines are targeted at the "financial
viability" of the health care system. Actuaries
help measure the financial risks associated with the
delivery of health care (e.g. utilization rates, costs, trends,
identification of opportunity, volatility, and risk).
Actuaries and clinicians together identify the clinical and
financial opportunities available, translate these
opportunities into specific clinical practices, and measure
the financial impact of changes. 6
58. James M. Schibanoff, MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, INC., HEALTHCARE STATUS
IMPROVEMENT & MANAGEMENT, PEDIATRIC HSIM, (1998).
59. Id.
60. For further discussion, see id. at 33.
61. HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note
45, at 6.
62. E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and Medical
Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 983 (1999).
63. HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note
45, at 6. The 2001 edition of The Managed Health Care Handbook, edited by a partner in the
accounting firm of Ernst & Young "with one of the largest health care consulting practices in the
United States", contains three chapters contributed by authors from Milliman & Robertson. The
author of "Actuarial Services in an Integrated Delivery System" discusses how to aid HMOs to
select providers to include or exclude from contracting, how to design incentive structures to
make regular, budgeted payments or periodic bonus payments to providers from integrated
delivery system gains, the design and determination of the value of various provider capitation
arrangements, the establishment of financial benchmarks for future measurement, and the
quantification of "medical management policy." Stephen M. Cigich, Actuarial Services in an
Integrated Delivery System, in THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 971 (Peter R.
Kongstvedt, ed.) (2001).
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In 1995, eighteen in-house consultants, nine physicians and nine
nurses, "having plenty of clinical and administrative experience especially
at health maintenance organizations," were writing new standards and
revising existing ones." Proposed standards were submitted for review to
physicians working for health plans relying on the M&R guidelines but not
to medical societies "whose recommendations are invariably more
generous than Milliman's. "63 On June 13, 2000, the American Medical
Association House of Delegates adopted Resolution 822, introduced by the
New York Delegation, and formally rejected "the Milliman & Robertson
Guidelines as the clinical standard of care. "6
5. The Application of Commercial Guidelines
"Some health plans are apparently using the Milliman & Robertson
recommendations as guidelines that should be followed for all patients,
unless an extension is justified, rather than as an aspirational benchmark."67
In Batas v. Prudential, the plaintiffs alleged the formal guideline
application to virtually all subscribers to deny coverage, and without
consideration of the treating physicians' clinical judgment, despite M&R's
caveat that the guidelines are not intended as exclusive criteria." Humana
documents obtained through discovery in cases against Humana Health
Insurance and Humana Inc. confirm the trend towards rigid guideline use.69
64. Myerson, supra note 44, at C1.
65. Id.
66. American Medical Association House of Delegates (A-00), Report of Reference
Committee H, HOD Action: Original Resolution 822 (Rejection of Milliman & Robertson as
Standard of Care).
67. Orentlicher, supra note 50, at n.71 (quoting PRIVATE SECTOR ADVOCACY AND
SUPPORT TEAM, AM. MED. ASS'N., MANAGED CARE AND THE MARKET: A SUMMARY OF
NATIONAL TRENDS AFFECTING PHYSICIANS 2 (2d ed. 1995).
68. Plaintiff's Surreply in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Discuss the Class Action
Complaint at 17 (August 1997), in Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div.,
Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v.
The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion granted by
Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
69. Chipps v. Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla., (15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County, Fla.)
(Case No. CL 96-00423 AE) (unreported, filed 1996). The jury awarded the plaintiff $80
million, and the case was appealed to the Fourth District Florida Court of Appeals. Humana
Health Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Chipps, 748 So.2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(No. 00-866), reh "g den.
Oct. 12, 1999, aff'd in part, rev'd, and remanded by Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Chipps,
802 So.2d 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Price et al. v. Humana Inc., (S.D. Fla.) (Case No. 9:99-
8763 CIV-Moreno) (unreported, filed 1999), transferred and consolidated In re Humana Inc.
Managed Care Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099 (2000), aff'd 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS (11th
Cir. 2002).
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After the quarterly earnings of Humana had dropped sharply in early
1995, the company called in the auditing firm Coopers & Lybrand for a
utilization management program audit. The Humana utilization
management program is centrally administered out of Louisville,
Kentucky. Its main components are pre-admission review, telephone pre-
certification, concurrent review, case management and written prior
authorization. Pre-admission review is conducted by admission
coordinators, registered nurses (RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs),
and supervisors. The Coopers & Lybrand report on the effectiveness of
the utilization management program recommended, among other
procedures, the more stringent use of commercial guidelines. In order to
seize the "tremendous opportunity" of generating additional savings, the
patient care coordinators (PCCs), performing concurrent review, should be
trained to be more "proactive and aggressive when discussing
'questionable' cases with physicians, and use more aggressive utilization
criteria, such as M&R for LOS [length-of-stay] and InterQual for
continued stay review across all markets." 70 Furthermore, the nurses' role
should be expanded by assigning M&R LOS guidelines for internal
management purposes, and by more aggressively addressing "all
questionable treatment issues" during the initial contact.', "Policies for
discharge planning and case management should be reviewed, revised if
necessary and reinforced with nurses during training. The revised
program should be supported by performance criteria and incentives for
the nurses. "72
For on-site concurrent review (OSCR), Coopers & Lybrand found
that medical necessity criteria were not applied consistently across all
markets: Chicago used InterQual SI/IS (severity of illness/intensity of
symptoms) criteria while Louisville employed the M&R guidelines. The
report recommended more "aggressive" utilization of such criteria for LOS
goals, for admission reviews and for continued stay review across all
markets was therefore recommended; training OSCR nurses in a "more
aggressive review approach"; and developing an "aggressive discharge
planning policy that supports the treatment of patients in alternative settings
even when in-patient criteria are met." 3  The Executive Summary
70. COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P., UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT FINAL REPORT 3 (Oct.
17, 1995) (emphasis added) [hereinafter COOPERS & LYBRAND FINAL REPORT].
71. Id.
72 . Id. at 5.
73. Id. at 24. The report went on to outline several "corporate issues" needing to be
addressed in order to improve the financial performance of the organization. "Many managed
care organizations have contractual language which stipulates they will not pay for the admission
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concluded that Humana had available a number of opportunities to improve
its competitive position through enhanced utilization performance.
Some of these recommendations require a cost benefit
analysis before implementation to document the potential
financial savings. The process could benefit from a true
Business Process Reengineering redesign. The efficiencies
gained would then free up existing resources which could
be dedicated to the implementation of some of the
recommendations in this report which will require
additional staffing."
By 1997, the Utilization Management Plan Description for San
Antonio and Other Markets listed both M&R Guidelines and InterQual
Criteria as inpatient and ambulatory care review decision protocols and
criteria for the appropriateness of medical services .7 These standards were
to be used during review for admission criteria, concurrent review,
discharge planning, and the authorization of referrals to specialists and of
special procedures. For prior authorization and pre-certification of elective
admissions, medical necessity and admission appropriateness were to be
determined by the use of "objective criteria" such as M&R and InterQual.
Under the concurrent review process, admission and continued stay review
relied on M&R Guidelines and InterQual SI/IS criteria for the
determination of medical necessity. Concurrent reviews were conducted at
specified intervals throughout the in-patient stay, assessing the member's
need for hospitalization by "using pre-established objective criteria
(InterQual, M&R, and Coverage and Referral Standards)."76 "High quality
care" is to be assured through "generic outcome screens.""
According to the Humana Medical Plan Utilization Management
Policy & Procedure Manual for the Northeast Florida market in effect until
January 1, 1997, the utilization management of mental health services,
delegated to Merit Behavioral Care, was to be monitored by Humana using
even if it was medically necessary when the hospital fails to fulfill its notice obligations.
Humana should consider adding such language to its new 'boiler plate' contracts and investigate
the feasibility of administering the new policy under its existing agreements. COOPERS &
LYBRAND FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 6.
74. Id. at 7.
75. HUMANA HEALTH CARE, HUMANA HEALTH CARE PLAN-SAN ANTONIO AND OTHER
DESIGNATED MARKETS-UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT PLAN DESCRIPTION (as approved Mar.
28, 1997) (see Chapter entitled "Screening Criteria" at page 12).




InterQual and M&R Guidelines for the review of 100% of mental health
and substance abuse admissions . 8  The inpatient UM process (for
concurrent, prospective, and retrospective medical necessity review)
required PCCs to be "thoroughly familiar with InterQual and M&R criteria
and their applications. " 9 PCCs were to review patients' conditions by
applying appropriate InterQual criteria and M&R Guidelines "to determine
medical necessity of the admission and appropriateness of the acute setting
for concurrent stay review (see InterQual Criteria & M&R Guidelines
Manual). [PCC] enters M&R Optimal Recovery Guidelines and assigns
LOS. Enters AHDs (Avoidable Hospital Days)."80 Among the PCC
review activities, the Policies & Procedures Manual lists "onsite
admission/subsequent review of the medical record applying appropriate
InterQual criteria and M&R Guidelines to determine medical necessity of
the admission and appropriateness of the acute care setting." 8 Cases not
meeting the "IS/SI (sic) discharge screens" were to be referred to Medical
Directors or PAs (physician advisors). Continued stay reviews were to be
conducted Monday through Friday, and results obtained by applying the
above guidelines were to be documented.Y The Utilization Medical
Director's tasks included the determination of hospital discharges, and "at
least bi-weekly 'grand rounds' for the review of all inpatients in greater
than ten days, all catastrophic cases, and all cases where Market Medical
Director intervention may result in more effective utilization, utilizing
UM/MD (utilization management/medical director) and Daily Utilization
Management Report (DUMR)."83 If the Medical Director determined that
"discharge screens are not met," concurrent reviews were to be continued
daily while all information and actions regarding the case were to be
documented in Medical. Services Review (MSR) "using SI/IS criteria
including admission criteria/discharge plan, M&R Criteria and ORGs
(optimal recovery guidelines) and LOS. "I"
78. HUMANA HEALTHCARE, INC., HUMANA MEDICAL PLAN UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT
POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR THE NORTHEAST FLORIDA MARKET 2/2 (in effect until
Jan. 1997) [hereinafter POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR THE NORTHEAST FLORIDA
MARKET].
79. Id. at 1/7.
80. Id. at 2/7.
81. Id. at 3/7.
82 Id. at 4/7.
83. POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR THE NORTHEAST FLORIDA MARKET, supra note
78, at 4/7.
84. Id. at 6/7.
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In its Utilization Management Report for the Kansas City and
Louisville "markets," Coopers & Lybrand related that "the case managers
are not referring to the M&R guidelines during their inpatient rounds. The
case managers use their own judgment in making decision.""5 In order to
remedy the situation, it was recommended to "reemphasize the use of
M&R and InterQual guidelines during concurrent review to ensure process
is objective as opposed to subjective", and to "document when criteria is
not met and state rationale when LOS exceeds M&R."8 6 Another finding
was that "PCCs report that network physicians are not supportive and in
some cases are openly hostile to utilization management initiatives." 7 It
was recommended to "conduct focused educational programs with network
physicians that stress the importance of their cooperation with utilization
management initiatives. " The Executive Summary emphasized that
"PCCs attach M&R guidelines to patient charts. PCCs report that
physicians remove the guidelines and/or write inappropriate comments in
response. The Medical Director should establish an intervention with
uncooperative physicians to resolve this situation. Uncooperative
physicians should be identified and the Medical Director should
communicate Plan expectations. " 9
In her trial testimony,90 Linda Peeno, M.D., a former medical
reviewer/physician advisor with Humana who also worked as case
management reviewer for Blue Cross in a hospital setting,9' commented on
the above Coopers & Lybrand audits and recommendations during cross
examination:
Q. Is there something inherently wrong with a health
care provider, like a hospital or a health insurer,
employing accountants to help them be efficient?
85. COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P., HUMANA UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT DRAFT
REPORT, REGION II, KANSAS CITY AND LOUISVILLE MARKETS 24 [hereinafter HUMANA
UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT DRAFT REPORT, KANSAS CITY AND LOUISVILLE].
86. Id.
87. Id. at 28.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 12.
90. Chipps v. Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla., (15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County, Fla.)
(Case No. CL 96-00423 AE) (unreported, filed 1996). See also supra note 69.
91. Dr. Peeno resigned because "I was concerned about the entire way the whole health
system was evolving, and I wanted to do something about the consequences to patients." Record
at 1901, in Chipps v. Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla., (15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County,
Fla.) (Case No. CL 96-00423 AE) (unreported, filed 1996). See also supra note 69.
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A. Yes. The way Humana did it with the Coopers &
Lybrand audit, there was something inherently wrong with
it.
Q. And you know more than Coopers & Lybrand
does, right, in terms of their recommendations as to
efficiency?
A. Yes. I know that they're an accounting firm that
comes in and does an audit of how these utilization
management procedures function, and the audit constitutes
what is the denial rate and how much money are you
saving, and what you do to save more money. And I read
through the voluminous report, and there wasn't a single
sentence in this entire report that addressed how patients
were being cared for, it was all cost driven. So yes, there
is something inherently wrong with having an accounting
firm come in and tell Humana how to take care of its
patients, when it's all cost driven.
Q. Do you know how many doctors were employed
by Coopers & Lybrand for their aid and assistance in the
audit that was performed on behalf of Humana?
A. No, not exactly. I'm sure several though.
Q. So there were obviously medical people involved,
not just accountants. You understand that, do you not?
A. Well, that's kind of a bizarre notion to have
medical doctors working for an accounting firm anyway,
so I mean, I think that's an inherent conflict.
Q. Well, you have accountants working for the
hospital with which you're affiliated. That's no less
bizarre, is it?
A. The accountants aren't at the bedside of patients
and telling doctors what to do and making judgments about
how doctors are practicing medicine.
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What I think happened was they came in, they went to the
utilization management department, they said okay, how
many denials, what's your percent of denials? Well, that's
not high enough, that's not industry standard, so let's
decrease or increase the rate of denials, let's decrease how
many people you admit to the hospital, let's decrease how
many days they stay.
And then they went through and calculated and produced a
mechanism to do that. They might as well have been
standing by the bedside telling the patients they couldn't
come into the hospital, they had to leave. 9
On re-direct examination:
Q. Dr. Peeno, if Humana was truly, truly concerned
with the quality of care of its members, how would a cost
benefit analysis apply?
A. It wouldn't. I mean, they would be doing
something different, they would be looking at the care of
patients, not just the cost.
Q. Would one associate cost benefit analysis with a
'machinery of denial' and treating people like nothing
more than widgets moving down an assembly line?
A. That's exactly-I mean, it's just like a factory.
You do a cost benefit analysis, we're going to hire these
new people, and what they're going to do is this is going to
justify the money we make or the money we lose. I mean,
it's all cost based.
Q. And let's look at some of the issues that corporate
was reviewing, corporate issues [refers to notice provision
in new boiler-plate contracts that Humana will not pay for
a hospital admission if the hospital failed to fulfill its notice
obligation, regardless of medical necessity].
92. Record at 1904-1907, in Chipps v. Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla., (15th Jud. Cir.,
Palm Beach County, Fla.) (Case No. CL 96-00423 AE) (unreported, filed 1996). See also supra
note 69.
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A. This is clearly they're not acting in the best
interests of the patient. That's a little financial technicality
that they can create in order to avoid some of the hospital
costs .9
6. Commercial Guidelines in the Court Room
Because of the ways commercially sold guidelines are developed and
used, they are now cited in numerous lawsuits as violating the medical
necessity standard promised to subscribers in managed care plan
documents. In Weiss v. CIGNA, general allegations were made that the
"highly controversial" actuarial M&R guidelines had been improperly used
for medical determinations instead of generally accepted standards, as
required by the plaintiff's plan.94 The judge, however, dismissed the
breach of contract claim since Weiss had not alleged that "CIGNA relies
on such guidelines to the exclusion of other factors," nor had she alleged
an "injury in fact" arising from the company's medical necessity
determinations departing from "generally accepted medical standards."
Therefore, the case or controversy requirement for an ERISA §502(a)
claim had also not been met. Since then, claims detailing the exclusive use
of the guidelines and the scientific inadequacy of their development
resulting in standard of care violations have become increasingly specific.
The complaint filed in Price v. Humana Inc., one of several class
action suits against managed care corporations consolidated for
multidistrict pretrial proceedings in the Southern District of Florida,5
referred to "undisclosed cost-based criteria" used by the MCOs in place of
or in addition to the medical necessity criteria set forth in the health plan
documents. It alleged actionable material omissions and misrepresentation
to the class in that the M&R guidelines, InterQual and Value Health
Services (VHS) guidelines and criteria were used for the approval or denial
of benefit claims. The complaint further alleged that such guidelines were
developed by third parties for the purpose of reducing the utilization rates
of care, and were used by Humana without regard to actual medical
93. Id. at 1935, 1936.
94. Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
95. The defendants are Humana Inc., Aetna Inc., Aetna U.S Healthcare Inc., CIGNA
Corp., Prudential Ins. Co., PacifiCare, and United HealthGroup, Inc. On Oct. 23, 2000, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered the consolidation of all actions into MDL-
1334-In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litigation. In re Humana Inc. Managed Care
Ligitation, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099 (2000).
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necessity.96 Disclosure documents were found devoid of information
concerning subcontracts with third parties such as VHS, using more
restrictive criteria for payment eligibility determinations for certain
medical conditions and procedures than the Humana medical necessity
criteria.Y
The Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Class
Certification98 listed exhibits indicating the following: "Milliman &I
Robertson guidelines are used in the review process across all markets,""
"It is the policy of the Utilization Management Department to assure that
concurrent review data entry is relevant, concise, and based on criteria
developed by Milliman & Robertson or Interqual Criteria,' 'a2 "Humana's
registered nurses use Interqual criteria for medical necessity review, '' 0°
Value Health makes coverage determinations based on "clinical standards
of care (emphasis added) developed by VHS and its medical advisors,"' 0
"VHS estimates that the Medical Review System saved its clients $67.5
million in 1995. The MRS consistently resulted in a direct savings of
approximately 9% after physician review,"103 "A preadmission review
nurse . . . compares the indications for hospital admission or surgery with
nationally-established medical/surgical screening criteria to determine
medical necessity. ' 1°1 The Humana Job Description of a Patient Care
Coordinator in Medical Services includes: "Perform daily admission and
concurrent review for hospitalized patients using standard review criteria to
96. Complaint at 40-41, 46, in Price et al. v. Humana Inc., (S.D. Fla.) (Case No. 9:99-
8763 CIV-Moreno) (unreported, filed 1999), transferred and consolidated In re Hwnana Inc.
Managed Care Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099 (2000), aff'd 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS (11th
Cir. 2002).
97. Id. at 42.
98. Documents include Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification, Attachment 1 to Reply Memorandum, Exhibits to First Amended Complaint
and Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Class Certification in Price et al. v. Humana Inc.,
(S.D. Fla.) (Case No. 9:99-8763 CIV-Moreno) (unreported, filed 1999), transferred and
consolidated In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099 (2000), aff'd
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS (l1th Cir. 2002).
99. Id. at Appendix Exhibit 5 (Coopers & Lybrand Utilization Management, Aug. 14,
1996, at 9).
100. Id. at Appendix Exhibit 28 (Humana Health Care Plans Policies/Procedures.
Documents Concerning Humana's Use of Undisclosed Cost-Based Criteria).
101. Id. at Appendix Exhibit 5 (Coopers & Lybrand Humana Medical Affairs Department
Review, Nov. 21, 1996, at 14).
102. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification,
supra note 98, at Appendix Exhibit 5 (Humana Inc. and Value Health Services Medical Review
System Agreement, Nov. 15, 1990, at 2).
103. Id. (Value Health Sciences Corporate Overview, 1997).
104. Id. (Humana Physician's Administration Manual, GL-2, May 1996).
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determine the medical necessity and appropriateness of care. A PCC must
have an active LPN/RN [licensed practical nurse/registered nurse] license,
BSN preferred,"'' 5 "Primary care physicians receive regular reports
outlining the utilization of health care services for their patient panel . . .
Profiles are developed to identify aberrant practice patterns and who may
require orientation, counseling, education, corrective actions or
sanctions," 06 and
The physician targeting program [emphasis added] selects
HMO primary care physicians or staff model centers
where the inpatient utilization exceeds preestablished norm
. . . The performance of the targeted physicians is
reviewed every four to six weeks by Dr. Langford [sic] . .
. The Executive Director and Medical Director of each
market are then notified about which physicians are on the
target lists.'°0
In Batas, Vogel v. Prudential,'°80 a class action suit currently before the
Appellate Division, New York Supreme Court, the complaint on behalf of
all subscribers of health care plans offered by Prudential alleged that the
MCO breached its contract with subscribers by using medical necessity
determination procedures, based on the M&R length-of-stay criteria,'°9 and
in violation of the prevailing standard of care, expressly or impliedly
promised in the subscriber agreements. In the agreement entered into by
Musette Batas, representative of the standard contracts for Prudential
105. Id.
106. Id. (Utilization Management Plan Description, 1997, at 26).
107. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification,
supra note 98,. at Appendix Exhibit 5 (Coopers & Lybrand Humana Utilization Management
Program, at 15).
108. Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-
107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v. The Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion granted by Batas v. The Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
109. Prudential entered into licensing agreements with M&R in 1992 and 1995, eventually
comprising all guideline volumes and their electronic versions. See Letter from M&R to Steven
Udvarhelyi, M.D., Vice President, Medical Services, The Prudential Insurance Company of
America (Feb. 26, 1992), Letter from M&R to Kay Volkert, Manager, Medical Services,
Utilization Management, The Prudential Insurance Company of America (Oct. 13, 1995),
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Class Certification, at 5, n.6 (Sept. 21, 1999), all
available in Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-
107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v. The Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion granted by Batas v. The Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
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plans, services and supplies not needed nor appropriately provided were
excluded from coverage. The contract specified:
For the purposes of this exclusion, a service will be
considered both "needed and appropriately provided" if
PruCare determines that it meets each of the following
requirements:
It is furnished or authorized by a Participating Physician
for the diagnosis or the treatment of a sickness or injury or
for the maintenance of a person's good health [emphasis
added].
The prevailing medical opinion within the appropriate
specialty of the United States medical profession that it is
safe and effective for its intended use, and that its omission
would adversely affect the person's medical condition
[emphasis added].
It is furnished by a provider with appropriate training,
experience, staff and facilities to furnish that particular
service or supply [emphasis added].11°
The contract also listed the sources to be relied on when determining
whether the above requirements have been met: published authoritative
medical literature; regulations and reports issued by government agencies
such as the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR),11' the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA); and listings in the American Medical Association Drug
Evaluations, and The United States Pharmacopeia Dispensing
Information. 1,2
The lower court upheld the fraud and breach of contract claims
against Prudential. The complaint, distinguishing the case from Weiss v.
CIGNA, "I detailed the alleged exclusive use of the M&R guidelines for
medical necessity determinations in spite of the actuarial firm's statement
that they are not intended to replace the treating physician's clinical
110. Id. at3.
111. Now the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
112. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification,
supra note 98, at Appendix Exhibit 28 (Humana Health Care Plans Policies/Procedures.
Documents Concerning Humana's Use of Undisclosed Cost-Based Criteria, at 3).
113. Weiss, 972 F. Supp. 748.
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judgment.14  Furthermore, it alleged that the guidelines were rigidly
applied by a Prudential concurrent review nurse to limit the plaintiffs'
hospital length-of-stay without consideration of her individual
circumstances, and against the vehement opposition of the attending
physicians, "participating physicians" under the plan. The Memorandum
of Law in Support of the Motion for Class Certification also alleged that
Prudential adopted a company-wide policy for its utilization review staff
for all plans to rely on the M&R guidelines,", and conducted uniform
training for guideline use."16  Preauthorization personnel was held to
evaluate the medical necessity of hospital admission "by using the M&R
guidelines and the Prudential Medical/Surgical guidelines," then to use
"M&R guidelines to determine appropriateness of setting and length of
stay (LOS).""' Once a patient was hospitalized, concurrent review nurses
were to decide whether the preauthorized length of stay may be exceeded.
When making such medical necessity determinations, the nurses could
consult with Prudential Medical Directors who orally confirmed "denials
of care without examining any medical records, examining the patients or
consulting with the patient's treating physician. '""I Medical Directors were
authorized to deny care based on the M&R guidelines for cases outside of
their own specialty: a psychiatrist refused to extend Ms. Vogel's
hospitalization after she had undergone a complicated hysterectomy for the
removal of uterine tumors, weighing over three-and-a-half pounds.
The decision to discharge Ms. Vogel only two days after her
hysterectomy (in agreement with the M&R recommendation) was opposed
by Dr. Vetere, Ms. Vogel's attending surgeon, a gynecologist with 20
years of surgical experience and Assistant Professor of Clinical Obstetrics
and Gynecology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
114. Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-
107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v. The Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion granted by Batas v. The Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
115. supra note 94, at 5.
116. Id. at6.
117. "Operating Procedures, Preauthorization of Schedule Inpatient Services" for PruCare
of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut (Apr. 17, 1996). Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion for Class Certification at 6 (Sept. 21, 1999). Both available in Batas v. The Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001), motion granted by Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
118. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification,
supra note 98, at Appendix Exhibit 5 (Coopers & Lybrand Humana Utilization Management
Program, at 15).
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A surgical case with Ms. Vogel's specific circumstances is
at increased risk for significant postoperative complications
.... Although one or two of these complications might be
evident with 48 hours of surgery, the vast majority will not
produce signs of symptoms for at least four to five days
postoperatively. " 119
Generally accepted medical practice following Ms. Vogel's
complicated surgery required "around the clock monitoring and evaluation
by experienced gynecological nurses and resident gynecological physicians
in addition to the one or two daily postoperative visits made by the
attending surgeon" for at least five days. According to Dr. Vetere, such
care is essential because the patient may develop complications not
amenable to self-diagnosis, leading to costly delays of the needed medical
attention. 120
In the course of the appeals procedure initiated by Ms. Vogel, Dr.
Vetere was informed by the Chief Medical Officer of Prudential that the
company, based exclusively on the M&R guidelines, had preauthorized a
two-day hospitalization for a total abdominal hysterectomy.'' Prudential's
refusal to continue coverage after two days complied with the Concurrent
Review Nurse's decision. "Remarkably, no effort was made to either
examine the patient or discuss her condition with me. "'2
Aside from the fact that I disagreed with the medical
conclusions reached by Prudential's Concurrent Review
Nurse concerning the medical needs of my patient, I also
object to the process used by Prudential for reaching and
implementing this decision. In particular, it is a gross
violation of acceptable medical protocols for a medical
necessity determination such as this to be made by
119. "These complications include, but are not limited to, postoperative hemorrhage,
including retroperitoneal and/or wound hematoma (with or without infection), seroma, bowel and
bladder dysfunction, wound infection, wound separation, pelvic cellulitis, tubo-ovarian abscess,
and pelvic thrombophlebitis with or without pulmonary embolism. Although most of these
complications are uncommon, some are life-threatening if not discovered and treated early."
Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, at 4 (July 30, 1997), in Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div.,
Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v.
The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion granted by
Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) [hereinafter
Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere].
120. Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere, supra note 119, at 4-5.
121. Id. at Exhibit 4 (dated June 28, 1996).
122. Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere, supra note 119, at 8.
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someone who is not even a physician, let alone one who is
trained and experienced in the medical condition at issue .
* . .Moreover .... Prudential did not even consult with a
trained gynecologist with experience in these types of
operations prior to deciding that further hospitalization was
not medically necessary. 3
Musette Batas, another example among Dr. Vetere's patients for
improper Prudential "interference with the practice of medicine" and
whose "health was threatened as a result of Prudential's improper
conduct," ' 14 suffered from Crohn's disease, a painful, potentially life-
threatening bowel disease. When six months pregnant, her baby at risk as
well, she was hospitalized for severe pain, but in spite of persistent severe
pain, had to be discharged after two days because Prudential refused
additional coverage. Barely one week later, she was readmitted through
the emergency room. One of Dr. Vetere's colleagues immediately applied
for permission to perform an exploratory laparotomy. Two days and
several phone calls later, the hospital having been told that the request was
"pending" and "waiting for Prudential's bureaucratic machinery to move,"
the patient's intestine burst, requiring immediate emergency surgery.
Because of the considerable risk of infection, her life was at stake. In
addition, the attending surgeon did not expect the baby to survive, and if it
would, felt that brain damage might occur. 12, Four days after the initial
request for exploratory surgery authorization and two days after the
emergency procedure, Prudential approved the exploratory surgery. Four
days after the emergency surgery, the Concurrent Review Nurse called the
attending surgeon's office to "demand" the patient's discharge. Only after
the physician "expressed outrage at this decision, explaining to Ms ...
123. Id. at 7, 8. In addition, Dr. Vetere received a letter from Prudential, indicating that a
company physician wanted to discuss his apparent dissatisfaction with his "contracted status as a
participating physician in the Prudential network", and the desire to speak with the head of Dr.
Vetere's department at S.U.N.Y. to confirm whether Dr. Vetere was speaking on behalf of the
department when complaining to the Prudential Executive Director about the handling of Ms.
Vogel's case. Id. at Exhibit 2 (dated May 31, 1996). "I took this request as a veiled threat that
she could retaliate against me for objecting to Prudential's mistreatment of my patient." Id. at 6.
124. Id. at 8.
125. Affidavit of Musette Batas in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss, at 6, 10 (Aug. 4, 1997), in Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App.
Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by
Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion
granted by Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
[hereinafter Affidavit of Musette Batas].
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[the Concurrent Review Nurse] that I was barely out of surgery, was
pregnant and was seriously ill, Prudential backed down. "126
One week later, the same nurse decided, based on a review of the
medical chart and "internal guidelines" never disclosed to the patient, that
she had to leave the hospital. The patient acquiesced, fearing the financial
burden of out-of-pocket payments for continued hospitalization. In his
affidavit, Dr. Vetere disputed Prudential's
right to make such critical medical determinations based on
third party guidelines that are not even interpreted by
properly trained physicians ... [h]ad I acted with regard
to may patient as it [Prudential] had, I would have
committed an act of malpractice. In my opinion,
Prudential has done just that.' 27
Dr. Vetere's office manager eventually reported to Prucare the
physicians' dissatisfaction with the way the company's medical
management division had handled five patients, both plaintiffs included.
"We have been told on more than one occasion that 'it doesn't matter how
the patient feels or what the doctor feels is medically necessary, it is what
Prucare feels is medically necessary."'2,
Johnson v. Humana29 also concerned a hysterectomy. Karen Johnson
was diagnosed with cervical cancer in situ with endocervical gland
extension. Even though her attending physicians considered a
hysterectomy medically necessary, Humana only approved a cervical
conization. Ms. Johnson paid for the recommended procedure out-of-
pocket."10 Prior to the denial, she was called by Humana nurses who, in a
recorded conversation, asked questions prompted by the VHS software to
derive a "profile" which was faxed to VHS reviewers in California, all of
them non-practicing physicians. The reviewers generally made treatment
decisions without evaluating patients' medical records, followed
instructions not to speak with them, and denied or approved claims after
a-taped-interview with the treating physician, and a brief review of the
126. Affidavit of Musette Batas, supra note 125, at 7.
127. Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere, supra note 119, at 10.
128. Id. at Exhibit 5 (dated April 18, 1996).
129. Johnson v. Humana Health Plan, (Jefferson Circuit Ct., Ky.) (Case No. 96-CI-00462
(Jan. 23, 1997) (unreported).
130. For the approved conization, an out-patient procedure, Humana would have had to
spend $787, a discounted $7,000 for the in-patient hysterectomy. Ms. Johnson, who did not
receive a discount, was charged more than $14,000. Brief for Appellee Johnson, at 4, in
Humana Health Plan v. Johnson (Ky. Ct. App.) (Case No. 99-CA-166) (unreported) [hereinafter
Brief for Appellee Johnson].
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"profile." Also, Humana instructed Ms. Johnson not to obtain a second
opinion even though more than ninety gynecologists would have been
available for second opinions, based on an actual examination of the patient
and of her record for less than what Humana paid VHS.' 3' Humana thus
relied on the VHS denial even though the VHS contract advised that the
medical review system is "not intendedas a replacement for the exercise of
medical judgment by the treating health care professional." VHS
furthermore pointed out that "there is no assurance that every variable that
may bear on appropriateness or effectiveness is known or has been
considered by VHS, that the course of treatment is ideal or appropriate for
any particular covered person, or that any treatment will be successful."132
The Brief for Appellee stated that Humana had identified
hysterectomies as "high-cost" and contracted with Value Health Services
(VHS) to review treatment requests for such procedures.'33 The denial rate
was a consistent 25%, compared with a national average of 1.2% for
patients with Ms. Johnson's condition. One of the VHS physician
reviewers admitted that, based on the VHS computer program and
company policy, no patient with Ms. Johnson's condition would be
approved for a hysterectomy without having undergone a conization first.'31
National Cancer Institute guidelines, however, consider a hysterectomy the
appropriate treatment for patients with the plaintiff's condition.
Furthermore, an expert testified at trial that a hysterectomy was the
standard of care and the cure for Ms. Johnson's stage zero carcinoma,
compared with a recurrence rate of over 30% for conization.'33
In addition, none of the VHS reviewers were aware of Humana's
medical necessity definition, and, as a consequence, "used their own
definitions of the standard of care rather than what language was contained
131. Id. at 3, n.5, 11.
132. Id. Leslie D. Michelson, however, then Chairman and CEO of VHS and one of its
founders, underlined the following virtues of the Medical Review System: "It uses very specific,
very scientific criteria that would distinguish between candidates -who would benefit from a
medical procedure, and those who would be adversely affected by it." Ronald Shinkman,
Enterprise: Computers Get Into Disease Management, 17 L.A. BUS. J. 1, No. 34, Aug. 21,
1995. In 1996, Mr. Michelson added, "A system such as the MRS is valuable because the
medical community doesn't always have enough current information to know precisely what
interventions are optimal for which patients and when. Healthcare technology is evolving with
unprecedented speed. The MRS helps physicians stay on top of all of those developments." PR
Newswire, One Millionth Case Goes Through Value Health Sciences' Medical Review System,
FIN. NEWS (May 20, 1996).
133. Brief for Appellee Johnson, supra note 130, at 3.
134. Id. at 5. This means in practice that a patient must have a recurrence of her cancer
before a hysterectomy will be approved.
135. Id. at 6, 8.
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in her [Ms. Johnson's] own contract with Humana." 3 6  Dr. Lankford,
Humana Senior Vice President for Medical Affairs at the time, testified:'
Q. Does it disturb you at all if I told you that the
doctors at VHS did not understand the definition of
medical necessity in Karen Johnson's contract of
insurance?
No, we didn't ask vendors to understand our contracts.
That was part of keeping the administrative process back
here, both the overview of the material and any negative
decision making had to be here because that all had to be
done internally. We just asked the outside vendors for
clinical expertise - (emphasis added)
So it did not matter to you whether they were applying a
different definition of medical necessity than was in her
contract?
No. I don't care what they thought about that issue. My
phyisician director would have clarified it and made the
right final decision, that's what their job was here.
Would it matter to you at all if Doctor Maroc testified that
in this case that he does not - he did not know at the time
he reviewed Karen Johnson's case what the definition of
medical necessity was in her contract?
A. Each of-the management process was to look at
the contracts before denying it. So if there was anything
unusual from what he had been taught, it would have been
flagged to him. Whether or not he reviewed the actual
document is-is not the issue. There was a process for
him to do it. I didn't have the physicians look at individual
contracts, the staff did that in the department.
Dr. Maroc, the Humana physician responsible for the final treatment
"review" decision who relied on the VHS denial, defined medical necessity
during deposition as "a situation where care needs to be provided to
136. Id. at 3.
137. Deposition of Ronald D. Lankford at 156, 157 (Dec. 15, 1997), in Johnson v. Humana
Health Plan, (Jefferson Circuit Ct., Ky.) (Case No. 96-CI-00462 (Jan. 23, 1997) (unreported)
[hereinafter Deposition of Ronald D. Lankford].
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prevent loss of life or limb or to prevent excessive morbidity from
occurring."'8 He admitted that he was unaware of the definition laid down
in the patient's insurance policy ("I didn't pay any attention to the
insurance agreement" 19): •
To be medically necessary a service or supply must be:
A. consistent with the symptoms or diagnosis and
treatment of the member's sickness and injury; and
B. appropriate with regards to the standards of good
medical practice.
Dr. Lankford later testified:
A. . . . Medical necessity as he [Dr. Maroc]
mentioned is an issue to do with the cost of doing the
therapies. So there is always a certain rate of mortality
and morbidity associated with treatments and that has to be
balanced in some fashion with the outcomes. ... And then
as we formalize things in the practice guidelines, or in this
case using the VHS system which was a formalized
practice guideline system, you rely on that system to
consistently make that decision.
Q. Does Dr. Maroc's definition of medical necessity
have anything to do with whether or not the procedure is
consistent with good medical practice?
A. Dr. Maroc's decision was not critical in this case.
The clinical decisionmaking was by a screening process in
the VHS system, followed by the clinical review by the
physicians that were board-certified and ... were familiar
with the VHS system. Dr. Maroc's part of the job was to
ensure that the processes in that department were going
well relative to how the reviews were done . . . . He was
not making clinical decisionmaking.1"
138. Id.
139. Deposition of James A. Maroc, at 101 (Jan. 23, 1997), in Johnson v. Humana Health
Plan, (Jefferson Circuit Ct., Ky.) (Case No. 96-CI-00462 (Jan. 23, 1997) (unreported).
140. Deposition of Ronald D. Lankford, supra note 137, at 159-60.
20021
542 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:507
None of the Humana physicians participating in the decision making
process were gynecologists, nor were they in practice.' They received a
salary of $100,00 plus $5,000 bonuses for limiting hospital admissions and
lowering the numbers of hospital days of Humana patients. For denying
Ms. Johnson's four-day hospitalization for a hysterectomy, Dr. Maroc was
compensated with two such bonus payments. 42  The Circuit Court jury
found the Humana denial of the hysterectomy to be an act of bad faith, and
awarded the plaintiff $14,000, the cost of the procedure, $100,000 for
mental suffering, and $13 million in punitive damages. The case
reportedly was settled for more than $2 million."3
For the first time, a lawsuit has now been filed directly against one of
the vendors of commercial guidelines, the actuarial firm Milliman &
Robertson. The plaintiffs in Cleary, Riley v. Milliman & Robertson,'" two
pediatricians, are suing the company for defamation, appropriation of
name, tortious interference with contract of employment, civil conspiracy,
and fraud and deceit. According to the complaint, M&R listed both Drs.
Cleary and Riley 45 without their consent as contributing authors of the
pediatric guidelines, published in 1998.146 In their affidavits, both
physicians stated that at no time were they made aware of nor did they give
their approval for the use of their names and professional reputations (the
volume lists both plaintiffs as the only experts in their respective fields) in
support of the M& R pediatric guidelines.14 7  On November 13, 1999, a
141. When Humana hired Dr. Maroc, the corporation was aware that his license was on
probation in Iowa, and that he was not licensed to practice medicine in Kentucky. Nineteen
months later, at the time of the court proceedings, his status had not changed. Johnson v.
Humana Health Plan, (Jefferson Circuit Ct., Ky.) (Case No. 96-CI-00462 (Jan. 23, 1997)
(unreported).
142. Id.
143. 4(18) Mealy's Managed Care Liability Report 15 Sept. 29, 2000.
144. Plaintiffs First Amended Petition, in Cleary v. Milliman & Robertson, (Dist. Ct.,
Harris County, Tex.) (Case No. 99-56719) (unreported, decided 2000) [hereinafter Plaintiff's
First Amended Petition].
145. Thomas G. Cleary, M.D., is Board Certified in Pediatrics and Pediatric Infectious
Diseases with the American Academy of Pediatrics. He is tenured Professor of Pediatrics,
Division of Infectious Diseases, at the University of Texas Medical School, Houston. William J.
Riley, M.D., is Board Certified in Pediatrics and Pediatric Endocrinology with the American
Academy of Pediatrics. He was tenured Professor of Pediatrics at the University of Texas -
Medical School, and currently serves as Vice President of Medical Education at Driscoll
Children's Hospital in Corpus Christi, Texas.
146. Schibanoff, supra note 58.
147. Affidavit of Thomas C. Cleary (Nov. 11, 2000) in Cleary v. Milliman & Robertson,
(Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex.) (Case No. 99-56719) (unreported, decided 2000) [hereinafter
Affidavit of Thomas C. Cleary]; Affidavit of William J. Riley (Nov. 10, 2000) in Cleary v.
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temporary injunction ordered M&R to cease publication of the Health Care
Status Improvement & Management (HSIM) showing both plaintiffs as
contributing authors. The amended complaint'"4 asks for exemplary
damages under the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, for punitive
damages, and a full injunction against M&R to cease use and publication of
plaintiffs' names as well as a recall from the stream of commerce all
Pediatric HSIM volumes listing them as contributing authors.
Both plaintiffs have denounced the guidelines as seriously flawed and
dangerous to pediatric patients. Dr. Cleary, after examining the proposed
guidelines pertaining to infectious diseases sent to him by Dr. Yetman, one
of the defendants, had provided the feedback that "the proposed guidelines
were dangerous and would harm kids. I recall that my words to him were
that 'children may die because of these guidelines.""14 9 He added in his
affidavit,
The published Pediatric HSIM are seriously flawed in their
approach to in-patient pediatric care. In my professional
opinion, the guidelines, overall, have a tendency to
mislead the user by understating the actual length of stays
that are required and are appropriate for seriously ill
children. In regard to my particular area of medical
specialty, there are in-patient guidelines and goal lengths of
stay for multiple serious pediatric infectious diseases that
are severely out-of-line with the standard of pediatric care.
As written, these guidelines pose significant risks of harm,
death and/or serious injury to children. Dangerous
guidelines include those for: endocarditis, brain abscess,
septic arthritis, osteomyelitis, neonatal sepsis, neonatal
meningitis, and meningitis in the older child. 11
For some illnesses, Dr. Cleary would recommend six weeks of
hospitalization while the guidelines suggest three days.' 1 The pediatrician
Milliman & Robertson, (Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex.) (Case No. 99-56719) (unreported,
decided 2000) [hereinafter Affidavit of William J. Riley].
148. Plaintiff's First Amended Petition, supra note 144.
149. Affidavit of Thomas C. Cleary, supra note 147, at 2; Plaintiffs First Amended
Petition, supra note 144.
150. Affidavit of Thomas C. Cleary, supra note 147, at 2.
151. Mary Flood, Doctors Say Book Misused Their Names, THE WALL STREET J., Nov.
17. 1999, at T1.
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also found "at least one risky recommendation on each page of the 400-
page document. "5 2
Dr. Riley, who had been asked to write and review two pediatric
endocrinology sections, assumed that the project had been abandoned since
he received no response to his first draft. In his affidavit, Dr. Riley
"vehemently" disagreed with and disavowed in particular the guideline
concerning the in-patient care of diabetic ketoacidosis:
This section, as published, poses a significant risk of harm
to pediatric patients who might suffer from diabetic
ketoacidosis. In fact, the Guidelines suggest that for
admission to ICU for coma from this condition that the
goal length of stay is (1) day. This is so clearly outside of
any reasonable approach to the standard of care as to be
wholly reckless, without regard to the safety of any child
with severe DKA. I am professionally and personally
shocked and distraught that my name would be listed as the
only endocrine pediatric specialist on a volume that
contains such an outrageously irresponsible and dangerous
recommendation." 3
Both physicians expressed mental anguish, embarrassment and
humiliation arising from the association of their names and reputations with
guidelines posing potential harm to children.
An additional possibly revealing aspect of the legal action is the
question whether M&R "tried to buy scientific legitimacy by giving
$100,000 to the pediatrics department at University of Texas Houston in
exchange for the schools stamp of approval."1' 4 The department is listed as
the co-presenter of the Pediatric HSIM in the first sentence of the preface'"5
but what precise role it actually played in the issuance of the guidelines and
whether some of the faculty were manipulated into becoming contributing
authors remains to be seen. Dr. Cleary suspected that M&R might have
wanted the cachet of medical school research to stave off "a firestorm of
anger" at the proposition that pediatric care might be withheld for cost-
152. Ron Nissimov, Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous," HOUSTON
CHRON., March 5, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called
"Dangerous ".
153. Affidavit of William J. Riley, supra note 147, at 2.
154. Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous, " supra note 152.
155. Ron Nissimov, Judge Tells Firm to Explain How Pediatric Rules Derived, HOUS.
CHRON., Nov. 3, 2000, at A35 [hereinafter , Judge Tells Firm to Explain How Pediatric Rules
Derived]. Upon request by the UT-Houston Medical School, M&R has refrained from naming it
in subsequent HSIM editions.
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containment purposes.- 6 Even though the Pediatric HSIM is intended to
"communicate best practices in pediatrics, ... developed in accordance with
the principles of evidence-based medicine, employing the current best
evidence"',", the methodology by which the guidelines were derived
remains unknown and, according to the Texas Pediatric Society, fails to
meet the standards set by the American Academy of Pediatrics and the
Agency for Health Care Policy.'"8 Dr. Cleary has denied the existence of
data or clinical studies showing the safety of the recommendations which
were "pulled out of thin air."'' 9 The Texas Pediatric Society expressed
hope that potential methodological flaws of guideline development would
be revealed in the course of discovery to public and professional scrutiny.' 6
In response to plaintiffs' request for production of documents, M&R
considered the following material "confidential, proprietary and trade
secret information": correspondence with any pediatric association;
corrections, recommendations, and/or suggested changes made by any
pediatric association; and agreements and contracts with such
associations.' 6  On the same grounds, the company objected to the
production of information relating to the medical cost savings to be
attained by customers or users of M&R's new generation of HSIM,
including the Pediatric HSIM. It further rejected as "overbroad, unduly
burdensome, and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence" requests for the production of copies of "any and all
epidemiology studies, analysis, or statistical analysis or study done that
supports, references, discusses or refers to any factual, medical and/or
scientific explanation underlying M&R's representation that its Pediatric
HSIM December 1998 volume comprises 'evidence-based medicine.'"
M&R pointed to the references "made to hundreds of published studies and
analyses in various areas of pediatrics."' 62  The same objection and
references to cited publications were made to requests for copies of
epidemiological studies, statistical analysis, studies or other analytical,
156. Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous, " supra note 152.
157. Schibanoff, supra note 58.
158. Texas Pediatric Society, Memo from the Texas Chapter of the American Academy of
Pediatrics (AARP), to Joe Sanders, M.D., Executive Director, AAP (June 14, 2000).
159. Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous, " supra note 152.
160. Texas Pediatric Society, supra note 158.
161. Defendant Milliman & Robertson, Inc.'s Response to Plaintiff's First Request for
Production at 3, (Feb. 2, 2000), in Cleary v. Milliman & Robertson, (Dist. Ct., Harris County,
Tex.) (Case No. 99-56719) (unreported, decided 2000) [hereinafter Milliman & Robertson's
Response to Plaintiffs First Request for Production].
162. Defendant Milliman & Robertson, Inc.'s Response to Plaintiffs Second Request for
Production, (Feb. 2, 2000) Plaintiffs First Amended Petition, supra note 144.
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scientific and/or statistical work to support or arrive at the HSIM's goal
length of stay (GLOS) recommendations, and for studies in support of the
representation that the guidelines concern the healthiest 85% of the
pediatric population and not the remaining sickest 15 % .163
The Preface to the Pediatric HSIM correctly points out that published
empirical studies are not available to validate all medical procedures.
Meta-analyses, however, detect trends represented by a large number of
studies employing somewhat different methodologies but dedicated to the
same subject matter. At least some of the "hundreds of studies and
analyses" cited by M&R could have been examined by meta-analysis for
guideline development and validation. For the GLOS, much less complex
statistical tests could have yielded results revealing prevailing practices.'6
Furthermore, a model could be developed to adjust for "inefficiencies" in
the delivery of health care to arrive at the "best practices" ("not the
median, not the average"' 65), which M&R claims to represent. Since this
would equal original research and could stimulate additional research,
there would be no reason to conceal it from the public and the scientific
community.
On November 1, 2000, the district judge presiding over the Cleary v.
Milliman & Robertson proceedings, ordered the company to respond to
questions concerning the methodology for the development of certain
pediatric care recommendations. Company officials had refused to reveal
this information during depositions upon the advice of counsel. The judge
did not preclude the possibility that questions relating to the origin of other
M&R guidelines might be appropriate in the future. '6
Information concerning M&R guideline development would then
support or invalidate the company's claim of scientific validity. Several
recent publications shed some light on their clinical usefulness. The
163. Milliman & Robertson's Response to Plaintiffs First Request for Production, supra
note 161.
164. Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous, " supra note 152. (showing a
simple calculation by the American College of Surgeons (ACS) of actual average stays for five
surgical procedures as suggested by 1,000 of its members, compared with the actual average
stays throughout North Carolina (N.C.) in 1996, and the M&R recommendations, yielded the
following results: mastectomy: ACS 2.5, N.C. 2.7, M&R 0; appendectomy: 5, 3.5, 1; radical
hysterectomy; 9, 5.9, 2; coronary artery bypass: 5, 8.3, 3; esophagectomy; 13, 12.9, 5,
ANNALS OF SURGERY, vol.228 No.4, Oct. 1998).
165. Jim Schibanoff, Presentation on Development and Implementation of Managed Care
Guidelines at 9, University of Texas, Houston Medical School (May 13,1997) (transcript
available at Houston Medical School, Department of Pediatrics).
166. Judge Tells Firm to Explain How Pediatric Rules Derived, supra note 155.
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private HCIA-Sachs Institute' 6 released the results of two studies,
comparing the M&R pediatric length of stay (LOS) guidelines with 1998
data for 3.5 million pediatric discharges at 2,400 general, non-federal
hospitals for forty-five pediatric conditions; and the LOS for the same
pediatric conditions at the Institute's 100 Top Hospitals.1'6 While M&R
considers 85% of all cases as "uncomplicated," the HCIA-Sachs studies
adjusted for four severity levels using the All Patient Refined Diagnosis
Related Groups (APR-DRGs). 6 9 Contrary to the M&R guidelines, this
system of classification accomodates the severity of the underlying illness,
of the comorbidity and complicating conditions. Across syndromes, 74%
of cases were found to correspond to the baseline severity level. Among
conditions, however, the percentage of low-severity patients ranged from
18% (drug withdrawal syndrome) to 99% (slipped femoral epiphysis). 70
75 % of all complicated and 64% of all uncomplicated cases had LOS
exceeding the M&R GLOS. For uncomplicated cases, the LOS varied by
condition, exceeding the M&R GLOS by 9% for epiglottis to 88% for
bacterial meningitis. For twenty-seven of forty-five pediatric conditions
examined, more than 50% of the LOS for uncomplicated cases exceeded
the M&R GLOS. For diabetic ketoacidosis (n=4,955), the HCIA-Sachs
Institute found an average LOS of 2.9 (median 2, mode 2) while M&R
recommends one day. All LOS at the hospitals included in the study
exceeded the M&R GLOS (complicated cases 92%, uncomplicated 80%,
all 81%), thus supporting Dr. Riley who had called the one-day hospital
stay for DKA "wholly reckless, without regard to the safety of any child."
The authors of the study concluded that
the consequences of encouraging clinicians to reduce LOS
to the Milliman & Robertson GLOS are of particular
concern .... In all conditions, clinicians need the latitude
to extend the LOS for patients with certain comorbid or
167. HCIA-SACHS INSTITUTE, COMPARISON OF MILLIMAN AND ROBERTSON PEDIATRIC
LENGTH OF STAY GUIDELINES (2000) (consulting firm in Evanston, IL, rates hospitals to
produce a list of the 100 Top Hospitals in the country, based on efficiency and quality of care.
Through its Clinical Research Program, the Institute conducts clinical studies to improve the
quality and delivery of care).
168. Id. (stating top hospitals are considered the most efficient and well managed facilities
in the country).
169. HCIA-SACHS INSTITUTE, supra note 167, at 4 (citing RICHARD F. AVERILL, 3M
HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEMS, ALL PATIENT REFINED DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS
DEFINITIONS MANUAL, VERSION 15.0. (1998)).
170. Id. at 5 (stating less than half of all cases fell in the baseline severity level for the
following conditons: drug withdrawal syndrome, endocarditis, bacterial meningitis, burn (major),
neonatal sepsis, gastrointestinal bleed, sepsis (strep pneumonia)).
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complicated conditions that require further care. Because
M&R assumes that sophisticated home health care is
available, it is also important that clinicians be able to
provide inpatient care when such services are
unavailable. '
As Dr. Cleary observed, "These guidelines are merely a mechanism
for insurance companies to avoid their responsibilities and to shift the cost
of care from themselves to kids' families. The guidelines quite literally
appear to have been made Up." "7
Results of the 100 Top Hospital study showed that lengths of stay for
60% of uncomplicated cases exceeded the M&R GLOS. For twenty-three
of the thirty-six conditions in this study, more than 50% of the
uncomplicated cases had LOS exceeding M&R recommendations.
Interestingly, the top hospitals applied LOS shorter or equivalent to non-
winner hospitals for almost all of the conditions included in the study."13 A
M&R spokesman questioned the studies' credibility by emphasizing that
they were conducted by a competing consulting medical firm.'7 But
another recent investigation found that the LOS in New York State in 1995
for sixteen pediatric conditions also exceeded .those of M&R. (No
adjustments, however, were made for severity of condition.) The authors
warn of the "potential effects of such guidelines on both patients and the
hospitals caring for them. While endorsing the need for cost-effective
practice, we call attention to the methods used to develop and validate
guidelines. "'7
D. Conclusion
Courts have increasingly recognized that managed care companies
make medical decisions. 76  By subjecting the attending physicians'
171. Id. at 7.
172. Linda 0. Prager, Pediatric Hospital Stay Goals Questioned, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct.
9, 2000, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pickOO/prl21016.htm.
173. HCIA-SACHS INSTITUTE, 100 ToP HOSPITALS PEDIATRIC LOS COMPARISON WITH
NON-WINNERS AND MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON GUIDELINES 7, 8 (2000).
174. Ron Nissimov, Studies: Children Shortchanged by Hospital Guidelines, HouS.
CHRON., Sept. 15, 2000.
175. MARION S. SILLS ET AL., Pediatric Milliman and Robertson Length-of-Stay Criteria:
Are They Realistic? 105(4) PEDIATRICS 733 (Apr. 2000).
176. Snow v. Burden, M.D., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932 (E.D. Pa. May 1999) (delaying
authorization by MCO for diagnostic procedures was substandard medical care); Plocica v.
Nylcare of Texas, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 658 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Moscovitch v. Danbury Hosp., 25
F. Supp. 2d 74 (U.S Dist. Conn. Oct. 1998) (in both cases, the appropriateness of the medical
and psychiatric care decisions of the MCOs were successfully challenged); Blaine v. Community
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treatment recommendations to medical necessity determinations according
to corporate criteria, often based on commercial guidelines deviating from
the prevailing standard of care, MCOs substitute their medical judgment
for that of the attending physicians. Frequently, such medical necessity
evaluations, judging the appropriateness of the treating physician's
diagnosis and proposed treatment plan, are made by individuals without the
required experience, medical training and knowledge of patient's individual
circumstances.'77 This practice has been rejected by the American Medical
Association, which insists that clinical judgment be left to properly
qualified licensed physicians with adequate patient contact, and be in
agreement with the applicable standard of care and the prevailing medical
opinion. 178 The organization further considered utilization review programs
that "involve the gathering of symptoms from a patient and communication
of a diagnosis to the patient" (such as on-site concurrent review by nurses)
as having many of the characteristics of the practice of medicine.
Physicians themselves have protested the "undue interference in their
practice of medicine" by MCO medical management staff without proper
Health Plan, 687 N.Y.S.2d 854 (N.Y. 1998) (stating that decision by MCO to have patient seen
by a nurse instead of a physician for diagnosis and treatment represented a unilateral
determination of medical treatment); Nascimento v. Harvard Community Health Care Plan, Inc.
et al., 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 166 (Mass. 1997) (stating MCO denial of autologous bone
marrow transplant in spite of contractual promise to provide all medically necessary care was
medical malpractice); Roessert v. Health Net et al, 929 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating
the MCO's decision to commit plaintiff to a mental institution was a medical decision).
177. Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere, supra note 119, at 3. See also Batas v. The Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001), motion granted by Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (attending physician, Dr. Vetere, for plaintiffs Batas and Vogel, stated in
his affidavit that a Prudential Concurrent Review Nurse called his office two days after Ms.
Vogel's surgery and "informed us that there was no medical reason (emphasis added) to keep the
patient hospitalized, stating that Prudential would not cover any further expenses arising from the
patient's hospitalization." The physician instructed his staff to inform the nurse that he
"adamantly disagreed with her medical opinion" and would refuse to discharge Ms. Vogel.
In her trial testimony, Dr. Linda Peeno explained that a Humana case manager nurse has
the authority to tell a board certified pediatric neurologist what to do. "That's exactly what a
health plan does ...and that is part of the difference between managed care and traditional
insurance that now the plan holds itself out as doing that, and that's one of the requirements that
they have to meet in order to be accredited." Record at 1902, 1903, in Chipps v. Humana Health
Ins. Co. of Fla., (15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County, Fla.) (Case No. CL 96-00423 AE)
(unreported, filed 1996). See also supra note 69.
178. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Medical Association and The Medical Society of
the State of New York at 2 (March 30, 2000), Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y.
App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
by Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion
granted by Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
[hereinafter Amicus Cfriae Brief of the American Medical Association].
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qualifications or by medical management department physicians not
specialized in their respective areas.'7 9  Furthermore, long delays in
obtaining approval for medical procedures are common. In cases of
denial, the appeals process for what is considered essential treatment can
be even more time-consuming. As a consequence, patients' conditions
have deterioratea irreversibly and some have died.,8o Even though delays
and denials are generally classified as "administrative" in nature, they
often have medical consequences and thus represent de facto medical
decisions not to treat.
1. Guidelines
Cost containment in health care and the standardization of medical
practice for quality control are generally not disputed in today's health care
delivery environment. Because of the extensive use of guidelines for such
purposes, guideline validity is essential. Guidelines developed by medical
specialty societies according to scientific and evidence-based criteria,
reflective of prevailing practices, and in agreement with Institute of
Medicine and Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality standards,
would most likely meet with little resistance on the part of practitioners.
Commercial guidelines, however, derived from data considered
"proprietary" and judged by physicians as endangering patients and in
violation of the standard of care, are rejected as "straightjackets" and
"cookbook medicine." Furthermore, the perceived economic motives for
such guideline development and their indiscriminate use by MCOs
undermine the guidelines' credibility with the medical community."'
Physicians have also expressed concern about practice guidelines
stretching the definition of primary care beyond what practitioners should
responsibly perform in their offices. According to the M&R guidelines,
large, potentially malignant facial lesions can be removed by general
practitioners,' 82 avoiding a referral to a plastic surgeon. Furthermore, as
reported by the director of an emergency room, MCOs have recently
179. MARK GREEN, WHAT AILS HMOS-A CONSUMER DIAGNOSIS AND Rx, 63 (1996) (a
report by the Public Advocate for the City of New York).
180. Crum v. Health Alliance Mid-West, Inc. 47 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (stating
that triage hotline nurse denied patient's admission to emergency care resulting in cardiac arrest);
Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), reh'g denied (Feb. 12, 1999) (stating that patient
became paraplegic because of delayed admission to the appropriate neurological facility).
181. Myerson, supra note 44, at Cl (stating that Dr. Doyle, chief author of the M&R
guidelines, has stressed that the guidelines are goals not rules but that "the more rigorous the
application, the greater the savings").
182. MARK GREEN, supra note 179, at 64 (quoting Pushing the Definition of Primary Care
to the Limit, MED. ECONOMICS, Aug. 7, 1995, at 60).
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instructed patients to see their primary care provider instead of visiting an
ER. "I find this worrisome, many PCPs have little suturing experience
and wouldn't know one tendon from another."'83 The M&R hospitalization
length-of-stay guidelines were called unrealistically optimistic by the AMA
because treatment and recovery often do involve considerable
complications since patients do not respond optimally, as the guidelines
assume.'84 Even though M&R points out that physicians should use their
own judgment, doctors are "worn down by constant bickering with
insurance companies that use guidelines such as M&R. A clerk with no
knowledge of medicine is often the one telling the doctor what the
recommended treatment is, and doctors have no idea the guidelines were
written by an actuarial firm."'85
2. Cost Containment
MCOs, physicians' offices and hospitals require an elaborate
administrative infrastructure for the preauthorization and concurrent review
of individual medical decisions. Disputes with providers over delays and
denials, frequent arguments over payment for tests or necessary
equipment, and excessive paperwork'86 absorb additional resources.
Hospitals may dedicate entire office suites to on-site personnel conducting
concurrent review for numerous MCOs. Managed care companies may
have eighteen nurses on staff for treatment reviews, a full-time medical
director, twenty-seven customer service representatives, and four part-time
medical directors. On the business side, there may be eight representatives
to recruit providers, fifteen salespeople to sell to employers, and roughly
one-hundred clerical workers for claims processing. '8 In addition, major
data processing centers are required for the wealth of medical and business
information generated by a large MCO. Humana, for example, has four-
hundred in-house application programmers for the development and
maintenance of its own application systems. "The information systems
support marketing, sales, underwriting, contract administration, billing,
financial .. . customer service, authorization and referral management,
183. Id.
184. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Medical Association, supra note 178, at 9.
185. Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous, "supra note 152.
186. MARK GREEN, supra note 179, at 63.
187. Id. at 81 (stating that this was the infrastructure of an HMO with 110,000 members in
New Jersey).
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concurrent review, physician capitation and claims administration, provider
management, quality management and utilization review.",88
Whether the immense administrative apparatus for controlling and
"standardizing" the micro-allocation of health care funds through managed
care treatment decisions at the bedside absorbs whatever "efficiencies"
may have been achieved, often at the patients' expense, remains
unanswered.'89 With health care expenditures stabilized on a macro level,
the traditional providers' hands-on clinical judgment might be just as
"efficient" while much more patient-friendly.19
188. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.
Attachment 1, Section 1, in Price et al. v. Humana Inc., (S.D. Fla.) (Case No. 9:99-8763 CIV-
Moreno) (unreported, filed 1999), transferred and consolidated In re Humana Inc. Managed
Care Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099 (2000), aff'd 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS (1lth Cir. 2002).
(stating that Humana's centralized management services include "management information
systems, product administration, financing, personnel, development, accounting, legal advice,
public relations, marketing, insurance, purchasing, risk management, actuarial, underwriting and
claims processing").
189. MCOs on the average spend close to 30% of every premium dollar on administration.
Administrative expenditures by German sickness funds do not exceed 6% even though recent
health care reforms are pushing costs upward.
190. See, e.g., Dave Barry, Wit's End, Managed Care, THE WASH. POST MAGAZINE, Oct.
15, 2000, at 36 (stating that the complex, bureaucratic administration of MCOs is certainly
perceived by the public and solutions are proposed. "All we have to do is get in a time machine
and go back to 1957. In those days we had a great health care system. The way it worked was,
every family had a doctor, who wore a white coat and a head reflector, and who had an aquarium
in his waiting room ...In those days, medical paperwork was simple: The doctor gave you a
bill. That was it. Whereas today, if you get involved with the medical care system in any way,
including sending flowers to a hospital patient, you will spend the rest of your life wading
through baffling statements from insurance companies. I speak with authority. At some point in
the past, some member of my family apparently received medical care, and now every day, rain
or shine, my employer's insurance company sends me at least one letter, comically entitled
"EXPLANATION OF BENEFITS," which looks like it was created by the Internal Revenue
Service From Hell. It's covered with numbers indicating my. in-network, out-of-pocket
deductible; my out-of-network, nondeductible pocketable; my semi-pocketed, nonworkable,
indestructible Donald Duckable, etc. For all I know, somewhere in all these numbers is a charge
for Dr. Cohn's fish food. What am I supposed to do with this information? ... Let's demand
some action! Let's track down the people sending out these EXPLANATION OF BENEFITS
letters and have them arrested! Let's bring back head reflectors!"); Carey Goldberg, State
Referendums Seeking to Overhaul Health Care System, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at Al
(stating that it may come as no surprise that states such as Maryland, Massachusetts, and Oregon
are gearing up for referendums on the introduction of universal health care systems); Gina
Kolata, For Those Who Can Afford It, Old-Style Medicine Returns, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, at
Al (stating that at the same time, increasing numbers of physicians accept self-paying patients
only, adding another tier to the already multi-tiered American health care system).
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III. GERMANY: ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
A. Introduction to the German Statutory Health Care System 91
The German health care system is an all-payer, pre-paid, non-profit,
universal access/universal coverage system of social health insurance
which is currently embodied in Title Five of the Social Code (SGB V) of
1988.192 It originated at the beginning of the 19th century when
tradesmen's guilds and industrialists began to introduce health care
coverage for the protection of their members and workers. In 1883, under
Chancellor Bismarck, the National Health Insurance Act was adopted
which integrated all individual plans into a single national social insurance
plan. The administrative structure which had grown out of seven
categories of corporate sickness funds and sickness funds by profession
was preserved and continues to be one of the foundations of the SGB V.111
Within these categories, a total of over 500 plans offering by law almost
identical comprehensive coverage is available. Originally, members were
required to obtain coverage for life under their professional plans. In
1996, open enrollment was introduced as an element of competition among
the different plans.
Premiums are assessed at a uniform percentage (13.8% in 2000)-
premiums are split evenly between employers and members-up to a
certain level of annual income (currently approximately $40,000). This
represents an element of income redistribution since half of the premium is
spent on a member's health care, the remaining half on family members
(covered at no additional charge, independent of their number) and on the
elderly. The unemployed and the elderly continue to receive the same
comprehensive benefits without paying premiums. Care is therefore
provided according to need, not according to income. Those whose
incomes exceed the legal maximum may opt out of the statutory plan. But
191. See Ursula Weide, A Comparison of American and German Cost Containment in
Health Care: Tort Liability of U.S. Managed Care Organizations vs. German Health Care
Reform Legislation, 13 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L. FOR. 47 (1998); Ursula Weide, Health Care
Reform and the Changing Standard of Care in the United States and Germany, 20(3) N.Y. L.
SCH. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 249 (2000).
192. SOZIALGESETZBUCH - FONFrES BUCH, SGB V. BGBL. S., 2477 Bonn. 20 Dezember
1988; [SOCIAL CODE, TITLE V, published in the GERMAN CODE 2477 (Dec. 20, 1988)]
[hereinafter SGB V].
193. Krankenkassen Betriebskassen (individual corporate plans) Innungskassen (plans by
trade). Landwirtschaftliche Krankenkasse (agricultural workers plan). See-Krankenkasse
(merchant marine plan). Bundesknappschaft (mine workers plan). Ortskassen (local funds by
municipality or county). Certain groups of blue and white collar workers also could choose one
of the so-called substitute funds (Ersatzkassen) instead.
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90% of all Germans remain covered as private coverage by law must
correspond at a minimum to statutory coverage, creating little incentive to
engage in private insurance contracting. Furthermore, most universal
system members have private secondary insurance covering additional
benefits such as private instead of semi-private hospital rooms. Ninety
percent of all physicians are public plan providers but may also deliver
care under private indemnity insurance.
While the government sets the overall legal framework for the health
care system and its administration (the SGB V has been amended numerous
times since its adoption in 1988 when it replaced the venerable Insurance
Code of 1914,'9 also amended and fine-tuned over time), the delivery of
care is subject to joint physician and sickness fund self-governance by
associations. The principle of self-govemance was officially announced by
Bismarck in the "Imperial Message" on November 11, 1881, read during
an opening session of the National Parliament, and announcing the
introduction of the Social Insurances Act. The delegation of power to
associations was intended to achieve "a greater closeness to the real forces
of the citizens' lives by concentrating those forces within corporate entities
protected and supported by the State, permitting the resolution of tasks
which the State would be unable to accomplish to the same extent."'' 9 In
1972, the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic rephrased in
modern language the stated purpose of the delegation of rulemaking
authority to associations, now corporate entities under public law.
Subgroups of society should be allowed to regulate their own affairs based
on their special expertise and knowledge of local particularities, often
difficult to discern for the legislator, thus reducing the distance between
those who adopt norms and those bound by them, and permitting more
rapid adjustment to change. 19
Sickness funds are self-governed corporate entities under public law,97
and deliver health care in cooperation with the providers (physicians,
194. This Act contained several titles covering health insurance, workers' compensation and
retirement benefits. A separate act for health insurance was adopted in 1988, the SGB V.
195. INGWER EBSEN, AUTONOME RECHTSSSETZUNG IN DER SOZIALVERSICHERUNG
[AUTONOMOUS RULEMAKING IN SOCIAL INSURANCES], VSSR 57 (1990) (quoting Kaiserliche
Botschaft, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 5. Legislaturperiode, Erste Session 1881, Bd. 1, S. I
ff [Deliberations of the National Parliament, Fifth Term, First Session 1881, Vol. 1, at 1]).
Associations as the expression of society's communitarian spirit have been analyzed at length by
German jurisprudists. See, e.g., OTro VON GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT
[THE GERMAN LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS] (1887). In opposition to the economic liberalism of
Kant, von Gierke's approach was labeled "economic communitarianism."
196. BverfGE 33, 125, 156.
197. K6rperschaften des offentlichen Rechts, Art. 4, SGB V. Self-governance and status as
corporate entities under public law are particularities of the delegation of rulemaking authority
Weide
dentists, psychologists, hospitals and pharmacists). These operate as
independent businesses but are subject to regulation.191 Both sickness funds
and physicians are represented by regional associations (plan physician
membership is mandatory)'1 with elected assemblies and boards. All
associations are corporate entities under public law. While there are
several federal sickness fund associations representing the different fund
categories, there is only one Federal Physician Association.2 The federal
associations of both parties to the system of self-governance annually
renegotiate a collective national agreement2°' stipulating the framework for
the provision of care and provider compensation. This agreement includes
a fee scale based on relative value units for fee-for-service payments, and
capitation for certain basic services. It also lists quality control guidelines
in agreement with SGB V, Art. 135, for specialized diagnostic and
treatment procedures such as MRI, dialysis, radiology and nuclear
medicine, pace makers, ultrasounds, and the cytological diagnosis of
female reproductive carcinomas. It further integrates the coverage
guidelines as adopted by the Joint Federal Committees of the Sickness
Funds and Physician Associations under SGB V, Art. 92. These
guidelines are intended to guarantee a high standard of care, not to limit
benefits. So far, nineteen guidelines apply, most prominent among them
the pregnancy care guideline, the early childhood screening guideline, the
prescription drug guideline, and the guideline for the evaluation of
diagnostic and treatment procedures for coverage purposes.-
Regional agreements, incorporating all elements of the national
agreement but allowing for regional adjustments, are concluded among the
regional physician and sickness fund associations. The regional
agreements emphasize provider compensation, random plausibility checks
under the German system of government. Other entities enjoying this status are municipalities
and counties, universities, chambers of industry and trade, public radio and television. All may
autonomously promulgate charters for the regulation of their affairs, and no enabling legislation
is required. HARTMUT MAURER, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT [GENERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 64 (12th ed. 1999).
198. The German health care delivery system does not employ anyone and in that sense is
not a "national health system" as found in Great Britain and Canada.
199. Landesverbande der Krankenkassen; Kassendrztliche Vereinigungen.
200. Spitzenverbande der Krankenkassen; Kassenarztliche Bundesvereinigung (KBV).
201. Bundesmantelvertrag, reprinted in VERTRAGE DER KASSENRZTLICHEN
BUNDESVEREINIGUNG (DIENSTAUFLAGE DER KBV) [CONTRACTS OF THE FEDERAL PHYSICIAN
ASSOCIATION, OFFICIAL EDITION] (1998).
202. Respectively, Mutterschaftsrichtlinie (for pregnancy); Kinderrichtlinie (for early
childhood screening); Arzneimittelrichtlinie (for prescription drugs); and Bewertung von
Untersuchungs und Behandlungsmethoden (for diagnostic and treatment procedures). The latter
guideline is applied in conjunction with the stipulations of Art. 135, SGB V.
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on claims filed, and the retrospective economic review of care delivered
by office, based on medical specialty. On a quarterly basis, physicians bill
their associations which process and pay the claims with assets received
from the sickness funds. Sickness fund revenues correspond to the
premiums paid by their members. Members are not invoiced except for
copayments and some dental indemnity claims.
B. Coverage, Benefits and Medical Necessity
Historically, the German health care code guaranteed the coverage of
members203 but did not yet bind sickness funds and providers. Due to poor
economic conditions in the 1930s, a comprehensive system of contracts
between these two parties and their associations was added to the code to
safeguard the health care delivery system.2 Today, the Coverage (Art. 1
to 66) and Health Care Delivery sections (Art. 69 to 140) are found in
Chapters Three and Four of the SGB V.-05 Coverage is comprehensive and
identical for all members, and physicians and sickness funds together must
ensure the delivery of care. Under SGB V, Art. 11, coverage is to be
provided:
for the prevention, early diagnosis, treatment and
stabilization of illness; contraception, elective sterilization,
and legal abortions.- Included are medical and adjunct
services for rehabilitation to prevent disability or illness
requiring longterm care, and services to reverse, improve
or stabilize such conditions. In case of hospitalization,
coverage extends to the presence of a patient's companion
whenever medically necessary.
Art. 27 specifies:
Members are entitled to benefits for the diagnosis,
treatment and stabilization of an illness or to control its
symptoms. Coverage includes medical and dental
treatment, psychotherapy, drugs, durable medical
equipment, medical/surgical dressings and supplies,
adjunct therapies, home care and household help,
203. Leistungsrecht.
204. Leistungserbringungsrecht.
205. The extent of future coverage may depend on the priority BSG-Bundessozialgericht,
the Supreme Social Court-jurisprudence may accord to one or the other Chapter. For further
discussion, see infra.
206. Abortions are reimbursed whenever "medically and socially" indicated. A recent
amendment extended coverage to medication-induced abortions.
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hospitalization, medical and other services for
rehabilitation, stress testing and occupational therapy. The
needs of mental health patients must receive particular
attention, including adjunct therapies and rehabilitation.
Fertility treatment . . . is covered. w
Several SGB V sections define what would correspond to the medical
necessity definition in managed care plan documents:
* The quality and efficacy of the benefits to be provided by the
sickness funds must correspond to the prevailing medical standard of
care and be in accordance with the progress of medical science. (Art.
2)
* Contracts between physician and sickness fund associations must
ensure the sufficient, appropriate and cost-effective °8 delivery of
207. United States. General Accounting Office, 1993 German Health Reforms New Coast
Control Initiatives: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. SENATE,
GAO/HRD 93-103, at 25. (stating the German health care system is one of the "most
comprehensive health insurance benefits programs in the world").
208. KARL HAUCK, SGB V: GESETZLICHE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG, KOMMENTAR [SGB
V ANNOTATED], K § 12, at 7, 8 (Sept. 1999) (stating that cost-effectiveness expresses the
fiduciary function of the State and applies to all levels of German government: federal, state and
local. Cost-effectiveness under social law, as related to health care for individual members, is of
relevance only when several equally effective but more or less costly treatments are available.
Cost is (basically) irrelevant when a single procedure would produce the desired outcome. (Art.
1, SGB V, entitles members to the preservation, restoration or improvement of their health.)
Benefits are cost-effective when the desired outcome can be achieved with an acceptable
minimum of resources. "Such a cost-benefit analysis, however, is not purely economic.
Qualitative medical considerations, especially the kind, duration and sustainability of the
outcome, must be balanced with cost. How to quantify quality is the underlying issue,
unresolved under current law, perhaps defying any kind of resolution. In a prepaid system of
health care, only increasing standardization may provide a satisfactory answer.") Hauck's loose-
leaf edition is continuously updated, reflecting all amendments to the code.
According to Art. 103, SGB V, cost-effectiveness reviews of physicians' practices are
conducted by both physician and sickness fund associations, based on economic utilization
criteria, determined by the various and changing cost containment approaches adopted by the
government. Examples are sector budgets (for all of ambulatory vs. in-patient care), prescription
drug budgets, and practice budgets by specialty. Penalties for violations generally are of a
collective nature and, even though stipulated by the SGB V, have not been enforced in any
consistent fashion. Art. 116, SGB V, provides for (economic utilization) cost-effectiveness
review of hospitals to be conducted by the sickness fund associations. This application of the
social law concept of cost-effectiveness has been criticized for ignoring costs incurred in cases of
undertreatment requiring more expensive care later on. "In this respect, the term cost-
effectiveness in social law is one-eyed: it is unrelated to general economic cost-effectiveness. It
has become a singular concept resistant to abstract definition and can be understood only within
the SGB V framework. " Thomas Clemens, Abrechnungsstreitigkeiten,
Wirtschaftlichkeitsprifung, Schadensregrefl [Claims Processing Disputes, Cost-Effectiveness
Audits, Sanctions], in HANDBUCH DES SOZIALVERSICHERUNGS-RECHTS, BAND 1,
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medical care for all insureds under the plan, in accordance with the
law and the coverage guidelines established by the Joint Federal
Committees (JFC) 2° , and correspond to the generally recognized level
of medical expertise.(Art. 72)210
* Sickness funds and providers must ensure care for all members as
needed, in a consistent fashion, and in accordance with the generally
recognized level of medical expertise. The delivery of care must be
sufficient and appropriate, it may not exceed whatever is necessary, it
must correspond to the professionally required level of quality, and
must be cost-effective. (Art. 70)
The BSG (Bundessozialgericht, Supreme Social Court) considers Art.
27 to represent a general guarantee of coverage but no entitlement to
individual benefits .21 Due to the complexity of medical care, additional
decisions must follow to establish the eligibility for benefits. First, a plan
physician, authorized under public law to determine "eligibility" must
suspect or find illness in accordance with Art. 27, defined as an
"exceptional physical or mental condition necessitating treatment." 2 2
(Benefits for prevention and early screening are guaranteed under Arts.
11, 20 to 26). Once this requirement of the SGB V Coverage Chapter has
been satisfied, the patient is eligible for benefits necessary for the
diagnosis, cure or stabilization of an illness, or to control its symptoms.
Individual treatment decisions are delegated to the attending physician who
provides or orders the services required to translate the general material
claim to coverage into individual benefits.2 '3 These must correspond to the
prevailing standard of care and reflect the progress of medical science.
(Art. 2) The delivery of care must be sufficient, appropriate and cost-
effective, not exceeding what is necessary for the individual circumstances
of the patient. (Arts. 70, 72) Benefits, however, may also be specified by
coverage guidelines issued by the Joint Federal Committee under the SGB
V Health Care Delivery Chapter (Arts. 92, 135). These guidelines are
considered general and abstract criteria, to be translated into specific
KRANKENVERSICHERUNGSRECHT [HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL INSURANCE LAW, VOL. 1, HEALTH
INSURANCE LAW] 918 (Bertram Schulin, ed., 1994).
209. Bundesausschiisse der ,rzte und Krankenkassen. For further discussion, see infra.
210. This article stipulates the joint contractual provider-sickness fund mandate to assure
access to and the provision of medical care for all insureds. Sicherstellungsauftrag.
211. BSG 4 Rk 5/92, E 73, 271, 277, 290 (Dec. 12, 1993).
212. HAUCK, supra note 208, K § 27, at 4 (50th addition to the Annotated Code, July
2000).
213. BSGE 73, 271, 279; BSG SozR 3-2500 §30 No. 8, at 32.
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benefits by the attending physicians, both in office and hospital
environments."'
C. The Joint Federal Committee
The institutions of the German universal system of health care have
remained remarkably stable in spite of several successive systems of
government. 21  The earliest embodiment of the Joint Federal Committees
was the then-called Central Committee, established by the Berlin
Agreement of 1913 as a response to a long period of conflict between
sickness funds and physicians. After a series of physician strikes, the
Berlin Agreement for the first time established a joint sickness fund-
physician committee with equal representation, under neutral
chairmanship, with the participation of neutral members, and a mandatory
arbitration procedure. The private Hartmann Bund (roughly comparable to
the American Medical Association) had been founded in 1900 to strengthen
the physicians' position vis-A-vis the sickness funds which contracted
individually with providers, thus creating total dependency. The Hartmann
Bund had demanded patients' independent choice of physicians and any
willing provider contracting with licensed physicians only. The joint
Central Committee's initial mandate was to improve the representation of
physicians' interests but also to protect the people from a collapse of the
health care system. In 1923, after the expiration of the voluntary Berlin
Agreement, many of its clauses were integrated into the National Social
Insurances Act (RVO) 26 by the National Ministry of Labor.1 7
The Central Committee, now safely anchored in public law, evolved
into the National Committee mandated to further develop the mechanisms
embodied in the original Berlin Agreement. The Committee subsequently
received rulemaking authority and refined the law regulating the relations
214. Robert Francke, Richtlinien, Normsetzungsvertrage und neue Behandlungsmethoden im
Rechtskonkretisierungskonzept des Bundessozialgerichts [Coverage Guidelines, Norm Contracts
and Innovative Procedures as Interpreted in Rulings of the Supreme Social Court], 1 DIE
SOZIALGERICHTSBARKEIT 5 (Jan. 1999) (citing BSGE 73, 271, 280 and BSG SozR 3-2500 §39
No. 3).
215. This section is based on Marian Dohler and Philip Manow-Borgwardt, Kontinuitat
durch Wandel: Zur Institutionsgeschichte des Bundesausschusses der Arzte und Krankenkassen
[Continuity Through Change: The Institutional History of the Federal Committee of Physicians
and Sickness Funds], in GESUNDHEITSRISIKEN, INDUSTRIEGESELLSCHAFT UND SOZIALE
SICHERUNGEN IN DER GESCHICHTE [HEALTH RISKS, THE INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETY, AND
SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS IN HISTORY] 119 (Dietrich Milles, ed., 1993).
216. Reichsversicherungsordnung. This act was adopted in 1914 and covered health
insurance, workers' compensation and retirement benefits.
217. Historically, oversight over health care has alternated between the Ministry of Labor
and the Ministry of Health.
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between physicians and sickness funds. This included the adoption of
licensing procedures for physicians and the first coverage guidelines for the
"cost-effective" dispensation of drugs and "electro-physical treatments" in
1925. The Hartmann Bund, willing at times to break the law to represent
physicians' interests and accused by the government of practicing
"terrorism," was now cooperating with the National Committee. Years of
such cooperation between physicians and sickness funds pursuing common
goals had already resulted in a much improved relationship between the
parties. The National Ministry of Labor supported the development of
sickness fund and physician associations and recognized their national
federations as the "legal representatives of the parties' interests" in the
RVO. In 1931, the physician associations received their status as
corporate entities under public law. The government had "domesticated
unruly" private law associations by recognizing the importance of their
contribution.
In spite of the normative authority of the National Committee, the
definition of its legal relationship with the state remained amorphous-the
Committee was at times designated as an "entity of the system of self-
governance under agency oversight" or as a "national agency with
elements of self-governance. "2'8 The legal status of its guidelines,
including the adoption of rules for the medical licensing boards, was
equally contested but a consensus developed eventually, according the
guidelines de facto normative status but not the force of law.
In 1931, in the middle of the international economic crisis, the
National Ministry of Labor issued an RVO emergency regulation defining
the relationship between sickness funds and physicians in accordance with
Committee guidelines, the logical next step in the continued development
of the cooperation between sickness funds and physicians. The social
health insurance code thus incorporated licensing rules, patient choice of
providers, capitated payments (adopted with the physicians' approval),
collective agreements, and the equal representation of sickness funds and
physicians on administrative entities under public law. As a consequence
of the adoption of the licensing regulations, physicians now had a public
law entitlement to a contract to practice, the first step towards extending
the RVO to individual physicians. The emergency regulation also
provided the National Committee with de jure authority to promulgate
binding rules under the act, a delegation of rulemaking authority unique
among all social insurance laws. Government regulatory authority was
preserved under default provisions. This democratic process collapsed,
however, when the physicians refused to participate in Committee activities
218. Marian D6hler and Philip Manow-Borgwardt, supra note 215, at 125.
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under the Nazi regime, and regulation reverted back to the National
Ministry of Health by default. 9
After World War II, the influential pre-war role of the now-called
Joint Federal Committee was not restored. Only when coverage was
expanded in the sixties, the JFC adopted the pregnancy care guideline, the
children's guideline and the rehabilitation guideline. The focus then was
on ensuring a high standard of care, and the guidelines served the detailed
interpretation of the health care code. But beginning in 1977, when the
first health care cost containment provision was passed, the entities of the
system of self-governance began to be instrumentalized for cost-
effectiveness purposes. The JFC was now charged with the
implementation of several cost control mechanisms, such as the
development of a list of medications for minor ailments (common cold,
headaches) to be excluded from coverage, and of the guideline for the cost-
effective use of major medical equipment. Over time, the Committee thus
has assumed different roles: initially, it served the collective interpretation
and implementation of the first agreements between sickness funds and
physicians, evolved into the regulatory entity of the system of self-
governance, further refining the contractual relationship between the
parties, then issued guidelines to uphold a high standard of care, and in
recent years has increasingly provided assistance with cost containment.
D. Coverage Rulemaking under SGB V, Arts. 92, 135, and 137
Today, the Joint Federal Committee,2 as established by SGB V, Art.
91, and mandated to issue coverage guidelines under Art. 92, has a total of
twenty-one members: a neutral chairperson, two neutral members, nine
members representing physicians (and dentists or psychologists), three
representatives of the Local Funds, two of the Substitute Funds, and one
member each representing the corporate-sponsored plans, the plans by
trade, and the agricultural workers, merchant marine, and mine workers
plans. Should the parties be unable to agree on the neutral chairperson and
the two neutral members, these are appointed by the Federal Secretary of
Health in cooperation with the Federal Physician Association and all
sickness fund associations. Each member has five deputies of which no
more than two may participate in meetings. Whenever psychotherapy
guidelines are to be drafted, the nine physician members are replaced by
219. Id. at 127.
220. Even though the singular is generally used, there are three JFCs covering medicine,
dentistry and psychology.
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five psychologists and five physicians practicing psychotherapy.'
Members may not receive instructions from their associations. Proposed
coverage decisions are referred to JFC working groups with generally nine
members each, representing the physician and sickness fund associations.
Decisions are submitted to the plenary and must be adopted by majority
vote. JFC membership is uncompensated, only travel expenses and time
spent working on JFC-related activities are reimbursed.
The Federal Ministry of Health has oversight over the JFC but is
concerned only with the proper implementation of procedures, not the
actual decision making. Coverage guidelines adopted by the JFC must be
submitted to the Ministry which may object within two months to matters
of law. Objections may not reflect political considerations. The
Committee may cure objections within the time frame set by the Ministry,
if it fails to do so, the Ministry may promulgate its own guideline. The
JFC may then bring an action before the social courts. So far, however,
the Committee has resolved all issues in a timely fashion, avoiding further
action by the Ministry. 22
1. Committee Activities
Since the adoption of the SGB V in 1988, the JFC's task has been the
development of coverage guidelines23 under Art. 92 as necessary to ensure
the "sufficient, appropriate and cost-effective" delivery of outpatient health
care. (The JFC for dentists issues guidelines limited to dental procedures,
dental prosthetics, and orthodontics.) Art. 92 mirrors the coverage
members are entitled to under Art. 27 and may be expanded (the original
act of 1988 did not include items 10 and 11):
The Federal Committees adopt guidelines as necessary for
the delivery of health care in order to ensure sufficient,
adequate and cost-effective services for the insureds; the
221. Psychologists fought for many years to be recognized and reimbursed as independent
providers since reimbursement was allowed only after referral from and while under supervision
by a physician. With equal representation of psychologists and physicians on the JFC for matters
psychological, physicians are still able to block psychologists' decisions.
222. Karl Jung, Leitlinien aus der Sicht des Bundesausschusses der Arzte und
Krankenkassen-Rechtspolitische and rechtspraktische Probleme [Clinical Practice Guidelines
Viewed by the Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds-Problems of Law,
Application and Policy], in ARZTLICHE LEITLINIEN: EMPIRIE UND RECHT PROFESSIONELLER
NORMSETZUNG [MEDICAL GUIDELINES: EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR SETrING
PROFESSIONAL NORMS] (Dieter Hart, ed., 2000) [hereinafter Clinical Practice Guidelines
Viewed by the Federal Committee].
223. Coverage guidelines are defined as "norms addressing acts or omissions, issued by a
rulemaking entity as mandated by the SGB V."
Weide
needs of mental health patients must receive particular
attention . ..Guidelines must be adopted in particular-2
[emphasis added] for:
1. medical treatment
2. dental treatment including dentures and orthodontics
3. the early diagnosis of illness
4. pregnancy and maternal care
5. the coverage of innovative2 diagnostic and treatment
procedures
6. the prescription of drugs, medical/surgical dressings
and supplies, medial equipment, prosthetic devices, adjunct
therapies, hospitalization, home care and socio-therapy
7. disability determination
8. the provision of medical care as required by individual
circumstances, and of medical, occupational and
complementary rehabilitation benefits
10. the determination of number of physicians required
for adequate health care delivery
11. medical services in cases of infertility
12. contraception and legal abortions.
Examples of current guidelines (nineteen have been adopted so far)
are the pregnancy care guideline (dating back to 1965), the early childhood
screening guideline, and guidelines for prescription drugs (originating in
the 19th century), early cancer screening, disability determination,
psychotherapy and fertility treatment. Their main purpose is to guarantee
the standard of care. The pregnancy care guideline is as detailed as a
224. This term indicates that the above list is not exclusive. Ein Verwaltungstiger erhilt
Zihne [An Administrative Tiger Gets Its Teeth], 23 DER KASSENARZT 31 (1997).
225. The German term is "new" procedures. The author, however, prefers to use
"innovative" because the issue concerns some of the same diagnostic and treatment services
dubbed "experimental" by managed care companies.
20021 563
564 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:507
clinical practice guideline (CPG) and sets a high standard for medical
services during pregnancy. Practitioners must apply the guideline and may
not undertreat. The early childhood screening guideline also has elements
of a CPG.
Art. 135, in conjunction with Art. 92(1)(5), further clarifies the
mandate for innovative treatment coverage determinations, introducing
specific evidence-based requirements. When the NOG 222 became law on
July 1, 1997, Art. 135 was significantly expanded:
Innovative medical and dental diagnostic and therapeutic
procedures are covered by the sickness funds only if the
Joint Federal Committee has issued guidelines under Art.
92(1)(5) recommending the acceptance of the diagnostic
and therapeutic usefulness of the new procedure, its
medical necessity and cost-effectiveness-also in
comparison with already covered benefits-in agreement
with the current state of scientific knowledge of the
specialty concerned.
The JFC's scope of action now included the examination of the
sufficiency, appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of innovative diagnostic
and therapeutic procedures as compared to already covered benefits, in
accordance with each medical specialty's state of the art. (Concerns were
raised at the time that the application of internal specialty standards would
lead to automatic "self-validation" but the JFC chairman, in agreement
with members of the health care committee, clarified that this phrase
expressed a requirement for comment by experts in the respective
fields. 217) Applications for such coverage determinations must be submitted
by a regional physician association, the Federal Physician Association, or
one of the sickness fund associations. Innovative procedures are not
covered until the JFC has pronounced their diagnostic and therapeutic
"usefulness." 22 The revised Art. 135229 was further extended to the
226. 2 Neuordnungsgesetz NOG. BGBL. S. 1520; Bonn, 30. Juni 1997 [Health Care Code
Revision Act II, German Code, June 30, 1997, at 1520].
227. An Administrative Tiger Gets Its Teeth, supra note 224. Wording was also added to
include alternative therapies. Resolution of the Health Care Committee, Art. 135(1)(1), in
GESETZLICHE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG [SGB V ANNOTATED] 84 (Wilhelm Schmidbauer and
Bernhard Schmidbauer, eds., 2000).
228. Nutzen. The BSG has interpreted this clause as an "exclusion of a procedure from
coverage until approved by the JFC" for purposes of quality control. It also considers the JFC to
hold a decision making monopoly for the coverage of innovative services. Rolf-Ulrich
Schlenker, Das Entscheidungsmonopol des Bundesausschusses fir neue medizinische Verfahren
und Auflenseitermethoden [The Decisionmaking Monopoly of the Federal Committee for
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evaluation of already covered benefits to ensure their continued usefulness
and appropriateness under the evolving standard of care. No application
by a third party is required, the Committee must act ex officio whenever
information indicative of the need for reevaluation of a covered procedure
or service is received. The JFC has thus become the major coverage
decision maker for outpatient treatment. 21
Furthermore, a Hospital Committee'3 for the evaluation of current and
innovative diagnostic and treatment procedures in hospitals, modeled after
the JFC, was created by the Social-Democratic Reform 2000 under SGB
V, Art. 137(c), thus eliminating an important legislative gap. Evaluations
must be based on the current state of scientific knowledge, and the Art. 92
criteria, "sufficiency, appropriateness and cost-effectiveness," continue to
apply.
Contrary to Art. 135, however, no mention is made of "diagnostic
and therapeutic usefulness," resulting in a less stringent evaluation
standard. This was criticized by the JFC chairman, also sitting on the
Hospital Committee, who expressed concerns related to the absence under
Art. 137(c) of adequate procedures and a sufficient organizational structure
for the initiation and implementation of evaluations, and the promulgation
of Hospital Committee decisions.2 3 Art. 137(e) established a Coordinating
Committee,233 a working group of all associations represented on both the
JFC and the Hospital Committee. Its task is the coordination of committee
activities resulting in a uniform set of criteria for the appropriate and cost-
effective delivery of in- and outpatient care, relying on evidence-based
clinical practice guidelines. The Committee is expected to issue such
guidelines for at least ten illnesses per annum for which there are
indications of the delivery of inadequate, inappropriate or excessive care,
the elimination of which may affect population morbidity and mortality.-4
Conceived as a working group, the Coordinating Committee lacks
independent legal status but its decisions will bind the sickness funds,
Innovative Medical Procedures and Alternative Treatments], 9 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
SOZIALRECHT 411 (1998).
229. Art. 135(1)(3), SGB V.
230. For further discussion, including some of the limitations of the scope of the JFC's
rulemaking authority and resources, see infra.
231. Ausschuss Krankenhaus.
232. Karl Jung, Rechtliche Grundlagen des Bundesausschusses auch nach der GKV-Reform
2000 unzureichend [Inadequate Legal Foundations for the Federal Committee Persist after
Adoption of the Reform 2000], KRANKENVERSICHERUNG 52 (March 2000) [hereinafter
Inadequate Legal Foundations].
233. Koordinierungsausschuss.
234. Art. 137(e)(3)(1), SGB V.
2002]
566 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:507
hospitals and plan physicians. '35 So far, neither the Hospital Committee
nor the Coordinating Committee have promulgated guidelines. Whether
and how they will be able to accomplish their mission remains to be seen.
2. Rulemaking Procedures
Art. 92, as of its earliest version in 1988, has mandated notice and
comment procedures for JFC coverage guideline development. Initially
limited to the prescription drug guideline, the article required that experts
in pharmacology, representatives of the pharmaceutical industry and the
pharmacist associations were to be heard.2 6 It was amended to currently
include the medical specialty associations for alternative treatments, the
midwives association, the organizations representing the manufacturers and
service providers for prosthetic devices, hearing aids, other medical
devices and equipment, the providers of preventive and rehabilitative
services, both public and private home care providers, and dental
technicians. At the Committee's discretion, additional parties may be
heard. All opinions must be duly considered and included in the final
coverage guideline decision. Deliberations are not open to the public.
The neutral JFC chairman has criticized the absence of a coherent
legislative concept covering all procedural aspects of the hearing process
such as the scope of notice and comment, the specific parties to be heard,
whether comments should be presented orally or in writing, when and to
which extent documentation should be made public and responses to
requests for information be provided, and the absence of a well-defined
obligation of the JFC to justify its decisions .237 The Committee therefore
issued additional, more stringent rules of procedure specifying, for
example, that any interested party may be heard or submit comments, once
appropriate notice of the subjects under consideration has been given.
Comments are distributed to all Committee members.
235. The sickness funds and Social-Democratic members of Parliament would have
preferred a corporate entity under public law, making the Coordinating Committee a strong
umbrella organization for all federal committees.
236. This was the result of the lobbying onslaught on the federal government before the
reference price system was adopted as one of the major innovations of the new SGB V. With
drug profit margins for both manufacturers and pharmacies exceeding the international average
by far, the government introduced reimbursement ceilings by drug, the so-called "reference
prices." These do not apply across the board, exempting innovative and patented drugs, for
example. Currently, 46.5% of total drug expenditures by the universal health care system cover
medication subject to reference prices. Bundeskartellamt stoppt neue Festbetrige fir
Medikamente [Federal Antitrust Agency stays new Reference Prices for Drugs], FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Jan. 29, 2001, at 13. In spite of the price regulations, drug supply
shortages as currently experienced in the United States are unlikely in Germany.
237. Inadequate Legal Foundations, supra note 232, at 53.
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Art. 135, contrary to Art. 92, does not contain any notice and
comment clauses, considered to be a serious legislative omission since the
Art. 135 process leads to coverage exclusions while the Art. 92 process
rarely does. Once again critical of the legislators' abdication, the JFC
issued its own procedural guidelines .238 Medical services to be evaluated
must be clearly defined and their indication specified. The JFC working
groups must give notice of the procedures to be evaluated in the Federal
Register and in the Deutsches Arzteblatt.2 39 Comments are solicited from
medical experts, specialty societies, and, whenever relevant, from
associations of manufacturers of medical products and equipment. The
working groups may hear expert testimony, and both written and oral
opinions should be based on a questionnaire developed by the respective
working group. Adequate time must be provided for the submission of
comments.
Applications for innovative procedure coverage under Art. 135 must
describe the usefulness of the new procedure, its medical necessity, and its
cost-effectiveness compared to already covered care. The "usefulness" of
the procedure must be supported by effectiveness studies for the specified
indication, evidence of the therapeutic results of a diagnostic procedure,
outcome evaluations including side-effects, and usefulness data in
comparison with other procedures used for the same purpose. "Medical
necessity" is to be shown through data detailing the relevance of the
clinical issue, the epidemiology of the syndrome, the spontaneous course
of the illness, and diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives. "Cost-
effectiveness"2'4 must be addressed by estimating costs per patient,
balancing costs and benefits per patient, balancing costs and benefits for
the insured community, including follow-up costs, and by balancing costs
and benefits in comparison with other treatment approaches.
Because the JFC must prioritize applications, data showing the
diagnostic/therapeutic relevance for certain illnesses, the inherent risks of
the procedure and its likely economic impact should also be submitted.
238. Richtlinien des Bundesausschusses der 4rzte und Krankenkassen aber die Einfiihrung
neuer Untersuchungs and Behandlungsmethoden und iber die Uberpruifung erbrachter
vertragsarztlicher Leistungen gemdaj §135 Abs. I i. V. m. §92 Abs. 1 Satz 2 Nr. 5 SGB V, 1.
Jan. 1998 [Guidelines of the Joint Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds for the
Coverage of Innovative Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedures and the Evaluation of Covered
Medical Services Under §135(1) in Conjunction with §92(1)(5)], in HAUCK, supra note 208, C
455, at 1 (Jan.1, 1998).
239. This is the official publication of the Federal Physician Association.
240. The JFC cost-effectiveness definition strives to avoid being "one-eyed," see
Bundesausschiisse der Arzte und Krankenkassen, supra note 209, by requiring the "balancing" of
costs and benefits and by addressing follow-up costs.
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The JFC then classifies applications for therapeutic innovations according
to: (I) evidence based on at least one randomized, controlled study,
conducted and published in agreement with internationally recognized
standards (good clinical practice, such as GCP according to Consort); (Ila)
evidence derived from other prospective studies with clinical intervention;
(lib) cohort or case-controlled studies, preferably involving more than one
group of subjects; (1Ic) time-series studies or comparisons between sites
with and/or without clinical intervention; (III) opinions of recognized
experts, correlational observations, pathophysiological discussions or
descriptions; expert committee reports, consensus conferences, case
studies.
Diagnostic procedures are classified by considering: (I) evidence
based on at least one randomized, controlled study, conducted and
published in agreement with internationally recognized standards; (Ila)
evidence based on prospective diagnostic studies using validated numerical
targets (so-called "gold standards"), conducted under routine clinical
conditions accompanied by sensitivity, specificity and predictive value
calculations; (IIb) evidence derived from studies using populations with a
health status determined at the outset of the study using validated numerical
targets (gold standards), indicating at least sensitivity and specificity data;
(IIc) evidence from studies of populations with a predetermined health
status using non-validated diagnostic coefficients resulting in at sensitivity
and specificity data; (III) opinions of recognized experts, correlational
observations, pathophysiological discussions or descriptions; expert
committee reports, consensus conferences, case studies.
Whenever the JFC has approved an innovative therapeutic or
diagnostic procedure, recommendations for required provider
qualifications, equipment standards and quality control measures are
published simultaneously in order to ensure the appropriate application of
the new method. The national sickness fund and physician associations
may then jointly issue additional detailed quality control requirements.
Procedures rejected as not meeting the statutory coverage criteria are
publicized as well.
Should the JFC have failed to rule on a new procedure or have done
so in a timely fashion'41 but treatment -was provided and reimbursement
denied by the sickness fund, patients may bring an action before the social
courts under Art. 13, SGB V, allowing payment for care required by
241. Systemversagen. Whenever the JFC has failed to rule on the coverage of a new
method in a timely fashion, the reimbursement of services will be permitted under Art. 13,
contingent on case-by-case medical necessity determinations by the sickness funds and their
Medical Services.
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individual circumstances. The social court will then apply the
"acceptance" standard to determine whether the procedure has become part
of medical practice and is supported in the literature. Sickness fund
payment decisions, however, are based on effectiveness and
appropriateness criteria, a contradiction not yet resolved by the BSG . 2
Since the Court has concluded that the judiciary lacks the competence to
make "medical-scientific" determinations-' , and the legislative has
conveniently delegated most of the responsibility for politically difficult
choices to the JFC, patients, according to some authors, are left without
the protection of the law.,"
3. Conclusion
In spite of the remaining procedural weaknesses, the coverage
determination process is public and transparent. Both Arts. 92 and 135
refer to generally recognized or prevailing standards of medical knowledge
as standard for currently covered and innovative benefits. Patients are
entitled to care in keeping with the progress of medical science (Art. 2),
and physicians are obligated to provide it (Art. 70). According to the JFC
chairman, coverage guidelines should therefore be based on the expertise
of competent organizations and institutions45 , and on evidence-based
criteria reflecting the prevailing standards and scientific progress inherent
in clinical practice guidelines (CPGs). These are also relied upon by
experts whose comments on proposed coverage guidelines are required by
law or JFC statutes. CPGs are developed by medical specialty societies,
the Federal Physicians' Chamber,- " and the AWMF (Working Group of
Scientific-Medical Societies). The Chamber and the Federal Physician
Association& (represented on the JFC) have jointly established a
242. Schlenker, supra note 228, at 415.
243. BSGE 81, 54, 70, 72.
244. Ruth Schimmelpfeng-Schuitte, Richtliniengebung durch den Bundesausschujl der Arzte
und Krankenkassen und demokratische Legitimation [JFC Guidelines and Democratic
Legitimacy], 11 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIALRECHT 530, 534 (1999).
245. Clinical Practice Guidelines Viewed by the Federal Committee, supra note 222.
246. Bundesarztekammer. Its regional member chambers (Landesdrztekammern), corporate
entities under public law, represent physicians' interests, and adopt and implement the rules for
the practice of medicine. They are roughly comparable to U.S. state boards monitoring the
application of the professional code of ethics, continuing education requirements, and other rules
and regulations controlling the exercise of the medical profession. All are components of the
system of health care self-governance.
247. Arbeitsgemeinschaft der wissenschaftlichen medizinischen Fachgesellschaften. The
AWMF's website is available for view at http://www.uni-duesseldorf.de/WWW/AWMF.
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Clearinghouse for Medical Quality Control. 48 It develops CPGs for in-
and outpatient delivery of care, supports both federal associations when
contracting with sickness funds and hospitals, and coordinates the quality
control activities of all associations on the federal level. It has also issued
a "checklist for guidelines," a step-by-step roadmap to ensure guideline
quality and validity. In 1999, all federal entities of the system of self-
governance representing physicians, sickness funds and hospitals adopted a
joint project to promote the quality of guidelines in cooperation with the
AWMF. Based on both Clearinghouse and AWMF criteria, a Guideline
Manual for the development, adaptation or implementation of guidelines
was published in October 2000.249 Increasing cooperation among all parties
will contribute to quality of care improvements since valid CPGs translated
into coverage guidelines would influence the daily practice of medicine. 2m
E. The Democratic Legitimacy of the Federal Committee
Guidelines
1. The Guidelines' Legal Status
Public law associations autonomously adopt charters which have the
force of law. But laws must result from a democratically legitimate
process: associations, representing a limited number of citizens for a
particular purpose, must have democratically constituted rulemaking bodies
such as elected assemblies and boards. Sickness fund and physician
associations meet this requirement but the democratic legitimacy of the
Joint Federal Committee and its coverage guidelines has been a matter of
much dispute. The SGB V of 1988 strengthened the normative force of the
guidelines by integrating them into the federal collective agreements
negotiated by the federal associations of sickness funds and physicians, and
thus into the regional collective agreements as well. But the legal status of
the guidelines and their external application to the insureds continues to be
discussed and questioned in the literature.
Until 1996, the BSG had held that guidelines were only internal
administrative rules binding the JFCs' member associations, without
248. 'rztliche Zentraistelle Qualittssicherung. This organization considers and uses
standards and definitions of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the former Agency for
Healthcare Policy and Research (AHCPR).
249. Leitlinien-Manual, at http://www.uni-duesseldorf.de/AWMF/ll/llmanual.htm. The
Manual, with 2001 updates, is available at this site for purchase or for download in Adobe
Portable Document File format.
250. Whenever clinical practice guidelines become part of the social law coverage
guidelines, the physicians' conflict between the cost-containment requirements of social law and
the civil law malpractice standard is resolved as CPGs represent the civil law standard of care.
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normative effects on individual sickness funds and providers. Guidelines
could be applied to such third parties"' only through their integration into
the regional association charters.2 2 Furthermore, guidelines could not limit
members' material claims to comprehensive health care under Art. 27 .213
The BSG thus gave clear precedence to the coverage and benefit
entitlement sections (Chapter Three, Arts. 11-66) of the SGB V over its
administrative health care delivery sections (Chapter Four, Arts. 69-140),
emphasizing the rights of patients to treatment over administrative
decisions by the JFC (established by Art. 91 of Chapter Four).- This
approach also helped bridge the inconsistencies between the coverage and
health care delivery aspects of the law, enabled the providers to provide
legal individualized services, protected the patients, and required the
sickness funds to accept medical judgment. Concurrently, physicians were
bound by the coverage guidelines and all collectively agreed upon
contractual conditions of health care delivery.
On March 20, 1996,2- however, the Supreme Social Court ruled that
the JFC is an "institution" under public law with rulemaking authority
limited to specific interpretations of the law.- Even though such
institutions, contrary to corporate "entities" under public law, are
established to fulfill a certain purpose without the democratic
representation of members, they too may adopt charters and participate in
a system of self-governance. Relying on SGB V, Art. 92(8) (the JFC
coverage guidelines are components of the federal collective agreements
between sickness fund and physician associations), Art. 82 (the federal
collective agreements determine the terms of the regional agreements),
Art. 83 (the regional agreements are binding for the sickness funds), Art.
251. Drittwirkung; Aussenwirkung.
252. Prior to 1988, guidelines were declared "binding" in the charters of the regional
sickness fund and physician associations, endowing them with only questionable applicability to
third parties. This issue had never been resolved. Ebsen, supra note 195.
253. Peter Hinz, Der Bundesausschuss der Arzte und Krankenkassen-Status and Aufgaben
[The Joint Federal Committe-Status and Mandate], 7 DIE LEISTUNGEN 385 (July 2000).
254. This was also a reflection of the historical development of German health care law:
one of the original purposes of the contractual arrangements between physicians and sickness
funds was the delivery of health care for favorable fees. Wolfgang Gitter & Gabriele K6hler-
Fleischmann, Gedanken zur Notwendigkeit und Wirtschaftlichkeit von Leistungen in der
gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung and zur Funktion des Bundesausschusses der Arzte und
Krankenkassen [Reflections on the Necessity and Cost-Effectiveness of Benefits under the SGB V
and the Function of the Joint Federal Committeel, 1 DIE SOZIALGERICHTS BARKEIT 1 (1999).
255. BSG 6 Rka 62/94, March 20, 1996, Methadonurteil ["The Methadone Ruling ], 3
MedR 123 (1997).
256. Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts mit begrenzter Rechtsfahigkeit mit der Aufgabe der
konkretisierenden Rechtssetzung.
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95 (the regional agreements bind individual providers), and Art. 81(the
regional physician association charters must contain clauses to make the
guidelines binding on association members), the Court reversed its earlier
interpretation of the law and held that the JFC guidelines have the same
normative effect on sickness funds and physicians as the federal and
regional collective agreements concluded by their associations. This
confirmed the separate rulemaking authority of the Joint Federal
Committee, independent of its constituent corporate entities under public
law governing the health care system. Furthermore, the BSG reversed the
primacy of the SGB V coverage and benefit entitlement sections over the
sections regulating the administration of the health care delivery system,
thus permitting administrative interventions in an area so far mainly
controlled by physicians.
The applicability of the new approach to the patients as third parties
was resolved by analyzing the internal consistency of the law.21 7 Chapter
Three (coverage and benefits) of the SGB V calls for JFC guidelines
detailing the material claims for benefits by members under SGB V, Arts.
27 (a)(4) for fertility treatment, and Art. 29(4) for orthodontics in
agreement with Art. 92 of Chapter Four (the health care delivery system).
Without such a specific mandate, Art. 92(1) was considered the default
clause granting general JFC rulemaking authority ("Guidelines must be
adopted to ensure the sufficient, adequate and cost-effective delivery of
care"). According to the BSG, Art. 92(1) is logically related to Art. 12(1)
of Chapter Three, requiring the "sufficient, adequate and cost-effective"
provision of benefits to individual patients. Art. 72(2) of Chapter Four
once again reiterates these terms when stipulating the joint obligation of
sickness fund and provider associations to deliver care. The BSG thus
found the guideline application to patients to be implied in the SGB V.
Five BSG decisions, announced on September 16, 1997,58 confirmed
the far-reaching delegation of rulemaking authority to the JFC,5 9 dubbed
"one of the traditional components of German health care law" by the
Court. In all five cases, the BSG denied patients' claims for
reimbursement by the sickness funds of treatments not considered covered
257. BSG 6 Rka 62/94, March 20, 1996; Hinz, supra note 253.
258. BSG 1 RK 28/95, SozR 3-2500 §135 No. 4.; BSG Az 1 RK 17/95; 1 RK 14/96; 1 RK
30/95; 1 RK 32/95.
259. The BSG assumed the constitutionality of the scope of the delegation by declaring that
the Constitution does not contain a numerus clausus provision, limiting the categories of
rulemaking approaches. Still, the constitutionality of the Committee rulemaking authority is
hotly contested by constitutional law scholars and experts. The final arbiter, the Constitutional
Court, has not yet been seized with the issue.
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by the SGB V. Three decisions relied on the exclusion by the JFC of
immuno-augmentative therapy for multiple sclerosis from coverage. 260
Building on the March 3, 1996, opinion, the Court considered the
binding normative effect of the JFC guidelines on patients as flowing from
the systematic unity of SGB V Chapters Three and Four. The analysis
turned in particular on Art. 2, entitling members to the provision of
benefits in accordance with the prevailing state of medical knowledge and
the progress of medical science. The JFC was thus given a central role in
coverage decision making under the SGB V, shifting more of the complex
application of the SGB V from legislators to a body of experts. This
responsibility is shared with federal and regional physician and sickness
fund associations which must initiate the innovative treatment evaluation
but may not block nor delay such proceedings which are subject to the Art.
2 provisions.36' But in light of the multitude and complexity of prevailing
and innovative practices, and the resources required for their evaluation,
the current capacity of the JFC to rule on comprehensive coverage while
ensuring adequate transparency and the rule of law is in doubt.
Furthermore, the scope of the JFC rulemaking authority has been
successfully challenged in court. The BSG, even though recognizing the
Committee's authority to issue guidelines to "concretize" the general
health care entitlement clauses of the SGB V, limited the Committee's
ability to adopt exclusions. 62  It rejected the JFC Viagra coverage
exclusion argument that sickness funds would be prevented from
"appropriately managing" the cost-effective provision of health care as
merely addressing administrative difficulties, insufficient justification for a
coverage exclusion reserved to the legislator under Art. 34, SGB V.263
Because erectile dysfunction meets the statutory definition of illness of Art.
27, SGB V, and can have differing etiologies (in this case a chronic, age-
unrelated condition), the JFC may not prohibit reimbursement of a drug
approved for its effectiveness independent of a patient's individual
circumstances. Relying on the BSG opinion, a state court approved
260. In another case, the treatment received by one of the plaintiffs was not considered the
prevailing standard of care since practiced by one physician only. In the fifth case, the
reimbursement of acupuncture for neurodermitis was denied because medical science had not
increasingly relied on such treatment for this indication.
261. Schlenker, supra note 228, at 415.
262. BSGE 85, 36, 45, Sept. 30, 1999. 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2764
(Sept. 2000).
263. Art. 34, SGB V, excludes from coverage most over-the-counter medication. It also
allows the Secretary of Health to exclude by regulation additional drugs, adjunctive therapies,
and durable medical equipment of questionable usefulness.
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coverage for a patient afflicted with diabetes.26' In another case before the
BSG, the Court reversed the JFC exclusion of medically indicated podiatric
services, referring to the authority of the Secretary of Health to regulate
adjunct therapies under Art. 34.261 Both BSG rulings clarify that the
guidelines may "concretize" adequate, appropriate and cost-effective care
but may not exclude from coverage a particular illness nor adjunct
therapies and specific drugs, a power reserved to the Secretary of Health.
In addition, one state court, ruling in three cases brought by three
pharmaceutical companies, imposed temporary injunctions against the
prescription drug guideline in 1999.2 A state supreme court, finding that
all provisions of the guideline applicable to the products of a
pharmaceutical manufacturer violated antitrust law, issued an injunction in
January 2000.67 The JFC chairman deplored these actions leading to a
temporary stay of the development of guidelines potentially subject to
further antitrust actions, accused physicians and the pharmaceutical
industry of jointly stymieing all efforts to "clean up" the drug market, and
called for a legislated solution. 26 He also advocated exclusive social court
jurisdiction over guideline-related issues as matters of public not civil law.
The national legislature under Social Democratic leadership agreed and
amended Art. 69, SGB V accordingly. Since sickness funds and their
associations are exercising a public law function, they do not act as private
law corporations, and antitrust law does not apply.29
2. Legal Norms Based on Contract?
As most elements of the German health care system, collective norm
setting based on contract is rooted in history.270 Many of the provisions of
264. SG Luneburg, S 9 KR 97/99, Feb. 2, 2000. 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
2766 (Sept. 2000).
265. BSG B 1 KR 9/97 R. Nov. 16, 1999.
266. LG Hamburg, AZ 315-0-115/99, 129/99, 143/99 (March 31, 1999).
267. OLG Mnchen (Jan. 1, 2000).
268. Inadequate Legal Foundations, supra note 232. Before the adoption of the SGB V in
1988, more than 60,000 prescription and OTC drugs were on the German market, often
combining different active ingredients without therapeutic justification but favored by the
"consumer" and the drug companies. Currently, 40,000 drugs remain.
269. HAUCK, supra note 208, at Art. 69. See also GESETZLICHE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG
[SGB V ANNOTATED] 44 (Wilhelm Schmidbauer et al., eds., 2000) (discussing legislative
intent). In addition, the relationships between sickness funds and their associations and providers
and their associations are regulated exclusively by Chapter Four, SGB V. See generally Art. 69,
SGB V.
270. This section is based on Klaus Engelmann, Untergesetzliche Normsetzung im Recht der
gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung durch Vertrage und Richtlinien [Rulemaking Through
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the civil law Berlin Agreement of 1913, regulating the relationship between
physicians and sickness funds, were entered into the national insurance act
of 1923. The Joint Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds, one of
the historical predecessors of the current JFC, was instituted to resolve the
details of health care delivery by plan physicians through the issuance of
(then indirectly normative) "guidelines." Their main purpose was to
facilitate the cooperation between physicians and sickness funds, with only
minor references to coverage. Eventually, the contractual relationships
between physicians and sickness funds began to evolve into collective
agreements which became the foundation of the health care system of self-
governance when the national insurance act was revised in 1932.
Furthermore, medical care has always been prepaid. 21' Sickness funds
as the "arrangers" of health care contracted with providers for the delivery
of services. Therefore, norms based on contracts helped specify the details
of the provision of prepaid care, a process carried forward through
successive versions of the national health care law. Today, the SGB V
requires collective contracts between physician and sickness fund
associations as corporate entities under public law, mandated to jointly
guarantee and govern health care delivery. JFC guidelines are seen as
collectively agreed-upon norms characteristic of the German health care
system. 72 But how legitimate are the guidelines?
On September 16, 1997,271 the BSG ruled that patients' claims to
health care are limited by the coverage definition of Chapter Four of the
SGB V, regulating the delivery of health care and the issuance of coverage
guidelines. "This Chapter determines the extent of coverage materially
and formally; the insureds may not claim benefits beyond coverage as
defined herein." The general statutory claim to comprehensive coverage in
case of illness of Chapter Three (Art. 27) thus was made subject to
interpretation by rulemaking as delegated to the JFCY.2 4 Opponents of the
now expanded normative character of the coverage guidelines consider the
delegation of such rulemaking authority to the JFC a violation of
fundamental constitutional rights, based upon the non-delegation
Collective Contracts and Coverage Guidelines as a Component of the Health Care Act], 1 NEUE
ZEITSCHRFIT FOR SOZIALRECHT 1, (2000).
271. This system was preferred over indemnity plans as guaranteeing more "social
protection" but also more control over the appropriate, adequate and cost-effective delivery of
care for the country. Id.
272. Rechtssetzung durch Vertrag. Engelmann, supra note 270, n.255.
273. Engelmann, supra note 270, n.241 (citing BSG 1 RK 28/95, SozR 3-2500 §135 No.
4).
274. Health care has now joined environmental protection and other complex technical and
scientific fields for which traditional laws have become inadequate mechanisms of control.
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doctrine. 27 - Fundamental rights and values, including "freedom, life and
physical inviolability" 276 , are subject only to the legislative powers of
parliament. Whether a fundamental right has been violated is to be
analyzed case-by-case by the Constitutional Court. It has been argued, 27
however, that the coverage and health care delivery sections (Chapter
Four) of the SGB V are complex, and legislating details of the provision of
medical services exceeds the resources of parliament. For decades, "the
judiciary has proven that it is capable of construing vague statutory terms
and clauses without diminishing the protection of the law afforded to the
people. 278
Even when accepting the validity of rulemaking delegation to the JFC
on behalf of physician and sickness fund associations, some authors
question the applicability of JFC guidelines to the patients. In 1996, the
6th Senate of the BSG ruled that patients were "passive beneficiaries", not
active participants in the implementation of the health care law, and no
separate justification for the extension of guideline applicability to them
was required. But are violations of the non-delegation doctrine really
contingent on individuals' active or passive role within a norm setting
process, or isn't it rather the degree to which the ensuing norm affects
their rights?279 The 1st Senate, in 1997, concurred with the 6th Senate
while dissenting from its analysis: JFC guidelines as norms based on
collective contracting are integral elements of a system of rules intended to
ensure the provision of medical care, and thus applies to all patients.
Some authors, however, consider the patients' absence from the
rulemaking process as undermining its democratic legitimacy.
Another strand of criticism cuts even more deeply. It disputes the
norm setting authority of physician and sickness fund associations, partners
275. Raimund Wimmer, Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an untergesetzliche
Rechtsetzung im Vertragsarztrecht, [Constitutional Limitations to Normsetting Procedures under
the SGB V Health Care Provider Sections], 9 MEZINRECHT 425 (1996).
276. Constitution of the Federal Republic, Art. 2(2). In combination with Art. 20 ("The
Federal Republic is a democratic, socially responsible state"), the rights to an existential
minimum, health care and informed consent ("patient autonomy") have been inferred by the
Constitutional Court.
277. Klaus Engelmann, Das Rechtskonkretisierungskonzept des SGB V und seine
dogmatische Einordnung durch das Bundessozialgericht [The Construction of the SGB V and its
Dogmatic Classification by the Supreme Social Court], in ARZTLICHE LEITLINIEN: EMPIRIE UND
RECHT PROFESSIONELLER NORMSETZUNG [MEDICAL GUIDELINES: EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR SETTING PROFESSIONAL NORMS] (Dieter Hart, ed., 2000). Justice
Engelmann is Chief Justice of the 6th Senate of the Supreme Social Court.
278. Id.
279. Schimmelpfeng-Schiitte, supra note 244, at 533.
280. Id.
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to the collective agreements. Hence none of the institutions established by
them, including the JFC, may issue any generally applicable rules or
coverage guidelines. The legislator should remedy this "legal vacuum"
because of guideline impact on the constitutional rights of patients,
providers, and of those who sell to the health care system.21 ,
Others argue alternatively that the increasing complexity of allocative
and medical decision making requires an effective intermediate-level
system of norms, consisting of collective agreements and guidelines,
constituting flexible elements of law with limited applicability, and
promoting the interplay between the state, the legislator, administrative
entities, and other relevant institutions such as public and private
associations.rn While funding was not an issue, health care laws could be
executed satisfactorily through the application of professionally and
medically-scientifically derived standards, preserving the quality of the
provision of care. But at a time when health care cost containment
measures are considered unavoidable, decision making must be delegated
to administrative rulemaking entities of the system of self-governance to
ensure the continued availability of "sufficient, appropriate and cost-
effective" care,23 respecting the standard mandated by law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Two more divergent approaches to coverage and "medical necessity"
are difficult to conceive. The German health care code, the SGB V, may
appear overly complex to American readers, "big government" seemingly
practicing medicine and limiting individual freedom. But the code was
drafted to protect the dignity and autonomy of patients and their families at
times of need, the autonomy of providers to practice medicine according to
the standards and values of their profession, and to guarantee a high
standard of care for everyone. In this spirit, the SGB V mandates
comprehensive universal coverage for the prevention, diagnosis, and
treatment of illness. Only physicians can translate these general material
claims to care into specific benefits. They must assess each individual
patient's circumstances and provide or arrange for needed procedures and
281. Raimund Wimmer, Grenzen der Regelungsbefugnis in der vertragsarztlichen
Selbstverwaltung [Limits of Rulemaking Authority within the System of Physician Self-
Governance], 3 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIALRECHT 3 (1999).
282. Robert Francke, Richtlinien, Normsetzungsvertrage und neue Behandlungsmethoden im
Rechtskonkretisierungskonzept des Bundessozialgerichts [Coverage Guidelines, Norm Contracts
and Innovative Medical Procedures: New Approaches to Interpreting Legislation as seen by the
Supreme Social Court], 1 DIE SOZIALGERICHTSBARKEIT 8 (Jan. 1999).
283. Id.
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services. The SGB V thus relies on physician autonomy for the
appropriate case-by-case delivery of health care, according to the
prevailing standards of medical practice and in keeping with the progress
of medical science.
Clinical decisionmaking, however, must respect the boundaries set by
budgets for practices by specialty, adjusted for regional variations of risk,
and for prescription drugs. 29' Furthermore, capitation for some basic
services shifts part of the morbidity risk to providers who, just as their
American colleagues, must now micro-allocate care. Sickness funds and
physician associations jointly conduct economic reviews of individual
physicians' practices. Individual or collective monetary sanctions are
imposed for expenditures exceeding a predetermined range. National
coverage "guidelines" for innovative treatments and technology result in
another, increasingly weighty, limitation on physician autonomy. But
guidelines by law are jointly negotiated by sickness funds and physician
organizations, just as aspects of quality control, standards of care, and
physician compensation. Through their participation in the collective self-
governance of the health care system, physicians therefore have a formal
role in the decision making process affecting the exercise of their
profession. Resulting from the communitarian German tradition of social
insurance, the health care system enjoys a high degree of acceptance
among both members and providers, and proposed amendments trigger a
heated, sometimes acrimonious, public debate. Recent reform and cost
control efforts have met with general discontent, and any fundamental
modifications would be rejected by all parties concerned.
In the United States, coverage for a majority of the population is
negotiated between private managed care companies and employers.
Policies list benefits and exclusions, while internal guidelines and criteria
subject physicians' treatment proposals to stringent corporate "medical
necessity determinations, "2 effectively transferring medical decision
making to a third party outside of the physician-patient relationship. Many
284. The current system of funding health care by assessing personal income up to a
specific bracket has been criticized because sickness fund revenue becomes insufficient at times
of high unemployment, early retirement to promote job creation, and an aging population.
Health care fund availability is thus limited by external factors such as labor market policies and
demographics. Sickness funds may not raise premiums as the law mandates "premium stability."
285. See M. Gregg Bloche, Medical Care and the Enigma of Efficiency, in SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH NETWORK ELECTRONIC PAPER COLLECTION 71 (1999), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf~abstract-id=184275. See also Lothar Krimmel, Was ist
"medizinisch notwendig"? [What is "Medically Necessary '?], 94 DEUTSCHES ARZTEBLATr, at
C16 (1997) (stating that "medical necessity" is considered "vacuous" and a "meaningless
metaphor" in both countries). Dr. Krimmel is past president of the Federal Physician
Association.
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physicians' clinical autonomy is subject to additional corporate control
through payment arrangements (financial incentives and capitation) and
provider profiling. Practitioners exceeding corporate utilization and
appeals benchmarks are dropped from the managed care network.
Physicians, lacking the protection of national health care legislation and an
effective system of self-governance, are prohibited by antitrust law from
forming unions to negotiate quality of services, working conditions, and
payment with managed care corporations. Considerable nationwide
dissatisfaction with the current health care delivery system has led to the
adoption of several contradictory "patients' rights bill" by Congress and
increasingly comprehensive state legislation regulating managed care
practices.
Common to both countries are cost containment efforts through
standardized practice guidelines. Managed care guidelines, both corporate
and commercial, are often considered "proprietary," and the methodology
for their development is not available for public scrutiny. German
guidelines, promulgated according to social law requirements, result from
a notice and comment administrative rulemaking procedure relying on
expert input but criticized because not yet completely transparent. In both
countries, guidelines developed according to scientific and evidence-based
criteria by medical societies do not yet have a major influence on medical
practice. "A negative consequence of being sponsored by a voluntary
professional organization is the lack of financial support to widely
distribute information." 2 6 In Germany, however, efforts are under way to
develop the growing number of guidelines adopted by the Joint Federal
Committee through formal cooperation with medical societies.
In both countries, there is also a clear recognition that guidelines
alone can not resolve the dilemma of how to increase cost-effectiveness
without compromising the delivery and quality of necessary care. "How to
quantify quality is the underlying issue, unresolved under current law,
perhaps defying any kind of resolution."2 7 Many prevailing practices have
not been evaluated and many are not amenable to empirical validation.
Furthermore, some of the most fundamental aspects of good medical care,
effective clinical support and comfort at the bedside, can not be cast into
standardized practice guidelines or subjected to a cost-effectiveness
analysis. Any efforts to remove such "waste" from health care to increase
efficiency would be misguided and ignore one of the basic purposes of
medicine. 8,
286. GARTNER & MEE-LEE, supra note 28, at 13.
287. HAUCK, supra note 208, K § 12, at 8.
288. Bloche, supra note 285.
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In the United States, there is a growing awareness that universal
access to health care would remedy much of the failings of the current
market-dominated system, singular among industrialized nations. "If this
moment-a moment of unprecedented economic prosperity and looming
budget surpluses-is the wrong one for an aggressive move towards
universal health insurance, when will it be right?"2' But any fundamental
changes to the health care system would have to be supported by culture
and societal values. In the United States, the emphasis traditionally has
been on individualism, the protection of individual rights, and the
protection from "government interference." In Germany, solidarity among
members of the national community-implying both rights and
obligations-is the foundation of social insurance. Social law is seen as
protective of the rights of individuals while codifying their obligations and
those of society.
But laws, regulations and charters, drawn too complex and too
restrictively, may impose excessive duties on individuals and the economy.
Wherever there is reliance on market forces, society gains space, and
government saves money. On the other hand, the market is cold, focused
on profitability, blind to off-balance-sheet side-effects, and indifferent to
politically defined concepts of justice. The state, predominant in the
"magic triangle of state, market, and self-regulation", can weight the
instruments at its disposal: effective administrative law, self-governance,
and the use of market forces. German health care reform efforts continue
to search for the proper balance between them. The more weight is given
to cooperative structures and flexible rulemaking, the more the market
forces become instrumentalized, and the more apparent the ability of legal
norms to protect freedom.2'- In order to restore patient autonomy and
choice of health care options, remove generic clinical decision making
from distant commercial entities and return it to physicians focussed on
their patients' individual needs, a new conception of American health care
law may be required.
289. Toward Universal Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept, 24, 2000, at A14.
290. Udo di Fabio, Verlust der Steuerungskraft klassischer Rechtsquellen [The Loss of
Control of Classical Sources of Law], 10 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIALRECHT 449, 453, 455
(1998).
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I. INTRODUCTION
With globalization there has been a visible growth in the international
trade of legal services. An increasing number of attorneys from around
the world come to the United States for various reasons. Most foreign,
("non-US") trained attorneys come to the United States for a short-term
course and return to their home countries after developing a basic
understanding of the American legal system. This article considers the
options for those foreign attorneys who wish to be licensed in the United
States. Foreign attorneys in the United States have two basic options;- they
can either choose a limited license through the Foreign Legal Consultant
("FLC") route, or they can become fully licensed by appearing for, and
passing, a bar examination.2 This article will first look at the scope for
FLCs and then examine the available choices with respect to bar
examinations. Because each state3 in the United States has its own rules
LL.M., LL.B. The author is an attorney from Bombay, India and is presently a legal
consultant with the Law Offices of Jonathan Clark Green P.C., in Chicago. He is also a
Research Associate in the Dean's Office of Chicago-Kent College of Law. Thanks are due to
Christa Garcia, Lydia Lazar, J Eugen Marans and Hugo Dubovoy for their valuable insight. The
views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily express those of the
institutions or individuals mentioned above. The author would like to acknowledge that ideas for
this paper were derived from an earlier piece by Pamela Stiebs Hollenhorst, Options For
Foreign-Trained Attorneys, 7 THE B. EXAMINER (NCBE), Aug. 1999, available at
http://www.ncbex.org/pub.htm.
1. In some literature on the topic, "foreign" refers to attorneys from outside a particular
state. In this paper, "foreign" is used interchangeably with "non-US" to refer to attorneys not
from the United States.
2. This paper does not deal with immigration and other issues, which might complicate
the choices for foreign attorneys.
3. The terms "state" and "jurisdiction" are used interchangeably in the paper. Not every
state has enacted provisions for FLCs.
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with respect to FLCs and bar admissions, this paper will also look at the
provisions in each individual state. It is important to note that these rules
are amended frequently and non-US attorneys should contact individual
jurisdictions for current information.
II. FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANTS
Non-US attorneys can apply for an FLC license in twenty-four United
States jurisdictions. An FLC typically advises clients only on laws of the
home country in which he or she is admitted. Since the FLC does not
appear for a bar examination he or she is not qualified to render advice on
any other laws. In no state is an FLC permitted to give advice on the
state's local laws. Some states allow FLCs to give advice on international
law4 and some allow them to pass along advice from other licensed
attorneys. Since the scope of an FLCs practice is limited and the
procedure lengthy, it has not been a popular option. With the exception of
New York, most states have had only a handful of FLC applicants.5 In
New York, because there is a one-time registration process, it is unclear
how many FLCs practice actively. 6
Non-US attorneys must refer to the rules of each individual state to
determine their eligibility and other unique requirements for each state.
Non-U.S. attorneys should also check reciprocity requirements, as some
states do not grant FLC status if the home country does not allow similar
opportunities to United States lawyers.
The following table divides the restrictions on FLC practice areas into
three broad categories. The table also highlights the prior experience
required before an application for FLC status can be made, and includes
the number of individuals licensed as FLCs from 1996 to 2000.
Though the following table classifies the scope of FLC practice into
three categories, it must be noted that the language of the relevant rules do
not. The classification reflects the interpretation given to the relevant
4. It can be argued that provisions restricting the scope of FLCs to advice, "only on the
law of the foreign country" would include international law. The following table does not
distinguish jurisdictions on the basis of this argument. The following table is a simplification of
intricate provisions. Foreign attorneys must note that details in the provisions could yield
outcomes opposite to those indicated in the table.
5. See Pamela Stiebs Hollenhorst, Options For Foreign-Trained Attorneys, 7 THE B.
EXAMINER (NCBE), Aug. 1999, available at http://www.ncbex.org/pub.htm. One factor, which
must be noted, is that NY being the commercial capital attracts a larger number of foreign
attorneys. This reason alone, and not the drafting of the FLC provision could explain the large
numbers in New York.
6. The problem is better exemplified by the fact that in twenty-three years only two FLCs
have formally resigned in NY. See Carol A. Needham, The Licensing of Foreign Legal
Consultants in the United States, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1126 (1998).
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provisions in literature on the topic.7 In genera, the provisions dealing
with FLCs can be divided into two categories. Most states restrict the
scope of practice for FLCs by stipulating that an FLC can render services
"only on the law of the foreign country." A few states have adopted the
American Bar Association's model rule, which allows for a broader scope
of practice for FLCs by stipulating what the FLC cannot practice.
7. See Needham, supra note 6.
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State' Scope of Permitted Legal Work Experience Required Number'
Can Can Can pass Years of Location of Individuals
advice on advice on along active experience licensed as
Int'l. law U.S. advice practice FLCs
and third- federal regarding immediately from
country law and any state preceeding 1996-





Alaska No Yes No 5 of 7 I l  0
Arizona Yes Yes No 5 of 7 HIJ 1
California No No No 4 of 6 HJ 32
Connecticut No No No 5 of 7 HJ 0
District of Yes Yes Yes 5 of 7 Hi 16
Columbia
Florida No No No 5 of 7 HI 43
Georgia No No No 5 of 7 HI 5
Hawaii No Yes No 5 of 7 HI 9
Illinois No No No 5 of 7 HI 5
Indiana No Yes No 5 of 7 Any 1
Louisiana No No No 5 HJ 0
Massachu- No No No 5 Any 3
setts
Michigan No No No 3 of 5 HI. 3
Minnesota No No No 5 of 7 HIJ 2
Missouri No No No 5 of 10 H 0
New Jersey No Yes No 5 of 7 I 5
New Mexico No Yes No 5 of 7 FI 0
New York Yes Yes No 3 of 5 ,Any 84
North No Yes No 5 of 7 H 0
Carolina 
_
Ohio Yes Yes No 4 of 6 HJ 2
Oregon No Yes No 5 of 7 HJ 0
8. Only jurisdictions with current provisions for FLC licensing are listed in this table.
9. 2000 Statistics, 1 The B. Examiner (NCBE), May 2001, available at
http://www.ncbex.org/stats.htm.
10. It must be noted that "law of the home country" could include international treaties,
(as they apply to that country) which are considered law "of that country." To illustrate, a
Mexican attorney licensed as an FLC in Illinois can advise on NAFTA, (as it applies to Mexico)
but an Argentinean attorney licensed as an FLC cannot.
11. Home Jurisdiction ("HI") implies applicant must have been in active practice in
country where licensed.
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StateU Scope of Permitted Legal Work Experience Required Number13
Can Can Can pass Years of Location of Individuals
advice on advice on along active experience licensed as
Int'l. law U.S. advice practice FLCs
and third- federal regarding immediately from
country law and any state preceeding 1996-




_ _license __ _
Texas No No No 5 of 7 I HJ 14
Utah discretionar 1
ylS _




Clearly the more popular option16 for foreign attorneys wishing to be
licensed in the United States is to sit for a state bar examination. By
passing the bar examination and satisfying other standards, non-U.S.
attorneys can practice in all areas of law just like U.S.-trained attorneys.
In thirty United States jurisdictions, foreign attorneys may appear for the
bar examination without further education if they fulfill certain
requirements. It is important to note that requirements in these states are
quite stringent and most require a determination of educational
equivalency. Most non-U.S. attorneys cure their deficiency in eligibility
requirements by pursuing a graduate law degree (such as an LL.M.) from
an American Bar Association approved school.17  In thirteen United States
12. Only jurisdictions with current provisions for FLC licensing are listed in this table.
13. 2000 Statistics, 1 THE B. EXAMINER (NCBE), May 2001, available at
http://www.ncbex.org/stats.htm.
14. It must be noted that "law of the home country" could include international treaties,
(as they apply to that country) which are considered law "of that country." To illustrate, a
Mexican attorney licensed as an FLC in Illinois can advise on NAFTA, (as it applies to Mexico)
but an Argentinean attorney licensed as an FLC cannot.
15. Utah does not stipulate a minimum length for experience, but the Utah Supreme Court
may consider this factor in deciding whether to grant a license. One additional mandatory
requirement in Utah is the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE).
16. See Hollenhorst, supra note 5. From 1975 to 1998, New York had a total of 277
FLCs, whereas in 1998 alone, 2047 foreign attorneys appeared for the New York bar
examination.
17. It is also important to note that satisfactory completion of graduate programs does not
guarantee that a graduate will pass the bar examination. Most LL.M. programs are not intended
to prepare candidates for bar examinations.
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jurisdictions, foreign attorneys may cure their deficiencies in eligibility by
pursuing a graduate law degree. It must be emphasized that a graduate
program does not guarantee eligibility for bar examination.,' Besides
education qualifications, close attention should also be placed on residency
and other requirements for each jurisdiction.' 9  The following table
highlights some important requirements for foreign graduates considering
bar examinations in the United States and the bar passing percent for non-
U.S. attorneys.
State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. 1 Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a I law degree 1998-20002
United States (LLM., S.D)
J.D. or I from ABA- T21 p2
LL.B.? t approved school? _ _ _
Alabama Yes No Proof of educational 1 1 100
_ _ _ _ _ equivalency required
Alaska Yes No Must be graduates 1 0 0




one academic year at
an ABA approved law




Arizona Yes Yes With a LL.M. or " -" 4
M.C.L. from an ABA
approved school
applicant can be
eligible for the bar
examination. _ _ _ _ _
18. Non-US attorneys must check whether the program meets the eligibility requirements
for the jurisdiction in which they wish to be licensed.
19. See Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admissions Requirements, 2000 (ABA), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/compguide2000/cg2000.html.
20. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
21. Taking ("T")
22. Passing ("P")
23. Passing percent (" %")
24. Arizona does'not compile statistics based on law degree received.
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State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a law degree 1998-20002'
United States (LL.M., SLD)
J.D. or from ABA- T26 P 27  %28
LL.B.? approved school?
Arkansas No No 0 0 0
California Yes Yes Eligibility is 56 20 3629




I education equivalency. i
Colorado Yes No Law degree must be 4 1 25
from a law school
located in a common
law, English speaking
nation, and applicant
must be admitted to
the bar of the nation






in the practice of law
for at least five of the
seven years preceding
application.
Connecti- Yes Yes Must obtain an LL.M. 9 4 44
cut degree for post-
graduate work
acceptable to the




bachelor of laws or
equivalent degree at a
law school for work
acceptable to the
committee.
25. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
26. Taking ("T")
27. Passing ("P")
28. Passing percent (" %")
29. California totals for applicants graduating from law schools outside the United States
are approximate.
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State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a law degree 1998-20003o
United States (LL.M., SJ.D)
J.D. or from ABA- T31 P32  %33
LL.B.? approved school?
Delaware No No 0 0 0
District Yes No An applicant who - - -
of graduated from a law
Columbia school not approved
by the American Bar
Association will be





hours of study in the
subjects tested in the
bar examination in a
law school that at the
time of such study was
approved by the ABA.
Florida No No 0 0 0
Georgia No No 0 0 0
Guam Yes No Those applicants who 0 0 0
did not graduate from
an ABA accredited






30. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
31. Taking ("T")
32. Passing ("P")
33. Passing percent (" %")
34. Independent data for graduates from non-U.S. law schools is not available as it is
merged with statistics of graduates from Non-ABA approved law schools.
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State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a I law degree 1998-2000'5
United States i (LL.M., SJ.D)
J.D. or I from ABA- T
36  p 37  %38
LL.B.? approved school? _
Hawaii Yes :'No Must be admitted to 0 0 0
Ipractice before the





basis of that country's
jurisprudence, and
where English is the
language of instruction
and practice in the
courts. Must have
actively practiced law
in such jurisdiction for
five of the six years
immediately preceding
his or her application.
Idaho No i No 0 0 0
Illinois No No 0 0 i0
Indiana No No 0 '0 0
Iowa No No 0 '0 0
Kansas No No 0 0 i0
Kentucky Yes Yes The foreign attorney's "0 0 0
legal education must
be substantially





degree has bearing on
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ boards decision. I
35. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
36. Taking ("T")
37. Passing ("P")
38. Passing percent (" %")
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State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a I law degree 998-200039
United States (LL.M., SJ.D)
J.D. or from ABA- T,0 P41 %42
LL.B.? approved school?
Lousiana Yes I No If an applicant is a 38 12 31
graduate of a law
school that is not




an application for an
equivalency
determination.
Maine Yes No Determination of 5 2 40
educational
equivalency required.




Massa- Yes I Yes Any applicant who 0 0 0
Chusetts received his/her legal
education at a law
school located outside








39. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
40. Taking ("T")
41. Passing ("P")
42. Passing percent (" %")
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State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a law degree 1998-200041
United States (LL.M., SJ.D)
J.D. or from ABA- 44 p45  %46
LL.B.? approved school?
Massa- Before permitting such
chusetts an applicant to take I
(cont.) the law examination,
the Board in its
discretion may, as a
condition to such
permission, require
the applicant to take
such further legal
studies as the Board
may designate at a law
school approved by
the ABA




the applicant's J.D. or
LL.B. need not be
from an approved law
school.
Minnesota No No 0 :0 0
Mississippi No No 0 0 0
Missouri No No 5__ S 2 40
Montana Yes No 1 1 .100
Nebraska Yes No Applicant must attain 1 1 100
educational
qualifications at least
equal to those required
at the time of
application for
admission by
examination to the bar
of Nebraska. _ _ _
43. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
44. Taking ("T")
45. Passing ("P")
46. Passing percent (" %")
47. Michigan does not compile data based on law degree received.
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48. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
49. Taking ("T")
50. Passing ("P")
51. Passing percent (" %")
52. Information on seven students in 1998 is not available, seven in 1999 and 2000 did not
pass.
State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a law degree 1998-200048
United States (LL.M., SJ.D)
J.D. or from ABA- T149 P 5 %51
I LL.B.? approved school?
Nevada Yes No A prospective 6 3 50
applicant who has
received a degree of
bachelor of laws or an
equivalent law degree
from a law school that
has not been approved








New Yes No 14 052 0Hampshire
New No No 0 0 0
Jersey
New Yes No A non-US foreign 0 0 0
Mexico graduate must be
engaged in the
practice of law in
another state or states






State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a law degree 1998-2000' 3
United States (LL.M., SJ.D) T5 p55  %J -
J.D. or from ABA-
LL.B.? approved school?
New Yes Yes The applicant will be 6983 2882 41
York eligible to cure the
deficiency and qualify
to take the bar
examination upon
successful completion




two basic courses in
American law, in an
approved law school
in the United States.
An LL.M. or master's
degree from a foreign
law school cannot be
substituted for the
study at an approved
______ U.S. law school.
North No No 0 0 0
Carolina
North No No 0 0 0
Dakota
Ohio Yes No Determination of 17 5 29
educational
equivalency is
required for all non-
US graduates
Okalhoma No .No 0 0 0
Oregon Yes No The applicant must be 7 3 42
admitted to practice
before the highest
tribunal of a foreign
country where the
common law of




53. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
54. Taking ("T")
55. Passing ("P")
56. Passing percent (" %")
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State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a law degree 1998-2000 7
United States (LL.M., SJ.D)
J.D. or from ABA- TM P59 %60
1 LL.B.? approved school?
Oregon The applicant must
(cont.) also prove that he/she
is a graduate of a law
school equivalent to a
law school approved
by the ABA.
Pennsyl- Yes Yes Non-US attorneys who 4 0 0
vania have for a period of
five years of the last
eight years
immediately preceding
the date of filing of
the application for
admission to the bar
engaged in the
practice of law in a
foreign country may




thirty credit hours in
an accredited US law
school in certain
specified subjects.
Puerto Yes No 27 7 25
Rico
Rhode Yes Yes Additional education
Island at an ABA approved





South Yes Yes Applicant should have 0 0 0
Carolina received a J.D.,
LL.B., LL.M. or
S.J.D degree from a
law school approved
by the ABA.
57. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
58. Taking ("T")
59. Passing ("P")
60. Passing percent (' %")
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State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a law degree 1998_200061
United States (LL.M., SJ.D)
J.D. or from ABA- T42 p63  %64
I LL.B.? approved school?
Sout No No 0 0 0
Dakota
Tennessee Yes Yes Any applicant who 53 13 24
received his or her
legal education in a
foreign country shall








Texas Yes Yes An Attorney holding a 216" 10- 47
valid law license
issued by a foreign




attorney has been in
active and substantial
practice of law in that
foreign nation for at
least five of the last
seven years
immediately preceding
the filing of the
application, holds the








, supra note 9.
Passing percent (" %")
1999 data for Texas is unavailable: the totals here are for 1998 and 2000.
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State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a law degree 1998-2000
United States (LL.M., SJ.D)
J.D. or from ABA- T6. p. %69
LL.B.? approved school?
Texas demonstrates to the
(cont.) Board that the law of
the foreign nation is
sufficiently
comparable to the law
of Texas or holds an
L.L.M. from an
approved law school.
If the foreign attorney
has less than five but
more than three years
of experience the
LL.M. is mandatory.
Utah Yes No Applicants who have 0 0 0
graduated from a
foreign law school in
a country where
principles of English
common law form the












Vermont Yes No A foreign attorney 2 2 100
who has been admitted
to the practice of law
before the highest
court of a foreign
nation which is a
common law
jurisdiction,
_ _,_  _ (continued)
66. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
67. Taking ("T")
68. Passing ("P")
69. Passing percent (" %")
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State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a law degree 19987200070
United States (LL.M., SJ.D)
J.D. or from ABA- T1 %73
pLL.B.? a roved school?
Vermont the Board, with the




admission as it deem
proper. _




acting dean of an ABA
approved law school
in Virginia that his or
her foreign legal
education, together
with his or her
I approved law school
degree, is the
equivalent of an
LL.B. or a J.D.
Degree in the dean's
_______law school.
Washing- Yes No To qualify to sit for 0 0 0
on the bar examination, a
non-US attorney must
complete three years
of the law clerk
program.
West Yes No Non-US attorney must 0 0 0
Virginia graduate from a law
school of a foreign
country where the
common law of




70. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
71. Taking ("T")
72. Passing ("P")
73. Passing percent (" %")
598 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:581
State Bar Examination Eligibility Comments Number
Non-U.S. Non-U.S. Number non-U.S. law
attorney attorney eligible school graduates
eligible for for bar exam taking and passing bar
bar exam with graduate examinations from
without a law degree 1998-2000
4
United States (LL.M., S..D)
J.D. or from ABA- T
75  p76
I LL.B.? approved school?
West and the applicant must
Virginia successfully complete
(cont.) study at an ABA-
accredited law school,
with a minimum of
thirty credit hours of
_______basic courses. _ _ _
Wisconsin No No 0 0 0
Wyoming No No 0 0 .0
IV. CONCLUSION
Non-U.S. trained attorneys facilitate international transactions and are
instrumental in expanding international trade in goods and services. The
growing need for international legal services may prompt many states to
reexamine their policies towards non-U.S. attorneys. New York has
followed the ABA model rule' for FLCs and attracted twice as many FLCs
than any other state. New York's liberal policies have also attracted over
95 % of all non-U.S. graduates appearing for bar examinations in the
United States, and it clearly dominates the globalization of law. FLC
licensing has not been a popular option among non-U.S. attorneys. Most
non-U.S. attorneys now choose programs that would help them meet the
eligibility requirements for specific bar examinations.
74. 2000 Statistics, supra note 9.
75. Taking ("T")
76. Passing ("P")
77. Passing percent (" %")
78. See Crossing the Bar, Interview with Peter D. Ehrenhaft, at
http://www.crossingthebar.com/Ehrenhaft.htm.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A great concern for the international community is protecting the
rights of children around the world.' Currently, there are approximately
100 million abandoned street children in the world.' In Latin American
countries there are approximately forty million street children; and there is
an estimation that this number will continue to increase, as poverty
becomes more widespread in the urban areas of these countries.4  The
street children in Latin American countries like Brazil, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Columbia learn daily how to survive on the rough streets of
J.D. Candidate, class of 2003, Nova Southeastern University. Junior Staff Member,
1LSA Journal of International & Comparative Law.
1. Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE. 153-55 (1997)
(discussing the struggle to protect fundamental human rights around the world).
2. Marc D. Seitles, Effect of the Convention on the Rights of the Child upon Street
Children in Latin America: A Study of Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala, 16 IN PUB. INTEREST
159-60 (1998) (examining the many problems associated with street children in Latin America,
and discussing international and local governmental responses to this growing social reality).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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the cities.- Their lives often involve sleeping on the cold hard cement,
begging for food, stealing from the locals and tourists, selling their bodies
for sex, and sniffing glue in order to escape reality.6  Many of these
children end up on the city streets of these Latin American countries
because they have made a choice to fend for themselves in the harsh
environment of the streets, as opposed to fight to survive in families torn
apart by poverty, alcoholism and abuse.
Thus, part one of this comment will give a general overview of the
street children in Latin America; examine some of the problems these
street children face on a daily basis; and discuss the children's addiction to
sniffing glue. Part two will give a general overview of the involvement of
H.B. Fuller Co., an American corporation that has manufactured the glue
in its own Central American plants., Part three will trace the history of
international children's rights organizations, and will discuss the primary
weaknesses of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 9 a body that was
established to protect the basic rights of the children. t0 Part four will
discuss policies, standards, and regulations established to propose human
rights guidelines for transnational corporations to follow." Finally, this
comment will conclude by offering suggestions on how transnational
corporations can create new policies to address children rights violations in
the countries where they operate.
II. THE RESISTOLEROS AND THE PROBLEMS THEY FACE ON THE
STREETS
Children of the streets' are children in Latin America who work and
live on the streets.'3 These children have minimal ties to their families, and
in most cases no ties at all.1 The street children are often called
5. Id.
6. Craig Kielburger, The Crusade of Free the Children, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 163-72
(1999).
7. Id.
8. Paul Jeffrey, Glue Maker's Image Won't Stick, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Dec.
1995, available at http://www.pangaea.org/street.children/latinfuller.htm.
9. Kielburger, supra note 6, at 165.
10. Id.
11. Frey, supra note 1, at 153.




Resistoleros,'" because of their addiction to the glue Resistol that is
manufactured in Central America by H.B. Fuller Co.'6 Because these
children are virtually on their own, they have to fend for themselves. The
age of the children varies from ten to seventeen years old." When the
children are younger, they use their innocent appearance to their
advantage; thus, the locals and tourists succumb to their begging.'"
However, as the children get older it becomes more difficult to gain
sympathy from the locals and tourist; therefore, begging is no longer an
option. 9 Consequently, the children then turn to stealing things like
wallets, sunglasses and jewelry that they sell to local shop owners in return
for food, a place to sleep or glue to inhale. 0
The most common reason the children turn to the streets for a home
is poverty.2 1  The children are usually born into families that are
dysfunctional in many ways. 22  For example, the parents are usually
unmarried; they have multiple children and often times abuse alcohol.2
Indeed, the problems the parents in Latin America face are typical of the
third world countries; there is a vast disparity between the rich and the
poor.2 Therefore, a small percentage of the population is extremely rich,
and the vast majority of the population is exceedingly poor.Y Because
these countries are under-developed, there are few economic and
educational opportunities?6 Thus, the parents themselves are also victims
of a vicious economic system, and as a result the children also end up
paying a steep price. Consequently, the children turn to the streets because
they do not have any other options.27
Life on the streets is tantamount to dodging bullets from an automatic
rifle. These young children face threats of physical and sexual abuse,
15. Leyla Kokmen, Coming Unglued, CITY BEAT, Feb. 9, 2000, available at
http://www.citypages.com/databank/21/1001/article8414.asp.
16. Id.
17. Seitles, supra note 2, at 162.
18. Tamara Rice Lave, Breaking the Cycle of Despair: Street Children in Guatemala City,
27 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv., 57-77 (1995) (describing the life of the street children).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Seitles, supra note 2, at 161-66.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Rice Lave, supra note 18, at 68.
25. Id.
26. Seitles, supra note 2, at 161.
27. Id.
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murder, disease, malnutrition, and prostitution.Y First, the children suffer
from several health problems because there is no basic health care for
them. 29 Some examples of the health problems the children experience are
respiratory, gastro-intestinal, and dental problems. 0 Additionally, since
the children do not have regular meals, they suffer from chronic
malnutrition that is quite evident in their appearance. 3' Their height and
weight are below average for children of the same age; and they are
usually sexually underdeveloped.3 2  Second, the children are highly
susceptible to diseases because of their health, and because sometimes they
are victims of sexual abuse.33
Third, civilians and law enforcement officials frequently mistreat the
children.3  The presence of the children on the streets is a menace to the
society in general.33 They view the children as a disturbance to the public:
they repel the children because of their appearance, and shun them because
they are potential thieves.36 For example, they yell or threaten the
children, stare at them, and refuse to service them in restaurants and food
stalls. 31 However, the children suffer the greatest threat from the law
enforcement officials.38  For example, they are brutally beaten; assaulted
sexually without protection; forced into prostitution; and murdered at the
hands of those that are sworn to uphold the law and protect the public as a
whole.3 9
28. Id.




33. /d. at 61 ("Sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs) also pose a serious health problem. A
1991 study of 143 Guatemalan street children conducted by the Center of Orientation, Diagnosis,
and Treatment of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Casa Alianza found that 93% of those
studied admitted to having STDs. Of these, 78.3% admitted to having genital herpes, 46.64%
gonorrhea, 27.3% papillomatosis, 13.29% vaginal trichomoniasis, 11.7% chancroids, and 69.9%
scabies.").
34. Rice Lave, supra note 18, at 66-8.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Rice Lave, supra note 18, at 66-67.
38. Seitles, supra note 2, at 162-64.
39. Id. at 163 ("The government supported policy of 'social cleansing' is often carried out
in Columbia by military officials and police officers who eliminate groups identified as worthless
or dangerous to society, including, but not limited to, street children. In Brazil, police death
squads, typically consisting of current, off-duty or former policemen, have systematically killed
street children without cause or justification. ").
Comprosky
Last, drug abuse is a serious problem for the street children; many are
dependent on glue, paint thinner or other types of drugs.4°  Yet, the
majority of the children inhale shoe glue.4 1 The glues that they sniff are
solvent-based adhesives that contain toxins, like toluene and cyclohexane
that can be fatal to the human body.4 2 The children turn to sniffing glue to
suppress feelings of hunger, stress, anxiety, isolation, rejection, cold, and
pain that comes from living on the streets.4 3 They also become addicted to
the feeling of euphoria that the glue provides."4 Although purchasing the
glue is legal, inhaling it as a drug over long periods can eventually damage
the brain, and the central nervous system.45 The short-term effects caused
by sniffing the glue are lightheadedness, nausea, and loss of appetite.46
Frequently, the children turn to the glue because it is easily accessible and
it is quite inexpensive.47 Although the drugs comfort the children and give
them courage, once they start using abusing them, it is very difficult to
stop.48
Ill. THE INVOLVEMENT OF H.B. FULLER CO., AN AMERICAN
CORPORATION
H.B. Fuller Co., a Minnesota-based company with manufacturing
plants in Central America was one of the main companies to sell
shoemaker's glue containing toluene in Latin America.4 9 H.B. Fuller Co.,
decided to stop selling solvent-based footwear adhesives in Latin America
in November of 1999 amidst controversy after human rights group
campaigned against them and continually attacked them in the media2 °
However, H.B. Fuller had long insisted that its company was not
responsible for product abuse, because it designed their glue for shoes, and
sold it to legitimate manufacturers.-' Thus, H.B. Fuller's decision to pull
40. Id.
41. Rice Lave, supra note 18, at 64-66.




46. Rice Lave, supra note 18, at 64-66.
47. Id.
48. Paul Jeffrey, Firm Resists Tighter Control on Toxic Glue, NATIONAL CATHOLIC
REPORTER, Mar. 31, 1995, available at http://www.pangaea.org/street-children/latin/ncr.htm.
49. Id.
50. Kokmen, supra note 15.
51. Id.
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out of the Latin American market has come after years of strife and fights
by advocacy groups for the street children.12
In the 1980s, activists in Central America demanded the addition of
oil of mustard to toluene-based glues to deter first-time users from trying
the glue and to discourage regular users. 3 The activists wanted the
manufacturers to follow the lead of another U.S.-based company, Testor
Corporation, that added mustard oil to model airplane glue in 1968.Y'
After the addition of mustard oil, the glue was difficult to inhale;
consequently, the abuse rate declined.55 Although the cost of this process
was negligible, there was a reduction in sales for Testor Corporation. 5
Following this example would have required the glue manufacturers
to address the abuse problem during the manufacturing stage of the
product. The activists viewed this as a very practical approach and insisted
on this implementation; however, H.B. Fuller and other manufacturers
refused to comply." In the wake of the controversy, the Honduran
Congress passed a law that required the addition of mustard oil to toluene-
based products.,, H.B. Fuller retaliated by inundating shoemakers with
claims that mustard oil would be dangerous for their health; and started to
lobby incessantly against the new law.19 Therefore, after H.B. Fuller's
attacks, the Honduran Congress succumbed, and recommended that toluene
products need not contain any mustard oil at all.60
Subsequently, the situation in Honduras became a hot subject with
children's activists in the United States. The United States activists began
campaigning strategically in order to compel H.B. Fuller to switch to less-
toxic, water-based glues or add mustard oil to the formula. 6 In 1992, after
learning that NBC "Dateline" would begin filming an investigation into
H.B. Fuller's role in the abuse of the glue, H.B. Fuller vowed to stop
52. Id.
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producing solvents in known areas where abuse was rampant. 62
Unfortunately, after the media attention had moved on, H.B. Fuller
continued to sell toluene-based glue in the region.63 Although it removed
the smaller containers of glue from store shelves in Honduras and
Guatemala, industrial sales and other retail distribution continued."
In 1993, activists in Central America still insisted that H.B. Fuller
had not kept its promises because the street children still had access to
toluene-based glue.65 H.B. Fuller disagreed because it added warning
labels to retail cans in Nicaragua, that advised against selling the product to
minors."6 However, the store clerks seemed to ignore the labels, and still
sold it to the children.67 Furthermore, H.B. Fuller insisted that it had spent
a great deal of time researching how to make solvent-based glues harder
for children to acquire, and more repugnant to smell." H.B. Fuller
disagreed with the addition of mustard oil because they claimed it was a
dangerous carcinogen.69 Moreover, it had developed water-based
alternatives to the solvents, but conceded that the shoemakers would not be
able to afford the necessary technology in order to incorporate the new
process. 7
In March of 1994, H.B. Fuller introduced a new glue formula in
Costa Rican newspaper advertisements that claimed it would substitute
cyclohexane for toluene, and began introducing the new formula in Latin
America. 7' H.B. Fuller asserted that this new formula would resolve the
abuse problem because it had a repugnant smell, so it would not be as
sweet smelling as toluene. 72 However, cyclohexane is also a hazardous
toxin, so H.B. Fuller's claim that the new formula was less dangerous was
rather misleading .7
62. Id.
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72. Id
73. Jeffrey, supra note 48 ("The suggestion that cyclohexane is less dangerous is
misleading. A hydrocarbon solvent like toluene, cyclohexane also makes the EPA's Superfund
list of hazardous toxins. "The difference between toluene and cyclohexane is like the difference
between a .44 magnum and a .357 magnum ...").
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In 1995, Julia Polanco a Guatemalan citizen filed a wrongful death
lawsuit against H.B. Fuller in a United States District Court in Dallas,
Texas .1' The suit alleged that H.B. Fuller contributed to the death of Julia
Polanco's son, Joel Linares, who died of kidney failure in 1993 in
Guatemala.15 Polanco plead that H.B. Fuller contributed to her son's death
by designing, manufacturing, and marketing a product that they knew
children abused; yet they continued to sell it without taking any
precautionary steps to ensure that the children would not be able to access
the product.76 Thereafter, Polanco's attorney filed a subsequent suit in
Minnesota, and then withdrew the Texas lawsuit once they stopped the
statute of limitations from running." In Polanco v. H.B. Fuller,"8 the
Minnesota federal court dismissed the suit on two grounds: lack of
diversity, and forum non conveniens.79 First, concerning lack of diversity,
the court stated that H.B. Fuller was not a monolithic entity because there
were three distinct companies, Fuller-U.S., Kativo, a Panamanian
company, and Fuller-Guatemala.0 Because the physical manufacturing of
the glue was by Fuller-Guatemala, an indispensable party that Fuller-U.S.
sought to join, Guatemalan citizens would be on both sides of the case, and
therefore diversity was destroyed.,
Second, concerning forum non conveniens, the court reasoned that
even if the jurisdictional problems were resolved, all the necessary
evidence would be in Guatemala so it would be more appropriate to try the
case in Guatemala. 2 Thus, Polanco had no other choice but to try the case
in Guatemala. However, Guatemala has a one-year statute of limitations
for filing cases; Polanco's son had died three years before the filing of the
Minnesota lawsuit.8 3
On November 30, 1999, H.B. Fuller finally decided to stop selling
the solvent-based glue in Latin America.' It decided to concentrate on




78. Polanco v. H.B. Fuller Co. 941 F. Supp. 1512 (D. Minn. 1996).
79. Id. at 1514-15.
80. Id. ("Fuller-U.S. owns 95% of Kativo, a Panamanian corporation. Kativo, directly,
and through its own subsidiary, in turn owns all the stock of Fuller-Guatemala, a Guatemlan
corporation. ")
81. Id. at 1515.
82. Id.
83. Polanco, 941 F. Supp. at 1515.
84. Kokmen, supra note 15.
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researching, and developing water-based glue as opposed to solvent-based
glue because they can offset the cost of the new technology to larger
industrial customers. 81
IV. THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
The first children's rights movement began in early 1920s.16  The
movement was an indirect response to the industrialization period, and a
world war that exposed children to various atrocities.8 In 1959, the United
Nations General Assembly passed the Declaration of Rights of the Child to
govern the rights of children after the Second World War when children
suffered inhumane deaths.M However, this was not a binding instrument
on the nations; it urged the nations to comply with the Declaration in hopes
of protecting the children.89 In 1979, Poland proposed a treaty that would
be binding on the member countries of the United Nations in order to
protect children in these countries.9° This was the opportune moment for a
treaty that sought to incorporate all the established principles of the
previous Declaration; and include other human rights treaties because the
world recognized 1979 as the International Year of the Child. 9' Thereafter,
in 1989 a sector of the United Nations completed the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.Y The Convention had taken ten years to draft, and it
addressed the concerns, problems and issues that involved children
throughout the world. 93
Thus, by the end of 1996, 176 countries had accepted the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and agreed to be bound by its principles. 94 This
was a milestone for children's rights because it demonstrated that the
United Nations had finally agreed to institutionalize the concept of
children's rights in an international forum.9 Moreover, the Convention
brought together leaders from all over the world to incorporate the full
85. Id.
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92. Id. at 165-66.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 166.
95. Id.
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range of human rights for children: civil, political, economical and
cultural rights.9
The Convention on the Rights of the Child formulates three basic
principles that include fundamental rights that are necessary to protect
children around the world.Y First, all children should enjoy their rights
without discrimination, prejudice, or exceptions of any kind. 98 Second, the
best interest of the child must be considered in all actions concerning
children, 'regardless of whether it involves public or private actions."
Third, children should have the opportunity to formulate ideas and express
their own opinions, and the public should acknowledge these opinions.1'0
Additionally, the Convention also includes substantive articles'01 that
recognize civil rights, a right to life, freedom for children, and offers
special protection to certain groups of children such as refugees, orphans
and disabled children.'°0
There is no definitive enforcement mechanism for making sure that
the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child are
incorporated. There is a presumption that the ratifying nations will
incorporate the provisions into the respective nations' laws; however, the
aim of the Convention is to assist the nations that have not ratified the
document to interpret the Convention's laws.103  Consequently, the
Convention instituted a permanent international forum to address important
issues, and discuss potential methods of resolution.1'4 The forum includes
an elected Committee on the Rights of the Child. The elected Committee
reviews progress reports from nations that have ratified the document to
ensure they comply with the Convention.1°O The Committee can request
96. Kielburger, supra note 6, at 166.




101. Id. ("The substantive articles of the Convention recognize civil rights and freedoms
for children, such as the right to a name, a nationality, freedom of expression, privacy and a
right to life. Developmental rights include assurances of an adequate standard of living, access
to health services, right to education, standards of parental responsibility, State assistance for
children deprived of a family environment, and the right to be free from all forms of abuse and
neglect. Protective rights in the Convention guard children against economic and sexual
exploitation, cruel tortuous treatment, arbitrary separation from their families, and abuses in the
criminal justice system.")
102. Seitles, supra note 2, at 168.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 168-73.
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additional documentation from the reporting nations; and will prepare and
submit a report of its own findings.'6
The Convention on the Rights of the Child has made promises to
children that it has a difficult task of keeping. A basic principle of the
Convention states that children are entitled to enjoy their rights without
discrimination or distinction.'" However, there is no enforcement
mechanism to guarantee this basic principle.' °0 Therefore, on the surface,
this Convention seems to be a panacea but in reality, it lacks any
substance. First, the Convention has an elected committee that reviews
progress reports from ratifying nations, but the nations are not obligated to
submit this report.',9 Thus, nations like Brazil, Guatemala, Colombia, and
Honduras where children live on the streets and endure abuse everyday
may decline to submit this report. However, the Convention does not
address this because there is an assumption that each ratifying nation will
comply. If the country does supply the report, there is no official
checkpoint to verify that it is accurate; therefore, there is the possibility
that countries may misrepresent its problems or exaggerate its successes."0
Second, although the Committee reviews and can request additional
documents from the countries, there are no enforcement mechanisms at the
international level to ensure the rights guaranteed by the Convention."'
Simply stated, the Convention does not have the power to guarantee that
children on the streets in Latin America will be able to enjoy a basic right
that it purports to guarantee.
Third, the Committee is not authorized to accept any petitions that
allege violations of the Convention from the States Parties or individuals
that may seek to file a grievance."2 In other words, there is no true dispute
resolution at the international level for parties that may have a conflict
about the rights of the Convention. Simply stated, street children who are
brutally beaten, murdered or forced into prostitution at the hands of law
enforcement officials while the government looks the other way cannot file
a petition with the Committee. Furthermore, street children cannot
petition to have corporations conduct their transactions so that the
corporations will comply with the Convention's principles. Indeed, there
seems to be no protection for the street children under the Convention.
106. Id.
107. Seitles, supra note 2, at 168-73.
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Fourth, poorer nations like the countries in Latin America may not
need to comply with the Convention because of their economic
conditions.1 1 3  Therefore, a country's resources could dictate the
appropriate measures that it should undertake."4  Consequently, "it may
result in an unfortunate escape clause for the same countries where
implementation is most necessary.""' Certainly this is an anomaly; the
countries where children tend to experience the most suffering are usually
the countries that have the fewest resources, and are struggling
economically. This is the classic case of the street children that barely
exist in Latin America. As previously stated, poverty is a mitigating factor
that drives these children to the streets.
Fifth, the Convention ensures the right to life of each child. 1 6
Therefore, it is the responsibility of each country to see to the welfare of
its children."17 The welfare of the child should encompass the necessities
for survival. Thus, each child should have a home, food and clothing.1 8
The street children do not have access to these basic necessities, and they
are left to fend for themselves while struggling to ward off evil forces that
threaten their lives; although, the Convention ensures that the ratifying
countries will take steps to prolong the life of its children."19 In order to
prolong the life of the children, the street children should have a fair
chance at survival. However, survival for the stfeet children requires that
they are safe from harm, and that society meets their basic needs on a daily
basis. On the contrary, Columbia's policy of "social cleansing" has
caused the death of one street child every four hours.1'0 In addition, in
Guatemala, National Police Officers and other government security force
members were incriminated in many assaults against street children that
resulted in fourteen murders over a period of eighteen months. 21
Consequently, Guatemala has been under international scrutiny, but it has
been difficult to prove that the government allowed this to transpire
113. Id.
114. Id. at 172-74.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 174-78.
117. Seitles, supra note 2, at 174-78.
118. Id. ("Assuring an adequate standard of living for all children is particularly relevant
for street children. Article 27 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child addresses this issues
and obliges States Parties to ensure that children are provided with food, clothing, and housing
according to the financial resources available and the norms of the particular culture.")
119. Id.
120. Id. at 176-78.
121. Id.
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although there is evidence that the local authorities approved of the
killings. 11
Sixth, the Convention on the Rights of the Child also contains a
specific reference to the illegal use of narcotic drugs, and psychotropic
substances because drug abuse is prevalent amongst children.' 23  Once
again, the countries in Latin America have failed the children when it
comes to drug abuse. The countries had done very little to stop the sale of
the glue until the lawsuit against H.B. Fuller was filed.' 2 Furthermore, the
Convention requires that children have access to rehabilitation and a
chance to reintegrate into society, yet there are no governmental programs
in Latin America for children that have serious addiction problems. "2 In
fact, Casa Alianza, an independent, non-profit organization, is the only
entity that offers a drug rehabilitation program to children with extreme
addiction problems in Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua.'
26
Thus, the Convention on the Rights of the Child guarantees that these
street children have some fundamental rights, but there is no real
enforcement mechanism to ensure that the member countries will comply
with the articles of the Convention. Therefore, there is no real protection
for these street children under a treaty that was established for their
benefit.
V. THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
The United Nations has been the primary entity in promoting and
protecting human rights at the international level.'27 Throughout history,
corporations have rarely gotten involved in the protection of human rights
issues. ' However, the transnational corporations are being scrutinized for
possible violation of human rights issues, and some of these corporations
have created their own policies in direct response to human rights
violations that occur in the countries where they do business.' 9
Originally, international bodies like the United Nations have enacted
schemes for regulating the activities of transnational corporations in the
122. Seitles, supra note 2, at 176-78.
123. Id. at 180-84.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Lave, supra note 18, at 102.
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countries where they conduct business. Initially, the goal was solely to
regulate economic issues and business practices.'1° In 1974, the United
Nations called for a code of conduct for transnational corporations that
would prevent them from exploiting the countries where they operate and
established a Commission with members from forty-eight states in order to
formulate a code of conduct for transnational corporations.' 3' The
formulation of the code started in 1977, continued through 1990, and
required transnational corporations to respect the social and cultural
objectives, human rights principles, and the values and traditions of the
people in the countries where they do business.3 2  Also, transnational
corporations should not discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex,
religion, language, social, national and ethnic origin or political or other
opinion.'33
Individual countries have also taken steps to regulate transnational
corporations. For example, the United States has also regulated the
activities of transnational corporations.' In 1930, the United States
forbade the importation of any goods that were produced by convict
labor.'35  In the 1970s, the United States also instituted policies that
addressed economic issues regarding international commerce. 36 However,
none of the policies was instituted specifically for protecting human rights
issues; but the United States has used economic sanctions as a tool to
punish governments when they violated human rights policies.' 37  The
legislative body of the United States enacted the Apartheid Act in 1986 that
prevented American companies from doing business in South Africa
because of the South African government policies; in 1995, the Burma
Freedom and Democracy Act forbid investments that supported the
130. Id. ("Many of the early U.N. actions to formulate policies for TNCs focused on
regulating restrictive business practices. The newly independent states in the U.N. formed the
Group of 77 (G-77). With support of the then-socialist East Bloc states, the G-77 worked within
the United Nations to control the ability of TNCs to threaten the sovereignty of host states
through the evasion of national regulation and taxation, the distortion of market conditions, or the
introduction of alien cultural values. ")
131. Id. ("Capital-exporting states intended to use the code as a means of protecting the
TNCs against discriminatory treatment; capital-importing countries wanted to use it as a means
of subjecting the activities of TNCs to greater regulation.")
132. Frey, supra note 1, at 166-68.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 168-71.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Frey, supra note 1, at 169. ("Despite its willingness to regulate business activities in
foreign countries, the U.S. government has made relatively few successful legislative and
executive efforts to specifically regulate TNCs on human rights issues.")
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Burmese military government.'3 Additionally, in 1989 the United States
Senate also formulated a code of conduct for American corporations that
did business in the Soviet Union; and then in 1991 a voluntary code of
conduct was also designed for American companies doing business in
China.' 9 Then, a United States senator introduced the Child Labor
Deterrence Act that would prohibit the importation of any goods that were
produced by children under the age of fifteen. '4
Private groups have also taken the initiative to propose standards for
corporations that do business in countries with human rights violations.'4
Two well-known principles are the Sullivan Principles'" and the MacBride
Principles;'43  these established principles play a significant role in
promoting human rights.'" The private groups monitor corporations that
conduct business in countries that have serious human rights violations .4
Last, some major companies that identify themselves as transnational
corporations have voluntarily executed internal policies and procedures that
specifically deal with human rights in the countries where they conduct
business.'4 Theses internal policies and procedures encompass vendor
standards,' 7  standards for supporting civil and political rights'" and
138. Id. at 169. ("The bill mandates that the U.S. Government withhold support for loans to
Burma from international financial institutions, prevent direct assistance to SLORC (State Law
and Order Restoration Council) and exclude the members of SLORC from the United States.")
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 174-77.
142. Frey, supra note 1, at 174-77. ("Sullivan's code of conduct included six principles
which placed businesses in the position of direct advocates of non-discrimination in the
workplace and the community during the period of apartheid in South Africa. During its height
of effectiveness, the Sullivan code had more than 125 companies as signatories, including giants
such as Exxon, Mobil, IBM, Citicorp and Merck. The Sullivan Principles required not only
non-discrimination in the workplace, but community investments to increase opportunities for
oppressed racial groups.")
143. Id. ("[A] U.S.-based group of advocates drafted its own code of conduct to encourage
TNCs to combat the legacy of discrimination and strife in Northern Ireland.... In addition to
promoting hiring, training, and advancement on a non-sectarian basis, the principles call for a
ban on 'provocative, sectarian, or political emblems from the workplace,' and adequate security
to protect employees from sectarian violence.")
144. Id. at 174.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 177-80.
147. Frey, supra note 1, at 177-80. ("Several companies have enacted minimum standards
regarding conditions of employment for their workers and those of their business partners. The
common features of these standards include a prohibition on forced, convict or child labor.").
148. Id. ("Some companies go beyond labor issues to expressly commit themselves to
protecting political rights, including freedom of association, freedom from compulsory political
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standards for investments."9 Being recognized as a transnational
corporation can be very advantageous for companies on an international
basis because it shows their commitment to human rights concerns.'- °
Moreover, these transnational corporations believe economic advantage
can be used as a sword to persuade countries with human rights violations
to conform to the correct standards.'5 '
All of the above bodies have created policies, rules, regulations or
guidelines for transnational corporations to comply with, however children
rights violations still continue in places like Latin America. The codes of
conduct do give some guidelines for corporations to follow, but they are
not binding on them.' 2  Whether a corporation responds to the human
rights violations depends on many factors.1 3 For example, a company's
benevolence may decide if it continues to do business in a place where
there is egregious violations. ' Additionally, if the corporation's
philosophy includes strong moral and ethical practices, and the corporation
has made this a part of its business culture, then that corporation may take
proactive steps to prevent violations.- Nevertheless, a corporation may
not choose to respond because it is driven by financial aspirations and that
may overshadow any ethical norms. '1 Consequently, the code of conduct
for transnational corporations maybe a starting point in the right direction,
and can be improved to benefit children who continue to suffer in places
like Latin America.
VI. CONCLUSION
The plight of the street children of Latin America is an example of a
problem compounded by a corporation continuing to sell an addictive
product even though it realized the children were addicted to that particular
product. However, companies are morally and ethically responsible to
respond to human rights violations especially when the company itself may
be a contributing factor to a part of the problem. Therefore, as a whole,
indoctrination, and freedom from labor as a punishment for holding or for peacefully expressing
political views.")
149. Id. ("A few companies have publicly stated bottom line principles guiding decisions
about whether or not to do business in a country with significant human rights problems.")
150. Id.
151. Id.
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transnational corporations must act to prevent or to correct violations that
occur in this manner.
First, transnational corporations must abide by the same code of ethics
in foreign nations, as they would abide by at home. Since the world is a
global marketplace, these corporations must do more than just reap the
economic benefits of doing business internationally. They must also bear
the burden of ensuring fundamental human rights, especially ones
concerning children who can not fend for themselves. On a whole, these
corporations must take into account the interest of all the parties who may
be affected by their actions. This is a logical approach because people pay
attention to the way these corporate entities conduct themselves.
Furthermore, these corporations may have to face negative repercussions if
they are perceived negatively. They could face being boycott on the home
front, and the devaluation of their stocks.
Second, transnational corporations should not passively allow
children's rights violations. Whenever one of these corporations are
violating a policy or contributing to the violation in any manner, the other
corporations should ban together to put pressure on the violator's ability to
conduct business. This could involve refusing to supply materials that are
necessary to complete production, and impeding shipment or delivery.
Therefore, all of these transnational corporations should actively work
together to uphold moral and ethical principles of human rights. Issues
that involve children should be a priority for these corporations. If
necessary, transnational corporations should also put pressure on
governments that violate children's rights. This could include a refusal to
ship necessary products until there is evidence of strategies to correct the
violation. In the case of street children that are being murdered, the
perpetrators must be prosecuted and there must be severe punishment for
those that attempt to abuse the children.
Third, transnational corporations should be required to provide
retribution when they have violated a human rights policy. When a
company agrees to provide retribution, the public should not perceive the
corporation as expressing wrongdoing, but should applaud them for
actively working to correct a situation. This may provide an incentive for
a company to clean up its negative activities. For example, in the case of
the Latin American street children, there should be monies provided for
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation should include curing the drug addiction and
providing facilities for the children to survive daily. If possible, efforts
should be made to reunite them with their families if there are strong
family ties. Funding should also be provided to help get the children off
the streets. Although the children's underlying problems stem from the
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economic problems in these countries, this would possibly push the
governments to prevent the flight from their parents.
To conclude, the street children of Latin America are victims who
have suffered and continue to suffer at the hands of an ineffective
government and a corporation., Although the Convention on the Rights of
the Child was created to ensure that children around the world would be
protected, there is no enforcement mechanism to guarantee that countries
will comply with the basic principles of the Convention. Therefore,
because the world is fast becoming a global economy, transnational
corporations are now being scrutinized for possible human rights violations
that occur in the countries where they operate or because the corporations
themselves are also perpetrators of the violations. Therefore, independent
bodies and the transnational corporations themselves have also created
policies in direct response to these violations. This maybe a step in the
right direction to addressing human rights violation in the global
marketplace. Thus, transnational corporations need to demonstrate that
they are conducting business in a moral and ethical way by taking
additional steps to prevent the victimization of children, and by employing
positive actions to correct any violation that does occur.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is one of the most heinous crimes against humanity and
human rights. It takes thousands of lives for no reason other than political
publicity. There is not a single religion in the world that condones this
behavior and yet its impact seems to grow with every passing year.
Human rights crimes are seen as crimes against mankind and there are
some that see terrorism in the same way, a common law offense against
mankind. When one thinks of a terrorist, typically a Middle Eastern Arab
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man comes to mind, as seen when the authorities were trying to find
suspects for both the New York City World Trade Center and Oklahoma
City bombings. However, American society was shocked to learn that
anyone could be a terrorist. The Oklahoma City bombing was
masterminded not by a Middle Eastern Arab but a white American citizen.
Besides being identified as an Arab, many terrorists have been viewed as
"madmen or fanatics" with whom one cannot negotiate.' Thus, in order to
rationalize their behavior they are described as psychotic or even psycho-
sociological. 2  But, if we cannot even profile a terrorist how are we
expected to combat terrorism?
The remainder of this paper will attempt to answer that question by
detailing how the world is addressing the problem of terrorism and
working as a global entity to eliminate it. Being that terrorism has evolved
over time, this paper will focus on pre-computer advancements and post-
computer advancements in a comparative fashion. Part I will lay out the
issues that will be addressed in the remainder of the paper. Part II will
focus on terrorism and the evolution it has made over time. Included in
this part, is a section dealing with definitional information so that everyone
is aware of the problem and understands how it is being addressed and
categorized. The next section profiles terrorism from the 1970's and
contrasts it with more modern terrorism. After that is a description of
statistics outlining the results of various terrorist attacks over the years
along with agency profiles. Next, is a section providing quotes from
various world leaders and nations in general pledging their commitment to
the eradication of terrorism. Following this is a national response to
terrorism, focusing mainly on laws and conventions from around the world
that have been enacted as a way to deal with the international problem of
terrorism. And finally, the last section in Part II will focus on new threats
to the world community in the face of terrorism.
Part III of this paper will focus on cyberterrorism, the newest form of
terrorism to have evolved. The first section in this part provides the reader
with a brief explanation of cyberterrorism along with numerous definitions
that have been used when describing cybercrime and cyberterrorism in
general. The following section is one of the reasons for the growth of
cyberterrorism. A section on the impact of cyberterrorism and the
coverage that it is able to maintain as a result of the advancements in
technology is next. After this section there will be some descriptions of
1. TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory eds.
1997). This viewpoint is contrasted in a subsequent footnote that indicates that yesterday's
terrorists were ones' that the authorities could in fact negotiate with.
2. Id.
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the new weapons used in cyberterrorism and the threat that they cause.
Lastly, there is a section detailing what is being done to deal with
cyberterrorism followed by critics who do not see cyberterrorism as an
issue that should be addressed at all right now. And finally, Part IV of this
paper will include conclusions reached.
II. TERRORISM
A. Definitional Explanations
Terrorism is a form of political behavior3 and has been defined as "the
threat or use of violence in order to create extreme fear and anxiety in a
target group so as to coerce them to meet political objectives of the
perpetrators." 4 It differs from revolutionary action in that it does not seek
to overthrow the government but rather strives for short-term intimidation.,
Normally, the terrorist act demonstrates the fragility of a certain social or
political order by attacking the State, its symbols or representatives of
power. 6 Thus, a terrorist act seems to be an "act of violence committed by
an individual with a political, ideological, social, or even religious aim."7
According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a
terrorist organization is defined as "one whose leadership, or whose
members, with the knowledge, approval, or acquiescence of the
leadership, have taken part in terrorist activities.", There are three
requirements that the Secretary of State can use to identify a terrorist
organization. They are: 1) if the organization is a foreign organization, 2)
if the organization engages in terrorist activities, and 3) if the organization
threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of
the United States.9 As of December 2000, there were twenty nine such
terrorist organizations listed."' A terrorist organization designation can be
3. Id. at4.
4. Yassin EI-Ayouty, International Terrorism Under the Law, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 485 (1999).
5. Higgins, supra note 1, at 4.
6. Id. at 150 (acknowledging that through their actions many terrorists are able to address
the nation and lay down conditions or espouse their beliefs).
7. Id.
8. Immigration Law Service ch. 14 Inadmissibility, Deportation, and Removal under
IIRAIRA. I. Grounds for Denial of Admission and of Visas; Exceptions D. Security and Related
Grounds 2. Terrorist Activities § 14:76 - Terrorist Organization.
9. Id. (defining "national security" as the "national defense, foreign relations, or
economic interests of the United States").
10. Id. (listing the organizations in alphabetical order as follows: Abu Nidal Organization,
Abu Sayyaf Group, al Qa'ida, Armed Islamic Group, Aum Shinrikyo, Basque Fatherland and
Liberty, Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Hamas, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Hezbollah, Islamic Movement of
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set aside, however by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia." However, the court cannot set aside a designation based on
the Secretary of State's determination that the organization threatens the
security of United States nationals or the national security of the United
States. '2
B. Contrasting Decades of Terrorism
In the 1970's and 1980's terrorism consisted of the taking of hostages,
plane hijacking and destruction, and attacks by bombs, mostly car bombs.'3
The terrorists themselves were small bands of nationals with identifiable
goals and usually had to do with the denial of the right of self-
determination or resistance to physical and oppressive foreign occupation. 4
Even if the organization took on a religious name the terrorism itself was
seen as secular in nature.'" Old terrorist leaders were ones you could
negotiate with, accept a cease-fire, exchange for hostages or the return of
the remains of dead soldiers in exchange for terrorist prisoners.' 6 This old
terror provided a contract like environment between the state and the
terrorist organization." In many instances, these terrorists were seen as
Uzbekistan*, Japanese Red Army*, al-Jihad, Kach*, Kahane Chai, Kurdistan Worker's Party,
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, National Liberation Army,
Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction, Palestine Liberation Front B Abu Abbas Faction,
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine B
General Command, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Revolutionary Organization 17
November, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front, Revolutionary People's Struggle*,
Shining Path, and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary* Movement.) * As of October 5, 2001, the
organizations indicated with an * were dropped from the list, while the Revolutionary Nuclei was
added to the list. State Dept. Redesignates 25 Groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
INTERPRETER RELEASES, Oct. 8, 2001.
11. Id. (explaining that the designation can be set aside based on five factors: 1) if the
court finds the designation "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; 2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 3) in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right; 4) lacking
substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified information
submitted to the court under I.N.A.'s 219(b)(2) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(b)(2)], not in accordance
with the procedures required by law").
12. Id. (noting however that the court can review the fact that the organization is "foreign"
or "engaged in terrorist activities").




17. Id. at 486 (noting that this relationship provided for some form of compromise
between the parties).
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"freedom fighters" and once peace returned many were elevated to
diplomatic posts or other political positions.",
This terrorism, however, is not today's terrorism. Today, there are
no borders, no fronts, no clear ideology, no state, no government, and no
physical structure.' 9 Rockets are no longer the weapon of choice, today it
is either chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons which can cause
mass terror and sweeping destruction.2° This also leaves open the notion of
cyber warfare against computers and telecommunication networks.2 ' As
means of communication have evolved and expanded terrorists can see the
"fruits of their labor" in seconds as images are broadcast throughout the
world.2" Today's terrorists are also interested in pseudo-religious and
transcontinental objectives. 2  Taken as a whole, this all looks depressing
but what is worse is that many of today's terrorists were "trained" by the
United States.2'
C. Statistics
A misconception about terrorists is that they are on suicide missions.
According to Center Intelligence Agency (CIA) statistics, 62% of terrorists
actually have a back up plan or escape route if things go wrong . 2  Another
way to protect their life is to engage in actions like placing a bomb or an
assassination instead of hijacking an airliner or seizing official buildings. 2
Terrorists even go as far as analyzing the likelihood of confronting the
authorities before they engage in certain acts.2 7  Once terrorists have
received the attention of the authorities they may even appear unselfish
18. EI-Ayouty, supra note 4.
19. Id. at 486 (recognizing that today's terrorists have globalized, there is no longer an
organizational chart, or fixed bases).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Higgins, supra note 1, at 5.
23. EI-Ayouty, supra note 4, at 486.
24. Id. (noting that individuals like Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were
"greenhoused" and "cocooned by the United States and/or allies of the United States like
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Afghanistan when it was under Soviet occupation" as a way
to prevent communist expansion into Afghanistan).
25. Higgins, supra note 1, at 5 (illustrating that terrorists are not interested in losing their
life as a result of their actions).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 6 (noting that other factors taken into consideration consist of risk and time).
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because when they plead their case it is not personal; rather it is addressing
something they believe should be changed.28
Terrorism is a concept that has evolved along with society.29
According to the United States Department of State, between 1968 and
1982, there were almost 8,000 terrorist attacks. 30 However, 1985 was the
record year for international terrorism with 800 deaths and 1,200 injuries.3'
In the mid- 1990's there were on average two terrorist attacks a day, which
varies between 600 and 850 per year.12 Another source, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) Assembly's Assessment of International
Terrorism in 1987, reported that between the years of 1973 and 1983,
5,175 terrorist attacks were conducted killing 3,689 individuals while
injuring 7,791 others. In 1997, 221 people died and another 690 were
injured the entire year, however the following year these statistics were
blown out of the water in a single one day, August 7, 1998. '
D. A Global Response
Leaders and nations from around the world have all spoken out
against terrorism. In 1998, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan
was quoted as saying, "Terrorism is a global menace, which clearly calls
for global action. Individual actions by Member States, whether aimed at
State or non-State actors, cannot in themselves provide a solution. We
must meet this threat together." 3 At this same conference, the Foreign
Minister of Egypt described terrorism as "an international crime against all
societies."36 President Clinton was even quoted as saying "it is a grave
misconception to see terrorism as only, or even mostly, an American
28. Id. at 150.
29. See text accompanying app. 1.
30. Higgins, supra note 1, at 4 (admitting that 188 terrorist groups carried out attacks on
3,162 victims of which 20% were either killed or wounded which included 540 international
hostage-takings). See also, Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats
and Responses, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 59, 75 (1999/2000) (noting that in 1970 there were 300
terrorist attacks but by 1999 that figure had jumped to over 5,000 attacks).
31. Higgins, supra note 1, at 261 n.8.
32. Id. at 4 (noting that the majority of these attacks are concentrated in the United States
and Western Europe).
33. Id. at 261 n. 8 (noting further that with every subsequent year the number of deaths
increase by 20% with Europe alone suffering half of that).
34. Alexander, supra note 30, at 76 (referring to when 260 people were killed and another
5,000 were injured after the simultaneous bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, supposedly masterminded by Osama bin Laden).
35. EI-Ayouty, supra note 4, at 496.
36. Id.
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problem."" Kuwait declared that "it supports all collective international
efforts to confront this phenomenon. 38 The United Arab Emirates has also
spoken out against terrorism claiming that "combating this dangerous
phenomenon should not be carried out on a unilateral basis."39 Yemen has
also stressed that "terrorism has become an international phenomenon. It
concerns all nations and peoples, and there is a pressing need for the
international community to respond immediately." ° Saudi Arabia's Chief
Delegate has stated that, "[v]iolence and terrorism are universal
phenomena rather than the characteristics of a certain people, race or
religion. Precisely because of the comprehensiveness and universality of
terrorism, the only way to combat it is through a unified and collective
international action, within the framework of the United Nation. "4
Terrorism is a global phenomenon 2 and it is the responsibility of the
entire world to combat its efforts. There are numerous ways in which one
can try and deal with terrorism.43  For example, more security has been
added at airports where for years terrorists were able to come and go
freely with material that should not have been able to leave the nation of
origin." As previously illustrated, world leaders are beginning to make
public statements denouncing terrorism and drawing attention to the brutal
nature of terrorist attacks .4 Advances in technology have also allowed
intelligence agencies to be better equipped to deal with potential attacks."
37. Id.
38. Id. at 497.
39. Id.
40. El-Ayouty, supra note 4.
41. Id. at 498.
42. Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Terrorism: A Global Phenomenon Mandating a Unified
International Response, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 685, 686, (1999) (indicating that there
are three factors that lead to terrorism being viewed as a global issue: 1. It "is not restricted to
any one region, State, or jurisdiction," 2. "the increased mobility of terrorists to cross borders,
acquire resources in numerous States, and access advanced communication systems," 3. The
victims of terrorist attacks are not necessarily even members of the same State).
43. Alexander, supra note 30, at 89 (listing several options as publicizing it, improving
intelligence gathering regarding it, enacting legislation, strengthening penalties against terrorists,
and providing greater protection for facilities and officials).
44. Id.
45. Id. (illustrating that world leaders have used specific attacks to show the pointless
nature of these instances).
46. Id. (noting that this has resulted from timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of
relevant information on individual terrorists, their beliefs, means of operation, and other relevant
information).
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For example, in 1991, European intelligence officials were able to prevent
Iraqi initiated terrorism in connection with the Gulf War.47
Changes in pre-existing laws have also aided in combating terrorism.
The problem though is that laws are not consistent. The United States is a
great example of this. Since states are free to define offenses through their
criminal and penal code, terrorism can be defined fifty different ways.
Take Arkansas for a definitional example, it's criminal code states, "a
person commits the offense of terroristic threatening if with the purpose of
terrorizing another person, he threatens to cause death or serious physical
injury or substantial property damage to another person. "4 There are nine
general categories that terrorism falls under in United States' state law.
4 9
State law is not the only ambiguity that exists in the United States
when it comes to a working definition of terrorism. For the past thirty
years, Congress has held numerous hearings, proposed bills, adopted
various resolutions, and passed a number of laws and yet there is still not a
concrete definition on what constitutes terrorism. However, recently
Congress has been trying to pass the "long arm statute that makes it a
federal crime for a terrorist to threaten, detain, seize, injure, or kill an
American abroad.",1 In the 1980's the Federal Bureau of Investigation
drafted an interagency definition of terrorism. 2 However, the United
States Department of State went ahead and drafted their own definition
contained in Title 22 of the United States Code Section 2656f(d).11
Following the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress was finally able to
push through terrorism legislation in both the House of Representatives and
47. Id.
48. Alexander, supra note 30.
49. Id. at 61 (listing them as: civil defense, antiterrorism provisions, destructive devices,
terrorist threats, enhanced criminal penalties, victim compensation, street terrorism, ecological
terrorism and taxes).
50. Id. at 62.
51. Id. at 90.
52. Id. at 62 (stating it as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
the furtherance of political or social objectives").
53. Alexander, supra note at 30, 62-63 (defining terrorism as a "premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience." The Code goes on to state that international
terrorism is "terrorism involving citizens of the territory of more than one country," while a
terrorist group is "any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice
international terrorism").
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the Senate." President Clinton signed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 on April 24.-s In 1996, legislation
was also passed allowing United States citizens who were victims of
terrorism to sue the country responsible as long as it was listed on the
United States Department of State's list of nations who support terrorism.-'
A few years later, Congress passed another bill taking things a step further
by allowing these same individuals to tap the frozen assets of the countries
they sued in order to receive their judgement."7 The Preparedness Against
Terrorism Act of 2000 H.R. 4210, plans on implementing changes to
existing laws to improve federal coordination and enhance domestic
preparedness regarding terrorist attacks." Also, Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD-62): Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the
Homeland and Americans Overseas reaffirmed PDD-39: United States
Counterterrorism Policy and expanded upon the use of weapons of mass
destruction and cyber warfare.19
Other nations and organizations around the world have their own
definition of terrorism and have struggled with how to combat the
problem. The United Nations has experienced difficulty when it comes to
trying to define terrorism. In December of 1999, the General Assembly
adopted a draft of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism that includes a working definition of terrorism. 6
54. Carberry, supra note 42, at 689 (noting that the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention
Act of 1995 was passed in the Senate on June 7, 1995 while the House passed their own version,
the Effective Death Penalty and Public Safety Act of 1996, on March 14).
55. Id. (indicating that the bill sets aside one billion dollars over the next four years to
numerous antiterrorism programs, it requires violators to make restitution to their victims,
strengthens immigration laws preventing individuals believed to belong to terrorist organizations
from legally entering the United States, increases the government's power to deport foreigners
convicted of crimes, and mandates that plastic explosives contain chemical taggants for tracking).
56. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Sue Terrorists, not Terrorist States, WASH.
POST, Oct. 28, 2000, at A25.
57. Id. (quoting Republican Senator Connie Mack of Florida, "the message is clear to
terrorist nations: There is a price to pay for killing Americans").
58. Charles L. Cragin, Terrorism Preparedness, Congressional Testimony by Federal
Document Clearing House, May 4, 2000. (Noting that the Department of Defense's role "is to
be prepared to provide, when requested, available military forces and capabilities to support
domestic requirements specified by the Attorney General of the United States or the Director of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency").
59. Id.
60. Alexander, supra note 30, at 64 (defining terrorism as "criminal acts intended or
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular
persons for political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other nature, that may be
invoked to justify them").
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Over the years, the United Kingdom has implemented a few
definitions of terrorism, some broad while others were narrower in scope.
In 1996, Lord Lloyd's working definition of terrorism was "the use of
serious violence against persons or property, or the threat to use such
violence, to intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any section
of the public, in order to promote political, social, or ideological
objectives." 6 1 The latest definition of terrorism in the United Kingdom
however, is the use or threat, for purposes of advancing a political,
religious, or ideological course of action which involves serious violence
against any person or property, endangers the life of any person, or creates
a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the
public.6
Based on their definition of terrorism, the United Kingdom has
implemented their own legislation. For the most part their terrorism
legislation has tended to focus on the clash between Catholic and Protestant
populations. 63  The European Court of Human Rights however, does not
approve of the United Kingdom's antiterrorism legislation claiming that the
United Kingdom's seven-day holding period violates the European
Convention on Human Rights." In 1989, the United Kingdom passed the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, basically a reincarnated version of the Act of
1984, that banned any form of financial assistance to terrorists and gave
the Secretary of State the power to exclude people thought to be involved
in terrorism without court review and empowered the police to arrest an
individual without a warrant if the officer reasonably suspected
involvement in acts of terrorism.65 More recently the United Kingdom
passed the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act of 1998.6
61. Id. at 63 (noting however that under the 1999 Prevention of Terrorism Bill the House
of Lords wanted a Under broader definition of terrorism that would include expressions of
single-issue extremism by groups).
62. Id.
63. Carberry, supra note 42, at 691 (citing the United Kingdom Prevention of Terrorism
Act of 1984 that "proscribed the Irish Republican Army and the Irish national Liberation Army
by placing the powers of detention, arrest, and exclusion in the hands of the Executive,
designated that contributing to acts of terrorists as a crime and provided the police with the
authority to conduct security checks on travelers").
64. Id. at 692 (noting that the government did not alter their law, "The government
maintained that the seven-day period was essential and that the sensitivity of the information on
which detention was based rendered its presentation to a court in the presence of the detainee
impossible").
65. Id. at 693.
66. Id. at 694 (indicating its significance in the fact that it makes it easier to secure the
conviction of terrorists, makes it illegal to conspire in the United Kingdom to commit a crime in
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Throughout the world there are numerous treaties and conventions
that address the act of terrorism.6' The New York Convention "mandates
cooperation in preventing attacks on diplomats both inside and outside their
territories, open exchange of information regarding the circumstances of
the crime and the alleged suspect's identity, and coordination of
administrative efforts against such attacks."" The Hostage Convention
also mandates that a State extradite or prosecute an individual believed to
be involved in a terrorist attack.69
There are several Conventions that specifically address the issue of
hijackings. The Tokyo Convention is one such agreement.' 0 The Hague
Convention, like the Tokyo one, is ambiguous when it comes to the
definition of hijacking however.71 The Montreal Convention however did
broaden the occasions when the offense of a hijacking could occur. 7
Despite the fact that nations may actually be a signatory to a particular
Convention does not mean they will adhere to its provisions. Take Uganda
for example, back in 1976, it was a part of the Entebbe hijacking episode
even though it had signed various hijacking Conventions.' 3
Besides Conventions there are also several international conferences
that have been held to address terrorism. At the Ministerial Conference on
Terrorism on July 30, 1996 the G-8 4 leaders adopted twenty-five practical
antiterrorism resolutions. 7- In 1985, the United Nations General Assembly
a foreign country, and allows for the forfeiture of property from the convicted individual if it is
found to be used in support of the terrorist organization).
67. EI-Ayouty, supra note 4, at 492 (comprising a list of the "Hijacking Convention of
1971, the Sabotage Convention of 1971, the Internationally Protected Persons Convention of
1973, the Hostage Convention of 1979, and the Maritime Terrorism Convention of 1988").
68. Carberry, supra note 42, at 701 (noting that the State in actual possession of the
offender must take measures to extradite or prosecute the individual and to notify other nations of
action taken and/or submit all relevant evidence to assist in prosecutorial proceedings if
conducted elsewhere).
69. Id. at 702 (indicating however that this convention has been seriously weakened as a
result of subsequent additions that allow nations to avoid extradition or prosecution).
70. Id. (stating that an individual can be convicted of a criminal offense even if on board a
flight outside of the borders of the contracting State).
71. Id. (defining a hijacking as the "use of physical force, threat, or intimidation to take
control of an aircraft as elements of hijacking").
72. Id. (pointing out that a hijacking can occur even if the doors of the aircraft are not
closed and the perpetrator is not currently present).
73. Carberry, supra note 42, at 703 (acknowledging that despite its known involvement
Uganda was never formally punished or censured).
74. Canada, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Russia.
75. Carberry, supra note 42, at 704 (citing the resolutions: increased public transportation
security measures, implementing global standards for detecting bombs, tightening border
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adopted resolution No. 40/61, calling on all nations to "fulfill their
obligations under international law to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting, or participating in terrorist acts in other states, or acquiescing in
activities within their territory directed toward the commission of such
acts." 6  As a side-note, not one of the anti-terrorist conventions provide
for either economic or other sanctions against States assisting terrorism."
E. National Responses to Terrorism
Around the world nations are facing internal terrorism. Many nations
are quietly appeasing terrorism, or trying to contain it, while others have
even become a terrorist's haven.78  There is no consistency when it comes
to terrorism but there are common threads that form a terrorist pattern that
people can be aware of. The differences that emerge between terrorists
will depend on their motivation and capabilities.79 Governments have used
terrorists and their techniques to injure or topple foreign governments.80
The Soviet Union was also a sponsor of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) in the 1960's 1980's and maintained an extremely
close military relationship., Another nation to engage in state sponsored
terrorism is that of Iran. Approximately $300 million is given annually to
the Hezbollah,2  along with organizational support, logistical and
operational assistance.8 3 However, Iran claims that they do not sponsor
terrorism, rather they [Iran] "only give political backing and humanitarian
controls, policing the Internet, improving exchange of intelligence information and drafting a
treaty compelling countries to prosecute or extradite suspected bombers).
76. EI-Ayouty, supra note 4, at 493 (citing a comment by Professor Oscar Schachter, "the
condemnation of international terrorism thus imposes an obligation on all states to take
appropriate measurers to prevent acts of international terrorism. When suspected terrorists are
apprehended the State must either extradite or try and punish them. This obligation, I believe, is
now general customary international law").
77. Id.
78. Id. at 494.
79. Alexander, supra note 30, at 68 (noting that smaller terrorist groups will tend to focus
on bombings while larger organizations will tend to implement more complex operations,
including kidnappings, assassinations, facility attacks, and hijacking).
80. Id. at 68 (acknowledging that the Soviet Union and other communist states engaged in
this type of behavior during the Cold War).
81. Id. (suggesting that the PLO received money, training, and supplies from the Soviet
Union that allowed them to engage in advanced operations against the Israelis over the years,
specifically the Black September attack on athletes at the Munich Olympic games in 1972).
82. "Party of G-d," an umbrella organization of radical fundamentalist Shiite groups
dedicated to establishing an Islamic Republic in Lebanon.
83. Alexander, supra note 30, at 69 (recognizing that all this aid is used to fight "Western
imperialism" in the Middle East along with removing the "Zionist" entity from the region).
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aid to the groups."" Hezbollah also receives assistance from Syria.5 This
financial assistance has allowed the organization to kill close to 130 people
while injuring another 440 .1
The United States has also recognized the nations of Afghanistan,
Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and the Sudan to be nations that sponsor
terrorism. 7 Afghanistan is one of the worst nations when it comes to state
sponsored terrorism. They have maintained training camps for members
of the Harkat ul Majahideen. 8  This group was responsible for the
December 24, 1999 hijacking of India Airline's Flight 814 from Nepal to
Pakistan. 9 The Harkat ul Majahideen is not the only terrorist group that
Afghanistan assists. Internationally, their worst terrorist offense is their
assistance of Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network.9° Osama bin
Laden is seen as a threat because of his views regarding the liberation of
Saudi Arabia and Palestine along with the overthrowing of "corrupt"
western-oriented governments in predominately Muslim nations. 9' His
operations have been widespread and destructive since the mid-1990's.Y
84. Iran to host Meeting Supporting Palestinians, CNN, Apr. 23, 2001, available at
CNN.com/World.
85. Alexander, supra note 30, at 69 (providing a channel between Iran and the
organization that also provides locations to mount their attacks against the nation of Israel
through Syrian controlled areas in Lebanon).
86. Id. (recognizing that the Hezbollah was responsible for car bombings of the United
States Embassy and Marine Headquarters in Beirut in 1983, kidnapping of numerous hostages in
Lebanon in the 1980's, rocket attacks on settlements in Israel proper in the 1990's, destruction of
the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, and destruction of the office building housing the
Argentine Jewry in 1994).
87. Id. at 70 (noting that these nations provide a safehaven, funding, training, and arms to
various terrorist organizations around the world).
88. An Islamic terrorist group based in Pakistan and dedicated to liberating India's
Kashmir.
89. Alexander, supra note 30, at 70 (explaining that the plane carrying 178 passengers and
eleven crew members was diverted to Afghanistan where the seize ended when the terrorists
coerced India into releasing three jailed comrades, one of whom had declared a Jihad (holy war)
against the United States and India).
90. Id. at 71 (noting that along with the Sudan, Afghanistan has been assisting possibly the
worst terrorist organization in the world).
91. Id. (citing the fact that Osama bin Laden maintains formal and informal ties with
terrorist groups in Algeria, Bosnia, Canada, Chechnya, Egypt, Eritrea, France, Libya, Pakistan,
Philippines, Somalia, United Kingdom, United States, and Yemen as a way to achieve his goals).
92. Id. at 72 (indicating that he has been held responsible for the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade center in New York City, the 1996 attack in Saudi Arabia of the Khobar Towers,
and the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania at the United States' Embassies). See also, Phil
Hirschkorn and Deborah Feyerick, Ex-copter pilot can't link bin Laden to Somalia, CNN, Apr.
23, 2001, available at CNN.com/Law Center; see also Phil Hirschkorn, Scant Evidence Shown
to link bin Laden to GI deaths in Somalia, CNN, Apr. 20, 2001, available at CNN.com/Law
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In response to state sponsored terrorism there are several things that a
nation may do. This includes adjusting their level of diplomacy with the
specific nation in question, along with the possibility of economic
sanctions, altering the level of law enforcement, and possibly the
movement of military power.93 A nation is allowed to expel diplomats
thought to be involved in terrorism.' Economic sanctions are a hard
measure to adhere to since they require international cooperation in many
instances. 95
However, not all nations are adding to the problem of terrorism;
many of them are actually helping to prevent its escalation. Today, nations
are beginning to work collectively to bring terrorists to court to stand trial
for their actions. Fawaz Younis,9 was arrested during a FBI sting in
international waters off of the coast of Cyprus and was eventually tried,
convicted and sentenced for his crimes.Y If it were not for the assistance
of Pakistan in 1995, Ramzi Yousef may still be at large. 98  Besides
extraditing terrorists, world governments are addressing the threats of
terrorism by increasing security measures," like adding x-ray machines at
airports around the world.1'0
F. Terrorism's New Threats
A new threat of international terrorism however is the stock piling of
weapons. Many terrorist organizations are now trying to gain access to
Center. The United States is trying to claim that Osama bin Laden was also responsible for the
death of eighteen Americans killed and eighty wounded during the October 3, 1993 battle in
Somalia's capital of Madadishu but so far they have been unable to produce a valid link.
93. Alexander, supra note 30, at 91.
94. Id. (pointing to the fact that the United States and many Western European nations
have expelled Libyan diplomats over the years thought to be involved in terrorist activities).
95. Id. (recognizing however that the United States has successfully imposed sanctions
against Iran and Libya while the United Nations has done the same against Afghanistan).
96. Id. at 90. He is a Lebanese operative from the 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner
that included American hostages.
97. Id.
98. Alexander, supra note 30 (noting that he was arrested in Pakistan and extradited to the
United States for trial). See also, Carberry, supra note 42, at 689 (commenting that Abdul
Hakeem was also extradited to the United States to stand trial for his involvement in the
Philippine air case April 12, 1995 along with Ishmail Najim in August from Jordan for his
involvement in the World Trade Center bombing).
99. Id. at 90 (noting that embassies are now built with added security measures in mind
along with training sessions on how to deal with various terrorist threats).
100. Id. at 91 (admitting that they are not fool proof but effective none the less).
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weapons of mass destruction. '01 When its leaders were arrested after the
Sarin gas attack in Japan back in 1995 the organization, Aur Shinrikyo,
was actively seeking lethal weapons. 101 People should be concerned about
this because if a nuclear bomb was to get into the wrong hands an
explosion of one kiloton anywhere could cause more than 100,000 fatalities
and damage totaling billions of dollars.' 3
When trying to combat terrorism people need to consider the socio-
economic causes like poverty, hopelessness, and the non-observance of
human rights driving young people into the arms of terrorism where "they
find communal support, an identity and a cause through which they vent
their anger through the heinous crime of terror." 10' For an economist, to
eradicate terrorism one must alter the benefits and cost structures to the
point where peace is the most viable and optimal solution.'0 Terrorism is
not something that is going to vanish anytime soon. There are numerous
causes that will continue to fuel its existence and unfortunately its
expansion. Terrorism may be impacted by the growing xenophobia around
the world directed against immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, guest
workers, and other "undesired" foreigners.' °0 New laws, stricter security
or enforcement measures, and military strikes may actually prove
counterproductive and result in the escalation of terrorism instead of
reduction.'1 Another factor that may lead to terrorism's growth is that of
heightened goals among terrorists.',8
Around the world there are various forms of terrorism. One is that of
biological terrorism. "Future terrorists wishing to wreak mass casualties
101. Id. at 72 (acknowledging that Osama bin Laden is trying to acquire biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons to use in subsequent attacks). "
102. Id. at 63 (indicating that this Japanese doomsday cult had killed twelve and injured
over five thousand with the release of the Sarin gas on the Tokyo subway). See also, The
Anthrax Threat, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2001, (pointing out that the intention was to kill
thousands). Despite spending thirty million the cult could not produce the Sarin gas in a pure
enough form, could not develop an effective delivery mechanism or distribution system.
103. Alexander, supra note 30, at 77 (noting that this would be only one-twentieth of the
power released in the Hiroshima attack).
104. E1-Ayouty, supra note 4, at 497.
105. Higgins, supra note 1, at 4.
106. Alexander, supra note 30, at 78 (noting that terrorism will also grow as a result of the
publicity that is generated from attacks, the fact that arms, explosives, supplies, financing, and
secret communication are all readily available, and international support networks exist that
underwrite the activities).
107. Id. at 79 (noting that some terrorist organizations may actually try more defiant types
of terrorism as a result).
108. Id. at 80 (eluding to the fact that as goals increase so to will terrorism because
ideological and political violence is often seen as the means to an end).
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may well turn to biological weapons."'" This results from the fact that as
biotechnologies proliferate it is making it easier for state and non-state
actors to develop weapons relatively easily and cheaply. " ' A second form
of terrorism is chemical in nature. The first instance of chemical terrorism
occurred all the way back in 1915 when Germany released liquid chlorine
from pressurized cylinders, allowing the poisonous gas to drift over enemy
lines."' Chemical and biological terrorism has been beneficial for
terrorists because of their lost cost, ease and speed of production, along
with the notion that people of limited education and facilities can develop
them."12 Nuclear Terrorism is also a possibility."3 It is growing in use as
well with the advent of nuclear bombs and fissionable material."4  Non-
nuclear attacks are likely as well with radio-frequency capabilities.",
III. THE NEWEST FORM OF TERRORISM
A. A Descriptional Analysis
The newest form of terrorism to emerge is that of cyberterrorism and
information warfare"6 to manipulate computer systems to disrupt or
incapacitate infrastructures.'" This type of attack is the focus of the
109. James Saxton, Domestic Terrorist Threats, Congregsional Testimony by Federal
Document Clearing House, May 23, 2000 at a Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism (quoting
Rep. James Saxton at the Open Hearing on Biological, Nuclear, and Cyber Terrorism).
Although the first biological weapon used was probably plague-infected bodies during medieval
times by besieging armies who tossed them over city walls in hopes of spreading disease. Old
scourges and new, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7320529.
110. Id. (acknowledging that many of the same technologies that go into fermenting beer
can be used to manufacture biological weapons).
111. Old Scourges and New, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2001, available at 2001 WL
7320529.
112. Id. at 82 (suggesting that this is the case because these weapons can be purchased
without raising much suspicion and the space needed to build them is minimal).
113. Saxton, supra note 109 (maintaining that the theft or sale of such weapons is likely
with lax security and possible monetary gain).
114. Alexander, supra note 30, at 82 (opining that for now nuclear terrorism will occur
only as a credible threat or hoax involving a nuclear device, holding for political or economic
blackmail a nuclear facility, or the bombing of a nuclear reactor site itself).
115. Saxton, supra note 109 (indicating that the United States' electronic infrastructure
could be damaged by such attacks).
116. Alexander, supra note 30, at 84 (defining information warfare to consist "of a broad
spectrum of threats ranging from electronic jamming to psychological operations underscoring
the perpetrators' deliberate exploitation of military and civilian information systems' inherent
vulnerabilities and thereby adversely affecting national and global security" quoting the author of
the article).
117. Saxton, supra note 109.
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remainder of this paper. Many believe cyberterrorism," began as
something just for fun, but evolved into industrial espionage and eventually
culminated in political motives."19  Cyberterrorists can be individuals,
criminal organizations, dissident groups or factions, or even another
nation. 2° The reason cyberterrorism is growing so fast is because of how
easy it is to launch a cyberattack. All one has to do is infect one computer
and then allow it to pass through a network, infecting other machines or
the entire network based on the program launched., The only tools
needed to launch such an attack are a computer, modem, telephone, and
hacker software."'
The cyberworld has developed a language all its own when it comes
to cybercrime. At one point it was very simple, the good guys were
Hackers while the bad guys were Crackers. Today everyone involved in
cybercrime is identified as a Hacker, '23 those with an interest in the
workings of a computer.'24 "Hackers" are individuals with a certain code
of ethics; they do not damage systems or data and are good
programmers.' However, there are some hackers who are beginning to
emerge lacking this code of ethics.1'2 "Crackers,"27 on the other hand, are
not bound by any ethics; they break into systems with malicious intent or
118. See generally, Cybercrimes: Infrastructure Threats From Cyber-Terrorists, 2
CYBERSPACE LAWYER 23, (1999) (defining cyberterrorism as "the use of computing resources
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives").
119. Vijay Mukhi, Internet Instructor/Political Hacking, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Nov. 8,
2000, available at 2000 WL 28353566 (stating that at first it was just to acquire credit card
numbers, and then it evolved to companies illegally accessing customer and product information
from the other). See also Cybercrimes, supra note 118, at 23.
120. Cybercrimes, supra note 118, at 23 (noting that attacks can be internal or external and
may be directed against a computer system, or focus on the infrastructure itself).
121. Mukhi, supra note 119, (noting that once a system is infected it can send out the IP
(Internet Protocol) address of your computer to a machine anywhere around the world or send
out its own code as an e-mail attachment and then trigger itself once the attachment is opened).
122. Cybercrimes, supra note 118, at 23.
123. Mukhi, supra note 119.
124. Yeang Soo Ching, Curbing Attacks on Websites, THE NEW STRAITS TIMES, (Malaysia)
Jan. 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9499310.
125. Id. (noting that their activities are both productive and creative). See generally,
Jennifer McKee, Hackers of a Different COLOR, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 11, 2001
(acknowledging that they tend to be older individuals who are gainfully employed and educated).
126. Ching, supra note 124 (indicating that these individuals are being called Black Hat
Hackers while those who maintain the code of ethics are beginning to be referred to as White Hat
Hackers).
127. McKee, supra note 125 (analyzing that the term derived from people "cracking" into
websites or software copyrights).
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strictly for money while destroying both data and systems.'2 Below
Crackers are "Script Kiddies," individuals who buy or download "scripts"
that will search the Internet for crackable sites 29 "Hactivists" 130 are
computer hackers with political and social agendas.' 3' While
"cybervandals" are individuals who's actions alter information on
spreading dogma on political and social sites.3 2  "Denial of service"1 3
refers to attacks that overwhelm a computer's ability to handle incoming
messages.' 3 "Defacers" are those who "deface" a website or system.'35
"Defacements" are a common cracker prank and include WebPages that
crackers post over with pre-existing websites that they have cracked.' 3
While a "Patch" refers to computer codes that can be used to fill in
security gaps left by crackers when they broke into the website.13 "Trojan
Horses" are programs that appear to perform a useful function and
sometimes do so quite well but also includes an unadvertised feature,
which is usually malicious in nature. 38
128. Ching, supra note 124 (acknowledging that these individuals rarely write their own
programs and their efforts are completely destructive in nature).
129. McKee, supra note 125 (labeling them the "ultimate poseurs" and calling them the
"lowest form of code tweakers" according to Codeflux.com, a hacker website that publishes a
"jargon dictionary").
130. Naomi Koppel, Anti-globalist Protesters Turn to Hacking to Thwart Opponents, THE
CANADIAN PRESS, Feb. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 12573165 (recognizing that the term was
first applied to Zapatista supporting rebels in Mexico's southern state of Chiapas who held virtual
sit-ins and sabotaged Mexican government websites since 1998).
131. Jon G. Auerbach & William M. Bulkeley, Net is New Frontier for Cyberterrorism,
Activism, Even War: Electronic Battlefield is Site for Hand-to-Mouse Combat, THE WALL ST. J.
EUR., Feb. 11, 2000, at 23 (noting that these individuals have vandalized government websites).
See also Jim Wolf, Business Faces Growing Threat of 'Hacktivism,' THE GLOBE AND MAIL,
Nov. 9, 2000, available at 11/09/2000 GlobemailT4 (recognizing that hactivism incorporates the
methods of guerilla theatre, grassroots organizing, and graffiti to cyberspace).
132. Auerbach, supra note 131, at 23.
133. Bruce Sterling, Revenge of the Smurfs, THE WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 16, 2000, at 10
(suggesting that this term along with "distributed coordinated attacks" may be replaced with
"Smurfing." Further noting that it is not a big deal, no security is broken, firewalls are not
melted down, no data is stolen, instead it just jams up the works; thus it is cheap, quick, dirty,
and highly effective).
134. Auerbach, supra note 131, at 23.
135. McKee, supra note 125 (noting that sometimes these individuals will even provide




138. Cybercrimes, supra note 118, at 23.
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B. The Growth of Cyberterrorism
There are many factors, which seem to be operating, that allow for
cybercrime both internally and externally according to Raja Azrina Raja
Othman, the MyCert project head.1 39 Cyberterrorism seems to be the new
way to wreak havoc around the world. "The World's growing dependence
on the Internet opened the door to renegade individuals and states who
could cripple economies and inflict death by remote control."' 0 The
threats of cyberattacks grow with every passing day. There are three basic
reasons for this. The first reason is the international growth of the Internet
itself, which causes "policing" to be much more difficult.", Secondly,
there are already over 30,000 hacker-oriented websites, which makes it
extremely easy for people to acquire the knowledge necessary to disrupt or
destroy whatever they are seeking. 1 2 And finally, with the end of the Cold
War came a mass exodus of terrorist organizations to other locations
around the world making it difficult to track them. ,,3
The reason that cyberterrorism is seen as so problematic is because an
attack could come from anyone or anywhere'" and could take any form."15
Hypothetically speaking, an organization with a budget of say ten million
with thirty computer experts strategically located throughout the world
could bring the United States to its knees with a well-coordinated
cyberattack." "Computer networks will increasingly be the main
139. Ching, supra note 124 (listing the internal factors as: "Lack of control and poor
management in computer administration;" "lack of knowledge and exposure in aspects of
computer security," "low priority given by top management;" "poor or haphazard computer
network and system design that is unsafe, ill-equipped with security components, and
misconfigured systems and application," outdated software and lack of maintenance." The
external factors cited include: "Free exploit tools or programs available over the Internet;"
"Vulnerable computer systems and application," "Motivation ... to establish status quo or for
monetary gain," and "Lack of ethics and professionalism among budding technologists").
140. Richard Ingham, Cyberterrorism: Death, Ruin at a Touch of the Return Key, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, May 16, 2000 (QUOTING FOREIGN MINISTER YOHEi KONO AT the conference
on cybercrime at the G8 (Group of Eight) meeting).
141. Alexander, supra note 30, at 86 (estimating that there are already 120 million users
and there will be close to a billion by 2005).
142. Id. (indicating that these sites contain information on step-by-step instructions, Trojan
horses, and logic bombs).
143. Id.
144. Ingham, supra note 140 (noting that an attack could result from a single assailant, a
group or government holding cheap equipment and knowledge pertaining to the Internet's
structure).
145. Cybercrimes: supra note 118, at 23 (listing thirteen possible forms that a cyberterrorist
attack could take).
146. Alexander, supra note 30, at 86.
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battleground for armies and terrorists. Computers are the roads and
bridges of the Information age ... the most important targets for people or
organizations bent on disabling communications. It's a basic military tenet
. . [t]ry to shut down your enemy's infrastructure."147
C. Cyberterrorism's Impact and Coverage
Right now cyberwar is emerging as the "third largest threat" to
developed nations behind chemical and bacteriological attack and nuclear
weapons.' 4 3 Every week more than fifty computer viruses are released.''
Also, every week a new computer hacker cracks into Pentagon computers
or breaks into the databases of banks or other financial institutions.' It
has even been reported that over $400 million in financial losses resulted
from cyberattacks in 2000, up 40% since 1999.151 In 1999, it has been
reported that the United States had $12.1 billion dollars in damage caused
by Internet viruses with the Melissa virus costing close to $10 billion
across the world. 2 It is believed that only 25.% of wired companies are
secure.'53 Currently, it is believed that close to 80% of all foreign attacks
on United States computers either originated in or passed through
Canada. 11 This is believed to be the case because Canada is such a wired
nation.15 Recently, in Edmonton and Calgary "Hacking Schools" were
147. Auerbach, supra note 131, at 23 (quoting Stanton McCandlish of the San Francisco
privacy and civil liberties group Electronic Frontier Foundation).
148. Ingham, supra note 140 (referring to a comment made by Colin Rose of Buchanan
International, a Scottish-based company specializing in tracking Internet offenders. He went on
to say "The potential for harm is enormous. If you can destroy industries and essential services
with the touch of a button, you don't need to bother with bombs").
149. Ann McFeatters, Russian Spy is Not the Threat, THE MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr.
2, 2001, at 11A.
150. Id.
151. Cooperation Urged Against Cyberterror, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 23,
2001, at A8.
152. 'Internet Widening Gap Between Haves, Have-nots,' BUSINESS TIMES (MALAY.), Jun.
5, 2000.
153. Judy Monchuk, Cyber Security Big Item for Businesses Wary of the Next Mafaboy,
THE CANADIAN PRESS, Feb. 7, 2001, available at 2001 WL 12573245.
154. Martin Stone, Canada Called Hotbed of Cyberterrorism, NEWSBYTE NEWS NETWORK,
Mar. 27, 2000 (relying on an American intelligence agency determination).
155. Id. (indicating that "the high number of hacker attacks coming from Canada is due to a
high degree of computerization . . . Canada is a very wired country and that hackers will
typically bounce through different computer systems to hide their original location." Colonel
Randy Alward).
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established to address the issue of cyberattacks. 1-1 The cost of a training
session can range from $500 all the way up to $5,000.'" China, on the
other hand, is looking to establish similar schools with the exact opposite
intention. 58
Currently, cyberattacks are mounting around the world. It is believed
that political cyberterrorism has been around since 1998 as far as web
defacement and denial of service attacks are concerned.5 9 But cyberattacks
may go back as far as 1986, when West German hackers stole passwords,
programs, and other data for the KGB.lw The United States' Pentagon
systems and a nuclear weapons lab were among several targets for an
Israeli hacker in February of 1998.161 This past New Year's Eve there was
also a conspiracy plot to take down the Internet. 62
China has been involved in many cyberattacks on both sides. Two
years ago, after the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade, China "retaliated" electronically.16  In China, as military
tensions have risen, there have been reciprocal attacks on computer
networks between the mainland and Taiwan.'6 It has been estimated that
Taiwan's governmental network has been broken into over 150 times with
a report suggesting that over 72,000 attacks have been launched against
156. Monchuk, supra note 153 (differentiating kids who want to learn how to be a hacker
from companies who are signing up employees to learn how to build a defense).
157. Id. (recognizing that the more expensive course is much more in-depth).
158. Frank J. Cilluffo et al., Bad Guys and Good Stuff: When and Where will the Cyber
Threats Converge?, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 131, 151, (1999/2000) (claiming that China wants to
train "cyberwarriors" at Army schools to wage war over the Internet and eventually establish a
fourth branch in their military devoted to Information Warfare).
159. Elinor Abreu, Chinese Hackers are Blamed for Vandalizing U.S. Websites, Apr. 13,
2001, available at Thestandard.com/article/0,1902,23717,00.html (providing that this first attack
seems to have been from a British hacker who published anti-nuclear messages on about 300
websites).
160. Alexander, supra note 30, at 84 (noting that this was accomplished after they broke
into military, scientific, and industry computers in the United States, Western Europe, and
Japan).
161. Id. (indicating that Ehud Tenenbaum and two other young collaborators from
California engaged in the cyberattacks).
162. Victoria Shannon, Tech Brief: Internet Conspiracy, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 15,
2001, at 12 U.S. (Indicating that four Israeli youths had been arrested, their computers, floppy
disks, CD-ROMs and other equipment confiscated).
163. Cilluffo, supra note 158, at 151 (referring to the cyber activity that they engaged in
which revealed close to 4,000 back doors," allowing outsiders to regain access to programs at a
future date, into United States computer systems).
164. Auerbach, supra note 131, at 23. See also, Cilluffo, supra note 158, at 153
(indicating that the cyberattacks resulted from Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui stating that there
should be relations between the two nations as equals).
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Taiwan.' 6 Another incident linked to China has been the e-mail bombs
that have proliferated the Chinese spiritual group Falun Dafa's website.'6
China is also under investigation for the defacement of nine United State
websites as a possible retaliatory measure after one of their fighter jets was
downed in early April. 6
The North Atlantic Treaty Organizations' (NATO) website along with
other government related sites have been bombarded with electronic mail
and hit with antiwar rhetoric.'1 Since the start of the Al Aqsa Intifada
between Israel and Palestine no permanent damage has resulted from their
cyberwar campaign. 9 So far it seems that this type of cyberterror has only
been used to raise awareness pertaining to each side's cause.1'1 In fact, the
virus that was released contained a note indicating that no damage would
result.' 7  An issue not quiet addressed yet however is the public's
perception of such attacks.'7
People should not believe that the United States is immune from
involvement. There are rumors that the United States spent more money
trying to cripple Iraq "invisibly" during the Gulf War than we spent on
military hardware.'" There are also rumors that President Clinton
165. Cilluffo, supra note 158, at 153 (according to Pentagon estimates the spreading of two
Taiwanese viruses have caused $120 million in damage and damaged 360,000 computers in
China).
166. Auerbach, supra note 131, at 23 (suggesting that China was responsible because at the
time China was engaged in cracking down on this group while a British agency was able to track
transmissions that seemed to originate from XinAn Information Service Center in Beijing,
thought to be a subsidiary of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security).
167. Abreu, supra note 159.
168. Auerbach, supra note 131, at 23 (indicating that the attacks might have originated from
activists connected with the Serbian side of the Balkan conflict). See also Alexander, supra note
30, at 85 (calling these attacks "Aping attacks" because of the way that they establish
communication with a target computer and then occupy its functions by continuously staying
linked and "feeding" it information). See also Cilluffo, supra note 158, at 149 (suggesting that a
group called Crna Ruka [Black Hand] could be responsible because they had attacked the Kosovo
Information Center the previous year).
169. Pro-Israel Hackers Told to Ignore 'Cyberterror,' HA'ARETZ, Mar. 23, 2001 (citing
that there was a pro-Palestinian e-mail virus that struck 10,000 Israeli e-mail users).
170. Id. (noting however that things could get out of hand if one side decided to up the
anty).
171. Id. (indicting that the attacks so far have been superficial, mainly defacing websites as
opposed to damaging infrastructures that could cause huge economic damage).
172. Id. (suggesting according to Yael Shahar, Webmaster at the International Policy
Institute for Counter Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya that "many groups on
both sides have realized that hacking, while intended to create 'public relations' for their cause,
is actually viewed by the public as criminal activity").
173. Ingham, supra note 140 (according to Colin Rose).
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authorized a plan to destabilize Slovodan Milosevic by employing hackers
to disrupt his foreign bank accounts. 74
D. New Weapons and their Impact on Cyberterrorism
Its not just cyberattacks that are alarming nations but what terrorists
are using personal computers for. As technology advances, many terrorist
organizations have gone online. For example, the Hezbollah maintain a
daily record of "heroic" battles carried out by its fighters in Southern
Lebanon on its official website.'1" Besides website propaganda, terrorists
are using their personal computers to store information pertaining to their
plans for future attacks.176  It is even believed that Osama bin Laden's
organization is maintained through satellite "uplinks" and encrypted
messages that they pass back and forth through their computers.' 7
According to United States officials, encryption has become the "everyday
tool of Muslim extremists.""8
Currently, there are new weapons at the disposal of cyberterrorists.
They are no longer limited to just computers. In corporate "spec wars"
cyberterrorists have begun using Magnetic Pulsing Devices that erase data
up to 100 yards without leaving any trace or evidence of their users. 79
Another weapon at the disposal of cyberterrorists besides a computer is a
HERF gun; it can destroy a server from thity yards away. 'w The gun
works by changing all the Os and Is into only Os leaving permanent
damage in which none of the effected data can be recovered.' 8'
174. Cilluffo, supra note 158, at 150 (noting that there was also a suggestion that the United
States was planning an attack on the Yugoslav command-and-control network along with the air
defense system).
175. Alexander, supra note 30, at 87 (noting that Afghanistan now publishes its radical
form of Islam on the Internet as well).
176. Id. (indicating that Ramzi Ahmed Yousef had plans on his personal computer to blow
up several American airlines over the Pacific Ocean, he is currently in jail for his role in the
World Trade center bombings).
177. Id. See also Jack Kelley, Terrorists Use Web to Mount Attacks, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Feb. 6, 2001, at A9 (estimating that encryption has enabled Osama bin Laden to carry out his
three latest plots).
178. Id. (recognizing that "Uncrackable encryption is allowing terrorists Hamas, Hezbollah,
al-Qaeda, and others - to communicate about their criminal intention without fear of outside
intrusion." FBI Director Louis Freeh at a closed door Senate testimony panel on terrorism last
March).
179. Patrick Sweeney, Be Aware of Off-Site Storage Security, 38 COMM. NEWS, Feb. 1,
2001, at 76 (pointing out that this weapon is small enough to fit inside a cigarette carton making
it almost impossible to track into the office).
180. Id. (noting that the weapon can be made easily by anyone for less than $600).
181. Id.
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E. What's Being Done to Deal with the Problem
It may be hard to address the problems raised by cyberterrorism
because politically motivated attacks can be difficult to investigate or
prosecute.'82 That does not mean nothing is being done to address the
problem. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in 1998 formed a new unit called The National Infrastructure
Protection Center to address cyberterrorism issues.18 The Department of
Justice has also established an internal Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section (CCIPS) to address international computer crimes.'8'
These are not the only things the United States government has done in an
effort to eliminate cyberterrorism. President Clinton outlined four
cyberterrorism initiatives in 1999 during a speech that he delivered at the
National Academy of Sciences.' 8 And then last year, he announced further
initiatives to counter the evolving problem of cyberterrorism. One
suggestion was offering college scholarships to individuals who studied
computer security in return for their public service upon graduation."
We need to do more to bring people into the field of
computer security. That's why I am proposing a new
program that will offer college scholarships to students in
the field of computer security in exchange for their public
service afterward. This program will create a new
182. Abreu, supra note 159 (indicating the thoughts of Michael Vatis, the director of the
Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College. "[Alnytime you have political
tension in the world, it's being mirrored by attacks in cyberspace").
183. Auerbach, supra note 131, at 23 (indicating that the unit was established to strengthen
the United States' defenses against cyberterrorism and other electronic threats). See also Tom
Spring, Cybervandalism is Tough to Thwart, PC WORLD ONLINE, Feb. 9, 2000, at 2000 WL
8855770 (hi-lighting that malicious hackers could be fined upwards of $250,000 and/or between
five and ten years in jail).
184. Bruce Braun et al., WWW.CommercialTerrorism.com: A Proposed Federal Criminal
Statute Addressing the Solicitation of commercial Terrorism through the Internet, 37 Harv. J.
159, 177 (2000) (citing the Department of Justice website indicating that the goal of the section is
for "government officials . . .the private sector , . academic institutions, and foreign
representatives to develop a global response to cyberattacks").
185. Jon Baumgarten et al., Clinton Attacks Cyberterrorism, 1 CYBERSPACE LAW. 16,
(1999) (outlining the four initiatives as follows: A Critical Infrastructure Applied Research
Initiative, tasked with detecting various activities or codes; Computer Intrusion Detection
Networks which will evaluate and design networks to detect attacks and warn other systems;
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers established to encourage private-sector development
along with providing outreach and training programs, and finally. Cyber Corps to set-up
scholarships and financial aid programs).
186. Scholarships Planned as Part of Fight Against Cyberterrorism, THE ARIz. REPUBLIC,
Jan. 8, 2000, at A4.
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generation of computer security specialists who will work
to defend our nation's computers. 87
Another initiative involved a $2 billion package to counter
cyberterrorism by securing the nation's computer systems. '" Included in
this plan would be an increase in governmental funding for research and
development, establishing a ROTC-type corps of information technology
specialists and forging a new partnership with the private sector. 89
President Clinton was also interested in establishing The Institute for
Information Infrastructure to "fill research gaps that neither public nor
private sectors are filling today." 19° The House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations have also scheduled
hearings to discuss how vulnerable the United States is to cyberattack.' 9'
California seems to be paving the way of cracking down on
cyberattacks within their state. California Governor Gray Davis signed a
bill introduced by Assemblyman Rico Oller, R-California, which raises the
fines for first-time offenders from $250 - $1,000 as long as no harm
resulted from their access to computers or unauthorized domain name
offenses.1'9 Under the new law, first-time hackers who do not cause
damage by introducing a new virus could face a fine of $5,000 or one year
in jail.9 13
Current federal criminal laws that have been used to address Internet
crime have included laws against mail and wire fraud, the federal riot act,
consumer protection acts, commerce protection acts, and statutes
prohibiting the issuance of threats and solicitations of violent crimes.1'
187. Transcript of Clinton's Remarks on Cyberterrorism, upon departure, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Jan. 7, 2000.
188. Deborah Kalb, Lawmaker Andrews to Propose own Cyberterrorism Bill, GANNETr
NEWS SERV., Jan. 19, 2000.
189. Cyberterror Fighting Plan to be Unveiled, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 7, 2000, at A8.
190. Transcript, supra note 187 (quoting President Clinton again at the news conference on
the South Lawn at 9:28 a.m. EST indicating that the Institute would "bring to bear the finest
computer scientists and engineers from the private sector, from universities and from other
research facilities to find ways to close these gaps").
191. Peralte C. Paul, Reno Warns of Cyberterrorism Threat, THE ATLANTA CONST., Apr.
6, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3668026.
192. Ronna Abramson, California Cracks Down on Cyberterrorism, THE INDUSTRY
STANDARD, Sept. 28, 2000 available at www.TheStandard.com/article/o,1902,18961,00.htm
(explaining that this also raised the violation from an infraction to a misdemeanor).
193. Id. (noting that second-time offenders could face $10,000 and up to three years in a
state prison if their action results in harm).
194. Braun, supra note 184, at 164-65 (noting that despitethe laws being on the books for
decades many of them were not enacted with Internet activity in mind and thus do not correctly
apply to the problem).
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Because these laws do not specifically address the problem of Internet
terrorism some academics from Harvard College have decided to draft a
proposed statute.'95  The authors of this statute, Bruce Braun, Dane
Drobny, and Douglas C. Gessner, President and Fellows of Harvard
College, believe that as things stand currently, the Internet resembles the
"lawless Wild West."'96 The authors further pointed out, that the United
States Justice Department has done little to track down and prosecute
Internet terrorists.' 1 For purposes of their statute they have defined
"commercial terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce commercial interests."1 98
The first section of their proposed legislation includes the definitions
for "Internet," "Interactive computer service," -and "Information content
provider. "'9 Part II of the draft addresses "Online solicitation to commit a
crime of violence. '" Here they lay out the punishment for those who
"transmit[s] or cause[s] to be transmitted via the Internet or interactive
computer service in interstate or foreign commerce any communication
containing any demand or request that another person engage in conduct
constituting a felony in violation of state law or the laws of the United
States." 201 Many provisions of their proposed legislation are based on
existing federal legislation that has been altered to encompass Internet
related crimes.201 There are potential problems with this legislation when it
comes to enforcement however. The Internet has allowed for anonymity.
A terrorist can easily hide his/her identity and if the prosecution cannot
195. Id. at 159.
196. Id. at 160 (describing the Internet as being "open to governance by human instincts,
including those of greed, deception, and hate").
197. Id. (noting that even if the Justice Department made prosecution of Internet terrorists a
top priority little could be done because of current laws, they are either "too broad, too
cumbersome, or fail to address the type of destruction caused by Internet terrorism").
198. Id.
199. Braun, supra note 184, at 169-70 (acknowledging that these definitions "parrot" the
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (1994), and were not struck down by a recent
Supreme Court decision based on this provision).
200. Id. at 169-70.
201. Id. at 170 (setting forth the possibility of an affirmative defense if the defendant is able
to thwart the commission of the crime that was solicited or prove that they were not a party to the
commission of the crime but were rather used as an unknown conduit for dissemination of the
information. However, the statute further notes that it is not a defense to claim that one is
immune from prosecution).
202. Id. at 171 (noting that certain provisions are based on 18 U.S.C. § 373 (1994)).
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track him/her down then there is no case.'23 As a result, for successful
enforcement, the authors suggest that the federal government work in
conjunction with academics, the private sector, and the Internet
community.204 However, this cyber-manhunt" 2° is not impossible.2 06
The United States is not the only nation to begin to address the
concerns surrounding cyberterrorism. Japan has also begun to implement
strategies to counter the threat after learning how vulnerable they are. It
seems that Japan is an easy target for cyberterrorism because many of its
leaders are computer illiterate when it comes to understanding computer
networks or the threats they face.20' "Until those attacks, very few people
in the government, business, or the media had even heard of
cyberterrorism. "20 In February of last year, Japan implemented a law
allowing for the prosecution of hackers as a result of worldwide pressure.'2
A network will be established that links the Ground Self-Defense Force,
the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Air Self-Defense Force, along
with construction of integrated information and communication networks
that include an anti-cyberterrorism unit.2 10  This unit will be designed to
monitor the agency's networks and to protect its data. 2 1' Other areas
covered include a guarantee of the interoperability of this network with the
203. Id. at 174 (describing the difference that occurs in a "typical" criminal act in which
eyewitnesses or written documentation can'be gathered as opposed to an Internet terrorists'
.ability to remain anonymous").
204. Braun, supra note 184, at 175 (opining that this is the best method for three reasons.
First, the expertise or technology are within the private sector or academic world. Second, as
Internet consultants emerge on the screen they are going to have to work with law enforcement
officers. And finally, due to the size of the Internet, a centralized government enforcement
would be ineffective).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 176 (pointing out that a lot of Internet terrorists will not try to conceal their
identity making it easy to find and prosecute them. Also, the federal government has resources
that could be transferred to this type of endeavor).
207. Cyberterrorism Expert Fears Risks for Japan, THE WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 8, 2000,
at 26.
208. Id. (quoting Raisuke Miyawake, a former government official referring to attacks
successfully launched by hackers who attacked Japanese government websites criticizing them for
trying to "whitewash" its military record during World War II).
209. Id. (expressing that "[o]ther industrialized countries have had to urge Japan to
strengthen its legislative defenses against cyberterrorism" according to Mr. Miyawake).
210. Defense Agency to Develop ITby Fiscal 2003+, JAPAN POL'Y & POLS., Dec. 4, 2000,
available at 2001 WL 29267566 (resulting from a Defense Agency draft outline regarding IT to
be implemented by 2003).
211. Id-
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United States military in Japan and for research into what IT developments
will do to military technology. 2
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has established a task force to
address the issue, seeking a special command office, a team of specialists
devoted to cybercrimes, the need to strengthen computer security systems,
and nurturing experts to combat cybercrime. 23 The LDP came up with a
proposal suggesting that the nation strengthen website security and related
systems, including a two-stage schedule of how to accomplish this and
indicated that a board of government officials and cybercrime experts from
the private sector should be established. 21'
Like California in the United States, Malaysia seems to be the pioneer
in the East when it comes to combating cyberattack. Hacking has been
illegal in Malaysia since 1997.215 However, that has not stopped the
problem. In the first eight months of 1999, Malaysia had forty-seven cases
of website hacking while in the previous year they only had twenty-eight . 1 6
F. Critics of the Importance Placed on Cyberterrorism
Despite world concern, there are individuals who do not see
cyberterrorism as a valid issue at all.
Look, nobody died. When a site is down, there may be
some lost business. But look at all the problems we have
over the registration of guns. People die as a result of
guns. Maybe the government should be paying a little
more attention to weapons that actually kill people." '
Mr. Bridges went on to state, "I don't think cyberterrorism is going
to accomplish anybody's death. Recipes have been on the Internet for a
long time. The problem is all these words with 'cyber'-prefixes are ways
to create jingoist alarmism. '" 218  Joel de la Garza of the security firm
212. Id.
213. LDP Task Force Outlines to Combat Cberterror, THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN / DAILY
YOMIURI (ASIA), Feb. 10, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4642972 (noting that the task force was
established as a result of attacks by hackers on ministry and agency Web sites).
214. Id. (recommending in the long term a law on high-net crimes and a campaign to
educate the public on proper and improper usage of the Internet).
215. Ching, supra note 124 (referring to section 5 of the Computer Crimes Act of 1997
indicating that a penalty of RM100,000 can be fined or jail time up to seven years).
216. Id.
217. Kevin Featherly, Feds Run out of Leads in DOS Attacks, NEWSBYTES NEWS
NETWORK, Mar. 10, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2274483 (quoting Andrew Bridges, a new
media attorney at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati in Palo Alto, California).
218. Id. (quoting Andrew Bridges).
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Securify argues that many web defacements are "just a bunch of kids
performing the cyber equivalent of toilet-papering someone's house." 219
But who is really hurt by cyberterrorism? Think about it,
"[i]t would cost the average Bangladeshi more than eight
years' income to buy a computer, whereas it would cost
the average American just one month's wage. . . [a]nd
what would this repository of information, in which more
than 80% of the content is in English, mean to 90% of
people worldwide who do not speak it.""
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Terrorism is not new; however, today it is different than it has been
in the past. The same elements may still be present, but new ones have
emerged that add to the threat. Terrorism began as "freedom fighters"
fighting for their liberation, self-termination, or social/political cause. It
has evolved to be a political weapon. Whenever an individual has an
issue, instead of taking the legal means to solve it he/she turns to terrorism
and destroys lives and property. What does this honestly solve? Nothing.
In the earlier days of terrorism, one could expect a suicide mission, a
car bomb, or hijacking. Today, the sky is the limit. With terrorists
amassing great fortunes of wealth and the ability to acquire weapons of
mass destruction, there is no telling what today's terrorists will try.
Actually, weapons are not even needed anymore. Today, with a computer,
terrorists can accomplish almost anything. What is worse is that
cyberterrorism is sure not to be the final version of terrorism. Just as
terrorism evolved from hijackings, bombs, and suicide missions to
chemical, biological, or even nuclear means, cyberterrorism seems to be
the next step in this evolving terrorist arsenal and who knows what the
world will be facing.
But for now, the world needs to concern themselves with the
implications of cyberterrorism and be ready for any situation that occurs.
To do this effectively is going to require a global commitment and right
now that does not seem to be the case. Despite the fact that world leaders
and nations have come out against terrorism, there are still places in the
world that provide a safe haven for these individuals and organizations and
as long as these places exist, terrorism will survive.
219. Abreu, supra note 159 (noting that this is not as serious as other cyber attacks that
could be waged).
220. Supra note 152 (quoting Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi).
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V. ADDENDUM
Since this paper was written a lot has changed in the world but this
section is going to focus on the events of September 1 lth. I think that one
would be hard pressed to find an individual who anticipated the events of
September 1lth. Most people in this country, actually in the world for that
matter, never expected someone to attack the mainland of the United States
because many thought that the United States was indestructible. That is no
longer the case. Everyone is beginning to understand that the United
States is just as vulnerable as any other nation in the world. As a result, a
lot of security measures have been implemented and terrorism is beginning
to be taken more seriously by everyone.
Let us begin with the new anti-terrorism legislation, the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, that passed Congress with enormous
speed. The goal of this legislation is to deter and punish terrorist acts in
the United States and abroad. 2' The USA Patriot Act of 2001, as it is also
known, will achieve its goals through law enforcement's and intelligence
agencies' expanded roles. These organizations have been authorized to
expand telephone tapping, monitoring of Internet traffic and conducting
other surveillance in pursuit of terrorists. 2  This bill also includes
provisions to combat money laundering.223 Another new measure provided
for in this legislation is expanded information sharing among agencies,22A
including allowing the FBI to have access to private records.22 5 The bill
also extends the statute of limitations for terrorist acts while strengthening
221. Bill to Combat Terrorism Contains Money Laundering Provisions: USA Act of 2001,
ANDREWS' BANK & LENDER LIABILITY LITIG. REP., Oct. 18, 2001. See also Legislative
Activity Veers Toward Border Control, Scrutiny of Aliens, INTERPRETER RELEASES, Oct. 1,
2001, at 5 (listing several other goals of this legislation as "strengthening domestic security,
updat[ing] and enhancing surveillance procedures, stopp[ing] financial support for terrorists,
tighten[ing] security along the Canadian border, provid[ing] for greater criminal history
information sharing with the State Department and the INS, remov[ing] personnel obstacles to
investigating terrorism, protect[ing] victims of terrorism, increas[ing] information sharing for
critical infrastructure protection, strengthen[ing] criminal laws against terrorism, and regulat[ing]
biological weapons").
222. Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Stands Tough on Tactics, WASH. POST SERVICE, Oct. 26, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 29164803.
223. Bill to Combat Terrorism Contains Money Laundering Provisions: supra note 221
(noting that this applies to private banking and correspondent banking by United States financial
institutions on behalf of offshore banks and foreign nationals).
224. Ann McFeatters, Bush Signs Antiterrorism Bill Into Law, CNN.com, Oct. 26, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/10/26/rec.bush.antiterror.bill/index.html.
225. Ann McFeatters, Bush Signs Anti-Terror Bill Says Tough Law Will Preserve
Constitutional Rights, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 2001 at A6.
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penalties for those who assist terrorists."6 In addition to this, immigrants
suspected of terrorism or aiding terrorism can be detained for up to a week
without being formally charged or deported for simply raising money for a
terrorist organization.27 At the last minute, another provision was inserted
that would require all schools to report on the status of their foreign
students. m
This legislation also creates a counterterrorism fund in the Treasury
Department to reimburse "the Justice Department for the cost of
countering, investigating and prosecuting domestic or international
terrorism. 2 29  The bill also extends the period in which electronic
surveillance can be performed on a non-United States person along with
roving surveillance on telephones used by suspected terrorists. A final
provision would allow the government to detain suspected terrorists for
seven days without bringing formal criminal or immigration charges.
This bill did not receive unanimous approval. In the Senate, Senator
Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) voted against the measure. His biggest
contention against the bill was the secrecy of searches and surveillance. 2 2
Not all of the provisions were hailed as breakthroughs in the fight against
terrorism. Many organizations voice opposition based on civil liberties,
specifically privacy and individual rights.213  David Cole, an expert on
Constitutional law teaching at the Georgetown University Law Center,
believes that this legislation is simply too "sweeping."2''  Mr. Cole fears
that law-abiding non-citizens will be deported simply because of "guilt by
association. '" 33  He went on to state his reservation to the provision
allowing the attorney general to place immigrants in custody based on
226. Id.
227. McFeatters, supra note 225.
228. Siobhan Gorman, Tracking the Foreigners Among Us, NAT'L J., Oct. 27, 2001.




232. Robert E. Pierre, Wisconsin Senator Emerges as a Maverick; Feingold, Who Did Not
Back Anti-Terrorism Bill, Says He Just Votes His Conscience, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001,
at A8 (acknowledging that he originally supported the Attorney General's position but had to
change his mind because he feels that the legislation takes away too many freedoms).
233. Manuel Perez-Rivas, Anti-Terrorism Proposals Worry Civil Libertarians, CNN.com,
Sept. 25, 2001, at www.cnn.com/2001/us/09/25/inv.civil.liberties/index.html (listing these
provisions as though dealing with the detention and deportation of immigrants, the expansion of
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suspicion without an ounce of evidence.3' There has also been criticism
expressed by privacy groups who believe that this legislation provides too
much power to the government to monitor online communications. 27
President Bush responded to this criticism by saying that "the bill
protects, rather than erodes, civil liberties by increasing federal authorities'
ability to prevent, rather than just respond to terrorist attacks." 28 A sunset
provision was also included in the bill to appease civil liberties
organizations, providing an expiration of 2004 for many of the major
provisions and dictating that the Justice Department prepares a report of
how civil liberties are impacted.2 19  Professor Jesse Choper, a
Constitutional Law Professor at the University of California at Berkeley,
points out that the federal government has every right to pull back
individual rights to protect national security interests.24
Another bill to pass both Houses of Congress quickly was the anti-
money-laundering bill. This was passed after President Bush froze the
assets of an original twenty-seven individuals and organizations and
another thirty-nine suspected accounts." One of the reasons it is so
important to freeze assets, is that an organization or individual does not
have the means to execute their plan.242 This bill contains three main
provisions. First, the United States Treasury Department would gain the
power to single out foreign countries or banks suspected of money
laundering. Second, the securities industry would be required to report
suspicious transactions, and finally it would be illegal to bring more than
236. Id.
237. Id. (noting that these groups are also afraid that grand jury secrecy rules would be
loosened while restrictions on searches would be eased as well).
238. McFeatters, supra note 224.
239. McFeatters, supra note 225 (establishing a way to also sue the government if personal
data is disclosed in a harmful manner).
240. Jess Bravin, Senate Sends Antiterrorism Bill to Bush, THE WALL ST. J., Oct. 26,
2001, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29676046.
241. The Money Trial, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2001. Along with freezing the assets of
individuals and organizations President Bush's plan also authorized the freezing of assets
belonging to banks that do business with terrorists and those who did not cooperate with the
American probe. See also Manuel Perez-Rivas, Investigators making progress in 'worldwide
puzzle', Oct. 2, 2001, available at
www.cnn.coml200l/us/1O/02/inv.investigation.status/index.html (indicating that over $6 million
dollars of terrorist accounts have been frozen, including thirty al-Qaeda accounts in the United
States and an additional twenty overseas). See also Money Laundering: Japan Freezes $750,000
in assets of Taliban, Affiliates, Ministry Says, INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 23, 2001.
(pointing out that Japan has frozen $750,000 assets contained in thirty-one deposit accounts
thought to belong to the Taliban and affiliated individuals and organizations).
242. The Money Trial, supra note 241. (indicating that it is estimated that it only cost
$200,000 to execute the September 11 th attacks).
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$10,000 cash into the United States. 3 However, people acknowledge this
bill may not be able to prevent Osama bin Laden from accessing his
money. Money laundering normally involves dirty money, whereas he is
able to engage in clean money. 2"
The Keeping America Safe Act of 2001 focuses on aliens and how the
United States government would deal with them post-September llth.
Rep. Robert E. Andrews (D- NJ) introduced legislation that would amend
the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(V) and
(iii)(IV)(V) to provide for "the inadmissibility of aliens who aid or abet a
terrorist organization, including those designated as foreign terrorist
organizations pursuant to INA § 219, or aid and abet an individual who has
conducted, is conducting, or is planning to conduct a terrorist activity." 245
Another act that focuses on aliens is the Criminal Alien Visa Denial
Act of 2001, introduced by Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.). This Act
provides for a coordinated effort between the United States State
Department and the INS to share access to United States criminal databases
before an alien is allowed to enter the country.3" The interaction between
the State Department and INS may be expanded with the passage of
Senator Edward M. Kennedy's (D-Mass.) bill. It would provide electronic
access for both the State Department and INS to criminal history records
held by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to determine whether a
visa applicant has a criminal history.' 7
Besides being concerned with aliens, Congress has also been busy
providing for the armed services. In a House defense authorization bill
Congress allocated $343 billion to the armed services to help with border
243. Id.
244. Id. (describing dirty money as the proceeds from say drug trafficking going through
the financial system as a way to make it look clean whereas clean money is harder to track
because it normally consists of money that has been donated to a charity and later used for
criminal endeavors).
245. Legislative Activity Veers Toward Border Control, Scrutiny of Aliens, INTERPRETER
RELEASES, Oct. 1, 2001, at 1528 (acknowledging that the amendment would also amend §
237(a)(4)(B) to "provide for the deportation of those aliens deemed inadmissible under the new §
212(a)(3)(B)(i)").
246. Id. (explaining the importance of this measure by citing an example of how an alien
can enter the United States, commit a crime, leave, and get permission to reenter from the
United States State Department without being detected because previously the State Department
could not access the National Crime Information Center [hereinafter NCIC] database).
247. Id. (indicating that this would amend INS § 105 by making it easier to obtain these
records, whereas in the past there were many regulations standing in the way of the information
sharing requested).
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patrol efforts.241 Not everyone supported this legislation however. Reps.
Solomon Ortiz (D-Tex.) and Silvestre Reyes (D-Tex.) opposed this
amendment arguing that military training does not automatically equate to
border patrol and that they are already understaffed.249 Rep. Sheila Jackson
Lee (D-Tex.) also pointed out that this legislation might be unconstitutional
because it allows military personnel to serve in a civil law enforcement
capacity. 2  Along with increased spending for defense, there is also a bill
pending regarding aviation security. The bill seeks stationing federal
marshals on flights, along with increasing cockpit security and training
pilots to handle hijacking situations. 5
With Congress passing so much legislation President Bush has also
asked them to push ratification of two treaties currently stalled in the
Senate. The first is the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings, which would require prosecution, or extradition of
any individual involved in a terrorist bombing within their jurisdiction. 22
The second Convention is the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism and refers to raising or collecting money to
sponsor terrorist activities instead of bombings.2 3
Besides legislation aimed at strengthening terrorism prevention there
has also been the creation of various offices, agencies and task forces.
One is the Office of Homeland Security. According to White House
Spokesman Ari Fleischer, Tom Ridge- is expected to "craft a coordinated,
integrated and comprehensive national strategy to combat domestic
terrorism." 5 Mr. Ridge is expected to have complete authority over the
planning process, and budget authority over federal terrorism and security
248. Id. (noting that this is an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 and put forward when it was discovered that some of the terrorists had entered
the United States from Canada. "If 300,000 illegal immigrants trying to find a better life can
gain access to America, do not believe for one moment that a larger contingent of people with
evil intentions could not gain entry," Rep. Jim Traficant [D-Ohio], the one who introduced the
amendment).
249. Id.
250. Legislative Activity Veers Toward Border Control Scrutiny of Aliens, supra note 245
(indicating that this may violate the posse comitatus prohibition of USC Title 10).
251. Bush touts House aviation security measure, Oct. 27, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/10/27/rec.bush.airlines.index.html.
252. Id. (explaining that this Convention was signed January 1998 and sent to the Senate in
September of 1999 where it still remains).
253. McFeatters, supra note 224.
254. President Bush's new Director to head up the White House Office of Homeland
Security.
255. Katherine Mclntire Peters, The War at Home, govexec.com, Nov. 1, 2001, available
at available at http://www.govexec.comlfeatures/1101/1101s2.htm.
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programs.m In the beginning he needs to establish a clearinghouse in a
secure location for monitoring terrorist activity and managing the
government's response in the event of an attack. ' However, this agency
would not have military authority or intelligence gathering capabilities.-a
There are some that believe establishing another office is not the answer.
Instead of a coordinator some argue that a security Czar would be better.219
The Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF) is
another creation resulting from September l1th. This task force was
established September 19, 2001 and is charged with developing an
integrated plan to coordinate efforts in the field.- Another group to be
established was the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Centre on September
14, 2001 charged with tracking terrorist finances .?" Along with tracking
terrorist finances, President Bush wants to establish a Foreign Terrorist
Tracking Force that would be assigned the role of tightening restrictions on
immigration. 2
A task force like the above mentioned example, is needed to track
foreigners as they enter this country. There are 300 checkpoints in which
individuals can enter the United States.26 To illustrate the importance of
tracking, take Ahmed Alghamdi for example. He was a student who
legally entered the United States on a student visa but thereafter
disappeared. INS had no idea where he was until September 1 lth when he




259. Richard Forno, Homeland Cyber Security - We Need a Czar, Not a Coordinator, Oct.
23, 2001, available at http://securityfocus.com.columnists/32. ("defining a Czar as a single,
knowledgeable leader who understands the issues of 'cyber-security' and who has the real power
to enact and enforce security laws in a climate of immediate and effective action").
260. US examines new counter-terrorist technologies, INT'L DEF. REV., Nov. 1, 2001.
(establishing connections with warfighting commanders-in-chief and organizations responsible for
homeland security along with other security-related agencies within the United States and
abroad).
261. The Money Trial, supra note 241 (noting that this task force was actually created over
a year ago but did not begin operations until after the September l1th attacks).
262. Tighten U.S. Immigration Rules, AP, Oct. 30, 2001. (indicating that the goal of the
task force would be to coordinate with other federal agencies to prevent terrorists from entering
the United States). See also Somini Sengupta, U.S. Doors Indefinitely Closed to Refugees, N.Y.
TIMES SERVICE, Oct. 30,2001. (indicating that the United States is not only watching
immigrants but also refugees. Until further notice the borders will be closed to all refugees).
263. Gorman, supra note 228 (stating that United States borders are crossed 500 million
times a year with thirty-one million nonimmigrant people crossing annually with three to four
million visitors remaining after their visas have expired).
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Center.26 As a result of this there has been a call for national identification
cards and automated entry and exit systems at all major border
checkpoints.' INS Commissioner James Ziglar has promised to unveil an
automated entry-exit system at all United States airports by 2003.11
When the United States decided to begin a campaign to eradicate the
Taliban from Afghanistan and a counterterrorist offense against the al-
Qaeda network President Bush declared that "either you are with us, or
you are with the terrorists. "267 It seems that many nations of the world
heeded his declaration and have joined the battle. Even the internationally
recognized President of Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani, has publicly
supported President Bush's air strikes against his own nation.- The first
nation to side with the United States was Great Britain. Prime Minister
Tony Blair has committed 200 Royal Marine commandos to standby on
ships in the Indian Ocean with an additional 400 placed on "high
readiness" .269 Prime Minister Blair went on to state that the action was
necessary to prevent Osama bin Laden from acquiring "chemical,
biological, even nuclear weapons of mass destruction." 270 Prime Minister
John Howard of Australia has also pledged 1,500 defense personnel to join
the United States in its war against Afghanistan. 7 ' Germany has pledged
264. Id. (pointing out that nine of the other seventeen hijackers had valid visas while six
are unaccounted for).
265. Id. (crediting the national ID card to Senator Feinstein (D-Calif.) and the border
system to Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kan.)). Senators
Kennedy and Brownback are also interested in making it harder to falsify or misuse immigration
documents, establish a tracking system through the schools where these individuals are
supposedly registered, and create a way for the State Department, INS, and intelligence agencies
to share information about suspected terrorists.
266. Id.
267. Tamara Makarenko & Daphne Biliouri, Central Asian States Set to Pay the Price of
US Strikes, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV., Nov. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 1012441 (calling
his initiative Operation Enduring Freedom and launching it October 7, 2001).
268. Afghan President Supports Escalated Airstrikes, at CNN.com, (Oct. 27, 2001) (stating
that this is the best way to eradicate terrorists).
269 Michael Dobbs, Afghanistan, WASH. POST SERVICE, Oct. 27, 2001, at A19.
(indicating that this was "a huge responsibility" that was needed to "defend civilized values
around the world.")
270. Id. (noting that "if they are allowed to carry on like this, our world will be an
insecure, unsafe place, and there will be no comer of the world - particularly not a place like
Britain - that will be untouched by that.")
271. Regional Briefing, 164 FAR E. ECON. REV. 43 at 14 (Nov. 1, 2001).
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an additional 35,000 troops for the "war against terrorism" 2" while Canada
has pledged six warships, six planes and a total of 2,000 personnel. 73
Although Great Britain was the first nation to provide assistance, the
first world leader that President Bush spoke to was Russia's President
Putin.274 There are several reasons why Russia would want to side with the
United States. First, Russia does not want to see radical Islamic elements
extend into Central Asia. 73  Secondly, the United States along with the
European Union have relaxed their opposition to Russia in criticism of
their handling of Chechnya. 27 6 However, there are several Russian military
leaders who do not think that this cooperation is a good idea, arguing that
Russia should be more concerned about Iraqi's security than the United
States' .277 As a result, President Puttin has stated that Russian airspace can
only be used for humanitarian missions.
2 8
Since September 11th, Japan has undergone a remarkable
transformation in military presence. As a result of World War II, Japan
had severe restrictions as to what sort of military operations it could
conduct. But that may all change very soon. At the end of October, Japan
approved a measure authorizing Japanese military support to the United
States led anti-terror campaign. This could pave the way for Japanese
troops to be sent overseas, however, they would not be permitted to
engage in combat.2 7 9 The legislation also allows the Japanese military to
272. Christoph Bluth, Germany Considers 'was on Terror Role, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE
REV., Nov. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 10122422 (indicating that Special forces could also
be sent).
273. Parliament Authorizes Japan Support Troops, AP, Oct. 30, 2001; see also, Hans
Greimel, Japan Passes Law to Join Terror War, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001.
274. Timothy J. Colton & Michael McFaul, America's Real Russian Allies, FOREIGN AFF.,
Nov. 1, 2001, at 46. (noting that many believe that Russia came to the United States' side so
quickly as a way for President Putin to later link the United States' stand against terrorism with
their own battle against Chechn rebels).
275. Makarenko and Biliouri, supra note 267.
276. Id.
277. Colton and McFaul, supra note 267 (recognizing however that the Russian people
support the United States in part of a deep support of democracy).
278. Makarenko and Biliouri, supra note 267. (indicating that he believed the way to
eradicate terrorism was by "tackling poverty, international conflicts and other problems that have
been correlated with the rise of terrorist groups").
279. Parliament Authorizes Japan Support Troops, supra note 273;. see also, Hans
Greimel, Japan Passes Law to Join Terror War, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001. (pointing
out that Japan may begin transporting weapons and ammunition in the war against terror in the
air or on the high seas but not on foreign soil).
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guard United States bases on Japanese soil along with permitting their
coast guard to fire on suspicious vessels.2
Another country to pledge support to the campaign against terrorism
has been China. Its President, Jiang Zemin, said that he condemns all
terrorism and would support the United States' attack against Afghanistan
and the Taliban as along as it was directed at military targets and not the
Afghan people or Islam in particular.u' He went on to add that China and
the United States, as major influences in the world, have a responsibility to
protect peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world.12
There is speculation however that the attacks in Afghanistan could
destabilize neighboring Central Asian States and make it easier for
authoritarian rule to rise along with an increase in indigenous Islamic
militance. 283 The irony is that Central Asian States have been seeking
Western support in their battle against terrorism and until September 1 lth
their voices were ignored.- However, now they have a strategic
advantage over the United States who could use their locations for
President Bush's "sustained and relentless" terrorism campaign.25
Uzbekistan's President, Islam Karimov, has stated that he would
cooperate "[i]f investigation[s] proves that the terror attacks had been
prepared on the territory of Afghanistan," indicating that "there must be
retribution." 26 The current state of dialogue between the two nations
would allow the United States access to Uzbekistan airspace and airbases
along with an exchange of intelligence.2 7 In return for this concession, the
United States has agreed to target Afghanistan training camps that trained
members of the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).n 8
Tajikistan is also getting involved in the campaign to eradicate
terrorism. Prior to September 11 th, the President of Tajikistan, Imamali
280. Parliament Authorizes Japan Support Troops, supra note 273; see also, Greimel,
supra note 279.
281. John Hill, China Sides With USA, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV., Nov. 1, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 10122415.
282. Id.
283. Makarenko & Biliouri, supra note 267.
284. Id. (pointing out that these nations have been asking for help since the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) conducted its first wave of terrorism in Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan back in 1999).
285. Id.
286. Id. (recognizing that Uzbekistan would be an ideal nation to have on the United States'
side because of its strategic location allowing for sustained attacks on terrorist training camps and
Taliban installations within Afghanistan).
287. Id. (limiting its missions to humanitarian and search-and rescue operations).
288. Makarenko & Biliouri, supra note 267.
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Rakhmonov, had supported counterterrorism measures in the
Commonwealth of Independent States and Central Asia, making it seem
that he would join in the efforts of the United States.8 9 President Bush
believes that Tajikistan could be beneficial in the campaign to arm the
Taliban opposition by utilizing routes through the country that have been
previously used by Russia and its allies to aid the Northern Alliance, the
opposition force against the Taliban.
2
10
Lebanon is also supporting the anti-terrorism campaign. They have
pledged their support and stationed additional troops at embassies and other
interests of countries supporting the campaign.2 9, Along with additional
troops, Lebanon has staged drills to practice for various hijacking
situations. 292  It is not just individual nations that are supporting the
campaign against terrorism; there are also global organizations that are
aiding in the effort. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum is one
such organization. 93 However, not all nations or organizations are in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The only involvement that Iran
will have in the campaign is to continue supplying the Northern Alliance
because it does not support military retaliation by the United States.
2
94
Nations around the world are not just aiding the United States. They
are also passing legislation back home to strengthen their own terrorism
laws. Surprisingly this includes laws regarding cyberterrorism. The
European Union (EU) in conjunction with the Council of Europe (COE)
have proposed cybercrime legislation in an attempt to prevent the "misuse
of the Internet." 91 The COE has also received support from all fifteen EU
countries on the world's first international agreement on crimes committed
289. Id. (acknowledging however that their support may be minimal and hidden due to the
lack of border control and factionalism).
290. Id. (noting however that border issues have to be discussed because as the campaign
against Afghanistan intensifies many refugees with be leaving Afghanistan via Tajikistan).
291. Beirut Demonstrates Will to Fight Terror With Drill, Oct. 26, 2001.
292. Id.
293. Regional Briefing, supra note 271 (acknowledging their statement condemning
terrorism along with calling for heightened security for telecommunications and transport and
promised "appropriate financial measures" to stop terrorist funding).
294. Makarenko & Biliouri, supra note 267 (noting that Iran believes that any terrorist
campaign against Afghanistan should also include a war on drugs). See also U.S. Sees Broader
Role in Columbia as Part of Anti-Terror Fights, Oct. 26, 2001 (pointing out that the United
States' war on terrorism has expanded beyond Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden. The United
States has pledged counterterrorism aid to Colombia in addition to military aid to assist in their
war on drugs).
295. Computer Crime: In Wake of September 11 Attacks, EU, COE Move Closer to
Approving Cybercrime Rules, INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 2, 2001. (acknowledging however
that the European Parliament is concerned about jurisdiction and privacy rights conflicts).
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in cyberspace.2 9 The Convention calls for the parties to "cooperate ... to
the widest extent possible" in investigation and prosecution of computer
related offenses along with the "collection of electronic evidence of a
criminal offense."297 Germany is also looking to pass local legislation that
would make it easier to use informants in criminal prosecutions along with
requiring fingerprints for passports and identity cards. 98
Since the September 1 lth attacks, attitudes towards money laundering
have changed. The American government along with other nations and
organizations now acknowledge the tracing of money and restricting its
flow to terrorist groups are key elements in the war against terrorism. 29
Following these attacks sixty-six countries have introduced legislation to
block the assets of organizations identified by the United States as terrorist
in nature.3°° While many nations are strengthening their money laundering
laws, Italy has actually become more lax with the passage of legislation
making it more difficult to investigate cross-border financial flows. 01
It is not just nations that are looking at these laws, multinational
organizations are also amending their provisions regarding money
laundering. As a way to combat money laundering the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) held an emergency
meeting to look at the financing of terrorist groups.3" The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision released previously prepared guidelines
on the subject. 3 The Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum also
indicated that it would tighten its money-laundering laws while the
296. Id. (referring to the agreement as the European Cybercrime Convention and also
indicating that there might be problems passing the legislation if separate approval is required
from the EU and national ratification).
297. Id. (listing offenses that must be criminalized - computer related forgery, computer-
related fraud, content related offenses like child pornography on the Internet along with
intellectual property right infringements).
298. Bluth, supra note 272 (noting that this was done after it was learned from FBI
intelligence that many of the terrorists involved in the September llth attacks had resided in
Germany before coming to the Unites States for flight school).
299. The Money Trial, supra note 241.
300. Id. (acknowledging that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are among the
sixty-six nations, which is crucial because a lot of money that finances Osama bin Laden's al-
Qaeda network is believed to have originated in these countries). See also, Money Laundering:
France Moves to Freeze Financial Assets of Terrorist Organizations Listed by U.S., INT'L BUS.
& FIN. DAILY, Sept. 27, 2001 (pointing out that France was the first nation to comply with
President Bush's bid to curb the money flow by groups linked to the September attacks. Between





European Union indicated that it would broaden its efforts to prevent
laundering earned or used in all serious crimes.0 The United Nations
Security Council also passed a money-laundering provision? 5
Along with the money laundering legislation that Congress passed the
United States has implemented Operation Green Quest to target
underground money transfers.30 6 It will be housed in the United States
Customs Service headquarters and staffed by financial crime investigators
from the Treasury and Justice Departments.3 °7 This operation will
hopefully reveal new information on sources of terrorist funding and
systems similar to hawala, a way to evade legal banking systems by
transferring money from one source to another via different countries.308
In the beginning, the operation is slated to focus on illicit charities,
counterfeiting, credit card fraud, fraudulent export and import schemes,
drug trafficking, and cash smuggling. 3
Many experts around the world believe that the events of September
1 1th were the work of Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network. There
is debate not only as to whether he is in fact the mastermind behind these
attacks but also what should be done to him if he is in fact responsible.
Some say that there should be no trial and he should just be killed as soon
as he is apprehended. 310 Others believe that he should be put on trial in the
United States as a way to prove that the American system of justice can
still function in times of adverse circumstances."' But does anyone believe
that any courtroom in the country could pull together an unbiased jury to
try him?
304. Id.
305. Money-Laundering: Security Council Passes Resolution Outline Strategy to Combat
Terrorism, INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 2, 2001 (outlining its provisions as a "multi-faceted
strategy, including criminalization of funding for terror attacks and freezing of assets for anyone
who facilitates such acts").
306. Customs Service Goes After Terrorist Funding, Oct. 25, 2001, available at
www.cnn.com/2001/US/10/25/inv.terrorist.funding/index.html. (indicating that this refers to the
"hawala" system concentrated in the Middle East and South Asia).
307. Rob Garver, Terro-Fund 'Quest' From Treasury, AM. BANKER, Oct. 26, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 26574662 (quoting Treasury Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam as saying that
the "operation's objective is to 'launch comprehensive investigations resulting in blocking orders,
criminal prosecutions, civil and criminal forfeitures, and other actions'").
308. Customs Service Goes After Terrorist Funding, supra note 306.
309. Id.
310. Henry Weinstein, A Trial Too Big for U.S.?: Trying Osama Bin Laden, if He's Ever
Caught, Could be a Showcase for American Principles or a Platform for His Extremist Views.
Some See a Security Nightmare, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at 2001 WL 28923653.
311. Id. (pointing out that this may not be the safest way to go because there is no
guarantee that United States citizens would be safe in the same courtroom as Osama bin Laden).
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The debate over a trial has emerged as a result of President Bush
calling for Osama bin Laden's capture. Both United States and
international law would call for a trial if he was in fact apprehended .' 2 If
Osama bin Laden was tried in the United States, any city in which the
flights originated could serve as proper venue along with where the flights
crashed or even where the pilots trained or opened bank accounts." 3 If
however, it was decided that Osama bin Laden would be tried overseas,
according to a hijacking convention adopted thirty years ago, he could be
tried in any of the eighty nations who lost citizens in the attack.3' Some
argue that an international trial would be more appropriate because of the
international cooperation that exists to handle the situation.3', The United
Nations Charter would provide another path. Chapter 7 provides the
Security Council with authority to create special courts when peace and
security are threatened." 6 A problem with all of these solutions is that it
provides Osama bin Laden with a public forum. Not only could he recruit
more followers but also classified information could be revealed that would
compromise United States intelligence sourcesY.17  Osama bin Laden has
spoken once publicly since the events of September 1 lth. He was quoted
as saying that "America will not live in peace' unless the United States
withdraws its troops-'the army of infidels'-from Saudi Arabia and ceases
its support for Israel. "38
Prior to the attacks as previously indicated in this paper, Osama bin
Laden has been known to keep in contact with his followers via satellite
phones and the Internet. Intelligence reports foiled a Paris Embassy plot
masterminded by one of Osama bin Laden's cells. There it was
determined that all communications regarding the plot were to be carried
312. Id. (indicating that if Osama bin Laden was captured and tried in the United States he
could also be tried for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were 224 people were
killed and an additional 5,000 injured).
313. Id. (noting that there are persuasive arguments for trying Osama bin Laden in the
United States. The attacks occurred on United States soil, violated numerous United States laws
and most of the victims were United States citizens).
314. Id. (acknowledging that the Convention binds 175 signatory countries to prosecute
hijackers and their accomplices or extradite them to countries that will).
315. Weinstein, supra note 310 (explaining that by trying Osama bin Laden in the United
States it would "shift attention from the global nature of the attack" causing an "enormous"
amount of "legitimacy, certainly in Muslim countries," Anne-Marie Slaughter, a professor of
International Law at Harvard University).
316. Id. (noting that this is what was done to investigate the war crimes in Yugoslavia).




out via coded messages hidden in pictures on the Internet 1 9 However,
since the September ilth attacks Osama bin Laden has been evading
authorities by returning to "stone age" communication.31 Despite bin
Laden's return to the "Stone Age" it is still thought that his cells
communicate via encrypted Internet messages.3 2' Even if an encrypted
message is discovered, there is little that can be done unless the
government has access to a supercomputer and then there is usually not
enough time to decrypt it.322
While Osama bin Laden may be going low-tech, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) is going high-tech. Since September llth, the FBI
has increased Internet surveillance and setup a website to monitor
developments surrounding the plane attacks.13 However, despite the FBI's
increased cyber presence other federal agencies are scrutinizing their
websites and removing any information that they believe would benefit a
terrorist. 2  No one is exactly sure what information is valuable but
Attorney General Ashcroft pointed out that an individual in federal custody
was discovered to have downloaded information on crop-dusting planes
that could be used for biological or chemical attacks.2
Early in October, a government antiterrorism commission
recommended that a cybercourt be established to prosecute hackers. 26
Governor Gilmore3 27 believes "[a] court dedicated to criminal cyber
conduct can develop the needed expertise to act appropriately on
investigative activities while ensuring the protection of civil rights and
liberties."3 2- The court would sit in "secret" and possess special powers
319. Chris Hedges, The Terrorist Who Lived Next Door, N.Y. TIMES SERVICE, Oct. 27,
2001.
320. Daniel Sieberg, Bin Laden Exploits Technology to Suit His Needs, Sept. 21, 2001,
available at www.cnn.com/2001/us/09/20/inv.terrorist.search-index.html. (indicating that
instead of satellite-linked phones, mobile handsets, and Internet access he is now simply
receiving emissaries and issuing orders in person).
321. Id. (noting that they use these methods to cover their tracks when sending e-mails and
coordinating their movements).
322. Id.
323. FBI hunts for attackers online, Sept. 13, 2001, at www.cnn.com/2001/Business/
asia/09/13/wash.tbiwebsite/index.html.
324. Feds Remove Information From Web Sites, AP, Oct. 25, 2001.
325. Id.
326. Anita Ramasastry, FindLaw Forum: We Don't Need a Secret New 'Cybercourt' for
Hackers: Why The Gilmore Commission's Recent Proposal Should Be Rejected, at htttp://unit.
news.findlaw.com/coilimentar/2001/024_ramasastry.html (recognizing the need based on the
slowness of acquiring warrants to investigate online crime).
327. Governor of Virginia and Chairman of the Commission.
328. Ramasastry. supra note 326.
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regarding search and surveillance.3 29 This court would be modeled after the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court.13 Some believe that a
cybercourt goes to far and argue that instead of establishing a new court
we should allow the existing courts to do their jobs. Over the years, courts
have taken existing laws and applied them to technological advancements
and many believe that they could do the same thing here.33' An alternative
suggestion would be to allow the existing FISA court to serve as the
cybercourt as well since they both potentially involve national security
issues. 33 2
Since the September 1 1th attacks the United States has also been hit
with an outbreak of anthrax. There is still debate as to where the anthrax
is coming from with experts taking sides, arguing that it was either
domestic or foreign in nature. Almost all experts admit that there has not
been a direct link to any foreign organization. Although there is a report
of Osama bin Laden buying $10,000 worth of anthrax on the open market
in Eastern Europe and South-East Asia. 3  There is another report that his
associates were able to obtain $3,685 worth of anthrax from a factory
supplied to the Indonesian-based Islamic Moro Front. 34
Gerald Brown, a retired United States Air force anti-terrorism
specialist believes that the anthrax is "homegrown. '' 33  However, there are
also those who believe that the letters were written by people who are not
familiar with the English language or are unfamiliar with American
329. Id.
330. Id. (acknowledging that this court consists of a rotating membership of United States
federal district court judges). There has been a lot of criticism from civil rights organizations
regarding this court because it conducts its proceedings in secret and does not have to adhere to
traditional Fourth Amendment guarantees. The purpose of the court is to deal with government
surveillance and reviews Justice Department's requests for electronic surveillance and physical
searches of individuals who are suspected to be national security risks. The point of contention is
the fact that everything is done in secret, thus people would may not even know that their home
was searched or their phone tapped The defendant may not even have access to the reasons why
they were subjected to a search and the resulting information may later be used in a criminal
prosecution.
331. Id. (noting that judges have been able to apply the Fourth Amendment to global
positioning devices and infrared heat sensors).
332. Id.
333. Katty Kay, Bin Laden Link to 'Mail Order Germs,' THE LONDON TIMES, Oct. 25,
2001, available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0, 2001350024-200137116,00.html
(suggesting that along with the anthrax Osama Bin Laden also acquired salmonella and e-coli
from mail order factories).
334. Id.
335. Peter Slevin, Are the Anthrax Letters Homegrown?, WASH. POST SERVICE, Oct. 26,
2001, at A23.
Ganeles
handwriting.336 Although, there is also a theory that the letters were in fact
written by a native English-speaker who is just trying to focus suspicion
elsewhere. 3"' Or it could even be an individual trying to be childlike in
nature. 38 There is some speculation that Iraq is behind the anthrax letters
as well but there has been no definitive link to this theory.3 9 Anthrax is
also beginning to appear outside of the United States. On October 11 th,
numerous letters were received in Germany claiming to contain anthrax
spores and an indication that the "jihad" had begun. Brazil, Argentina,
and the Bahamas have also reported anthrax-contaminated letters.3"
It is hard to know what is going to happen from here but I think that it
is safe to assume that life will never return to pre-September 1 1th
existence. Whether this means that there will be a renewed patriotism or
people living constantly in fear, one thing is certain; nothing will be
overlooked or believed not to be possible. Hopefully, we have seen the




339. Seeing the World Anew, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2001.
340. Bluth, supra note 272.
341. The Anthrax Threat, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2001.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act created a "complete divorcement"
between commercial and investment banking.' Under this legislation,
commercial banks were prohibited from engaging in the underwriting of
securities.2 In addition, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 restricted
the ability of bank holding companies to enter into various business arenas
or to purchase other banks.' However, over the years, banks have found
loopholes to expand their business and to avoid such banking regulations.
As the Glass-Steagall Act was diluted by numerous Federal Reserve
Board rulings and bank activities, it became apparent that there was a need
for new legislation.4 Glass-Steagall was out of date, and it was restricting
United States banking institutions here and abroad by limiting commercial
banks and their affiliates from engaging in investment opportunities. The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 19991 ("GLB") repealed Glass-Steagall's
Section 20, which banned affiliations between member banks of the
Federal Reserve and firms that were "engaged principally in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution.. .of stocks, bonds,
Sarah Smith is a law student at the Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern
University, Florida. She has a B.A. in History from the University of Virginia.
1. Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING
INST. 221, 223-85 (2000) (citing S. Rep. No. 73-1455, at 185 (1934)).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Markham, supra note 1.
5. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
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debentures, notes, or other securities," 6 and Section 32, which provided
that "[n]o officer, director, or employee" of a company engaged
principally in underwriting securities could concurrently serve "as an
officer, director, or employee", of a Federal Reserve member bank."
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ratified what had already been
accomplished through legal loopholes. GLB maintains the functional
regulatory system as the basis for regulating the expanded activities of the
banks and their holding company structures. 9 This means that traditional
commercial banking activities would continue to be regulated by the bank
regulators and securities activities would be regulated by the SEC and state
securities commissions. By eliminating prohibitions on affiliations between
commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance companies, GLB
is expected to initiate a new wave of mergers as securities underwriters,
insurers, and banks combine to form more diversified financial services
corporations.
Financial services have become increasingly globalized as of late.' 0
GLB has set the stage not only for a wide array of mergers and
acquisitions domestically, but GLB also provides avenues for foreign banks
to enter the United States financial services market and for United States
financial companies to pursue interests in other countries." However, the
initial enactment of GLB was discriminatory against foreign banks electing
to become financial holding companies in that GLB provided different
standards for foreign and domestic applicants.
Since the enactment of GLB, the Federal Reserve Board has issued an
interim ruling and several amendments to the interim rule that clarify the
process of becoming a financial holding company.,, This article will
examine how these rulings affect German banks. The first section will
describe the German banking system, which is a complex system of
banking institutions and credit cooperatives. The second section will take a
6. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1993) (repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1993) (repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)).
8. Patricia A. McCoy, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, at
http://www.bender.com/bender/open/webdriver?Mlval =chan&channelD =banking (last visited
Aug. 29, 2001).
9. L. Richard Fischer, Financial Services Modernization 2001: Implementation of the
Gramm-Leach-Blilev Act, SF57 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 445 (2001).
10. Id.
11. McCoy, supra note 8.
12. Bank holding companies and change in bank control, 65 Fed. Reg. 3785 (Jan. 25,
2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 21, 2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 16302 (Mar. 28, 2000).
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closer look at the Glass-Steagall and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Acts. The third
section will analyze the new regulations established by the Federal
Reserve's interim ruling and amendments of Gramm-Leach Bliley, and
how these rulings pertain to German banks wishing to become financial
holding companies under GLB. This paper will show that the new
regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board will alleviate burdens the
Act placed on German banks by equalizing the playing field between
foreign and domestic entities.
II. STRUCTURE OF GERMAN BANKS
The German banking system varies significantly from that of the
United States in form and permissible activities. It is, therefore, important
to understand the structure of the German banking system before analyzing
how United States laws affect foreign banks.
German banks offer a wide range of financial services, some of which
are prohibited activities in the United States.'3 There is no division
between commercial and investment banking in Germany.14 Thus, the
universal banking system allows banks to own equity in and/or control
commercial, industrial, and insurance companies." As long as non-
banking corporations are deemed "reliable" by the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur
das Kreditwesen (Federal Supervisory Authority), such corporations may
own up to 100 percent of a banking corporation's equity interest. 6
Banks in Germany have taken the role of initiators, advisers, and
financiers of mergers and acquisitions.'7 While all German banks have the
power of universal banking, only a few actually underwrite securities. 'S
Instead, the German banking system is highly segregated. The banking
industry is divided into three major sectors: public sector banks,
cooperative banks, and private banks.19 The Genossenschaftsbanken, or
credit cooperative sector, primarily deals with small business and
13. See generally Helen A. Garten, Universal Banking and Financial Stability, 19 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 159 (1993).
14. Hwa-Jin Kim, Markets, Financial Institutions, and Corporate Governance:
Perspectives From Germany, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 371 (1995).
15. Id.
16. Mark E. Nance & Bernd Singhof, Banking's Influence Over Non-Bank Companies
After Glass-Steagall: A German Universal Comparison, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1305 (2000).
17. Id.
18. Kim, supra note 14.
19. James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider's Look into the Regulation of Insider Trading in
Germany: A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz Deutschland, 19
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1996).
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agricultural financing.10 The Geschaftsbanken are private commercial
banks.' Finally, the Sparkassen and Landesbanken, which are public
savings banks, maintain a majority of deposits and dominate the local
market.Y
The group of credit associations, or Genossenschaftsbanken, is
composed of local associations (Volksbanken and Raiffeisenbanken), their
regional institutions (Zentralbanken), and a central institution (Deutsche
Genossenschaftsbank). 2 The local credit associations are structured in the
form of co-operatives. Banking services under the Genossenschaftsbanken
were initially only accessible to members, who had set up the co-operatives
as "self-made banks" to finance agricultural and industrial undertakings.24
Their business today encompasses all types of financial services and is no
longer limited to members. In regards to branching, the
Genossenschaftsbanken constitute the most widespread banking group in
Germany today, with a market share of approximately twenty-one
percent."
The Geschaftsbanken, or private commercial banks, developed as the
country industrialized in the nineteenth century.26 The lack of an equity
market capable of meeting the financial needs of emerging industrial
enterprises forced Germans to turn to banks for capital. Thus, during the
nineteenth century, banks and industry developed a close relationship.27 In
the twentieth century, these relationships were strengthened in the inter-
war years, when banks were obligated to take stock as protection from
financially troubled companies.28 Following World War II, German capital
markets were once again weakened. The reconstruction of the destroyed
industry heavily depended upon the Marshall Plan, which poured a
significant amount of United States' funds into Germany. 29 After initial




23. Theodore Baums & Michael Gruson, The German Banking Sstem-System of the
Future?, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L 101 (1993).
24. Id.
25. Mance & Singhof, supra note 16, at 1355.
26. Id. at 1356.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1356.
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abandoned, the large commercial banks regained their prominent position
within the German economy?
Currently, the private commercial banks are divided into four
categories. These types consist of big branch banks (GroSSbanken),
regional.banks (Regionalbanken), private bankers (Privatbankiers), and the
branches of foreign banks. Regional banks are organized either as stock
corporations (Aktiengesellschaft-AG) or as limited liability companies
(Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung-GmbH). 1 These regional banks
maintain a nationwide network of branches with a concentration on a
specific region. 2 In contrast, private bankers comprise all banks organized
as partnerships. Nearly all of these private commercial banks function as
universal banks.3   They, therefore, engage in all types of banking
operations. 4 The private commercial banks comprise thirty-five percent of
the commercial bank market share. 3
Sparkassen, or savings banks, are established by cities and
incorporated under state public law.36 Throughout German history,
municipalities and counties considered the opportunity to earn interest on
deposits (of any amount) to be part of their public welfare function. 37 In
order to provide their citizens with this service, counties and cities formed
Sparkassen. Savings banks focus on traditional banking services.38 These
services include the extension of commercial loans and the acceptance of
deposits (that the depositor may withdraw upon demand).3 9 Savings banks'
operations are limited to the locality of the establishing municipality or
district, under what is referred to as Regionalprinzip (or the "territorial
principle").40
30. Nance & Singhof, supra note 16.
31. The so-called "Big Three" (Deutsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG, and
Commerzbank AG) have become a party of four after the merger of Bayerische Hypotheken und
Wechselbank and Bayerische Vereinsbank AG into Bayerische HypoVerinsbank. By the end of
2000, it was expected that there would be a party of three again as a result of a proposed merger
between Dresdner Bank AG and Deutsche Bank. Even though this particular merger failed,
other mergers of significance are likely to ensue. Id.
32. Nance & Singhof, supra note 16.
33. Id. at 1357.
34. See generally Garten, supra note 13.
35. Nance & Singhof, supra note 16, at 1357.




40. Kim, supra note 14.
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Like the majority of German banks, Landesbanken are universal
banks engaging in both investment banking and commercial banking
functions." In addition, Landesbanken invest in commercial and industrial
ventures.42  Landesbanken are not corporations; instead, they are
established under public law, and their obligations are guaranteed by the
German States.'3
Landesbanken play a vital role in the German banking business and in
the sector of international financial institutions.u One reason for this
position is their close connection with their sponsoring state or political
subdivision of a state."3 Unlike commercial banks organized as entities
under the general corporate law, the internal structure of Landesbanken is
congruous with the requirements of their regulatory supervision."
Landesbanken are at a disadvantage to other German banking institutions
in that it is more difficult for Landesbanken to create new capital. 7
However, Landesbanken provide a unique protection for all customers,
whether as depositors, fund transfer customers, purchasers of securities, or
other types of customers.48 The Landesbanken's lengthy history of more
than 100 years has demonstrated the fortitude of the.public sector banking
organization and has shown that the states and their subdivisions have
benefited from the system of the Landesbanken.'9
The universal banks are valid throughout the European Union
("EU").10 Each member state of the EU recognizes the banking license of
the universal banks, subject to limitations. Since they are not hampered by
restrictions on activities or by geographic limitations, some larger German
banks are actively engaged in United States banking and capital markets.'
Bayerische Landesbank, Westdeutsche Landesbank, and Landedscreditbank
41. Michael Gruson & Uwe H. Schneider, The German Landesbanken, 1995 COLUM.




45. Gruson & Schneider, supra note 41, at 355.
46. Id.
47. See Gruson & Schneider, supra note 41.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Peter Q. Noack, West German Bank Secrecy: A Barrier to SEC Insider-Trading
Investigations, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609(1987).
51. Nance & Singhof, supra note 16, at 1353.
Smith
Baden-Wurttemberg have all made public offerings of debt securities in the
United States.2
The EU has encouraged the proliferation of financial services abroad.
As the world's third largest economic power, Germany has sought to
expand its financial strength into other countries, primarily the United
States.53 However, as German financial institutions expand into different
countries, the banks must comply with the laws of the various countries.
1I. REGULATIONS ON UNITED STATES BANKING
Following the United States stock market crash of 1929, the Glass-
Steagall Act was enacted.- Since it was thought that banks' involvement in
the stock market was a contributing factor to the crash, the Act sought to
divide commercial banking and investment banking in the United States. 5
By prohibiting banks from underwriting securities, the federal government
sought to protect investors' The law also prohibited affiliates of banks
from being principally engaged in underwriting securities, and banned
banks and securities finms from sharing board members and directors. 57
The United States entered into its worst depression after the stock
market crash of "Black Thursday" on Wall Street, October 24, 1929.
With more than 11,000 commercial bank failures from 1930 to 1933, the
number of functioning commercial banks was reduced by more than forty
percent from 25,000 to 14,000.11 A quarter of the working population
became unemployed by 1933.- 9 Under the newly elected Roosevelt
administration, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, which
prohibited commercial banks from engaging in securities transactions (the
principal exception being that commercial banks were allowed to
underwrite most government-issued bonds).6 It was the prevailing belief
that the cause for these bank failures and the stock market crash was the
involvement of banks in securities transactions. 6'
52. Id.
53. Freis, supra note 19.





59. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley,
25 J. CORP. L. 691 (2000).
60. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994).
61. Adam Nguyen & Matt Watkins, Financial Services Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
579 (2000).
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Populist sentiment, not careful inquiry, encouraged the passage of the
Glass-Steagall Act." In light of disclosures of disreputable practices and
dishonest dealings with such banks as National City Bank, public mistrust
of speculative securities dealings carried over into commercial banking.
This hastened the enactment of the Glass-Steagall regulatory measures.63
Some historians now attribute the bank failures to the Depression itself,
which caused real estate and other values to fall, thus undermining bank
loans." Furthermore, these historians note that securities abuses played a
minor role in the collapse of banks. There were few failures among the
New York banks, which had the largest Wall Street operations. 61 Actually,
the legislative history to the Glass-Steagall Act does not indicate that
Congress blamed banks or their securities for the onset of the Great
Depression, but instead, shows congressional concern with the relationship
between commercial banks and their subsidiaries that underwrote
securities, and the ability of the banks, through their subsidiaries, to
dominate corporate underwriting."
Since the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, banks and other financial
service industries gradually chipped away at the restrictions between
commercial and investment banking.7 The banking industry pressed for
almost two decades for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and for changes
to the Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA")." Regulatory interpretation,
cross-industry relationships, court rulings, and marketplace practices had
an impact on the practicality of these two statutes, but no legislative action
was taken. 69
The business of traditional banking and investment banking had
converged prior to enactment of GLB.7°  In addition, banks were
significantly involved in the insurance business through such sources of
authority as "the place of 5000" exception to Section 92 of the National
62. Markham, supra note 1, at 237.
63. See Macey, supra note 59.
64. Id.
65. Laura J. Cox, The Impact of Citicorp-Travelers Group Merger on Financial
Modernization and the Repeal of Glass-Steagall, 23 NOVA L. REV. 899, 902 (1999) (citing
Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 57 (1987)).
66. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The "Great Fall:" The Consequences of Repealing the Glass-
Steagall Act, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 129, 138 (1995) (citing 75 Cong. Rec. 9887 (1933) and
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Banking Act ("NBA")," and Section 24 (Seventh) of the NBA, providing
that national banks may engage in the business of banking and "all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking." ' 2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank of Marion
County v. Nelson" held that state legislation could not restrict national
banks from selling insurance.
Likewise, insurance companies started to sell securities-e.g.,
products such as variable annuities-and found ways to bypass restrictions
of the BHCA, which prohibited mixing of banking and nonbanking
activities." Some strategies to achieve this consisted of owning a thrift
subsidiary," a "nonbank" bank,' 6 and operating a limited purpose trust."
United States Senator Gramm of Texas, in a November 3, 1999 floor
statement, summarized this evolution:
This bill we bring to the floor of the Senate basically
knocks down the barriers in American law that separate
banking from insurance and banking from securities, These
walls, over time, because of innovative regulators and
because of the pressure of the market system, have come
71. The National Bank Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 752, 753-54 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 92
(1994)), permits a national bank located in a place with a population of less than five thousand
people to act as an insurance agent. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court held that this
statute was still on the books. See United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins.
Agents ofAmer., 508 U.S. 439, 463 (1993).
72. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994). See also NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (holding that the sale of annuities by national banks to their
customers was "incidental" to "the business of banking" under the National Bank Act. Variable
annuities were held to be financial products).
73. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
74. The variable annuity was held to be a security by the Supreme Court. See SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 71-72 (1959). Annuity premiums were
invested in securities, and therefore the performance of such investments determined the income
of the variable annuity, a product sold to compete with mutual funds.
75. The Savings and Loan Holding Company Act (Codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1730A (1994))
provided that a company owning a single thrift institution, with sixty-five percent or more of its
assets devoted to housing or consumer-related lending, was not restricted to any restrictions on
other activities undertaken by the company. GLB closes this loophole.
76. A nonbank bank is an institution that failed to meet the BHCA's defimition of a bank,
which is an institution that both accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans. The
Competitive Equality Bank Act of 1987 closed this loophole, but grandfathered nonbank banks
existing as of March 5,1987. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (c)(A) (1994) (defining "bank" under the
BHCA).
77. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D) (1994). A trust company is not considered a bank
under the BHCA if functioning "solely in a trust or fiduciary capacity," accepting only trust
funds deposits (as opposed to demand deposits) and does not offer FDIC insurance.
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to look like very thin slices of Swiss cheese. As a result,
we already have substantial competition occurring, but it is
competition that is largely inefficient and costly, it is
unstable, and it is not in the public interest for this
situation to continue.7'
The convergence, which took place between banks, insurance
companies, and securities firms, and the trend toward consolidation of
these industries to create "one-stop-shop" financial centers, is best
illustrated by the 1998 merger of two large United States banks, Citicorp
and Travelers, into the conglomerate, Citigroup. 79 The Federal Reserve
Board ("FRB") approval of the merger was subject to the divestiture of the
Travelers' insurance underwriting business.80 Under the BHCA, the
divestiture period for non-conforming assets is two years by statute, with
the FRB allowed to grant three additional one-year extensions."1
Obviously, Citigroup was counting on Congress to change the laws before
the expiration of the divestiture deadline.82
In passing GLB, Congress gave formal recognition of the many
changes that had already occurred in the marketplace during the prior two
decades.'3 Senator Rod Grams of Minnesota acknowledged that the world
envisioned by GLB already existed at the time of enactment, stating that
"many times Congress shows up at the dance after the music is over."'4
However, attempts to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act began almost as
soon it was passed." The most vocal proponent of its repeal was,
ironically, one of the bill's authors, Senator Carter Glass. Only two years
after the Glass-Steagall Act was adopted, Glass believed it was a "mistake
and overreaction."86 However, the more frequent and serious reform
attempts were made in the 1980s and 1990s. The last unsuccessful attempt
78. Steve Cocheo, The "Big One" Becomes Law; S.900: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
ABA BANKING J. (1999).
79. Cox, supra note 65, at 902.
80. Id.
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1994).
82. See Cox, supra note 65.
83. Cocheo, supra note 78, at 6.
84. See Douglas P. Faucette, The Impact of Converge and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on
the Insurance Industry, 8 GEo. MASON. L. REv. 623, 629 (2000) (citing Dean Anason, Senate
Passes Reform Bill, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 1999, at 1).
85. Id.
86. See Rep. James A. Leach, Modernization of Financial Institutions, 25 IOWA J. CORP.
LAW 681, 683 (2000) (citing Robert Litan, It's Alive, Why Glass-Steagall, Reviled for Decades,
Just Won't Go Away, THE WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1998, at A6).
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was in 1998, with the proposed Financial Services Competitiveness Act of
1997. H.R. 10, introduced in the 105th Congress, would have repealed
Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, thus allowing affiliations
among banks, securities firms, and insurance firms through financial
holding companies to be regulated by the FRB.10 The proposed Act would
also have created a new entity, the Wholesale Financial Institution, which
would not accept deposits of less than $100,000, and would not be
federally insured.w The White House opposed elements of H.R. 10,
because it would have shifted some regulatory duties from the Department
of the Treasury to the FRB. The bill was approved by the full House of
Representatives on May 13, 1998 by one vote, but failed to reach a Senate
vote, due to Senator Gramm's opposition to the CRA provisions in the
bill.9
Building on the activity that took place during 1997 and 1998, early
legislation action followed in the 106th Congress. In the House of
Representatives, Representative James Leach, Chairman of the House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, introduced on January 6,
1999, H.R. 10, the "Financial Services Act of 1999."90 On March 4,
1999, the Senate Banking Committee, under the Chairmanship of Senator
Phil Gramm, revised a Committee Print that was then introduced as
S.900, the "Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999."91
On March 23, the House Committee on Banking and Financial
Services approved H.R. 10, which was then sequentially referred to the
House Commerce Committee.9 In the meantime, on April 28, 1999, the
Senate Banking Committee formally filed S.900, Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999, in the Senate.9 On May 6, 1999, the Senate
passed an amended version of S.900, by a vote of 54-44. The House
Committee on Commerce, under Chairman Thomas Bliley, reported its
own version of H.R. 10 on June 15, 1999." Subsequently, the House
Rules Committee resolved differences between the two versions of H.R.




90. H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999).
91. Financial Service Modernization Act of 1999, Report of the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, to accompany S.900 together with Additional
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July 1, 1999 by a vote of 343-86." H.R. 10 and S.900 then went to
conference under bill number S.900.96
On August 3, 1999, the Conference Committee held its first meeting,
chaired by the Chairman of the House Banking Committee, Representative
James Leach (Republican, Iowa)."' On October 12, 1999, Chairman
Gramm, Leach, and Bliley released a "Chairmen's Mark," which became
the document from which the conference committee would work." On
October 14, 1999, the Department of Treasury and the FRB reached a
compromise over their corresponding supervisory roles."' On October 22,
1999, the conference committee held a final meeting. A compromise was
reached on CRA, and the bill was named the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
The Conference Report,19' together with the Statement of Managers
Summary of Major Provisions dated November 1, 1999, was approved
and signed by majority of conferees on November 2, 1999. °10 On
November 4, 1999, the Senate approved the Conference Report on S.900,
by a vote of 90-8.102 The House of Representatives followed within hours
by a vote of 362-57.9' On November 12, 1999, the President signed the
bill into law.'°GLB repeals Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act. 10 Section
20 prohibited member banks from affiliating with a company "engaged
principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution
at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or other securities."'9' The Act also repealed Section
32 of Glass-Steagall which provided that "no officer, director or
employee" of a firm principally engaged in underwriting securities may
serve "as an officer, director, or employee" of a member bank of the
95. Id.









105. GLB did not affect Sections 16 or 21 of Glass-Steagall.
106. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).
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Federal Reserve."" This provision allows for the interlocking of various
boards of banks and securities firms. ,06
The Bank Holding Company Act prohibited bank holding companies
from "providing insurance as a principal, agent, or broker."'1' GLB's
reversal of that restriction cleared the path for financial holding companies
to own insurance companies.1"° Under GLB, a company that wishes to
participate in such industries must apply with the FRB to attain a financial
holding company status.", This new type of bank holding company,
known as a financial holding company, may engage in expanded financial
activities, either directly or via subsidiaries." 2 A bank holding company
that is not a financial holding company will be restricted in its activities to
those that were previously determined to be closely related to banking."
To that effect, Section 102 of GLB amends Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act, allowing a bank holding company to control
"shares of any company the activities of which had been determined by
the Board by regulation or order under this paragraph ... to be so closely
related to banking as to be proper incident thereto . . . .""i Only banks
that are "well capitalized" and "well managed" may elect to become a
financial holding company. GLB also establishes the FRB as the
"umbrella regulator. ""i
GLB modernizes the delivery of financial services to consumers,
allowing the financial industry to cross-market services among affiliates
and third parties."6 The elimination of legal barriers to affiliations among
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies will facilitate "one-stop
shopping" consumer offerings for banking, insurance, and securities
107. Id.
108. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1994).




114. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994).
115. See generally Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 61. Under the umbrella regulator
structure, the Federal Reserve Board will regulate financial holding companies and their
activities. Antitrust agencies such as the Department of Justice, Office of the Comptroller of
Currency, Federal Trade Commission, the Fed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
retain the authority to review mergers and acquisitions. Other agencies-i.e., the SEC and state
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transactions."' Greater competition and a more efficient financial service
system should result in substantial savings to the consumer. 8  Also, GLB
should increase the international competitiveness of American financial
firms. "9
GLB provides flexibility in structuring these affiliations and addresses
how these structures will be regulated, including safeguards against
adverse consequences from consolidation. '2 By allowing most activities
"financial in nature" 2' to be conducted by either a holding company or a
bank's financial subsidiary, GLB provides financial organizations with
flexibility in structuring these new activities. Although the FRB's role of
umbrella supervisor is maintained, GLB provides for functional
regulation, thus utilizing the strengths of the various federal and state
regulators.'2 How this will develop remains unclear: with banking,
insurance, and securities products becoming increasingly similar, a
rationalization of the regulatory structure may be revisited by Congress in
the future.,2
GLB provides for safeguards designed to mitigate adverse
consequences from consolidation within the financial industry, such as
117. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley,




121. Activities that are "financial in nature" include:
underwriting, dealing in, or making a market in securities; insuring, guaranteeing, or
indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness, disability, or death, or providing and
issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent, or broker for purposes of such
insurance, in any state; lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or
safeguarding money or securities; issuing or selling instruments representing interests
in pools of assets permissible for a bank to hold directly; providing financial,
investment, or economic advisory services, including advising an investment company;
all activities the Board determined were closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto as of November 12, 1999;
engaging in all activities that traditional bank holding companies may engage in outside
of the United States; engaging in all activities that the Board determined were "usual in
connection with the transaction of banking or other financial operations abroad" as to
November 11, 1999; engaging in merchant banking by directly or indirectly owning
securities acquired and held by a securities affiliate, an investment adviser affiliate or
an insurance underwriting affiliate as part of a bona fide underwriting or merchant or
investment banking activity; and directly or indirectly owning securities as an
investment made in the ordinary course of business as an insurance underwriter.
McCoy, supra note 8.
122. Id.
123. See Macey, supra note 59, at 692.
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requiring a bank holding company seeking financial holding company
status to be "well capitalized" and "well managed."'1' Another provision
calls for a study to prevent the possible damage that would arise from the
failure of a "too big to fail" institution. '12
GLB also provides for various consumer protection provisions, such
as privacy of personal information and ATM fees disclosure.' 2 A
minimum federal standard of financial privacy has also been established. '11
However, as information sharing among affiliates is not subject to the new
rules, the financial industry is not seriously affected in its ability to cross-
market services among affiliates and third parties.' More legislation on
privacy can be expected, such as on the sharing of medical information
that financial conglomerates may possess through their insurance
subsidiaries. 29  Major consumer protection provisions also include
disclosure of surcharges on ATMs and consumer protection rules for
insurance practices together with disclosure and advertisement
requirements, including anti-tying provisions. 11o
GLB maintains international supervisory standards established by the
Basle Committee, which states that the holding company of a bank
organization with multinational operations must be supervised by the home
country of that bank.'3' However, subsidiaries must register with the FRB
as a "representative office." 32 Foreign banks that do not maintain an
American office may still be subject to United States banking
supervision. 133 Foreign-owned United States broker-dealer and investment
managers may be required to register with the FRB.1'4 Also, a foreign
banking organization that operates a branch or agency, or that owns or
controls a bank or commercial lending company in the United States, is
subject to the limits applicable to domestic bank holding companies and
124. Id.
125. Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 61.
126. Steve Bartlett, Conswners Reap Benefits When Financial Firms Integrate Information,
5 ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP. 8 (2001).
127. Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 61.
128. L. Richard Fischer, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Its Implementation, A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 445 (2001).
129. Bartlett, supra note 126.
130. Id.
131. McCoy, supra note 8.
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financial holding companies.- Therefore, the FRB applies domestic
requirements of capital management and activities to foreign banks that
operate branches in the United States. '11
IV. NEW REGULATIONS
The regulations instituted since GLB significantly affect foreign banks
that operate in the United States.' In January 2000, the FRB issued an
interim rule that:
sets forth the procedures by which bank holding companies
and foreign banks may submit to the Board an election to
become a financial holding company and describes the
period in which the Board will act on financial holding
company elections. [The rule] also enumerates the criteria
that bank holding companies and foreign banks must meet
in order to qualify as a financial holding company. In
addition, the newly added sections set forth the limitations
that the Board will apply to financial holding companies
that fail to maintain compliance with applicable capital,
management, and CRA criteria. 's
In order to make the treatment of elections by foreign banks equal to
those elections filed by domestic bank holding companies, the interim rule
was amended to allow elections filed by foreign banks that meet the "well
managed" and "well capitalized" provisions of the Act to become effective
on the thirty-first day after filing, unless the Board finds the election
unsatisfactory or the foreign bank agrees to extend the review period. 3 9 In
addition, the Board amended the interim rule to require that all domestic
depository institution subsidiaries (such as thrifts and nonbank trust
companies) of electing foreign banks be "well capitalized" and "well
managed" and have satisfactory or better composite and Community
Reinvestment Act ratings. 14 This provision makes the requirements for
foreign banks consistent with the requirements imposed on domestic bank
holding companies. 1 Finally, the Board amended the interim rule to deal
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 65 Fed. Reg. 3785 (Jan. 25, 2000).
138. Id.




with banks that are chartered in countries where there is no comprehensive
consolidated supervision determiner." 2 Banks in such a situation should
use the pre-clearance process provided by the interim rule if such a bank is
considering making a financial holding company election."3
The first amendment is intended to equalize the processing of
elections filed by foreign banks and the processing of elections filed by
domestic bank holding companies.I" Under the provisions of the interim
rule as issued on January 19, 2000, an application to attain financial
holding company status by a foreign bank or company is not effective until
the Board makes an affirmative finding that the foreign bank meets specific
capital and management standards.""
However, a domestic bank holding company's election for financial
holding company status is effective within thirty-one days of its filing
unless the Board determines otherwise. '"4 Therefore, when a foreign bank
applied to the FRB to obtain financial holding company status, the foreign
bank was at the mercy of the FRB."7 The FRB had no time limitations on
its review of the foreign bank.'14 New regulations, however, impose a
thirty-one-day time limit in which the FRB must determine whether the
foreign bank is adequately capitalized and managed to be a financial
holding company." 9
Under the amendment, the Board retains the authority to declare the
election ineffective because of inadequate capital in comparison to the
capital required for a domestic bank owned by a financial holding
company.' ° The rule was also amended to allow the Board to find an
election ineffective if the Board does not have sufficient information to
assess whether the foreign bank meets the criteria of a financial holding
company.'' These changes ensure that qualified foreign banks will receive
equal treatment as similarly situated domestic bank holding companies. If
a foreign bank does not meet the rule's specified requirements, it may file
a pre-clearance request for a specific determination on the comparability of
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 21, 2000).
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its capital and management.' This pre-clearance request means that the
FRB will return an assessment of what areas of the company's capital and
management do not meet the requirements needed to become a financial
holding company.3
The second amendment clarifies the interim rule with respect to
foreign banks that do not have a United States subsidiary bank, but may
have other United States depository institution subsidiaries, such as thrifts
and nonbank trust companies.'" The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires
that, in order for a bank holding company to be eligible to become a
financial holding company, all depository institutions controlled by the
bank holding company must be "well capitalized" and "well managed."Im
The interim rule required only that a foreign bank and each of its United
States branches, agencies, and commercial lending subsidiaries be well
capitalized and well managed in order for the foreign bank to be eligible as
a financial holding company.'1 In order to make the requirements for
foreign banks consistent with the requirements imposed on bank holding
companies, the interim rule was amended to mandate that all domestic
depository institution subsidiaries of the foreign bank must be "well
capitalized" and "well managed" for the foreign bank to qualify as a
financial holding company. ' As a result, the rule was also amended to
require that the foreign bank certify that its United States depository
institution subsidiaries are "well capitalized" and "well managed." .
A bank is deemed to be "well capitalized" if:
(1)(i) its home country supervisor, as defined in §211.21
of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.21), has adopted
risk-based capital standards consistent with the Capital
Accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(Basel Accord);
(ii) the foreign bank maintains a Tier 1 capital to total
risk-based assets ratio of six percent and a total capital to
total risk-based assets ratio of ten percent, as calculated
under its home country standard;




156. 65 Fed. Reg. 3785 (Jan. 25, 2000).
157. 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 21, 2000).
158. Id.
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(iii) the foreign bank maintains a Tier 1 capital to total
assets leverage ratio of at least three percent; and
(iv) the foreign bank's capital is comparable to the
capital required for a United States bank owned by a
financial holding company; or
(2) the foreign bank has obtained a determination from
the Board under § 225.91(c) that the foreign bank's capital
is otherwise comparable to the capital that would be
required of a United States bank owned by a financial
holding company.
(c) standards for "well managed." A foreign bank will
be considered "well managed" if: Each of the United
States branches, agencies, and commercial lending
subsidiaries of the foreign bank has received at least a
satisfactory composite rating at its most recent assessment;
(2) the home country supervisor of the foreign bank
considers the overall operations of the foreign bank to be
satisfactory or better; and
(3) the management of the foreign bank meets
standards comparable to those required of a United States
bank owned by a financial holding company." 9
A bank is "well managed" if:
(i) at its most recent inspection or examination or
subsequent review by the appropriate Federal banking
agency for the depository institution, the institution
received:
(A) at least a satisfactory composite rating; and
(B) at least a satisfactory rating for management; or
(ii) in the case of a depository institution that has not
received an examination rating, the Board has determined,
after a review of managerial and other resources of the
159. 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 25, 2000).
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depository institution and after consulting the appropriate
Federal banking agency for the institution, that the
institution is well managed. 160
The third amendment to the interim rule relates to the review of
comprehensive consolidated supervision ("CCS") in connection with
elections by foreign banks to become a financial holding company.'16
Home country supervision is an important factor in the determination of
whether a bank is "well managed."'6 Most foreign banks that elect to be
treated as financial holding companies will be subject to comprehensive
consolidated supervision. 16,
The interim rule allows a foreign bank or company to request a
review of its qualifications prior to formally filing its election to become a
financial holding company.'TM In order to assist the Board's review of
whether the management of a foreign bank meets the appropriate
standards, the interim rule was amended. It encourages foreign banks that
have not been reviewed by the Board with respect to home country
supervision and that are chartered in countries where no other bank from
that country has received a CCS determination from the Board (including a
determination that the home country supervisor is actively working toward
a system of CCS) to use the pre-clearance process if such bank is
considering making an election to be treated as a financial holding
company. 6 5
The amendment to the interim rule regarding bank holding companies
is a revision of the definition of "well managed" applicable to a depository
institution for purposes of determining qualification as a financial holding
company under the Grann-Leach-Bliley Act.'6 6 For this purpose, the
Board initially adopted the existing Regulation Y definition of "well





164. 65 Fed. Reg. 3785 (Jan. 25, 2000).
165. 65 Fed. Reg. 15053 (Mar. 21, 2000).
166. Id.
167. (c) Well managed--(1) In general. For purposes of this subpart, a depository institution
is well managed if:
(i) at its most recent inspection or examination or subsequent review by the appropriate
Federal banking agency for the depository institution, the institution received:
(A) at least a satisfactory composite rating; and
(B) at least a satisfactory rating for management; or
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have at least a satisfactory composite examination rating and at least a
satisfactory rating for both management and compliance. '6 This three-part
definition was initially adopted by the Board as part of its effort to
determine whether a bank holding company qualifies for expedited
treatment in applications processing. '6
Therefore, a bank holding company qualifies for expedited processing
if eighty percent of the depository institution assets of the company were
"well managed."170 In order to become and remain a financial holding
company under the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act, all of the depository
institution assets of a bank holding company must be "well managed. "7
The Granmm-Leach-Bliley Act does not address compliance ratings in
determining whether an institution is "well managed." Accordingly, the
Board is amending its regulatory definition of "well managed" for
purposes of determining qualification as a financial holding company to
reflect the two-part test in the statute.'n Thus, a depository institution will
be considered "well managed" for this purpose if it has a satisfactory
composite rating and a satisfactory rating for management.' 3
The Board continues to believe that compliance ratings are important
and will address issues relating to compliance in other contexts. In
particular, the Board and other federal banking agencies have supervisory
authority to take full action against an institution if compliance issues are
raised. 17 In addition, each agency may consider compliance ratings when
determining whether to approve any merger or expansion proposal
involving the depository institution or the parent bank holding company of
the institution.'"7
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allows financial holding companies in
the United States to conduct banking, investment and insurance business
(ii) in the case of a depository institution that has not received an examination rating,
the Board has determined, after a review of managerial and other resources of the
depository institution and after consulting the appropriate Federal banking agency for
the institution, that the institution is well managed.
Id.
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through separate subsidiaries.16  This is a step toward the universal
banking system already in existence in Germany. However, these steps
imposed more rigid capital and management standards for foreign banks
with United States branches thus having a discriminatory effect on foreign
banks. In the final implementing regulations, the FRB relaxed the
requirements for foreign banks. As a result, it will be easier for German
banks to obtain and preserve United States financial holding company
status.
The new regulations will make it easier for foreign banks to enter the
United States market. Not only do the regulations level the playing field
between domestic and foreign banks, by applying the same standards and
time limits, but they also clarify the process for becoming a financial
holding company.
The first amendment to the interim ruling will eliminate the
discriminatory effect that GLB had against the election of German financial
service institutions to become financial holding company in the United
States. By applying the same time period in which the Federal Reserve
Board must decide whether or not an election for fimancial holding
company status is effective, domestic financial service companies and
foreign financial service companies have the same opportunity to gain the
perks of being a financial holding company. Prior to the amendment, a
German bank would have to wait until the FRB assessed its election,
without any given time schedule. Now, German banks will be afforded the
same thirty-one-day period as any domestic bank would receive.
The second and third amendments will continue to tear down barriers
that GLB instituted by clarifying the election procedures for foreign
companies. The original standards for becoming a financial holding
company in GLB were vague and difficult for German banks to be in
compliance. These new criteria apply the same tests to domestic applicants
as well as foreign companies. As such, German banks will be on equal
footing with United States banks.
V. CONCLUSION
The new regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board will
alleviate the discriminatory effect that Gramm-Leach-Bliley had on
German banks operating in the United States. By equalizing the playing
field, both domestic banks and foreign banks will have the same
opportunities regarding the election of becoming a financial holding
company.
176. McCoy, supra note 8.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the establishment of the first drug treatment court in Dade
County, Florida, United States in 1989, these specialized courts have
become a rapidly expanding alternative to traditional law enforcement.'
Alternately called drug courts, drug treatment courts, or treatment courts, 2
these courts have spurred many debates as critics and proponents alike seek
to conduct studies evaluating the drug courts' impact on recidivism rates as
well as their effectiveness in rehabilitating drug addicts. While some
studies point to the greatly reduced recidivism rates of drug court graduates
and the economic advantages of this system, critics point to flaws in the
studies., However, the rapid growth in the number of drug courts to
almost 700 in operation in the United States today, combined with the
federal government's fiscal support, leads to a conclusion that these
specialized courts are here to stay.' While drug courts in the United States
have both proponents and critics, Canadian officials view the United States
experiment with drug courts as a huge success.5  In 1998, the first
Canadian drug court was set up in Toronto and based on the United States
format. Further, Canada's Department of Justice Minister and Attorney
General, Anne McLellan, recently announced that Canada's federal
government plans to set up drug courts in all major Canadian cities by
2004 .6
II. DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES
A. A Legislative Overview of United States Drug Control
In the early 1900s, the United States federal government marked its
entrance into the world of drug control first with the passage of the Federal
Food and Drugs Act of 1906, which mandated truth in labeling, and then
with the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914.7 The Harrison
1. Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About
Drug Treatment Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 48 (2000-2001).
2. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, at 841 (2000).
3. Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, at 1481 (2000).
4. John S.Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for Justice
Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 928 (2000).
5. Darlene James & Ed Sawka, Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse, Drug Treatment
Courts: Substance Abuse Intervention Within the Justice System (2001), available at
http://www.ccsa.ca/DrugCourts.htm.
6. Chad Skelton and Norm Ovenden, B.C. Hails Ottawa's Plan for Drug Courts,
VANCOUVER SUN (Canada), Dec. 1, 2000, available at http://www.cfdp.ca/index.htm.
7. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1454.
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Narcotics Act of 1914 restricted distribution by requiring doctors to keep
records of their disbursements of medication and imposing fines upon those
who failed to comply! From this point forward, drug use was no longer
solely a medical concern but was now part of a concerted effort by the
federal government to control the use and abuse of narcotic substances
through the imposition of control and punishment.' Since then, varying
tactics have been tried to curb the spread of drugs, including the use of
harsher sentences for drug offenders. These laws, while having little
impact on the supply and demand of drugs, have had an enormous impact
on the criminal justice system and on the United States' Federal budget.l0
When the 1960s brought widespread protest, rebellion and drug use, issues
of drug sales, use and addiction began demanding heightened attention."
In response, President Nixon declared a "war on crime," promising to
expand federal drug control laws. 12 By the 1980s, Presidents Reagan and
Bush were spending billions of dollars on drug control efforts and narcotics
enforcement within and outside United States borders." Rather than
reducing the number of cases involving narcotics, these "war on drugs"
tactics resulted in a larger-than-ever number of defendants passing through
the criminal justice system, overloading an already overcrowded system. '4
In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) which
outlawed virtually all non-alcohol recreational drugs and required
mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenders. 1 Between 1968 and
1988, drug prosecutions quadrupled, and by 1990 they accounted for one-
third of all state felony prosecutions. 6  This increase in prosecutions,
coupled with the stiffer sentencing laws, resulted in an explosion of
incarceration rates." As of November 1999, 60% of all federal prisoners
were being incarcerated for drug offenses as compared to only 6.3% in
1970.18 Because of these drug laws, more people are incarcerated per
capita in the United States than in any other industrialized country except
8. Id. at 1455.
9. Quinn, supra note 1, at 40.
10. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1459.
11. Quinn, supra note 1, at 40.
12. Id. at 41.
13. Id. at 42.
14. Id.
15. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1458.




688 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:685
Russia." With the widespread use of crack cocaine in the 1980s, there was
increased state and federal legislation mandating serious penalties for drug
traffickers and users.2 As the application of these laws threatened to
overwhelm the criminal justice system, the courts by necessity sought
effective alternatives to incarceration. 2' This necessity, combined with the
availability of credible research regarding the effectiveness of treatment in
reducing both drug addiction and drug related crime, led many to believe
that alternatives to incarceration could help the addict control addiction and
therefore eradicate the crime committed by addicts in furtherance of their
addiction.Y
Some supporters of the drug court programs believe the "war on
drugs" should be viewed as a public health issue in addition to being a
criminal justice issue.23 The premise behind this belief is that drug
addiction should be treated as a disease because it has been so classified by
the American Medical Association.2 The American Bar Association and
the Centers for Disease Control have defined drug addiction as a disease as
well, and supporters of this theory believe it is time to "medicalize" the
war on drugs.2 1 In light of this viewpoint, some United States supporters
believe an addict should be considered a patient to be treated rather than a
criminal to be incarcerated.36
Some localities focused on the need to expedite the movement of
narcotics matters through the court system while others focused on creating
specialized courts to handle drug offenses only. However, neither case
expedition nor specialized courts relieved the problem of overcrowding in
prisons and jail.27
B. The First United States Drug Courts
The movement toward a specialized drug court system began in the
late 1980s in response to rising rates of drug-related court cases and the
inability of traditional law enforcement and justice policies to reduce the
19. Id. at 458.
20. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 841.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Jefferson M. Fish, Rethinking our Drug Policy, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 9,
at 48 (2000).
24. Id. at 49.
25. Id. at 52.
26. Id at 65.
27. Quinn, supra note 1, at 42.
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supply and demand for illegal drugs.R According to statistics from the
United States Bureau of Justice, an increase in drug offenders accounted
for nearly three-quarters of the growth in prison populations in the ten
years between 1985 and 1995." In 1997, 33% of state and 22% of federal
inmates had committed their crimes while under the influence of drugs;
approximately 60% were incarcerated for drug-related offenses; and more
than 75 % of the correctional population had substance abuse problems. 10
Traditionally, defendants convicted of drug offenses are either
sentenced to a period of incarceration or referred for probation
supervision." While some jurisdictions require drug testing to monitor use
after conviction, they lack the capacity to respond quickly when a
defendant has tested positive.32 Additionally, while a few jails and prisons
provide comprehensive treatment services for inmates, they do not provide
long-term rehabilitation support following a defendant's release. 3 Those
jurisdictions that require drug treatment as a condition of probation usually
do not monitor defendants after completion of the program to see if the
drug treatment wa successful." This situation, combined with the fact that
at least 45 % of defendants will recidivate with a similar offense within two
to three years, has led many justice system officials to conclude that the
traditional case disposition process is not effective in reducing drug usage
by persons convicted of drug offenses.35
As participants in the criminal justice system began to abandon the
view that punishment was the only effective treatment for addicts,
treatment providers were softening their convictions that voluntary entry
into a program was required for recovery.36 Coerced treatment became a
possible solution to breaking the chain of addiction."
Finally, a specialized drug treatment court in Miami, Florida was
developed to integrate drug treatment with traditional case processing.38
28. James & Sawka, supra note 5.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project, U.S. Department of






36. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 842.
37. Id.
38. Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 943.
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The innovators of this drug court were confronted with an overwhelmed
criminal justice system because police arrests of drug offenders underwent
a 93% increase in possession cases from 1985 to 1989. 39 Established in
Dade County, Florida, in 1989 the court required defendants in the
program to appear in court regularly, accompanied by a treatment
provider's report on the client's performance in its program.40 These
reports were used to gauge the success or failure of the client as well as to
monitor the effectiveness of the treatment provider." While the clients
were rewarded for good behavior through encouragement, or penalized for
infractions with sanctions such as short periods of incarceration for
repeated violations, the treatment providers were evaluated for their
programs.42
The drug court strategy was an attempt to do something about the
"root cause" of criminal activity associated with drug use by providing
drug treatment with close judicial supervision in a drug court setting.'3 The
drug treatment courts operated outside the conventional adversarial
relationship usually seen in the courtroom and replaced it with a "team
work" atmosphere in where all the players, including the judge,
prosecutor, and defendant, worked together in the best interest of the
defendant." As this team-based approach took root, other localities began
setting up similar systems. By 1994, forty-two drug courts had been set up
in the United States.'5
C. Expansion of the United States Drug Court System
The first drug courts were developed and launched largely without aid
from the federal government." They were the result of the work of a small
network of committed court officials and treatment providers searching for
a solution for an overburdened criminal justice system. 7 In December
1993, the first national meeting of drug courts was convened in Miami,
Florida and included representatives from over twenty drug courts already
in operation.48 The Honorable Janet Reno, the former Miami prosecutor
39. Id.
40. Quinn, supra note 1, at 44.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 943.
44. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 844.
45. Id. at 843.




instrumental in the development of the first drug court and later the
Attorney General of the United States, addressed over 400 officials from
across the United States, helping to garner support for a drug court
approach. 9 Recommendations of this national meeting resulted in the
creation of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP)
and spurred the Department of Justice to become involved in the
development of drug courts. °
As a result of the combined efforts of drug court supporters, interest
in drug treatment courts grew throughout the nation.51 Interest in providing
court-sponsored treatment to drug offenders, as opposed to imposing
punitive alternatives, began to spread. The federal government began to
play a large role in spreading the word about drug treatment courts.m In
1995, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) established a Drug
Courts Program Office under the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994.11 Simultaneously, personnel affiliated with the
twelve drug courts then in operation formed the National Association of
Drug Court Professionals1 The Office of Justice Program (OJP)
established the Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project
(DCCTAP) to assist state and local justice system officials and treatment
professionals in establishing drug court programs in their jurisdictions."5
This office, in cooperation with the National Association of Drug Court
Professionals, published a 1997 report entitled Defining Drug Courts: The
Key Components.m Relying on the experiences of previous local drug
court experiments, this report set forth guidelines outlining successful
features of the drug courts to be utilized in setting up additional ones.-"
Some of the main requirements included the integration of drug treatment
with case processing; prompt placement of eligible individuals into
treatment; and close monitoring of defendants' drug use by the judge.-
Thereafter, the DOJ conditioned the funding and grants for new drug
courts on their establishment in accordance with the ten key components
49. Id.
50. Id. at 949.
51. Quinn, supra note 1, at 45.
52. Id.
53. Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 949.
54. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 844.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 845.
57. Id.
58. Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 936.
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set forth." At the national level, the federal government pooled
information on the activities of the drug courts and extracted data to help
create guidelines for successful treatment court structures.6°
Congress appropriated $12 million in the OJP's first year to support
the planning and implementation of drug courts in the United States.6 1 In
fiscal year 1999, the OJP provided nearly $20 million to approximately
seventy jurisdictions that had applied for drug court grants in 1998.6 Since
then, federal funding has grown each year, and on July 6, 2001, Attorney
General John Ashcroft announced that $30.9 million would be allocated to
assist in the planning, establishment and improvement of drug courts.6
Since 1995, the Justice Department's Drug Courts Program Office (DCPO)
has made approximately 650 grants for a total of more than $125 million."
There are currently 700 drug courts in operation in the United States with
plans for the establishment of another 430.65 Drug courts are currently in
operation in all fifty states, and thirty-two states have already passed
legislation supporting drug courts."
D. Focus and Operation of United States Drug Courts
Although drug treatment courts vary in operational detail throughout
the nation, they share the same basic pattern.67 People ciarged with low-
level, non-violent criminal misconduct related to drug use may choose,
with the consent of the prosecutor, to have the charges filed in the
treatment court.6 In this court, the defendant pleads guilty or accepts
responsibility for a charged offense and accepts placement in a court-
mandated treatment program.61 The treatments offered these offenders
vary, depending on the assessment of needs by the court personnel.' ° The
59. Id.
60. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 834.
61. Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 949.
62. United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Program News, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/dcpopr63.htm.
63. Press Release, Attorney General Department of Justice, Communities Nationwide
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performance of the offender in the program is closely monitored by the
judge and the court to determine if the treatment program is adequate or if
a lesser or more intensive treatment plan is appropriate.' Once the
defendant successfully completes the program, the conviction is usually
expunged. n
Drug courts focus on facilitating treatment for non-violent drug
offenders by offering them an opportunity to complete a drug treatment
program in return for a dismissal of charges or a reduction in custody or
probation time." The goal of the court is abstinence and law-abiding
behavior through intense judicial supervision, comprehensive substance
abuse treatment, frequent drug testing, incentives and sanctions, and
clinical case management.74 For drug treatment courts to be successful,
court personnel must work closely with the treatment service providers to
ensure that a high quality of care is being provided.75  Because frequent
contact with the court is part of the drug court program, the courts are in a
position to detect and correct problems and provide oversight for treatment
providers.76
Today, more than half of all prison inmates are illegal drug users, and
as each year brings new legislation mandating longer minimum sentences
for drug crimes and harsher punishments for those who violate drug laws,
court dockets are further overburdened and prisons continue to be
overcrowded." Drug treatment courts offer a viable alternative. While
treatment courts provide an alternative to incarceration, they do not
decriminalize drug use.78
Until the creation of drug courts, the likelihood of offenders identified
as having a serious drug problem being placed in treatment was poor.7 9
While those sentenced to probation might find themselves placed in some
sort of treatment program, those sentenced to incarceration were not likely
to receive comprehensive drug treatment.8) Prior to the creation of the
drug treatment courts, the court's involvement in treatment was to refer
offenders to treatment programs upon the recommendation of the probation
71. Id.
72. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 832.
73. James & Sawka, supra note 5.
74. Id.
75. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 869.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 831.
78. Id.
79. Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 931.
80. Id.
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staff.'t While this approach may have worked years ago, the huge volume
of cases that overwhelmed the justice system in the 1980s and 1990s has
made it almost impossible for probation officers to monitor offenders'
compliance with treatment.Y Under traditional practices, there was little
communication between the court system and the treatment providers.
Drug courts now play a role similar to that of the probation officers in the
past but wield the power of the criminal court, enabling them to more
effectively see a drug offender through a treatment program.'
Drug treatment courts operate on the premise that because they
address drug problems, recidivism to the criminal justice system will
decline.' However, various studies of this issue, depending on the
underlying goals of those conducting the studies, offer varying statistics as
to the success of drug courts achieving this goal. 86
E. Effectiveness of United States Drug Courts
According to the National Association of Drug Court Professionals
(NADCP), drug courts have shown promising results, particularly in terms
of reduced recidivism:' According to the Drug Court Clearinghouse and
Technical Assistance Project (DCCTAP), a program of the Drug Courts
Program Office of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ),
"reductions in recidivism and drug usage are being achieved, with
recidivism rates substantially reduced for graduates, and to a lesser but
significant degree, for participants who do not graduate as well.""
Although no formal cost-effectiveness studies have been conducted,
evidence suggests that drug treatment costs are a lower-cost alternative to
incarceration." By diverting low-level drug-related defendants to drug
treatment courts rather than keeping them in the traditional court and
corrections system, courts have significantly reduced jail and prosecution
expenditures.9° In 1998, the drug courts program cost the DOJ $30 million
and with additional funding for fiscal year 2000, it will cost the DOJ $50
81. Id.
82. Id. at 933.
83. Id. at 934.
84. Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 934.
85. Id. at 937.
86. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 3.





million.91 Per person, drug courts cost about $2000 annually, while the
cost of incarceration is somewhere between $20,000 to $50,000 per
person.Y
According to critics, while current evaluations of drug courts appear
positive, they must be viewed with caution because no clear scientific
studies have been conducted.Y Additionally, rates of recidivism are often
misleading due to the different sentencing models and treatment regimes
prescribed by the different drug courts. 9' Also, because the drug court
strategy is relatively new (beginning in the late 1980s) its long-term
effectiveness in treating addiction and furthering an individual's successful
functioning in society cannot be adequately gauged."
The DCCTAP at American University is sponsored by the DCPO and
OJP. DCCTAP is responsible for evaluative information on drug courts
throughout the United States.9 ' While the DCCTAP points to reduced rates
of recidivism among drug court graduates, it acknowledges that a number
of issues give rise to difficulties in compiling data: difficulty in obtaining
relevant data on the behavior of comparison group members; the changing
nature of drug courts; lack of experienced researchers; inadequate
management information systems in various localities; and a lack of long-
term impact.Y However, DCCTAP has published reports stating that drug
courts have been successful in achieving their goals of reduction in
recidivism and drug usage in the United States, and Canada has chosen to
implement such courts based on the United States experiment. 9
While drug courts receive criticism for their "problem-solving"
approach from critics who view them as inappropriate, or from critics who
view drug court studies as flawed, the rapidly growing volume of drug
courts operating in the United States suggests that they are here to stay.99
As a result, the question that receives most focus is not whether they
should be established but rather how they can best be implemented. 11
91. Id.
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99. Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 928.
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111. DRUG CONTROL IN CANADA
The legal framework for drug control in Canada began in 1908 with
the passage of the Opium Act, which created the first drug prohibition.,,"
In 1911, the Act was expanded to include opiates and cocaine, and in 1923
cannabis was added to the list of prohibited substances.'t 0 "The Opium and
Narcotics Act of 1929 became Canada's main instrument of DrugPolicy.-,o10
In 1969, the Canadian Government's LeDain Commission, conducting
a four-year study of substance abuse policy in Canada, °m revealed that
hundreds of thousands of Canadians were being convicted for possession of
illegal substances.,, The Commission recommended that the Canadian
Government begin to look for alternatives to criminal sanctions against
these offenders10 In 1987, "Canada's Drug Strategy" was implemented,
and the government committed funds to support both supply and demand
reduction programs and programs in enforcement, treatment and
prevention programs.1'7
In 1997, Canada consolidated previous drug acts and modernized
Canada's drug control policy with the passage of a new Controlled Drugs
and Substances Act (CDSA). -- Like previous Acts, this Act did not
include alternatives to conviction or punishment for drug possession. 109
The Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse (CCSA) was created by an
Act of Parliament in 1988 to provide a national focus for substance abuse
issues."0 The CCSA, receiving support from the Canadian justice and law
enforcement communities, serves as a bridge between the private and
public sectors, programmers and policy-makers, theorists and
practitioners, and prevention specialists and police."' The CCSA has
gained importance in Canada since independent territorial drug and alcohol
101. Diane Riley, Canadian Foundation for Drug Policy, Drugs and Drug Policy in




104. Substance Abuse Policy in Canada: A Presentation to the House Standing Committee
on Health (1996), available at http://www.ccsa.ca/polrev.htm.





110. Substance Abuse Policy in Canada, supra note 104.
111. Id.
Strauss
agencies began dismantling years ago." 2 The CCSA promotes awareness
among Canadians of issues related to drug and alcohol abuse, promotes
participation by Canadians in efforts to reduce the harm associated with
alcohol and drug abuse, and measures the effectiveness of programs
designed to eradicate this abuse.'" The Centre operates the National
Clearinghouse on Substance Abuse which collects and disseminates
information via its maintenance of databases."4 It provides free access to
substance abuse information, along with "hot links" to other information
providers around the world, via its site on the World Wide Web." The
Centre also publishes directories, statistical profiles, pamphlets, research
and policy papers, and special reports." 6  The CCSA initiates and
coordinates joint projects with law enforcement and health enforcement
officials to set up public education campaigns, gather information on drug
use, and study alternative approaches to drug enforcement. i7
In Canada, while health care, prevention services, and educational
programs fall under provincial jurisdiction, activists in the substance abuse
field have suggested an active role for the federal government to provide
coordination and leadership."" In 1987, the government of Canada
announced a "National Drug Strategy," later to be known as "Canada's
Drug Strategy," in which the government committed funds amounting to
Canadian $210 million to combat drug abuse."19 This was a new addition to
the government's spending of approximately Canadian $168 million a year
on both supply and demand reduction programs.'1'
Canada, like the United States, has found a link between crime and
drug dependency.2' Since the early 1970s, drug offenses have accounted
for more than a third of the prison population growth in Canada, and since
1980 the incarceration rate for drug-related arrests has increased 1000%.'2
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Canada began setting up its first drug treatment court in Toronto in
December of 1998.'2
IV. ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT PROGRAMS IN THE CANADIAN
COURT SYSTEM
In Canada, approximately 10% of the federal inmates are incarcerated
for drug offenses while more than 50% of the inmates have a substance
abuse problem.l2 However, there are few Canadian substance abuse
treatment programs designed for inmates. '2 In the early 1990s, the
Offender Substance Abuse Pre-release Program (OSAP) was implemented
to bring treatment to inmates. 12 In an evaluation of this program, it was
found that rates of readmission to custody of these inmates were much
higher among drug offenders with severe substance abuse problems. 12,
In 1996, the Solicitor General of Canada introduced alternative
sanctions and conditional sentencing as part of a reform package.'2
Included in the reforms was Bill C-41, which provided a legal mechanism
for diverting offenders away from the criminal justice system and toward
substance abuse treatment. '2 Also, changes in federal sentencing enabled
the provinces and territories in Canada to administer their own alternative
programs for first-time, non-violent offenders. 130 These sentencing reforms
to the Statutes of Canada became law in September 1996.31 The legislation
gave the courts an option to distinguish between crimes that should carry a
jail sentence and those that would be more effectively dealt with through
alternative sentencing. 32  The legislation included principles to guide
judges in determining fair sentences. 133 Included in these principles are
statements that "an offender should not be imprisoned if less restrictive
123. Innovative Drug Treatment Court in Toronto Celebrates Official Opening, supra note
121.
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punishment is appropriate, and that judges must take any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances into consideration."11
Included in the major reforms to Canada's criminal code was the
addition of conditional sentences for those offenders guilty of less serious
crimes.'35 Judges can impose conditional sentences on an offender that
allow the offender to serve the sentence in the community rather than in
jail. 6  As part of the conditional sentence, judges may require that the
offender obtain treatment for a substance abuse problem or do community
service.'" If the offender fails to comply with the conditions of the
sentence, he or she can be brought back to court to serve out a sentence,
have new conditions imposed, or have the suspension reinstated after a
specified amount of time spent in custody. "
This legislation for alternative sanctions also enables the provinces
and territories to set up and administer their own versions of alternative
measures programs.' 39 Through these types of programs, society can avoid
expensive and unnecessary court proceedings while at the same time
providing a forum in which these less serious crimes can be dealt with in
the community. 140
A. The First Canadian Drug Courts
In December of 1998, in response to the growing drug court
movement in the United States, as well as the United Kingdom and
Australia, Canada opened its first drug treatment court in Toronto. 4 1 With
federal funding of more than Canadian $1.6 million over four years, this
program reflects a collaborative effort between the Centre for Addiction
and Mental Health (CAMH), the criminal justice system, the Toronto
Police Service, the City of Toronto Public Health Department, the Health
City Office and various community-based agencies.' 42 The CAMH has
established a drug court program, similar to drug court programs in the
United States, in which court participants will undergo assessment,
stabilization, treatment, maintenance and aftercare.1,,
134. Id.
135. Id.
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In efforts to evaluate the overall success of the program, the Toronto
drug treatment court experiment includes a comprehensive evaluation plan
to assess cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness. '" While the estimated cost per
year for incarceration of a drug offender is $47,000, the estimated cost per
offender in the Toronto drug court program is approximately $4,500.1'4
The Toronto drug court plan includes an experimental design that
compares a treatment group of those offenders who opt to go through drug
court to a comparison group comprised of offenders who undergo the
initial screening and are deemed eligible for the program but do not
participate beyond assessment.'" The plan will include following up on
200 participants for 24 months.'" As of December 31, 1999, interim
results of the study show a 56% retention rate for the experimental group,
a rate lower than those found in many jurisdictions. ' This may be a
reflection of different sentencing practices for drug users in the United
States and Canada. In the United States system, sentencing may be more
severe, thus providing incentive for program participants to remain in the
program longer. "49
B. Expansion of the Canadian Drug Court System
Overall, the Toronto experiment has been viewed as a success, and
Canada's Department of Justice Minister and Attorney General, Anne
McLellan, has announced that the federal government plans to set up drug
courts in all major Canadian cities by 2004.'1 While the Toronto drug
court only handled offenders charged with federal drug offences, other
provinces, including Vancouver, are considering including offenders
charged with property crimes to pay for their drug habits as drug court
candidates.'
A plan for the Vancouver drug treatment court has been proposed but
funds have not yet been specifically allocated for the project.'" The
Vancouver drug treatment court is to be developed in conjunction with the
development of a comprehensive drug policy framework for the province
144. Id.
145. Id.








of British Columbia. 3  It is currently expected that the substance abuse
component of the Vancouver drug treatment program would last anywhere
from twelve to eighteen months and would include assessment, treatment
and aftercare.15
IV. ANALYZING THE SUCCESS OF UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN
DRUG COURTS
A. The Influence of Sentencing Guidelines
1. Sentencing Guidelines in the United States
One of the main criticisms of current drug courts in the United States
is that because of sentencing guidelines and minimums, many offenders
enroll in drug courts as a way to avoid harsher sentencing.'" During the
1970s and 1980s, Congress and many state legislatures passed mandatory
minimum sentences that resulted in mandatory prison sentences for drug
offenders, including non-violent, low level offenders. '6
In 1984, after extensive studies of rehabilitation theories of
punishment and indiscriminate sentencing, Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 and created the United States Sentencing Commission
(Commission).'" In rejecting the sentencing flexibility included in the
rehabilitative theory of punishment, Congress focused on the goal of
deterrence and incapacitation. I' The Commission established compulsory
sentencing guidelines ("Guidelines") which were intended to limit judioial
discretion so that similar sentences would be prescribed for defendants
convicted of similar crimes under similar circumstances.5 9 While the
actual sentence was left to the discretion of a judge, the Guidelines
established an acceptable range of punishment for any given crime. '6
While proponents argue that the Guidelines have effectively resulted in
uniformity and certainty in sentencing, critics argue that the Guidelines
have created more problems then they have resolved. 161
153 James & Sawka, supra note 5.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 23, at 65.
156. Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, Issues in Focus: Substance Abuse (2001),
available at http:/www.pdxnorml.org/druglaw_101.htm.
157. Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40
VILL. L. REv. 335, 347 (1995).
158. Id. at 348.
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Critics of the Guidelines as they relate to drug offenses focus their
criticism on the mandatory minimum sentences.1''  Prior to the passage of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, federal judges were able to tailor
sentences of drug offenders based on the differing circumstances of each
case. '6 However, with the passage of this the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Congress imposed mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for
drug offenders.'" The 1986 Act mandated a five-to-forty year sentence for
first-time offenders convicted with possession with intent to distribute
small quantities of specified drugs. 65
The 1988 Amendments to the 1986 Act increased the mandatory
minimums and imposed these minimums for simple possession of smaller
quantities of drugs. 1" The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 (1994 Crime Bill) increased the use of mandatory minimums
for drug-related offenses while at the same time emphasizing alternative
types of punishment.6' The 1994 Crime Bill also included grants for drug
court programs. ,68
Because of the strict sentencing guidelines found throughout the
United States, it appears that the difficulty in gathering reliable statistics
from drug court programs shall continue. Today, the drug court programs
include those drug offenders who may choose drug court not because of a
desire to undergo treatment for substance abuse but rather as an alternative
to a more punitive jail sentence for a different crime. 69 As long as these
types of offenders are processed through the drug court system, the
effectiveness of these courts in treating addiction will be difficult to
determine. However, society should benefit as a whole from the
rehabilitation, rather than the incarceration of addicts. 70
2. The Absence of Sentencing Guidelines in Canada
In Canada, because of the absence of sentencing guidelines for drug
offenders, the effectiveness of drug courts may prove clearer to ascertain.
By the time Canada's first drug treatment court was established in Toronto
in 1998, Canada's laws already allowed for offenders found guilty of less
162. Spencer, supra note 157, at 350.
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168. Id. at 355.
169. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 23, at 65.
170. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1487.
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serious crimes to serve their sentence in the community rather than in
jail.", Because the alternative to drug treatment court is likely to be a light
sentence,' 1 first time, non-violent drug offenders who enter Toronto's drug
treatment court program are likely to be those who genuinely desire to
receive substance abuse treatment, as opposed to those who may be opting
for it in order to evade a harsher sentence.
B. The Need for Ongoing Study in both the United States and
Canada
Three different types of studies have been utilized in determining the
effectiveness of drug treatment courts in the United States.7 3 The first type
evaluates operational processes and analyzes data such as filings and drop-
out rates of offenders to get an overall view of the drug court process. 7 ' A
second type of study uses a cost-savings analysis to compare the
operational and sentencing costs of drug treatment courts to these costs in
traditional courts.' 7 The third type of study is the "impact evaluation"
study which attempts to assess the impact of drug courts by comparing
recidivism rates between offenders who are processed through the drug
courts to offenders processed through the traditional courts. 6
The main purpose of the drug court strategy is to reduce criminal
activity associated with drug use by providing offenders with drug
treatment along with close judicial supervision in a drug court setting.'"
With reduced crime as a goal, it would appear that the best way to measure
the effectiveness of drug courts is to compare recidivism rates of drug
offenders processed through the drug courts to those of drug offenders
processed through traditional courts. 78 However, the value of recidivism
studies depends a great deal on the length of the follow-up of an offender,
and because drug court programs are still relatively new, follow-up of drug
court attendees has been short-term. '79 Because drug courts treat the drug
addict's addiction as the "root cause" of drug related crime,1'8 if the drug
171. See, e.g., Module 3-Sentencing reforms, supra note 131.
172. James & Sawka, supra note 5.
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offender's addiction is successfully treated, the offender should not
recidivate. To successfully evaluate the impact of drug court programs on
recidivism rates, future studies will have to focus on the long-term follow-
up of all drug court defendants. '8'
V. CONCLUSION
The United States drug control efforts of the 1980s and 1990s resulted
in a larger-than-ever number of defendants passing through the criminal
justice system, resulting in overloaded criminal court dockets and
overcrowded prisons. '8 In response to these rising rates of drug-related
court cases, and to the inability of traditional law enforcement and justice
policies to reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs, a movement
towards a specialized drug treatment court began in the United States in the
late 1980s. 13 Since the creation of the first drug court in Miami, Florida,
the movement has spread throughout the nation and there are currently
over 700 drug courts in operation in the United States.-M The United States
has made firn commitments to support the growth of drug courts through
the issuing of federal grants to those jurisdictions seeking to set up drug
courts. 8
Canada began its first drug court experiment in Toronto in 1998.
While firm financial commitments have not yet been made regarding future
expansion of drug courts in Canada, Canada's Justice Minister and
Attorney General, Anne McLellan, has announced that the federal
government plans to set up drug courts in all major Canadian cities by
2004.186 These drug courts will be modeled on the Toronto experiment and
United States drug courts.'
Complicating the impact evaluation studies of drug courts in the
United States are the strict mandatory minimum sentences imposed on low-
level drug offenders. Drug offenders who have no desire to receive drug
treatment may opt for drug court simply to evade a prison sentence. Some
of these offenders may not suffer from a substance abuse problem. If a
substance abuse problem is not the "root cause" for a drug offender's
181 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1486.
182. Quinn, supra note 1, at 42.
183. James & Sawka, supra note 5.
184. Communities Nationwide Receive Justice Department Funds for Drug Courts, supra
note 63.
185. Id.
186. B.C. Hails Ottawa's Plan for Drug Courts, supra note 6.
187. Id.
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criminal behavior, the drug court experience may be ineffective in
reducing this offender's likelihood to recidivate.
Impact evaluations of Canada's drug courts should prove to be more
accurate evaluations of the effectiveness of drug courts because those drug
offenders who opt for the drug court program are likely to only be those
with substance abuse problems. By the time Canada's first drug treatment
court was established in Toronto in 1998, Canada's laws already allowed
for offenders found guilty of less serious crimes to serve their sentence in
the community. lu Because first time, non-violent drug offenders have the
option of lighter sentencing as opposed to mandatory prison time, they are
less likely to opt for the drug court program unless they really desire
treatment.
The rapid expansion of drug courts throughout the United States, and
the recent establishment and proposed expansion of Canadian drug courts
leads to the conclusion that drug courts are here to stay.'8 9 Because of the
short history of drug courts in the United States and Canada, impact
studies that evaluate the effect of drug courts on the recidivism rates of
drug offenders have all been short-term.1" Long-term impact studies over
time will be the truest indicator of the drug court movement's success. ,9,
However, given their short history, and the significant impact they have
had in reducing the recidivism rates of drug offenders in the United States,
the future looks bright for the drug court movement.
188. See, e.g., Module 3-Sentencing reforms, supra note 131.
189. See, e.g., Goldkarnp, supra note 4, at 928; B.C. Hails Ottawa's Plan for Drug Courts,
supra note 6.
190. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1486.
191. See, e.g., Goldkanip, supra note 4, at 943.
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I. INTRODUCTION
United States foreign policy toward Cuba has to a great degree been
based on the containment and management of Cuban nationals seeking to
migrate to the Untied States. On both sides of the Florida Straits, policy
makers balance domestic political interests with foreign policy objectives,
while seeking to manage the ever-present threat of a massive migration
crisis.
From the early days of the "freedom flights,"' the Mariel boatlift, 2 the
Guantanamo Refugee, crisis, The Cuban Refugee Adjustment Refugee Act
J.D. Candidate, Class of 2003, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida.
1. In November of 1966, following a massive sea exodus form the port of Camarioca in
Cuba, the Johnson administration set up formal flights to bring Cubans seeking refuge to the
United States. Those flights became informally known as the freedom flights.
2. In 1980, Cuban president Fidel Castro allowed Cubans, who wanted to leave to the
United States to be picked by their relatives through the port of Mariel. It became known as the
Mariel Boat Lift.
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of 1966' (CAA) has been at the center of the vortex. This United States
law has been lauded as the proper vehicle to illustrate our "very strong
desire that Cuba shall be freed from Communist domination and that the
Cuban people will again, be able to enjoy the benefits of freedom"' and it
has been labeled as a "diabolical killing machine that claims lives and
provokes tragedy. ",
During last few years efforts to repeal the CAA have intensified both
in Cuba and in the United States. Several legislative efforts have been
made to repeal it and immigration reform groups have joined the fight to
have the CAA overturned. Refugee advocates have complained that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) interpretation of new statutes
affecting the CAA has caused a "de facto repeal of the Cuban Adjustment
and circumvented congressional intent"' and litigation over the application
of the CAA has ensued.
This comment seeks to analyze the congressional intent for passing
the CAA, the early application of the statute, its application in subsequent
migratory crisis, INS interpretation of its application and validity, and the
political battles that have ensued in an effort to repeal it.
II. CUBAN ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1966: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
During the period of 1902-1959 the United States did not have a
separate policy to deal with Cuban migration.8 The migration of Cubans to
the United States followed an orderly process and Cuba was not seen as
migratory threat9 . On January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro seized control of the
Cuban government and shortly thereafter installed a communist
dictatorship on the island. Cuban migration exploded following the Cuban
revolution, and the number of Cubans entering the United States grew
from 70,000'0 prior to 1959 to over 1,053,000 in 1990."1
3. In 1994 Fidel Castro allowed Cubans who wanted to leave the island to do by sea.
That resulted in a large refugee exodus by Cubans using boats and rafts. The United States
Coast intercepted the refugees and detained them at the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.
4. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966); 8
U.S.C. § 1255 (1994 & Supp. 111966) [hereinafter Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966].
5. H.R. REP. No. 89-1978, at 4 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794.
6. President Fidel Castro Ruz, Address at the 7th Congress of Federation of Cuban
Women (Mar. 8, 2000).
7. Maria Dominguez, Cuban Adjustment Act Survives, C.A.B.A Briefs at 12 (1999).
8. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Immigration: Challenges and Opportunities, in
CUBA IN TRANSITION-AsOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 65,66 (1998).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 66.
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In January of 1961, the United States severed diplomatic relations
with Cuba and launched an exile led invasion known as the "the bay of
Pigs" 12 in an effort to overthrow the Cuban government 13. In 1962, the
United States banned commercial transportation to and from Cuba.
Following the Castro revolution, political and economic conditions in Cuba
deteriorated and the numbers of Cubans seeking to migrate to the United
States increased dramatically."' These early refugees were paroled into the
United States and no interdiction and deportation efforts were made.
These early refugees received public assistance by programs set up by the
United States government for their benefit. "5
In 1965, the Cuban government allowed all those who opposed the
communist government to leave the island by sea through the port of
Camarioca and thousands fled to United States by boat, many with the aid
of the exile community in the United States.' President Lyndon B.
Johnson was faced with the first mass exodus of Cubans to the United
States. On October 3, 1965, the President welcomed the Cubans fleeing
the island, declaring in a speech "that those seeking refuge here in
America will find it. We Americans will welcome these Cuban people." 7
The United States formalized the orderly departure of Cubans from the
island by instituting the "freedom flights" on December 1, 1965.18
This migration crisis resulted in thousands of Cuban nationals being
paroled into the United States for an indefinite period of time without the
possibility of returning to their country of origin.19 Cuban refugees could
only adjust their status to permanent resident by leaving the United States
and seeking an immigrant visa at a United States consulate and returning to
the United States as permanent residents.n This process proved difficult if
not impossible for most refugees and the number of migrants paroled into
11. United States Census Bureau 1990, at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/BasicFactsServlet (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
12. A group of Cuban American soldiers trained by the CIA invaded Cuba on April 17,
1961. The invasion took place on Bahia de Cochinos on the southern coast of Cuba. Bay of Pigs
is the English translation of Bahia de Cochinos.
13. Id.
14. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 8, at 66.
15. Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat. 121.
16. The Oban Adjustment Act of 1966: ?Mirando Por los Ojos de Don Quijote 0 Sancho
Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 902, 904 (2001).
17. President Lyndon Johnson, Address to the People of Cuba (Oct. 3, 1965).
18. The Cuban Adjusment Act of 1966: ?Mirando Por los Ojos de Don Quijote 0 Sancho
Panza?, supra note 16, at 904.
19. Dominguez, supra note 7.
20. H.R. REP. No. 89-1978.
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the United States far outnumbered those able to obtain an immigrant visa.
Congress reasoned that the process in place would create "great personal
hardship to those already impoverished by force or circumstance. "21
Congress intended to create legislation which would enhance the
resettlement of Cuban refugees and to improve their opportunity to be
gainfully employed and educated in the United States." It is against this
backdrop that congress decided to expedite the adjustment of status for
Cuban refugees by implementing the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of
1966.
On November 2, 1966, Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act.
The act states:
That notwithstanding the provisions of section 245(c) of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act the status of any
alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been
inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States
subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically
present for at least one year, may be adjusted by the
Attorney General in his discretion and under such
regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, if the alien makes an
application for such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to
receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United
States for permanent residence.3
From the unambiguous language of the statute it would appear that the
law could be easily applied to Cuban migrants as they entered the United
States in succeeding years. However, the CAA has been a source of
controversy and many attempts have been made to repeal it, restrict it or
modify it. The maxim that "the function of a court in interpreting a statute
is to determine the intent of Congress in enacting the statute and to give
effect to that intent"14 does not seem to apply to the various applications
given to the Cuban Adjustment Act.
The Cuban adjustment act was the byproduct of an era when the
United States had a "willingness to approve legislation to aid the
persecuted peoples of the world. "15 Other legislation passed during that era
suggests that protective immigration laws were used as a United States
21. Id. at 3794.
22. Id. at 3793.
23. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, supra note 4.
24. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
25. H.R. REP. No 89-1978.
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policy statement against Communism. The debate over the usefulness of
the CAA took center stage after the end of the Cold War and it has now
become the pivotal issue in United States-Cuba relations.
III. APPLICATION AND USE IN SUBSEQUENT MIGRATION CRISIS:
MARIEL-GUANTANAMO
United States-Cuba migration policy was severely tested in the spring
of 1980, when on April 19, Fidel Castro opened the port of Mariel and
allowed Cubans to migrate. Within days, relatives from the United States
flooded the Straits of Florida with vessels seeking to bring their relatives to
the United States. Between April 1 and September 25, 1980, 124,776
Cuban nationals entered the United States by sea."
The United States government welcomed these refugees. Congress
declared, "It is the historic policy of the United States to the respond to the
urgent needs of person subject to persecution in their homeland. "s The act
defined a refugee as "any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality ...and who is unable or unwilling to return, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that
country because of persecution or well-founded fear of persecution. "2
Analysis of the Acts' legislative history indicates that the statutory
language indicating the United States "would provide aid for necessary
transportation, to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern
to the United States" applies to Cubans?3 The Refugee Act of 1980
reduced the physical presence requirement for Cubans seeking adjustment
form two years to one.3' This reduction led some refugee advocates to
infer that since the same period of adjustment applies to refugees as it does
for Cubans seeking adjustment under the CAA, this signaled legislative
intent to consider Cubans defacto refugees. n
26. See Dominguez, supra note 7, (discussing Pub. L. No. 85-559 on behalf of Hungarian
Refugees; Pub. L. No. 86-648 (on behalf of refugees within the mandate of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees) and Pub. L. No. 89-236 (on behalf of refugees from communist
countries outside the Western Hemisphere)).
27. United States Coast Guard, Mariel Boat Lift, U.S. COAST GUARD ALIEN MIGRANT
INTERDICTION, at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/mariel.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
28. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1980)
[hereinafter Refugee Act of 1980].
29. Id.
30. Id. See also Michael W. Lind, Cuban Refugees at Sea: A Legal Twilight Zone, 24
CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 793 (1995) (discussing S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)).
31. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 28. 94 Stat. 108 (B)(i) amended the first section of
the Cuban Adjustment Act by striking out two years and inserting in lieu one year.
32. Dominguez, supra note 7.
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In 1984, the office of special council instructed INS that the Cubans
seeking adjustment under the CAA would not be dependent on the
availability of an immigrant visa and therefore the numbers of those
receiving permanent residence would not be limited by the number of visas
available. The court in Fair v. Meese33 held that nothing in the 1976
amendment to the CAA required that any applicants be charged against the
collateral quotas, regardless of the entry dates.5 '
In 1984, the United States and Cuba negotiated the return to Cuba of
those persons who had arrived during Mariel and were ineligible to remain
in the United States.3" This agreement affected approximately 2700 Cubans
who had committed serious crimes in Cuba or the United Sates or those
psychiatric patients that Castro had forced to travel to the United States.16
The combination of Castro's political oppression, Cuba's failed
economic policies, and the beneficial treatment of the Cuban adjustment act
resulted in the settlement of over 750,000 Cubans into the United States
between 1959-1990.17
Since 1960 Cuba's economy has been heavily dependent on Soviet
aid.3 When the Eastern communist block collapsed in the early 1990s,
Cuba's primary source of income declined dramatically and this resulted in
scarcity of consumer goods and additional burdens on the Cuban people. 39
As internal discontent grew, the number of people risking their life in the
Florida Straits increased proportionally. 4 On July 13, 1994, a group of
people seeking to leave the island hijacked a ferryboat in Havana Harbor.4 1
The boat was sunk by the Cuban border patrol resulting in the death of
thirty-seven people.42 In the subsequent weeks three other passenger
33. Fair v. Meese, 643 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
34. Id. at 988.
35. Matthew A. Pingeton, United States Immigration Policy: Detaining Cuban Refugees
Taken From the Sea, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. POL'Y 329, 330 (1999).
36. Id.
37. 1990 U.S. Census Bureau, reprinted in Silvia Pedraza, Cuba's Refugees: Manifold
Migrations, in 5 CUBA IN TRANSmON: ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN
ECONOMY 311, 315 (1995).




42. See generally Geoffrey W. Hymans, Outlawing the Use of Refugees as Tools in
Foreign Policy, 3 I.L.S.A. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 149, 152 (1996). The Cuban government
claimed that the sinking was an accident. However, survivors claimed that the boat was rammed
by water cannons from three government tugs and then rammed by one of the vessels.
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ferries were hijacked, as well as a plane and a military vessel.' 3 On August
5, 1994, rumors circulated in Havana that another ferry boat was going to
be hijacked to the United States. More than 500 people gathered on the
docks and the most serious anti-government riots occurred since Castro
took power."
Castro responded to the crisis by removing exit restrictions for those
seeking to flee to the United States by sea. In an article in Prensa Latina,"
Castro stated that "we will stop blocking the departure of those who want
to leave the country" and "we cannot continue to guard the coasts of the
United States.""
Cubans were now free to flee the country without the threat of
interdiction by Cuban patrol boats and without being subjected to the
"illegal exit" penalties of Cuban law. 7 This resulted in the immediate
departure of large numbers of migrants using home made rafts and taking
the perilous journey to the United States.
The Clinton administration responded to the crisis by reversing the
traditional policy of welcoming Cuban refugees to the United States. On
August 19, 1994, President William Clinton announced that the United
Sates would bar the "rafters" from entering the country. The United
States Coast Guard was instructed to detain the migrants at sea at transport
them to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base as a precursor to repatriation."
The interdiction at sea of Cuban nationals in the high seas and" the
sudden reversal of the long held policy of protecting political refugees
created a politically volatile situation for the Clinton administration and
threatened to produce a defacto repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act.
By preventing Cubans from reaching United States territory, the
Clinton Administration prevented the first legal requirement of the CAA
from being met. The first requirement is that the applicant be "inspected
and admitted or paroled into the United States. "' Although the decision to
43. Id.
44. Id. at 153.
45. Presna Latina is Cuba's official news agency.
46. Hymans, supra note 42, at 153.
47. Cuba's penal code provides for a penalty for illegal departure. See U.S. Dept. of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice (Feb. 23, 2001) availab/e at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/751.htm.
48. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 8, at 67 (citing GAO, Cuba-U.S. Response to 1994 Cuban
Migration Crisis, GAO/NSIAD 95-211(Sept. 1995)).
49. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, supra note 4.
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prevent Cubans form entering the United States-°  while fleeing
Communism was a new policy for the United States, detention of migrants
seeking to reach United States territory was not.
Executive Order 12,807, issued by President Bush in 1992 as a
response to the mass Haitian exodus of 1991,51 provided for the repatriation
of undocumented aliens without the benefit of immigration proceedings.
The order reads in part:
The president has the authority to suspend the entry of
aliens coming by sea to the United States without necessary
documentation, to establish reasonable rules and
regulations regarding, and other limitations on, the entry of
aliens into the United States, and to repatriate aliens
interdicted beyond the territorial seas of the United States. n
Executive Order 12,807 prompted legal challenges that were resolved
by the Supreme Court when it held that the repatriations of Haitians,
without first determining whether they qualified as refugees53, was not
prohibited by section 243 of the INA or article 33 of the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.54
Although Executive Order 12,807 was not directed at Cubans fleeing
Communism, the order is not limited to specific nationality of aliens5 and
therefore Cubans can be repatriated under its authority.
President's Clinton's decision to prevent Cubans fleeing Communism
from reaching the United States, and his reliance on President Bush's
Executive Order 12,807 were in contraposition to his own Executive Order
12,854,1 which implemented the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA).17 His
50. The United States does not include waters or airspace subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38).
51. For a helpful analysis of Exec. Order No. 12,807, see Summer L. Hacldey, Sea
Interdictions: Are Aliens Apprehended on the High Seas Entitled to Protections Afforded by the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 6 ILSA J. INTL. & COMP. L. 143 (1999).
52. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (June 1, 1992).
53. Refugee is "any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person has
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2001).
54. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, (1993).
55. Hackley, supra note 51, at 149.
56. Exec. Order No. 12,854, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,587 (July 4, 1993).
57. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001 (West 2001).
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order ratified, approved and affirmed the Congressional findings and its
intent in passing the CDA. As it relates to the CDA Congress found that
[t]he government of Fidel Castro has demonstrated
consistent disregard for internationally accepted standards
of human rights and for democratic value. It restricts the
Cuban people's exercise of freedom of speech, press
assembly, and other rights recognized by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948.m
The adoption of the CDA into United States law also codified the
Congressional belief that fleeing persecution is legitimate methods of
opposing a dictatorship. In its relevant part the CDA states: "The Cuban
people have demonstrated their yearning for freedom and their increasing
opposition to the Castro government by risking their lives in organizing
independent democratic activities on the island and by undertaking
hazardous flights for freedom to the United States and other Countries." 19
During the rafter crisis of 1994, the United States government
appeared to have veered away for a policy of welcoming Cuban refugees to
one of preventing their entrance into United States jurisdiction therefore
preventing from becoming an "applicant for admission." The statutory
definition of an applicant for admission is "an alien present in the United
States or who has arrived in the United Sates."6 Cubans housed at
Guantanamo Naval base in Cuba were not given the benefit of the CAA
when the courts ruled that the naval base was not "United States
territory. "61
The rafter crisis ended when the United States and Cuba began
negotiations which would lead to an agreement on September 9, 1994
wherein the United States would Parole the Cubans detained in
Guantanamo and Cuba would accept the repatriation of Cubans picked up
at sea.6 2 The United States agreed to allow a minimum of 20,000 of
Cubans to migrate legally to United States each year but only if they
applied for immigrant or refugee visas at the United States Interest Section
in Havana.63 The refugees in Guantanamo were paroled" and the United
States policy of welcoming Cubans fleeing from the island ended.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(1) (West 2001).
61. Cuban Am. BarAss'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1424 (11th Cir. 1995).
62. Id. at 1418.
63. Id.
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President Bill Clinton ignored congressional intent and his ratification
of the Cuban Democracy Act5 when he defended his policies in a speech
on June 9, 1995 and declared:
We simply cannot admit all Cubans who seek to come
here. We cannot let people risk their lives on open seas in
unseaworthy rafts. . . Regularizing Cuba migration also
helps our efforts to promote a peaceful transition to
democracy on the island .. . For too long, Castro has
used the threats of uncontrolled migration to distract us
from this fundamental objective. With the steps we've
taken, we will be able to devote ourselves fully to our real
long term goals."
IV. ENFORCEMENT OR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE CUBAN
ADJUSTMENT ACT?
The U.S.-Cuba migration accords created an apparent disparity
between those who are interdicted at sea and almost certainly returned to
Cuba, and those who manage to reach dry land. The race for the shore has
become the prerequisite to receiving the benefits of the Cuban Adjustment
Act. For Cubans, a United States vessel in international waters is not
jusridictionally sufficient, and a safe refuge under United States control
does not suffice to trigger the "arrived in" the United Sates requirement of
section 235 of the INA.6
Cuban refugees are therefore required to avoid detection and to the
head for United States shores. Even those who are apprehended in United
States territorial waters still face deportation to Cuba. Courts have held
that under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, merely crossing
into the territorial waters of the United States is insufficient to constitute
physical presence for the purpose of determining whether an alien has
entered the United States. The "physical presence" requirement of the
entry test can be satisfied only when an alien reaches dry land."1 Even
64. "The Attorney General may .... in his discretion parole into the United States
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe... for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit any alien applying for admission into the United States . . . " 8
U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (West 2001)
65. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001 (West 2001).
66. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 8, at 69, citing President William Clinton, Speech directed
to Cuban-Americans, in ASSOCIATED PRESS June 27, 1995.
67. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
68. Yang v. Maugans 68 F.3d 1540, 1549 (3d Cir. 1995).
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when the alien has disembarked and is heading to shore, the courts have
held that a person is not "physically present" in the United States. This
position was upheld when Chinese migrants aboard the vessel Golden
Venture jumped into the water and waded through the surf before being
detained. 69 The court held that
United States immigration law is designed to regulate the
travel of human beings, whose habitat is land, not the
comings and goings of fish or birds. We hold that an alien
attempting to enter the United States by sea has not
satisfied the physical presence element of Pierre at least
until he has landed.70
In 1999 a group of Cubans migrants tested the policy when they
landed in Key Largo, Florida, and stood in water three feet deep: two
were apprehended one hundred yards from shore and one made it ashore.7 1
Although their feet were on the same ground, only the one who came
ashore was allowed to stay." An INS spokesman defended the policy
stating "There are unique circumstances around every landing. The strict
interpretation of the wet-foot policy is that the other alien was still in the
water. The interpretation found that one had made landfall. Everybody
knows you have to make landfall.""
Has the wet-foot dry-foot policy deterred Cubans from leaving the
island? The answer appears to be no. Just 1,400 Cuban migrants were
intercepted at sea from 1995 to 1997.74
The number of Cubans who reached United States shore totaled 2,048
in 1999-more than double 1998 total of 916 .7 An estimated eighty
percent were believed to have been smuggled by professional smugglers
who charge between $1000 and $5000 a head for the trip.7'
69. The Golden Venture was a merchant ship which left China on February 13, 1993 and
transported Chinese migrants to the United States. The vessel ran aground on the morning of
June 6, 1993, in New York.
70. 27ang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 754 (2d Cir. 1995).
71. Yves Colon, Touching Land Defines Who Stays, Goes, MIA. HERALD, Jun. 30, 1999.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Jay Weaver, U.S. Migration Policy Doesn't Deter Treache Journeys, Cuban
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V. INS INTERPRETATION OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND
IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY OF 1996 (IIRIRA).
In effort to control illegal immigration Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)." The
Act created confusion among the various districts as to what constitutes
"admission," "inspection," and "parole," and whether Cubans entering
through irregular means could be paroled and eventually adjust under the
CAA,.78 The INS determined that Cubans who arrived at a port other than
a designated port of entry could no longer adjust to permanent resident
status under the CAA.79  Immigration advocates considered that the INS
interpretation of IIRIRA resulted in de facto repeal of the Cuban
Adjustment Act.'8 Community activists feared that if Cubans could not
adjust their status and were "deported," this would create a subclass of
undocumented aliens who would be unable to earn a living and would
linger indefinitely in immigration limbo. 8'
This confusion led INS Commissioner Dorris Meissner to issue a
memorandum clarifying the legibility for permanent residence under the
Cuban adjustment act.f The memorandum specifically addressed the issue
of Cubans arriving by sea. In its relevant parts it reads:
This policy clarification, effective immediately, helps
define in specific terms those Cubans who are eligible for
parole and adjustment of status under the Cuban
Adjustment Act, regardless of how they arrived in the
United States. Under the CAA, a Cuban national who is
paroled may, one year after the grant of parole, apply for
permanent residence in the United States. The fact that a
Cuban national arrived in the United States at a place other
than a designated port of entry will not make him or her
77. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
78. "Irregular means" refers those aliens who enter by sea without going through a port of
entry. Cuban rafters who entered without being found did not enter through a "port of entry" a
port of entry includes airports, seaports and land ports located at the border.
79. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, supra note 4.
80. Dominguez, supra note 7.
81. Although immigration could remove a Cuban national under I.N.A § 235, the
government of Cuba generally does not accept the repatriation of Cubans from U.S. soil. See
Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, supra note 4.
82. Press Release, U.S. Department. of Justice, Clarification of Eligibility for Permanent
Residence Under the Cuban Adjustment Act (April 26, 1999) available at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/cubarel.htm (ast visited Feb. 3, 2002).
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ineligible for permanent residence under the CAA (unless
the individual is ineligible on other grounds such as having
a criminal record). This action removes a significant bar if
the Cubans are otherwise eligible for adjustment under the
CAA. A Cuban national who is in the United States
without having been admitted or paroled by the INS must
first surrender into INS custody and receive a grant of
parole and wait one year before applying for permanent
residence under the CAA. With the grant of parole, the
Cuban national will be able to apply for employment
authorization. 83
Doris Meissner's memorandum and clarification led immigration
advocates to declare that the CAA had "survive another blow."84 Before
the dust settled, the INS threw another roadblock to the implementation of
Cuban Adjustment Act. It began to classify Cubans arriving at United
States airports "arriving aliens."
Traditionally Cubans arriving through United States airports were
placed in exclusion proceedings and the INS adjusted their status even after
receiving final exclusion orders.u Subsequent to the passage of IIRIRA,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) took the position that
immigration judges lacked the authority to adjudicate the application for
adjustment filed by arriving alienss, in removal proceedings. Attorneys for
Cubans migrants argued that Cubans cannot be "arriving aliens" under the
INA."7
They argued that by statutory definition an "applicant for admission"
is an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
has arrived in the United States." They further argued that applicants for
admission are subject to inspection and screening by INS, and officers
83. Id.
84. Dominguez, supra note 7.
85. Exclusion orders were given pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (2001) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.
86. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q) (2002). The term arriving alien means an applicant for admission
coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port of entry, or an alien seeking transit
through the United States at a port of entry, or an alien interdicted in international waters or
United States waters and brought into the Untied States by any means, whether or not to
designated port of entry, and regardless of the means of transport. An arriving alien remains
such even if paroled pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the act.
87. Brief for Appellee/Respondent Artigas, at 9, in In re Artigas, (U.S. Dep't of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals) (Case No. A 76 543 602).
88. Id. at 10, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(1) (West 2001).
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shall order the applicant removed unless the alien is a native or citizen of
Cuba and said Cuban arrives by aircraft at a port of entry. 89
Respondents' attorneys argued that because all applicants for
admission except for Cubans who arrive by aircraft at a port of entry, if
not admissible, must be "expeditiously" removed and Cubans cannot be
removed expeditiously, Cubans cannot fall under the INA's definition of
arriving alien.10
The issue of whether an immigration judge has jurisdiction to
adjudicate an application for adjustment of status under the Cuban
adjustment act when the applicant is an arriving alien in removal
proceedings was decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in In
re Ada Rosa Artigas." In Artigas, the court held that an immigration judge
has jurisdiction to adjudicate an application for adjustment of status under
the Cuban refugee Adjustment Act of 1966.
In the 35 years since the passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act, the
law has withstood a series of legal challenges. Pro-immigration advocates
wonder why there is such a resistance to an act that benefits people a
repressive dictatorship.93 The answer appears to point to the political and
ideological battles which have plagued the CAA since its inception.
VI. THE POLITICAL BATTLE OVER THE STATUTE
A. The Cuban Government's Effort to Repeal the "Killer Law"
If there was ever any doubt as to Cuba's position regarding the Cuban
Adjustment act it was dispelled by Cuban president Fidel Castro's speech
on March 8, 2000. Castro's key remarks included:
The United States does not have any right to promote the
death of people form this country, whether they are
criminals or not. The diabolical killing machine that
claims lives and provokes tragedies is nothing other than
the Cuban Adjustment Act. We will fight against this
vicious law, this heinous and criminal law. We will keep
fighting until it is repealed. Only then can we be certain
that thousands of innocent children will not be illegally
uprooted from their homeland, from their schools, from
89. Brief for Appellee/Respondent Artigas, supra note 87, at 9; 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(i)
(2001).
90. Brief for Appellee/Respondent Artigas, supra note 87, at 9.
91. In re Ada Rosa Artigas, 23 1. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 2001).
92. Id.
93. Dominguez, supra note 7.
Talamo
their identities, and subjected to extreme dangers or even
death.9'
On July 2, 2000 Ricardo Alarcon continued the verbal assault of the
CAA in a television interview with Sam Donaldson.9 ' When asked by Mr.
Donaldson& why he referred to the Cuban Adjustment Act as a "killing
machine", Mr. Alarcon responded that the Cuban Adjustment act is a way
to "distort reality" and that since the United States is not prepared to have
a "Dominican, Mexican, Haitian or a Chinese adjustment act and it's just
for Cuba. It's precisely Cold war politics. "9
Cuba's public repudiation of the CAA intensified when on July 12,
2000, the government of Cuba issued the "Proclamation by National
Assembly of the People's power of the Republic of Cuba on the Cuban
Adjustment Act."9 The proclamation referred to the CAA as "the
criminal, immoral and discriminatory immigration policy, deliberately
conceived to destabilize and undermine Cuban society while shamefully
manipulating the tragedies caused by this act."" The Cuban government
accused the United States of using the CAA to criminally incite Cubans to
risk their lives in dangerous sea crossing for the sole purpose of
embarrassing the Cuban government. 100 The proclamation called for the
United States to "put an end to its criminal, irresponsible and demagogic
policy, conceived and implemented against the Cubans, which is
detrimental to other Latin Americans and harmful to the interests of the
American people. "19
B. Opposition within the United States
The Cuban Adjustment Act has come under fire not only from the
government of Cuba, but from political groups within the United States.
The question has been asked: Why is it that United States Law reflects
94. Castro Ruz, supra note 6.
95. Mr. Alarcon is the president of the National Assembly of the People's Power of the
Republic of Cuba.
96. Sam Donaldson is a U.S television reporter host of the program "This Week."
97. Interview by Sam Donaldson with Ricardo Alarcon, President of the Cuban National
Assembly, This Week, ABC News (Jul. 2, 2000).
98. Proclamation by the National Assembly of People's Power of the Republic of Cuba on
the Cuban Adjustment Act, Digital Granma International, Jul. 12, 2000, at
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favoritism for Cubans?1in The Federation for American Immigration
Reform (FAIR) contends that the CAA provides disparate treatment under
immigration law between Cuban and other groups."'n FAIR has called the
CAA "the most massively used exceptional provision in our law" and has
publicly called for its repeal.0'
In 1996 Congress debated the repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act.105
Senator Bob Graham sought to condition the repeal of the CAA on a
democratically elected government being in power in Cuba.in6 Those
favoring the Graham amendment argued that repeal of the Act was entirely
unjustified because Castro continues to be a brutal dictator who
"suppresses all democratic and individual freedoms, and thousands of
Cubans still risk their lives by trying to escape to America. "'°0
Those opposing the amendment contended that the CAA is an
anachronism.' While they agreed that Castro is "a ruthless communist
dictator" they noted that China, North Korea, and Vietnam are also ruled
by ruthless communist dictators and the United States does not give special
treatment to those fleeing form those nations. 'n Those opposing the
Graham amendment synthesized the belief of those who oppose the CAA
when they stated in part:
It would be nice if the United States were able to afford to
take in all the billions of people around the world who live
under totalitarian rule, but it obviously cannot. We
already have millions of people form around the world
who have been cleared for legal entry into the United
States, may of whom are the spouses or very young
children of citizens, but will have to wait for years before
their turn to enter comes up. Given this fact, we cannot
support a continuation of the Cuba Adjustment Act before
its application to the 20,000 parolees who will be let in
102. Issue Brief, FavortisM for uans, FEDERATION FOR AMER. IMMIG. REFORM, Jul.
1998, available at http://www.fairus.org/html/04154806.htm [hereinafter FAIR Brief].
103. FAIR argues that Haitians who arrive under similar circumstances as Cubans do not
receive the same treatment under that law. See FAIR Brief, supra note 102.
104. FAIR Brief, supra note 102, at 4.
105. 104th CONG. REC. S-4397 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1996) (Graham amendment No. 3760 to
the Dole [for Simpson] amendment No. 3743) available at
http:l/www.senate.gov/-rpclrva/10421104291.htm.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id.
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each year. Therefore we urge the rejection of the Graham
Amendment.n°
The Graham amendment passed 62 to 37, and the repeal of the Cuban
Adjustment Act was averted.'"
The attacks on the Cubans Adjustment Act have gone beyond the legal
and the political arena and have entered the realm of legal academia.
Some in academia have argued that the social ills that are caused by the
CAA are "too great for the CAA's roots to remain unexamined."11 2 The
authors of the Harvard note have put forth the notion that the justifications
which created the CAA are outdated and that the CAA has inflicted "great
harm on American Society.""' They argue that the CAA has been accused
of being a racist policy, which in turn has tarnished the legitimacy of
United States immigration policy, fostering social apathy, dissatisfaction
and resentment in immigrant communities.14
Furthermore, critics argue that in addition to fostering internal
discontent the CAA has benefited Castro because the it "has been
simultaneously a sword that cuts deep lines of division and resentment in
the United States and shields and protects the island by enabling him to
export undesirables and unify all Cubans."'Ii
VII. CONCLUSION
The Cuban Adjustment Act is the byproduct of an era when United
States Immigration Policy was a testament of the ideals and values of the
United States. In 1966, The United States government thought that the
ideal of protecting those fleeing communism in the island of Cuba was
worthy of special legislation. The legislative history suggests, and the
statutory language indicates, that the intent and purpose of the Cuban
Adjustment Act is to facilitate the integration of those fleeing Cuba into
American society by granting them the right to become permanent United
States residents. Congress has ratified its intent in subsequent years and
the courts have validated the legality of the statute by upholding the right
of Cubans in the United States to adjust their status using the CAA.
110. 104th CONG. REC. S-4397 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1996) (Graham amendment No. 3760 to
the Dole [for Simpson] amendment No. 3743) available at
http:lwww.senate.gov/-rpc/rval1042/104291.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
111. Id. at4.
112. The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: ?Mirando Por los Cos de Don Quijote 0 Sancho
Panza?, supra note 16, at 904.
113. Id. at 914.
114. Id. at 916.
115. Id. at 917.
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Those who oppose the CAA argue that its initial purpose is no longer
valid, and that it gives Cubans and unfair advantage. However, Cubans
continue to flee Cuba, and the Cuban government continues to violate
human rights and other immigrant groups do not benefit by the repeal of
the Cuban Adjustment Act.
Academics have wondered whether Americans will see the CAA
through an idealistic lens or a realistic one."6 Human rights activists have
asked why there is such resistance to an act that benefits victims of
oppression. The CAA has been perpetually interwoven with politics and
foreign policy and it will continue to be so. The CAA might be the law of
the land, but it has been, and continues to be, a law under siege.
116. Id. at 924.
